England and Wales High Court (Administrative Court) Decisions

IN THE HIGH COURT OF JUSTICE
QUEEN'S BENCH DIVISION
ADMINISTRATIVE COURT

		Royal Courts of Justice Strand, London, WC2A 2LL
		20/06/2006

Mr Justice Stanley Burnton :

Introduction

1. In my judgment on the substantive issues in this appeal I stated that I should consider questions of costs and other consequential matters on the written submissions of the parties. I have received their written submissions. This is my judgment on costs and the order to be made on the appeal.

Costs

2. So far as costs are concerned, Mr Parry has submitted a claim for £71,575, plus his overpayment of tax and the costs of any further hearings or applications. His claim is not restricted to the costs of the appeal before me, which are the only costs I can consider, and it includes a claim for personal damages and for distress and anxiety alleged to have been caused to his parents. It bears no relation to the provisions of CPR 48.6, relating to the costs of litigants in person. It is clearly many times the costs to which Mr Parry could be entitled.
3. Mr Bhose, for the Respondent, accepts that in principle Mr Parry is entitled to his costs of the appeal. Understandably, the Council disputes the quantum and the content of Mr Parry's claim. In addition, Mr Bhose submits that the Council is entitled to its costs of opposing Mr Parry's application made in his letter of 1 March 2006 (misdated 1 March 2005), in which he sought orders that inadmissible evidence be adduced before this Court on the appeal. By order dated 31 March 2006, Walker J refused to order the attendance of officers of the Council to give evidence at the hearing of the appeal; at the hearing of the appeal I did not accede to Mr Parry's application to adduce evidence that was not before the Tribunal.
4. In my judgment, Mr Parry is entitled to the costs of the appeal. The amount and apparent extravagance of his claim for costs lead me to conclude, reluctantly, that I should not assess his costs summarily. They will be determined by a costs judge on a detailed assessment, unless otherwise agreed. Mr Parry should realise, however, that he may not recover the costs of that assessment; indeed, he may in certain circumstances be liable for the costs of the Council.
5. The Council incurred costs in connection with Mr Parry's interlocutory application referred to above. The application was misconceived, and he should pay the costs occasioned by the application. Those costs will be determined by a costs judge on a detailed assessment, and will be set off against the costs that the Council is to pay Mr Parry.

The substantive order of the Court

6. The Court order dated 5 May 2006 simply quashes the Tribunal's decision. In my judgment, I stated that the Tribunal Council would be directed to assess Mr Parry's liability for council tax on the basis that he was the owner, but not resident in, Ivanhoe Cottage. Mr Bhose seeks an order that the matter be remitted to the Tribunal for rehearing on the basis of the law as stated in my judgment. He asserts that the Tribunal would not have been bound to conclude that Mr Parry was not resident in the Cottage irrespective of the evidence put before it. The order he seeks would, if the Council thought it appropriate, result in a rehearing and would permit the Council to place before the Tribunal evidence that was not previously before it.
7. Mr Bhose rightly points out that during the hearing the possibility was raised of a remission to the Tribunal for further facts to be found was mentioned, without dissent from myself. However, this was in the context of a possible conclusion that a finding that Mr Parry was resident in the Cottage involved a finding as to his intention (since he had not physically returned to live in it), and on the assumption that the Tribunal had made no finding as to his intention. To this extent, I do not accept the assertion in paragraph 4 of Mr Bhose's submission dated 18 May 2006. I do accept, however, that during the hearing the possibility of my making an order varying the order of the Tribunal was not raised. I have, however, now carefully considered Mr Bhose's submissions on the consequences of my conclusion as expressed in my judgment.
8. The Council had the opportunity to place before the Tribunal any relevant evidence going to establish that Mr Parry was a resident of the Cottage. In my judgment of 5 May 2006, I concluded that the Tribunal, on the evidence before it, had found a relevant fact, namely that on the termination of his contract of employment in Spain Mr Parry sought alternative employment in Spain, which was inconsistent with a finding that he then resided in the Cottage. In these circumstances, it seems to me that it would be wrong for there to be a new hearing with possibly new evidence. On the facts found by the Tribunal, Mr Parry was not a resident of the Cottage within the meaning of section 6 of the 1992 Act. It follows that his liability for council tax for the period in question should be based on his ownership but not on his alleged residence. For these reasons, I decline to direct a fresh hearing of the matter before the Tribunal.