England and Wales High Court (Administrative Court) Decisions

IN THE HIGH COURT OF JUSTICE
QUEEN'S BENCH DIVISION
THE ADMINISTRATIVE COURT

		Royal Courts of Justice Strand London WC2
		5 April 2006

1. LORD JUSTICE MAURICE KAY: This is a statutory appeal pursuant to the Solicitors Act 1974 in which Mr Sooriakumar appeals against the decision of the Solicitors Disciplinary Tribunal, which found him guilty of conduct unbefitting a solicitor and imposed upon him a fine of £7,500 together with an order for costs. The disciplinary proceedings against Mr Sooriakumar were connected with concurrent disciplinary proceedings against two other solicitors, Mr Veeravagu and Mr Mansoor.
2. The allegations were that they had all three been guilty of conduct unbefitting solicitors in that they (a) failed to maintain properly written books of account contrary to rule 32 of the Solicitors Accounts' Rules 1998, and, (b) drew moneys out of a client account otherwise than as permitted by rule 22 of the Solicitors Accounts' Rules 1998.
3. A hearing was held on 22 August 2003. Neither Mr Veeravagu nor Mr Sooriakumar attended or was represented on that date, although both had put in written submissions. Mr Mansoor was present and represented. The outcome of the case was that Mr Veeravagu was struck off, Mr Sooriakumar was fined in the manner I have described, and Mr Mansoor was reprimanded.
4. So far as the costs of the proceedings were concerned, they were awarded in favour of the Law Society to be apportioned between the three solicitors as to 75 percent to be payable by Mr Veeravagu, 15 percent by Mr Sooriakumar and 10 percent by Mr Mansoor.
5. The allegations against Mr Sooriakumar, and, for that matter, Mr Mansoor, were limited to their participation in a partnership with Mr Veeravagu, which was styled "Tooting Law Chambers". The partnership was established on 1 March 2001 and its activities ceased on or about 31 July 2001. Mr Veeravagu was also the subject of proceedings in relation to other practices, and fell into a significantly different category.
6. The facts found by the Tribunal included the following. Mr Veeravagu was born in 1946 and was admitted as a solicitor in 1991. Mr Sooriakumar was admitted in 1998 at the age of , and Mr Mansoor was admitted in March 2001 at the age of 51. It is apparent, therefore, that he became a partner in Tooting Law Chambers virtually at the moment of his mature admission.
7. There can be no doubt that the three men were partners in Tooting Law Chambers. Equally, it is apparent from the findings and is not in dispute that Mr Veeravagu and Mr Mansoor were actively engaged in the partnership whilst Mr Sooriakumar did not play an active part. At all material times, he had his own firm a very short distance away from Tooting Law Chambers. It seems that the idea behind the new firm was that it was to obtain a franchise for publicly-funded work in relation to immigration and criminal law. It was anticipated that Mr Sooriakumar would refer cases to it.
8. Mr Veeravagu and Mr Mansoor were signatories on the client and office accounts maintained at Barclays Bank. It is clear, and is common ground, that they fell out, and that led to certain difficulties.
9. An officer of the Forensic Investigation Unit of the Law Society carried out an inspection of the books of account at Tooting Law Chambers and produced a report dated 5 December 2001. It was before the Tribunal, and the officer gave evidence to the Tribunal confirming and explaining his report. The essence of the allegations was that the bank account had become hamstrung by the fact that the co-signatories had fallen out. This had led to breaches of undertaking on the part of Mr Veeravagu, who could not release funds so as to make good two undertakings in property matters.
10. The investigation accountant prepared client ledger balances with cash available, and found cash shortages in the account to the extent of £1,979.84. The report also revealed that the firm's books of accounts were not in compliance with the rules because individual client ledgers did not record any office account transactions, and there were other shortcomings as well.
11. The case against Mr Sooriakumar was essentially that he had lent his name to this firm but had played no part and had discharged none of the responsibilities which were imposed upon him as a partner in a firm of solicitors. His defence to that charge, as disclosed by his affidavit to the Tribunal, was essentially that he had done nothing wrong. The problems had all stemmed from the relationship between Mr Veeravagu and Mr Mansoor and its deterioration. Mr Sooriakumar conducted no work in the firm. He had not been a signatory on the bank accounts. He portrayed himself as a victim of what he described as a power struggle between his two partners, both of whom put their own interests before the interests of their clients or the interests of the firm.
12. The findings of the Tribunal are really contained in these two passages, so far as Mr Sooriakumar is concerned. In paragraph 50:

"Mr Sooriakumar asserts that he was not liable because he was not there. It appears that he simply lent his name as a partner in the firm. The Tribunal deprecates Mr Sooriakumar's attempt to avoid liability. He was held out to the public as a partner in the firm and as such is liable for compliance with the Solicitors' Accounts Rules. It is a serious failing on the part of a solicitor to abdicate that responsibility."

