QUEEN'S BENCH DIVISION
ADMINISTRATIVE COURT
Strand, London, WC2A 2LL |
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B e f o r e :
Neutral
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THE QUEEN On the application of WESTERN RIVERSIDE WASTE AUTHORITY |
Claimant |
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- and - |
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WANDSWORTH BOROUGH COUNCIL |
Defendant |
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Smith Bernal Wordwave Limited, 190 Fleet Street
London EC4A 2AG
Tel No: 020 7421 4040, Fax No: 020 7831 8838
Official Shorthand Writers to the Court)
Charles Béar QC/Ben Hooper (instructed by ASB Law) for the Defendant
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Crown Copyright ©
The Hon. Mr. Justice Evans-Lombe :
The Statutory Scheme
"75(4) "Controlled waste" means household, industrial and commercial waste or any such waste."
"(7) Subject to subsection (8) below [not material] "commercial waste" means waste from premises used wholly or mainly for the purposes of a trade or business or the purposes of sport, recreation or entertainment excluding—
(a) household waste;
(b) industrial waste;
(c) waste from any mine etc… from premises used for agriculture
(d) waste of any other description prescribed by regulations…."
Duties and Functions of a WCA
"45.(1) It shall be the duty of each waste collection authority—
(a) to arrange for the collection of household waste in its area except waste—
(i) which is situated at a place which in the opinion of the authority is so isolated or inaccessible that the cost of collecting it would be unreasonably high, and
(ii) as to which the authority is satisfied that adequate arrangements for its disposal have been or can reasonably be expected to be made by a person who controls the waste; and
(b) if requested by the occupier of premises in its area to collect any commercial waste from the premises, to arrange for the collection of the waste…
(3) No charge shall be made for the collection of household waste except in cases prescribed in regulations made by the Secretary of State [not material]…
(4) A person at whose request waste other than household waste is collected under this section shall be liable to pay a reasonable charge for the collection and disposal of the waste to the authority which arranged for its collection; and it shall be the duty of that authority to recover the charge unless in the case of a charge in respect of commercial waste the authority considers it inappropriate to do so…."
"48.(1) Subject to subsections (2) and (6) below [immaterial] it shall be the duty of each waste collection authority to deliver for disposal all waste which is collected by the authority under section 45 above to such places as the waste disposal authority for its area directs…"
The Duties and Functions of the Authority
"51.(1) It shall be the duty of each waste disposal authority to arrange
(a) for the disposal of the controlled waste collected in its area by the waste collection authorities; and
(b) for places to be provided at which persons resident in its area may deposit their household waste and for the disposal of waste so deposited;
in either case by means of arrangements made (in accordance with Part II of Schedule 2 to this Act) with waste disposal contractors, but by no other means.
(2)…
(3)…
(4) For the purpose of discharging its duty under subsection (1)(a) above as respects controlled waste collected as mentioned in that paragraph a waste disposal authority
(a) shall give directions to the waste collection authorities within its area as to the persons to whom and places at which such waste is to be delivered;…"
Duties on waste producers
"34(1) …it shall be the duty of any person who… produces… controlled waste… to take all such measures applicable to him in that capacity as are reasonable in the circumstances
(a)…
(b)…
(c) on the transfer of the waste, to secure
(i) that the transfer is only to an authorised person…".
Other relevant legislation
"355 In exercising any function under Part II of the Environmental Protection Act 1990 (waste on land)-
(a) each of the waste collection authorities in Greater London, and
(b) each of the waste disposal authorities in Greater London, shall have regard to the municipal waste management strategy."
"32(1) The waste authorities for a two-tier area [such as the area of the Authority] must, at all times after the end of the period of 18 months beginning with the day on which this Act is passed, have for the area a joint strategy for the management of
(a) waste from households, and
(b) other waste that, because of its nature or composition, is similar to waste from households."
The origins of the dispute
"6 Collection of commercial waste
6.1 Under section 45(1)(b) of the 1990 Act the council has a duty to arrange for the collection of Commercial Waste from any premises within the London Borough of Wandsworth if requested by the occupier.
