England and Wales High Court (Administrative Court) Decisions

IN THE HIGH COURT OF JUSTICE
QUEEN'S BENCH DIVISION
THE ADMINISTRATIVE COURT

		Royal Courts of Justice Strand London WC2
		9 May 2006

1. MR JUSTICE SULLIVAN: This is an application under section 288 of the Town and Country Planning Act 1990 ("the Act") against a decision of the first defendant by his inspector, Mr Street, to allow two appeals made by the third defendant against refusals of planning permission and listed building consent by the second defendant, the London Borough of Camden.
2. In a decision letter dated 13 June 2005, the inspector granted planning permission and Conservation Area consent, subject in each case to a number of conditions. The appeals were dealt with by written representations following a site visit by the inspector on 6 April 2005. The development was proposed on land at 155 Gray's Inn Road. The inspector described the appeal site in paragraphs 2 and 3 of his decision letter. He noted that the site lay in the heart of the Bloomsbury Conservation Area and that it was a rectangular area of "backland" behind the properties that front onto Gray's Inn Road to the east. It was bounded by Guildford Street to the south and the Georgian Terraces in Doughty Street to the west.
3. The inspector said in paragraph 3 that the appeal site itself was substantially covered by a building of part single storey, part two-storey and part three-storey height. The building had last been used for storage purposes. In paragraph 5 of the decision letter, the inspector summarised the appeal proposal, which was to demolish the existing warehouse building and replace it with a mixed use development that included nine car parking spaces in the basement, offices at ground floor and nine residential units in three blocks above. The inspector then set out the reasons why planning permission was refused by the local planning authority, but noted that the proposal had been recommended for approval by the Council's officers.
4. In paragraph 9 the inspector set out the main issues, saying:

"Adjoined by terraces of listed buildings and situated in a Conservation Area the appeal site is plainly a sensitive one. In my view the appeal raises two main issues of planning merit. These concern: first, whether implementation of the proposal would preserve or enhance the character or appearance of the Bloomsbury Conservation Area; and second whether the implementation of the proposal would preserve the listed buildings adjoining the site, or the settings of those buildings or any features of special architectural or historic interest which they possess."

Pausing there, those were undoubtedly the main issues which the inspector had to address in the light of the Council's reasons for refusal.

5. The inspector then set out the relevant planning policies, both at central government level, in particular mentioning PPG15 which is concerned with planning and the historic environment; and then at local level, identifying the relevant policies in the Council's adopted Unitary Development Plan.
6. The inspector then set out his reasoning, first under the head: "The Preservation or Enhancement of the Character or Appearance of the Conservation Area". He began that consideration by looking at the building currently on the site. He concluded that its presence had a strong negative impact on the appearance and character of the surrounding area.
7. He then considered the appeal scheme and dealt point by point with the criticisms that had been made of that scheme by the Council and others, in particular the Georgian Group and the Conservation Area Committee. That consideration continues until paragraph 20 of the decision letter, in which the inspector said:

"Overall my view is that the implementation of the appeal proposal would preserve and indeed enhance the character and appearance of the immediate surroundings of the site and of the Conservation Area as a whole."

8. The inspector then turned to the second main issue, namely, "The Preservation of the Listed Buildings, of their Settings and of any Special Features", and concluded that the implementation of the proposal would preserve the listed buildings near to the appeal site and their settings and any features of special interest that they possess. Between paragraphs 22 to 27 the inspector considered that issue in greater detail, looking in turn at each of the reasons which had been advanced as to why it was said by those objecting to the proposals that they would not preserve the listed buildings, alternatively would not preserve their settings or would harm any features of special interest.
9. In paragraphs 25 and 26 the inspector addressed a particular aspect of the objections, namely concern expressed by the Council and nearby residents about the part of the appeal scheme which would reduce the height of the existing boundary wall on part of the Doughty Street side of the development.
10. Paragraph 25 of the decision letter said this:

"The Council say that this wall is important because it provides evidence of a former stable block and because it defines the curtilages of the listing buildings adjoining it. They say it is thus part of the special interest of the site and that, as a boundary, it forms an important part of the settings of the listed buildings. They contend that the removal of such features erodes the character and settings of the individual listed buildings and of the terrace as a whole. The adjoining residents share that view. They say that the wall is an attractive feature and that the removal of the upper part of it would harm the settings of their listed buildings (- and also damage their residential amenities)."

