England and Wales High Court (Administrative Court) Decisions

IN THE HIGH COURT OF JUSTICE
QUEEN'S BENCH DIVISION
DIVISIONAL COURT

		Royal Courts of Justice Strand London WC2
		29th March 2006

1. MR JUSTICE NEWMAN: This is an appeal by the Chief Constable of Cleveland Police. He challenges a decision of District Judge Harrison of 13th June 2005. On that occasion, the Chief Constable was found to be in contempt of court and an order for costs was made against him.
2. The essential background of the matter is as follows. On 7th September 2004 a motorcar was stolen. In October 2004 Mr Michael Dobson purchased the vehicle. He then subsequently reported the matter to the police and it was reported to the Cleveland Police in October 2004. On 25th October 2004 it was seized by the Cleveland police because it was believed to be stolen property, and indeed there is no question it was stolen property. It was a cloned vehicle.
3. Thereafter, the police investigated the circumstances of the theft which had occurred, and matters proceeded to a point where it became plain to the police that there was an issue between the insurers of the original owner and Mr Dobson as to who was the true owner. Therefore, exercising their powers under the Police (Property) Complaints Act, the police issued a complaint in the Magistrates' Court on 12th January 2005.
4. The procedure under the Police (Property) Act 1897 is reserved for straightforward cases where there is a dispute as to ownership, and it is left to the Magistrates to determine the true owner. Section 1 of the Police (Property) Act 1897 provides:

"Where any property has come into the possession of the police in connection with their investigation of a suspected offence, a court of summary jurisdiction may, on application either by an officer of police or by a claimant of the property, make an order for the delivery of the property to the person appearing to the magistrate or court to be the owner thereof, or, if the owner cannot be ascertained, make such order with respect to the property as to the Magistrate or Court may seem meet."

5. On 31st March 2005, the matters had been resolved as between Mr Dobson and the insurers for the original owner and it was by agreement that an order was made for the delivery of the property, in accordance with section 1 of the Act, to Mr Dobson. It would then appear from the material before the court that there was some discussion as to what would happen in the event that the garage where the vehicle was kept needed to be paid storage charges. The discussion, which is recorded in the written reasons for the Magistrate finding the Chief Constable guilty of contempt, are not particularly specific or clear. But certainly it is plain that the issue was raised as to what would happen. Some suggestion was made that the police could be in a position, perhaps, to cooperate if problems arose.
6. In any event, what did happen is that the police wrote a letter authorising the release of the car to Mr Dobson. When that was done, on 15th April 2005, it brought a response from Mr Dobson by way of a complaint which ultimately came before the court on 19th April, issued by way of the usual form of a Magistrates' Court complaint form under the Magistrates' Courts Act sections 51 and 52 of the Magistrates' Courts Rules 1981, Rule 4. The complaint was:

"Matter of complaint: An order was made pursuant to the Police Property Act 1897 by District Judge Harrison on 31st March 2005 requiring the Cleveland police to deliver the motor vehicle to the owner, Michael Dobson. It was clarified in court that there was a requirement for the police to secure the release of the vehicle by payment of any relevant costs so as to perform their duty of delivery. There was no doubt or confusion as to the interpretation of the order. The Cleveland police had failed to comply with the terms of the order and by doing so are in contempt of court."

7. In any event, by the time the matter did come before the Magistrate on 13th June 2005, there had already been delivered to the Magistrate a form of skeleton argument settled by counsel, Mr Stephen Twist, in which outline submissions in some detail were made as to the legal position which arises in connection with orders for delivery made under section 1 of the 1897 Act. The submission was plainly made that in this regard the vehicle was in the lawful possession of the police under their duty of care to the true owner, and that the police take this action on behalf of the true owner of the property, whoever he may be. Inevitably, where it happens that charges for storage result, these must be regarded in law as attributable to the owner. The charges pass with the vehicle and there is no obligation upon any public authority such as the police to discharge the expenses in connection with the storage of the vehicle, which has been preserved, initially for the purposes of the investigation of crime and thereafter for the benefit of the owner so that it can be returned to the owner.
8. The submissions made it plain that it was accepted that the court had determined that Mr Dobson was entitled to the delivery of the vehicle. There was then a submission made as to the meaning of "delivery to" in the provisions of the Act. It set out in detail what the police had done in relation to the fulfilment of the order. It is submitted that it was for the owner to satisfy the third party debt that rides with the vehicle and that to do otherwise imposes on the police and other public departments a duty to satisfy all debts incurred in the discharge of their obligations to seize and store property when investigating suspected offences. It was pointed out that there could be tens of thousands of vehicles stored by public authorities dealing with suspected offences and that the cost in relation to this would obviously be enormous. In this case, it was contended that the police had acted properly in retaining the property and that they had done all that the law required them to do under section 1 of the Act to deliver the vehicle to Mr Dobson.
9. Having regard to that state of affairs, the position I am satisfied existed at the time the complaint was made (which was heard on 13th June) was that there was indeed an issue in good faith which existed as to the requirements of the law in connection with the payment of storage charges. In that event, in my judgment, the conclusion reached, for the reasons which have been set out in the decision of the District Judge, cannot stand scrutiny. This was not a case in which there was any basis for the Chief Constable of Cleveland Police to be found guilty of contempt. This was a case in which he was plainly raising -- as indeed there had been raised before the Magistrates and not resolved in accordance with any determination of legal principle -- a question as to who should be responsible for the charges.
10. This matter therefore has come before this court only by way of an appeal of the Chief Constable against the finding of contempt and the order for costs. Of course, underlining it is a very important point in connection with who should be responsible for the charges in relation to vehicles when they are held in circumstances such as this case discloses and when Police (Property) Act complaints and determinations are made. As to that, the appellant, the Chief Constable, was represented by counsel but there is nobody here for Mr Dobson, for understandable reasons which have been explained to the court. The issue is, as I see it, is one which is of some importance but, as it happens, it is not one which is necessary to be determined in the light of the facts which I have summarised and the issue of law which arises.
11. In my judgment, this finding of contempt, putting aside any of the procedural irregularities that there might also have been in connection with those proceedings, should not have been made. There was no basis for concluding that the Chief Constable of Cleveland Police had deliberately and intentionally flouted an order of the court. He had done that which, on the basis of legal advice, he was advised he should do in respect of a matter which, as it is agreed, is by no means clear.
12. For that reason, in my judgment, this appeal must be allowed and the order set aside. As to the underlying matter, that will have to arise and be determined in another case.
13. MR JUSTICE STANLEY BURNTON: I agree.
14. MR JUSTICE NEWMAN: Do you ask for any other order?
15. MR WILLCOX: No, my Lord.
16. MR JUSTICE NEWMAN: Thank you very much indeed.