6.2 The Contractor shall provide the required Commercial Waste collection service in response to any request which the Council receives pursuant to section 45(1)(b) of the 1990 Act as an integral part of the non domestic waste collection service. Without prejudice to the above it should be noted that the Council has no records of receiving any such requests leading to the provision of a direct service in the last seven years."
"1 The Council does not wish to provide trade waste collection services. Until 25th September 2004 Onyx UK Ltd has a licence to provide trade waste services concurrently with the provision of a household waste service on a profit sharing basis. The contract provides for the sale or novation of the Council's Commercial Portfolio. However the Council is conscious that smaller shops and businesses in the main shopping areas within the Borough may still have difficulties in obtaining suitable waste services from commercial operators to collect their refuse and this may lead to the disfigurement of the shopping areas with uncollected refuse. This specification thus provides for the provision of a limited service should this be needed as a last resort. If such a service is required, it will not be started before September 2005 and will be instituted after consultation with the Contractor. It will not collect commercial waste in Bulk Bins."
"General
1 The Council does not wish to provide trade waste collection services. Until 25th September 2004 Onyx Uk Ltd has a licence to provide trade waste services concurrently with the provision of domestic waste services on a profit sharing basis.
1.2 This specification provides for the sale of this Commercial Portfolio as a separate sale contract, with the service to be run separately from the services set out in other parts of this specification which shall not apply. The sale may be to any contractor and is not linked to any other contract.
Limitations
The service is not to be provided from the Council's premises and is not to use the vehicles or plant used to provide services to or for the Council or be identified in any way as being a Wandsworth Council service.
The Contractor shall make its own arrangements direct at its own expense with Waste Transfer Stations or any other licensed disposal facility for the disposal of the Controlled Waste arising from these operations.
The Contractor shall note that the Council reserves the right to establish a last resort service, as set out in schedule 4, if the commercial sector does not provide sufficient and suitable waste collection services to small businesses in the town and local centres of the Borough."
"The Council has already accepted the tender from Biffa Waste Services Ltd for refuse collection services, and the associated contract specification provides for the collection of directable trade waste. The Council has to determine the applicable tariff charges, and recommendations are made accordingly on the basis of full cost recovery.
The Council's tariff with likely further increases during the coming year, is unlikely to be attractive in comparison with the existing tariff that Onyx proposes to sustain and with those of other private sector contractors. The Executive are recommended to agree that Onyx UK Ltd should be released from the present contractual restrictions on offering trade waste services in the Borough, and that a coordinated approach be adopted in informing these businesses about tariffs and arrangements for trade waste."
"(c) That the Council's tariff charges for trade waste be determined as set out in paragraph 9, page 4, and that the Director of Leisure and Amenity Services be authorised to arrange for this to be published and notices to be served on existing customers and take steps to clarify whether they are or are not requesting the Council to arrange the collection of their waste in the future;
(d) That the Council agrees to release Onyx UK Ltd from the present contractual restrictions on offering trade waste services in the Borough for a consideration of £750,000 and to adopt a coordinated approach in informing the relevant businesses about tariffs and arrangements for trade waste services… on terms to be settled by the Director of Leisure and Amenity Services in consultation with the Director of Finance and the Borough's solicitor;"
"CHARGES FOR COLLECTION OF TRADE WASTE
7. The Council's new contract with Biffa Waste Services Ltd requires Biffa to collect any directable waste from business premises upon receipt of an instruction to do so from the Council. Setting and collecting trade waste charges, however, is a matter for the Council itself. Legislation requires a reasonable charge to be set for collection and disposal, and both Government guidance and previous Council policy interpret this as implying. full cost recovery. From 1st April 2005, disposal costs for municipal waste will be subject to increases because of the Landfill Allowances Trading Scheme (LATS). The immediate financial impact of this is uncertain but the Government has set the penalty for exceeding allowances at £200 per tonne, making this effectively the top end of the potential trading range. When compared with the current total disposal cost of around £50 per tonne, it is clear that local authorities are facing a substantial handicap that will not apply to the private sector. Beyond the first few months, therefore, the portfolio is likely to dwindle, and this outlook could militate against full take-up of the Council's service from the outset.