11. In paragraph 26 the inspector responded to those points at considerable length. He began the paragraph by saying:

"I see very little substance in these representations. No documentary or similar evidence has been produced about the presence of an original stable block or mews. The officers of the Council evidently consider that the upper part of the wall at least, the part proposed to be demolished, only dates from the time of the construction of the warehouse, not from the much earlier time when the Doughty Street houses were built. The occupants of Nos 33-34 Doughty Street do not accept that the upper part of the wall is not original but give no specific evidence to support their view. By contrast the appellant is strongly of the view that the whole of the boundary wall from the ground up was and is part of the warehouse and was built at the time the warehouse was built. My observations on site lead me to consider that the appellant is probably right on this point. Certainly the wall appears to be of similar brick from top to bottom and it supports part of the main roof of the warehouse. The spacing of what the Council describe as bricked-up arches in the wall does not appear to match up with the positioning of the domestic boundary walls. The 'arches' do match similar features on the opposite wall of the warehouse but do not appear to be related to the listed buildings on the Gray's Inn Road side. All this suggests to me that certainly the part of the wall that is proposed to be demolished, and probably the lower part of the wall as well, was never part of the original settings of the listed buildings, but part of the much more recent, undistinguished, warehouse. On that basis the wall is not a feature of historical or architectural interest associated with the listed buildings."

12. Pausing there, it is submitted by Mrs Crossley that there was indeed cartographic evidence showing the existence of an original stable block or mews. She has referred to a report by Tina Garratt of CGMS Consulting which included a number of maps, including Greenwood's Map of London of 1827 and a John Britton Map of 1837, both of which appear to show a mews between the Gray's Inn Road houses and the Doughty Street houses. By the time of the 1894 ordinance survey, that mews had been replaced by one large building.
13. The difficulty with that submission is that that report was not placed before the inspector as part of the written representations, so he can hardly be criticised for not considering it, and indeed it would appear that he was entirely correct to say that, on the material placed before him in the written representations from the Council and from objectors, there was indeed no documentary or similar evidence produced about the presence of an original stable block or mews. Although Mrs Crossley laid great stress upon the inspector's conclusion that there was no such evidence, in fact that conclusion really leads to a dead end in terms of the inspector's reasoning.
14. The inspector's conclusions about the dating of the wall stem largely from his observations on site as to the manner in which it was constructed. But perhaps of greater significance is the latter part of paragraph 26 of the inspector's decision, because the inspector went on to say:

"Whatever the historical status of the wall I am very strongly of the view that the removal of the upper part of it, and the implementation of the appellant's proposals, would enhance the settings of the nearby listed buildings and the buildings themselves very materially. The grim warehouse would be replaced by a development of much higher visual quality adjoining the rear of the listed terrace and the removal of the upper part of the wall would create more space at the rear of the terrace and enhance the settings of the buildings in that way too. I would accept that the lower part of the wall forms a pleasant visual end stop to the gardens of the listed buildings, but that part would not be affected by the appeal scheme. As it stands at its present height I found the wall to be a very overbearing feature, seen from the rear of the houses, one that detracts from the setting of the buildings as well as from the residential amenities of the residents. I share the view of the appellant that if it were reduced in height as proposed the wall would be more in keeping with the listed buildings as they are and with the likely scale of any buildings that might have been on the appeal site before the warehouse was built there."