Then in paragraph 52:

"Mr Sooriakumar had allowed his name to be used to front a partnership and give the impression of a larger and more important firm than was the truth. His involvement was minimal. That was a very unsatisfactory situation and represented a serious failure on the part of that solicitor to behave with propriety. The Tribunal concluded that the seriousness of Mr Sooriakumar's behaviour could be met by a fine of £7,500 representing a fine of £3,750 in respect of each of the two allegations."

13. The relative leniency extended to Mr Mansoor arose because the Tribunal was positively impressed by the mitigation put forward on his behalf, and indeed by Mr Mansoor himself. The Tribunal described him as a man of honesty and integrity. He had also resorted to his own funds in order to make a repayment in respect of some of the deficiency.
14. I add that in the case of both Mr Sooriakumar and Mr Mansoor no allegation of dishonesty was pursued.
15. The appeal to this court has taken place in the physical absence of Mr Sooriakumar. He plainly knows of the listing of his appeal today, and has been in communication with the court and with Mr Geoffrey Williams QC who appears on behalf of the Law Society. That communication has continued in the last 24 hours or so when further documents have been submitted. It is implicit in one of his communications to Mr Williams that he did not intend to be present today.
16. In the documents he has submitted to this court, the first impression one has is that his challenge is simply to the financial penalty and not to the adverse finding of guilt. In his most recent documents, it appears to me that there is a widening of the ambit of his appeal because he does assert in a brief skeleton argument, amongst other things, that the Tribunal "wrongly held that my conduct was bad for a solicitor." He refers to other alleged errors which might be said to go to conviction at least as much as they go to sentence. Accordingly, it is appropriate that we treat the matter as an appeal against both conviction and sentence.
17. So far as conviction is concerned, I say at once that his grounds of appeal are utterly unarguable. He placed material before the Tribunal. It is abundantly clear that the Tribunal took full account of the material he had placed before it. There is a lengthy passage in the findings, in paragraphs 18 to 22, in which the Tribunal sets out the assertions made by Mr Sooriakumar in that affidavit. In my judgment, his case was fully considered and the conclusions that were reached by way of findings in the passages which I have previously set out were undoubtedly conclusions which the Tribunal was entitled to reach. Indeed, in my judgment, they were inevitable conclusions on the material before it. Moreover, there is nothing in the latest material put forward by Mr Sooriakumar which casts any doubt on the correctness of those findings. Having dealt with conviction as briefly as that, and no further consideration being called for, I turn to the question of the sentence.
18. As I have indicated, Mr Sooriakumar's mitigation was essentially based on his inactivity and lack of involvement. However, it is a point of some significance that in the franchise arrangements that were the whole purpose of the formation of the partnership, Mr Sooriakumar was referred to, with his knowledge, as a "category supervisor" in the franchise. He was later to refer to that as his "undoing".
19. The imposition of an appropriate sanction for the offence of conduct unbefitting a solicitor is one which may cover a wide range, depending on the circumstances of the case. Plainly, where dishonesty is involved, the matter is viewed with the utmost gravity and will generally result in somebody being struck off.
20. In Bolton v. Law Society [1994] 1 WLR 512, Sir Thomas Bingham, MR, expounded certain matters of approach which have governed cases such as this ever since. He said, at page 518:

"Any solicitor who is shown to have discharged his professional duties with anything less than complete integrity, probity and trustworthiness must expect severe sanctions to be imposed upon him by the Solicitors Disciplinary Tribunal. Lapses from the required high standard may, of course, take different forms and be of varying degrees. The most serious involves proven dishonesty...

In such cases the Tribunal has almost invariably, no matter how strong the mitigation advanced for the solicitor, ordered that he be struck off the Roll of Solicitors....

If a solicitor is not shown to have acted dishonestly, but is shown to have fallen below the required standards of integrity, probity and trustworthiness, his lapse is less serious but it remains very serious indeed in a member of a profession whose reputation depends upon trust. A striking off order will not necessarily follow in such a case, but it may well. The decision whether to strike off or to suspend will often involve a fine and difficult exercise of judgement, to be made by the Tribunal as an informed and expert body on all the facts of the case. Only in a very unusual and venial case of this kind would the Tribunal be likely to regard as appropriate any order less severe than one of suspension."

Later in his judgment, he said at page 519:

"...none of them touches the essential issue, which is the need to maintain among members of the public a well-founded confidence that any solicitor whom they instruct will be a person of unquestionable integrity, probity and trustworthiness...