8. The Council's charges will have to reflect the level of costs in the Biffa contract, some apportionment of contract management costs, the costs of billing and recovery, and the prevailing WRWA disposal charges (including from 1st April 2005 the impact of LATS). The charges are particularly sensitive to the economies of scale in the Biffa contract: charges can be substantially less if the whole portfolio remains with the Council than if only 10% remains.
From 26th September 2004 | From 26th September 2004 | From 26th September 2004 | |
to 31st March 2005 | to 31st March 2005 | to 31st March 2005 | |
10% 0% |
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% portfolio continuing: | 100% | 75% | 10% |
Costs | £000 | £000 | £000 |
- collection | 1,086 | 992 | 237 |
- disposal | 938 | 744 | 60 |
- administration | 154 | 145 | 61 |
- billing and recovery | 43 | 35 | 7 |
Total annual costs | 2,221 | 1,916 | 365 |
% portfolio | Weekly | Cost lift per | Current | Current | Current | Current |
continuing | Service | No. of | ||||
Charge | 100% | 75% | 10% | Onyx | contracts | |
Charges | £ | £ | £ | £ | £ | |
Bag | 1.40 | 1.81 | 2.01 | 3.96 | 1.65 | 814 |
660 litre container | 1.40 | 9.72 | 10.43 | 31.81 | 7.06 | 67 |
770 litre container | 1.40 | 11.21 | 12.04 | 37.16 | 7.77 | 16 |
Paladin | 1.40 | 14.65 | 15.73 | 48.31 | 10.28 | 163 |
Euro 1100 litre | 1.40 | 16.03 | 17.21 | 53.02 | 10.28 | 485 |
container | ||||||
Compactor Skip | 1.40 | 273.00 | 274.80 | 363.36 | 175.00 | 9 |
All of the above prices will be subject to VAT at 17 ½%
9. Even with the maximum potential economies of scale (reflected in the column headed "100%" in the above table), the charges that would have to be applied from 26th September 2004 are generally higher than current standard charges, and some current customers enjoy even lower discounted or negotiated rates. Onyx has undertaken to maintain current charges for its own customers at least until April 2005. Thereafter the Council's tariff is likely to become even less competitive because of the additional handicap of the Landfill Allowances Trading Scheme. No doubt, several other private-sector contractors could also offer competitive services similar to Onyx's. It follows that it is unrealistic to expect to retain the entire current portfolio. The economies of scale will therefore be lost, and charges should be based on the assumption that, at most, 10% will continue with the Council's contractor. The recommended charges from 26th September 2004 are, therefore, those shown in the column headed "10%" in the table above, with analogous charges for bulk containers of other sizes. It is recommended that the Director of Leisure and Amenity Services be authorised to arrange for the tariff to be publicised and notices to be served on existing customers accordingly."
"You have an important choice:
The Grounds of challenge
"39 The Claimant challenges the decision on three bases
(a) The decision and its implementation frustrate the policy and objects of the Act;
(b) The defendant failed to have regard to relevant matters in reaching the decision; and
(c) Irrationality, in the senses of (a) and (b) above, that the decision and its implementation frustrate the policy and objects of the Act and that the defendant has failed to have regard to relevant matters in reaching the decision"
Ground 1: Alleged frustration of the policy of the 1990 Act
"43 The defendant's decision and its implementation have constituted an attempt to deny, or alternatively to thwart, its duty to collect commercial waste if requested. In particular, the tariff, by rendering the defendant's collection charges artificially high, was intended to deter and has deterred occupiers from requesting that the defendant collect commercial waste."
"Commercial Waste
The council does not provide any waste collection services for commercial premises."
"This subsection gives to the local authority a complete discretion as to the rents which they will charge subject to only the requirement that they shall be "reasonable". I doubt whether the addition of the adjective "reasonable" has the effect of narrowing the wide discretion which the local authority would have if that word were not present since (see Roberts v Hopwood [1925] AC 578) where a local authority is exercising a discretion conferred on it by Parliament it must in any event exercise it "reasonably…""
"…unless it appears to them –
(a) That his proposed service would comply with the requirement specified in subsection (2) and
(b) That he would be able to maintain that service throughout the period for which the licence would be enforced."