15. So having examined all of those matters, the inspector concluded in paragraph 27 that the implementation of the appeal proposals would preserve and indeed enhance the listed buildings and their settings and any special features that they possess. It followed from those conclusions that granting planning permission and Conservation Area consent would be in accord with the relevant policies in the UDP. The inspector made it plain in paragraph 29 that, in reaching those findings, he had had regard to all of the representations, including those by the Conservation Area Advisory Committee and the Georgian Group. He said that the former had expressed the view that the proposal takes no account of Georgian Bloomsbury, but: "Apart from that remark the BCAAC gives no reasons for their very strong views and so I can give them little weight".
16. The central thrust of Mrs Crossley's submission was that, because of the overwhelming body of opinion, as she described it, that opposed the proposed development, the inspector's conclusion that the development would preserve or enhance the character or appearance of the Conservation Area, and would preserve the listed buildings and their settings, and any special architectural or historic features, was simply perverse. She further submitted that the inspector had erred in law because he failed to give "sufficient weight" to the body of evidence that was against the proposal.
17. Dealing with those propositions in turn, it is essential to bear in mind that applications under section 288 are not an opportunity for a re-run of the arguments on the planning permits. In order to succeed under section 288, an applicant has to be able to demonstrate some legal defect in the inspector's decision letter. Simply asserting that an inspector gave insufficient weight to one piece of evidence, or overmuch weight to another, does not raise any issue of law. It is the inspector's function to decide what weight to give to particular pieces of evidence, and it was entirely open to the inspector to conclude that, if the Conservation Area Committee chose to give no reasons for their very strong views, then he could give them little weight.
18. So far as the allegation that the inspector's conclusions were perverse is concerned, it is, in substance, no more than a sustained disagreement on the part of Mrs Crossley with the inspector's views, which he had reached after having carried out a site inspection. It has often been observed that, in the context of planning appeals, those contending that the decision taker has made a perverse decision face a particularly difficult task because much of the decision will have been based upon the site inspection, which by definition the court will not have carried out. The court will simply be looking at the matter on the papers.
19. Mrs Crossley's submissions, strongly though she believes in them, simply do not come within striking distance of establishing a case of perversity. As a matter of detail, although she refers to the overwhelming body of opinion that was opposed to the proposed development, it is not without significance that the planning officers had recommended the grant of planning permission and Conservation Area consent subject to the imposition of conditions. It is very difficult in those circumstances to see how a perversity argument could even begin to get off the ground.
20. Returning to the decision letter, having dealt with the two main issues, the inspector went on to deal with the subsidiary issues that had been raised before him under the heading "Other Matters". Firstly, he considered the issue of residential amenity. He noted that the Council had not objected to the proposal on that ground, but he said that he had borne it in mind when he carried out his inspection and he had given careful consideration to the written representations. In essence, he endorsed what he described as the Council officers' thorough examination of the residential amenity impact of the appeal proposal before the planning application was considered by the Council. He set out the relevant factors in some detail in paragraph 31. In that paragraph, he accepted that, in respect of parts of one or two of the properties affected, and in respect of one or two aspects of residential amenity, existing occupiers would see a reduction in the level of amenity that they enjoy at present, but in no case would the change be so serious as to be unacceptable, and in all cases many other aspects of residential amenity would be enhanced by the implementation of the appeal scheme. He continued:

"In particular I consider that the proposed lowering of the boundary wall on the Doughty Street side would bring important amenity benefits, in terms of reduced overbearingness and increased sunlight and daylight to lower rear rooms."

