England and Wales High Court (Administrative Court) Decisions

IN THE HIGH COURT OF JUSTICE
QUEEN'S BENCH DIVISION
THE ADMINISTRATIVE COURT

		Royal Courts of Justice Strand London WC2
		24 February 2006

1. MR JUSTICE OUSELEY: This is a procedural application in which the claimant, Mr Amcako, has had his notice of appeal rejected by the court office on the grounds that it is out of time. It is contended on his behalf that it is in time.
2. The way the matter arises is this: in the course of extradition proceedings before the District Judge at Bow Street Magistrates' Court, adjourned to 17th February 2006, the judge, who had a heavy list, concluded the hearing of the application for extradition at about a quarter past six in the evening. The provisions of section 26 of the Extradition Act 2003 say in subsection 4:

"Notice of an appeal must be given in accordance with the rules of court before the end of the permitted period, which is seven days starting with the day on which the order is made."

3. The notice of appeal was sought to be lodged today, in the morning of 24th February 2006. It follows therefore that if Friday the 17th was the day on which the order was made, then the notice of appeal was lodged out of time and it is agreed that there is no power in this court to extend time.
4. The argument that has been put forward by Mr Speedborough, on behalf of the person whose extradition is sought, is that because the Magistrates' Court concluded its hearing after business hours on the 17th, the order should be treated as having been made on the Monday and accordingly he was not out of time making his application, lodging his notice of appeal today, the 24th. I say the Monday, because it is clear that if the order was not made on Friday because of business hours, the next business day would have been the Monday. It would also follow in accordance with that argument that if the seven days started on the Monday, they would not expire until the following Monday. The argument therefore turns on what is meant by the day on which the order is made.
5. It is important, in my judgment, that there be legal certainty over when the order is made. In any normal use of language, the day on which the order is made is the day when the District Judge pronounces that the order for extradition was being made. That, in this case, was the Friday. That means that the time expired on Thursday at the close of business hours in this court.
6. It is a commonplace amongst magistrates' courts, and sometimes it happens indeed in these courts, that sitting hours extend beyond the normal business hours for the court's offices, but that in my judgment does not alter at all the day on which the court makes its order.
7. Accordingly, I considered whether there is anything to displace what would be the normal conclusion that the order was made on Friday. There are no indications in the 2003 Act. There is nothing in the Interpretation Act either and the CPR contains nothing which suggests that the "business day" interpretation of "day", upon which Mr Speedborough relies is right. Part two does not define "day" as "business day". Rule 2.8 contains no definition of "day".
8. What it says in sub-rule 2.85 is that:

"When the period specified by rules, practice directions, judgments or court orders for doing an act at the office ends on a day on which the office is closed, the act should be in time, if done on the next day for which the office is open."

9. That does not advance the matter at all. The office was open on Thursday, the last lodging day, and in any event that is dealing with the rules and not the Act.
10. Mr Speedborough is right to point out that business hours for the courts are set in the practice direction as between 10.00 and 4.30, subject to exceptions. But all that that means is that if the act has to be done within the seven days, starting with the day on which the order was made, it is too late if, on the last day of the period, it is sought to be done after 4.30.
11. Accordingly, I see nothing in any statute or procedural provisions to displace the normal meaning of "day". Nor do I see any disadvantage to a would-be appellant. Seven days starting with the day on which the order is made is a perfectly adequate period for the modest endeavour required to lodge a notice of appeal.
12. The provision of seven days, starting with the day on which the order is made, will always include a period of a weekend, but it would be very strange if the length of period available could be so adventitiously extended even up to a matter of four days, it seems to me, if an order is made late on Friday by the fact that it might have exceeded by a few minutes the normal business hours.
13. Far from it being a fair position that Mr Speedborough contends for, it would in fact introduce considerable uncertainty, looking at the clock to see at precisely what moment the District Judge uttered the words of extradition and the extent to which he uttered them before he gave his reasons or after he gave his reasons and whether he completed what he had to say by 4.30 or 4.31. This, in my judgment, is perfectly clear.
14. Mr Speedborough suggests that this is a matter which could merit the attention of the House of Lords. I think not.
15. Thank you, Mr Speedborough, you have done all you can.
16. MR SPEEDBOROUGH: My Lord, I beg your pardon, I have not made an application at this stage -- I was instructed very late in the afternoon -- of whether Legal Aid may be granted for this or whether it is a matter to put before --
17. MR JUSTICE OUSELEY: I do not know whether it is a matter for me or not. I do not know what powers I have to grant Legal Aid under an application of that sort. I do not think there is anything I can do.