"An applicant for judicial review must show more than a mistake on the part of the decision maker or his advisers. Where a decision is made in good faith following a proper procedure and as a result of conscientious consideration, an applicant for judicial review is not entitled to relief save on grounds established by Lord Greene MR in [Wednesbury]…"
"Although the action or inaction of the local authority is clearly susceptible to judicial review where they have mis-construed the Act or abused their powers or otherwise acted perversely, I think that great restraint should be exercised in giving leave to proceed by judicial review. The plight of the homeless is a desperate one, and the plight of the applicants in the present case commands the deepest sympathy. But it is not, in my opinion appropriate that the remedy of judicial review, which is a discretionary remedy, should be made use of to monitor the actions of local authorities under the Act save in the exceptional case. The ground upon which the courts will review the exercise of administrative discretion is abuse of power – e.g. bad faith, a mistake in construing the limits of the power, a procedural irregularity, or unreasonableness in the Wednesbury sense – unreasonableness verging on an absurdity see the speech of Lord Scarman in Reg v Secretary of State for the Environment ex parte Nottinghamshire County Council [1986] AC 240 247-244. Where the existence or non existence of a fact is left to the judgment and discretion of a public body and that fact involves a broad spectrum ranging from the obvious to the debateable to the just conceivable, it is the duty of the court to leave the decision of that fact to the public body to whom Parliament has entrusted the decision-making power save in a case where it is obvious that the public body, consciously or unconsciously are acting perversely."
"Bromley's submissions rely not only on the Act but also on the case law applicable to local authorities. The House is invited to construe the Act in the light of the principle that a local authority owes a fiduciary duty to its ratepayers. It is an invitation which has to be accepted: and I did not understand counsel for the appellants to argue otherwise. But the invitation does not decide the case. For, as the statute must be interpreted in the light of the general law, so also must the general law be adapted and applied in a way consistent with the statute…."
"This construction of the section, [advanced by the GLC supporting a case for subsidy] if correct, would make mincemeat of the fiduciary duty owed to the ratepayers. It would also be inconsistent with what was a key principle of earlier legislation, that transport undertakings were to be operated on a "break-even" basis, so far as practicable."
1) As Mr Farrell's evidence discloses the fundamental features of his calculations which produced a level of charges substantially greater than those available from Onyx or those being applied to a similar service by the other three Constituent Boroughs were:a) Wandsworth's policy that its charges for the collection of commercial waste should, as far as possible, cover the cost of the provision of the service. Section 45(4) conferred on Wandsworth a discretion to subsidise if thought "appropriate". Wandsworth has decided not to take that course and, in the light of the Bromley case it cannot be said that such a policy is unreasonable indeed the contrary was not suggested.b) The assumption made by Wandsworth, and reflected in the calculations of Mr Farrell that their rates should be calculated on the basis that Wandsworth would be providing a residual service to a clientele consisting of approximately 10% of its existing customer base for commercial waste collection services.c) Wandsworth's assumption under (b) was itself based on their view, derived from the results of the tendering process which I have set out above, that even if they retained 100% of such customer base they could not compete with Onyx's rates and at the same time cover the costs of providing the service, and thus would be likely quickly to lose the bulk of those customers.d) A likely cause of this lack of competiveness was the inability to make use of the efficiencies flowing from a system of co-collection of commercial and household waste which had been operated by Onyx but which flowed from Wandsworth's decision for other confirmed financial reasons, not to permit commercial waste to be delivered mixed with household waste after co-collection.2) It was Wandsworth's view that the provision of a commercial waste collection services would prove to be very price-sensitive and thus, even if an attempt was made to run the service fixing a price on the basis that they would retain all their previous customers, the loss of those customers would take place very quickly notwithstanding that Wandsworth was in a position to prevent Onyx from competing for a period of twelve months from the expiry of Onyx's contract. It was their view that the attempt to do so would prove very costly. Thus the appropriate course was to fix a tariff at the level appropriate to cover the costs of the provision of a residual service straight away.