21. Mrs Crossley referred to Article 1 in Protocol 1 to the European Convention on Human Rights in her oral submissions before me, although she had not specifically referred to that provision in her grounds of challenge. She submitted that the inspector had failed to give due consideration to the representations of adjoining neighbours. It is plain that the decision letter did give proper consideration to those representations and this complaint is nothing more than a disagreement with the inspector's conclusions. But, in any event, it is important to bear in mind that Article 1 of Protocol 1 cuts both ways.
22. The appellants before the inspector were entitled under Article 1 of Protocol 1 to deal with their property as they wished, subject to compliance with the requirements of the Town and Country Planning Act. Thus, the appeal process was a balancing exercise between the rights of the developers to develop their property and the rights of adjoining owners to have their amenities protected. It is plain that the inspector carried out that balancing exercise in looking at, amongst other things, the impact of the proposal in terms of residential amenity.
23. Returning to the decision letter, the inspector then mentioned an objection that had been raised on the basis that there would be a loss of warehouse use, and concluded that, in principle, the introduction of residential accommodation on the appeal site had much to commend it. The Council had made it plain that they had no objection to a mixed use on the site. Their only objections were on the basis of design and impact on the Conservation Area and the listed buildings.
24. The inspector then dealt with an issue which had not been raised by the Council, but had been raised by certain local residents, including Mrs Crossley; that is to say the extent to which the proposed development complied with current transportation policy. He said this at paragraph 34:

"Concern is expressed by nearby residents that the proposed development does not accord with current transportation policy. I do not consider these objections to be well founded. For example I regard the proposal as in line with Greater London Transportation Policy, which seeks the reduction of traffic growth, as it provides for a mixed use development with residential accommodation as well as a significant employment element. The Council have raised no objections to the proposal on transportation grounds and indeed have indicated that, should planning permission be granted on appeal, the proposed parking arrangements should be protected by the imposition of conditions."

25. Mrs Crossley submitted that the inspector had erred in law because the proposal was incompatible on transportation grounds with the Mayor's strategic guidelines and with certain policies in the UDP. In essence, she submitted that, whilst a mixed development was appropriate, there should have been no car parking spaces and no electric lift to take the cars up and down from the basement. She contended that the inspector had given "insufficient and invalid reasons" as to why that objection was not well-founded.
26. I do not accept that submission. It is plain that the inspector considered this issue. It was not a major issue. It had not been raised by the planning authority, which had not raised any objection in terms of wider transportation policy. The replacement of a warehouse use with a mixed use incorporating elements of employment as well as residential was acceptable, in principle, on the site, and the inspector's manner of dealing with this issue in paragraph 34 was entirely appropriate for what was on any basis a subsidiary issue.
27. Related to this question, Mrs Crossley drew my attention to certain documents which deal with energy efficiency, and submitted that the inspector should have had regard to those documents. Most of the documents in fact post-date the decision letter so the inspector could not be criticised for failing to have regard to them. There is no suggestion that he was referred to those documents or to comparable documents, and Mrs Crossley's submission that the inspector was under a duty to ask for information and a duty to enquire whether there might be further material is unsupported by authority. The inspector was under a duty to deal with the representations and material that were put before him. It was up to those who objected to the scheme to put forward whatever they wished in support of their submissions.
28. The last issue dealt with by the inspector concerned the fact that there had been an application for listed building consent for the part demolition of the boundary wall affecting the residents of Nos 32 to 35 Doughty Street. The inspector noted in paragraph 35 of the decision letter that the residents were concerned that separating the decisions on the planning and listed building applications would prejudice the proper consideration of the development that is the subject of appeal A, and there is -

"... a great risk that the application for listed building consent would not be considered properly if dealt with separately and later. Implicit in these representations is a suggestion that my decision on Appeals A and B should be deferred pending a decision by the Council on the application for listed building consent that is currently withdrawn. The Council appear to share the concern of the residents."

29. In fact, the Council's written submissions in paragraph 5.4 mention that concerns had been raised "as it is clear that demolition of the wall cannot occur with part demolition of the existing building". But if one looks at the Council's representations it would appear that the Council were principally concerned that no consent for demolition should be given until the replacement building had been granted permission. It is plain that the Council were concerned that:

"... there is the danger of the building being demolished and a vacant neglected site covered with building debris taking its place. This would have a detrimental impact on the Conservation Area. Consequently, the appellant has withdrawn this application [for listed building consent] and waits for this appeal to be determined."