The reputation of the profession is more important than the fortunes of any individual member. Membership of a profession brings many benefits, but that is a part of the price."

21. In other cases, the requirement to observe the responsibilities imposed by the Solicitors Accounts' Rules has been emphasised, including by Lord Bingham of Cornhill, CJ, in Weston v. Law Society, The Times, 15 July 1998.
22. The other point that falls to be referred to so far as the authorities are concerned, and it is something which is partly covered in the first of the citations to which I have just referred, is the role of this court. In Newfield v. Law Society [2005] EWHC 765 (Admin), David Steel J, with whom Laws LJ agreed, referred to Bolton v. Law Society and other recent authorities before adding, at paragraph 47:

"In my judgment a professional disciplinary tribunal still remains the body best fitted to assess the seriousness of professional misconduct and an appellate court should be slow, save in a clear case, to interfere in the sentence of the relevant Tribunal."

23. Acting on that guidance and comparing the sanction that was imposed in the present case with the sanction imposed in other cases which lacked the element of dishonesty, including the sanctions of striking off and suspension, which often are imposed in such cases, it seems to me to be clear beyond doubt that the Tribunal imposed a sanction in this case which was well within its discretion.
24. As the authorities disclose, it is the Tribunal which has the expertise in matters such as this. It cannot conceivably be said that it exercised its discretion in a manner which is susceptible to interference in this court. Indeed, Mr Williams submits that this was by any standards a lenient sanction having regard to the findings that were made. He may well be right. We do not have to consider that submission further because there is no cross-appeal from the Law Society seeking to increase the sanction. It is sufficient to observe that the sanction imposed was entirely commensurate and proportionate.
25. The attempt on the part of Mr Sooriakumar to compare himself, advantageously, with Mr Mansoor is wholly unpersuasive. The Tribunal explained why they were taking one view of Mr Mansoor and another of Mr Sooriakumar. Its approach in that regard, too, is unimpeachable. Accordingly, I would dismiss the appeal.
26. MR JUSTICE TUGENDHAT: I agree, and I have nothing to add.
27. MR WILLIAMS: My Lords, I am very much obliged. There are two points. The first, if I may, my Lord, I took a note of the judgment and I think in one of the early paragraphs my Lord made a reference to the hearing of Solicitors Disciplinary Tribunal taking place in August 2003 whereas the date was 21 September 2004. My data may be wrong, but I mention it.
28. Secondly, my Lord, I seek an order for costs. I have produced a schedule to my Lords. I sent a copy of this to Mr Sooriakumar last week and have heard nothing from him by way of reaction. I would ask the court, so as to avoid incurring still further costs in this matter, to deal with the application by way of summary assessment.
29. LORD JUSTICE MAURICE KAY: When did he receive this?
30. MR WILLIAMS: If I may take a short moment, I sent it to Mr Sooriakumar in a letter by first class post dated 31 March 2006, which would have been last Friday, so he should have received it on the Saturday.
31. LORD JUSTICE MAURICE KAY: I think I have made this observation to you before, Mr Williams, or, if not to you, to one of your colleagues. Where you have an appeal from a Tribunal, where all the documentation from the original Tribunal, including a transcript of the hearing and the findings, are contained within a fairly small bundle, why is it necessary to write twenty-nine letters between the Tribunal hearing and the present hearing?
32. MR WILLIAMS: My Lord, the letters are written to Mr Sooriakumar, to the other side, to the court, to my client, to the shorthand writers. They all in this case are of a perfectly routine and essential nature. In particular, there was an adjournment application made last year, which was dealt with, and another one that was dealt with of late, in writing, and in this case, my Lord, those letters had to be written.
33. LORD JUSTICE MAURICE KAY: Very well; and in what it seems to me you have properly interpreted as being no more than an appeal against sentence, why does it take so long to prepare?
34. MR WILLIAMS: Having collated and prepared the court bundle, which I think runs to 460 pages, I think it unwise to put a case before this court without having re-read it all. There is some time between the case at the Solicitors Disciplinary Tribunal and the appeal. I did find it necessary to read everything again and then produce the skeleton.
35. LORD JUSTICE MAURICE KAY: Very well. We will just try and assess the costs summarily, if we can. We will just retire and see where we get to.

(An adjournment)

36. Mr Williams, we accept your explanations in relation to the two questions we asked. We have no counter proposals or criticisms from Mr Sooriakumar. We have come to the conclusion that the figure claimed of £7,179.25 including VAT is a reasonable figure, and we summarily assess your costs in that sum, and direct that Mr Sooriakumar pays them.
37. MR WILLIAMS: I am much obliged, my Lord.
38. LORD JUSTICE MAURICE KAY: Thank you for your help.