30. The inspector in paragraph 36 noted that there was no application for listed building consent before him, noted the advice in PPG 15 that "it is generally preferable if related applications for planning permission and for listed building consent are considered concurrently", but went on to say:

"That advice is far from saying that it is essential that such applications are considered together. I am of the view that separate consideration in this case would not prejudice the proper examination of the applications that are the subject of Appeals A and B and any other related applications that may arise."

31. He then went on to explain in some considerable detail why he had reached that view. He further concluded that:

"The integrity and importance of the subsequent listed building application could be protected by the imposition of a condition on any approval or consent given, requiring that the buildings on the site concerned shall not be demolished until listed building consent has been applied for and granted."

He imposed such a condition when granting permission. He said:

"In this particular case there is a clear reason why the applications have not been dealt with concurrently -- the Council did not decide that an application for listed building consent would be required until a very late stage in the processing of the applications that are the subject of Appeals A and B. The Secretary of State has a duty to consider appeals before him with reasonable speed. This weighs against the proposition that the determination of the appeals before me should be deferred in some way. In all the circumstances I consider it reasonable to proceed to determine Appeals A and B now."

32. There is no conceivable basis on which it could be said that that conclusion was in any way erroneous; much less that it was so unreasonable that the inspector could not reasonably have arrived at it.
33. Lastly, the inspector dealt with an issue that was of concern to Mrs Crossley and some of her neighbours, that is to say the ownership of the boundary wall. In paragraph 37 the inspector said:

"One occupier of No 35 Doughty Street says that part of the boundary wall that is proposed to be demolished belongs to No 35 and the occupiers of Nos 33 and 34 Doughty Street consider that the wall is a party wall. They say that these considerations bring into doubt whether, if planning permission were granted, the appeal scheme could be implemented. I do not find the main point here to be very convincing. The appellant asserts that it is the legal owner of the wall and, as the wall is an integral and vital part of the warehouse building I find that assertion probably to be correct. The claims of the nearby residents are much less substantial and are not backed by any evidence. The development only involves the demolition of the upper part of the wall. These circumstances do not justify the refusal of planning permission for the whole development."

34. Whatever view is taken about the ownership of the wall, it might be thought that the final sentence of paragraph 37 is eminently sensible. Mrs Crossley submitted that this paragraph demonstrated that the inspector was partisan towards the developer. I emphatically reject that submission. Mrs Crossley relied on the proposition that the inspector had simply been inclined to accept an assertion made on behalf of the appellant, whereas he was not prepared to accept submissions that had been put forward by the local residents. That simply plucks one phrase out of the paragraph as a whole. It is plain that the inspector accepted the appellant's assertion as being probably correct, not because it was an assertion made by the appellant, but because of the view he had formed on his site inspection as to whether or not (to use his words) "the wall [was] an integral and vital part of the warehouse". In any event, the ownership of the wall and whether or not it is a party wall are entirely separate matters from the question whether or not planning permission and Conservation Area consent should be granted. They are matters of private law as between the land owners and the developer, and cannot affect the overall planning merits of the proposal to replace the warehouse with the new development.
35. For all of these reasons, I am satisfied that there is no legal defect in the inspector's decision letter. In truth, Mrs Crossley's submissions are no more than a sustained disagreement with the inspector on the planning merits and they do not raise any issue of law. For all of these reasons, this application must be dismissed.
36. MR GREATOREX: My Lord, I am grateful. There is an application for costs. Has your Lordship seen the schedule?
37. MR JUSTICE SULLIVAN: I have.
38. MR GREATOREX: My Lord, I do not know if I can assist with any aspect of that.
39. MR JUSTICE SULLIVAN: No, it seems to be -- the hearing two-and-a-half hours, yes, we have just about run two-and-a-half hours. We have actually run more than two-and-a-half hours. But that is your claim. Yes, do you want to say anything about that, Mrs Crossley; whether there is any reason, in principle, why you should not pay or as to the detail?
40. CLAIMANT: Yes, my Lord, because in fact the Treasury Solicitor is claiming, I think, 11-and-a-half hours for work done on the documents, and in fact there is no evidence to suggest that he did any work on the documents. My Lord, I prepared my own statement of costs and I listed the number of letters out and the number of letters received, and the Treasury Solicitor sent -- I received seven one-page letters from the Treasury Solicitor and I was responsible for preparing the bundle, both bundles, and serving it, and if you look at the two figures counsel has given --
41. MR JUSTICE SULLIVAN: £280 and £560.
42. CLAIMANT: Yes. In fact, counsel prepared the skeleton argument way back in October and there was no involvement, as far as I can see, from the Treasury Solicitor at all in preparing the skeleton argument because that --
43. MR JUSTICE SULLIVAN: That is probably right. It would be counsel who prepared the skeleton argument. But in all these things there are swings and roundabouts. You have a fair amount of work done on the documents by the Treasury Solicitor. It seems a lot, but, on the other hand, that means that counsel ends up with a very detailed brief from the Treasury Solicitor rather than the briefs that sometimes one used to get from some solicitors which gave you a large pile of undigested documents and said that there is a point of law in there struggling to get out, if you could please identify it, and so you had to go through the documents for hours. So that is why -- I suspect, I do not know, but Mr Greatorex may be able to confirm -- the fee for the second skeleton argument is relatively modest. Indeed, I think counsel's fees generally are relatively modest. That is partly because if you act for the Treasury Solicitor a whole lot is predigested.
44. CLAIMANT: I am saying that counsel did the work, prepared the skeleton on October 18, and the fee for preparing it was £280. The fee for the hearing today was £560. But the main point was that the fee for preparing the skeleton, which was done in October, was £280. The solicitor is claiming £1,840 -- the 11-and-a-half hours -- and I am saying that there was no detailed brief to the solicitor because at that stage, on 18 October, he did not have any of these bundles and he only had the witness statement, and therefore there were not documents for work to be done on, and that that is a vastly inflated figure of £1,840. I looked into exactly how many letters I received from the Treasury Solicitor. I received seven one-page letters, and he also said to me in March that I would shortly be getting the skeleton argument, and he did not send it until 27 April.
45. MR JUSTICE SULLIVAN: Yes, but you got it on 27 April.
46. CLAIMANT: Late -- two days late and beyond the period. It would seem to me that the figure for counsel's fees would be -- and it does also say in the Rules, my Lord, that, unless the skeleton argument is submitted 14 days beforehand, that in fact the person may not be heard at the -- it gives an indication that they may not be heard at the hearing --
47. MR JUSTICE SULLIVAN: It is my discretion.
48. CLAIMANT: -- and there is a sanction in costs.
49. MR JUSTICE SULLIVAN: Yes, indeed. If I think that a late skeleton argument has caused any unnecessary costs and expense, I can reflect that in costs. But I do not see any case for that here. If you, on receipt of the skeleton argument, had promptly withdrawn the case, it is possible that the fact that it was two days late might have had some effect, but the fact was that it did not. So it is neither here nor there -- the fact that it was two days late -- as far as the costs are concerned on the facts of this case.
50. CLAIMANT: But as a litigant in person, I did not get the skeleton until 27 April and I did not get the authorities -- they were three days late. It does say under these Rules that advocates for the defendant and any other party wishing to be heard must lodge and serve two copies of their skeleton argument.
51. MR JUSTICE SULLIVAN: I am very familiar with the Rules. We are at the stage of considering the costs.
52. CLAIMANT: I am sorry, my Lord, and it does refer to sanctions in costs.
53. MR JUSTICE SULLIVAN: Is there any other point you want to raise? I shall certainly take up the point with the 11-and-a-half hours with Mr Greatorex and ask if there is any explanation for that. His fees I regard as entirely reasonable and modest by the standards of the fees for these sorts of cases. Indeed, the overall costs are not out of line, but I will certainly pursue the 11-and-a-half hours. Anything else you want to take up?
54. CLAIMANT: Yes.
55. MR JUSTICE SULLIVAN: Do not take too long about it because at the moment we only have two-and-a-half hours for the Treasury Solicitor attending and we have now spent longer, I think.
56. CLAIMANT: I think the attendances on counsel of £336 -- 2.1 hours attendances on counsel -- I think that that is an inflated figure given that Mr Greatorex prepared that in October last year, when he had my written statement. He had the contents of this bundle then and it should not have required two-and-a-half hours with the Treasury Solicitor.
57. MR JUSTICE SULLIVAN: Right.
58. CLAIMANT: I think it is an inflated figure for attendances on opponents because they were very routine letters and I think that that £144 is an inflated figure.
59. MR JUSTICE SULLIVAN: Yes.
60. CLAIMANT: My Lord, would you have a brief look at this because this was my own costs and it just shows what I quite clearly --
61. MR JUSTICE SULLIVAN: No, I do not think so. I do not think it would assist me at all.
62. CLAIMANT: -- because it says: Treasury Solicitor, seven one-page letters received, one e-mail --
63. MR JUSTICE SULLIVAN: Mrs Crossley, it would not assist me to look at it, and I think I have heard your submissions on costs.
64. CLAIMANT: I am sorry, my Lord.
65. MR JUSTICE SULLIVAN: Right, thank you. Now, Mr Greatorex, what about the 11-and-a-half hours?
66. MR GREATOREX: My Lord, I was going to make one point about Mrs Crossley's schedule of costs: merely that her work on documents totals 20 hours. So it gives it some sort of perspective.
67. MR JUSTICE SULLIVAN: Yes.
68. MR GREATOREX: So far as the 11-and-a-half hours are concerned, I am instructed that that comprises all the hours from the moment this case began and different documents came in at different stages, and the trial bundle was considerably greater in size than anything previously. A large part of that is explained by the minutes of advice, which is always prepared by the Treasury Solicitor.
69. MR JUSTICE SULLIVAN: Which goes to the lay client.
70. MR GREATOREX: Yes, my Lord, before counsel are instructed. It was the point your Lordship had in mind about the digestion. My Lord already has the benefit of some legal analysis, and it is usually very good. I might say it certainly was in this case, and that does, as your Lordship indicated, have a swings and roundabouts effect on counsel's costs --
71. MR JUSTICE SULLIVAN: In short, if one was to knock four-and-a-half hours, in very rough terms, off the 11-and-a-half hours, and say seven half-hours on work done on the documents, then that actually, I think, brings it down to about £3,000 in round terms. I know you are not saying I should do that, but I am just saying, if I did that, that would be the approximate consequence, which would not be in the least, in my experience, out of line with the overall cost of cases of this kind.
72. MR GREATOREX: My Lord, the figure as per the schedule is well within the normal range and certainly a lot less than it would be if it was a developer's costs or any private --
73. MR JUSTICE SULLIVAN: Absolutely, yes, I quite understand that. Thank you very much, Mr Greatorex. What I am going to do is to summarily assess the costs in the sum of £3,000. It may be charitable towards you, Mrs Crossley, but I am prepared to accept that, conceivably an excess of zeal, if you like, in terms of looking at the documents and preparing the minute and so forth for the lay client might be there. So what I have done in round terms is to knock four-and-a-half hours off.
74. CLAIMANT: I very much appreciate that, my Lord. But, my Lord, they did say -- they implied that the bundles and documents came in dribs and drabs, but that was not the case.
75. MR JUSTICE SULLIVAN: Just think yourself lucky that I do not have any time to reconsider £3,000. Thank you very much indeed.