3) The Authority attacked the decision to base Wandsworth's charges on the costs of providing a residual service calculated on the basis that 10% of Wandsworth's previous customers would be retained and also on the basis that Wandsworth were wrong in basing their charges on the results of the tenders submitted for "unspecified work". It was suggested that Wandsworth should have sought tenders for the co-collection of household and commercial waste which would have involved a departure from Wandsworth's "separate collection" decision. Apart from this no serious challenge was mounted to Mr Farrell's calculation of the costs of providing a residual service to 10% of the existing customer base which was plainly vigorous, conducted by an expert, and disclosed no artificial increase in the charges over the cost of provision given the factors which I have set out above. The Authority's evidence conceded that the cost of providing a collection service varied inversely to the number of customers served.
(4) The Authority also criticised the fixing of the tariff on the ground that its calculation was affected wrongly by Wandsworth's ill conceived view of the effect in the future of the Landfill Allowance Trading Scheme established by the 2003 Act. I can see no reason to reject Mr Farrell's evidence that the possible effects of the Scheme played no part in his calculations. If they played a part in the assumption of a 10% customer base I fail to see how this can be categorised as Wednesbury unreasonable.
In my judgment subject to the issue of "mistake in construing the limits of its power" with which I will shortly deal it is not possible for the court to find that Wandsworth's fixing of its tariff of charges for the collection of commercial waste was done in bad faith or as the result of procedural irregularity or was unreasonable in the Wednesbury sense. See per Lord Brightman in the Puhlofer case.
"50. The policy and objects of the Act generally and Part II in particular are to secure the efficient public collection and disposal of household and of commercial waste, when the latter is requested.
51. Public authority functions are likely to be more environmentally friendly and efficient than commercial operations. Public authorities can reliably ensure that household and commercial waste is collected and disposed of in accordance with overarching national and regional (here London-wide) strategies.
52. First, waste collection authorities must collect commercial waste, if requested, and by implication, they may not lawfully thwart that duty. It is not, as D's Counsel contended at the permission hearing, a "long stop duty" or a "matter of logistics and practicality". It is correct that occupiers who produce commercial waste have a choice as to whom they request to collect such waste. However, the existence of private sector alternatives does not deny the existence of D's duty to collect commercial waste on request nor does it render the duty of lesser or no public or statutory purpose. No waste collection authority can lawfully act as though, let alone aver that, it has no duty to collect commercial waste if requested or take decisions designed to prevent occupiers from using such service.
53. Secondly, there is a statutory policy that a waste disposal authority be able to plan their disposal arrangements and be able to direct waste collection authorities in such ways as will best achieve the efficient discharge of their functions set out in section 51(4). This policy is implicit in the duty of direction. It was formerly implied in the waste collection authority's section 49 duty of notification of recycling. It is now enshrined in the duty imposed on C and D by section 32 of the 2003 Act to formulate joint Waste Management Strategies.
54. Thirdly, there is a statutory policy that household and, where requested, commercial waste collection and disposal be regionally organised in an efficient way with appropriate duties on London waste collection authorities to heed and obey directions by the London waste disposal authorities and by the Mayor of London.
55. The waste collection and disposal regime established under Part II of the Act therefore constitutes a comprehensive statutory scheme where a waste collection authority may not so order its affairs as to avoid being asked to collect commercial waste.
56. However, D's impugned decision and its implementation constitute a denial, or alternatively thwarted, its duty to collect commercial waste on request. In particular, the tariff, by rendering D's collection charges artificially high, was intended to deter and has deterred occupiers from requesting that D collect commercial waste."
It seems to me that these submissions involve the court taking the view that Part 2 of the 1990 Act confers on a WDA a power to interfere in and to direct the manner in which a WCA, in its area, is to discharge its statutory functions.
""(3)(b) A committee of investigation shall…(b) be charged with the duty, if the Minister in any case so directs, of considering, and reporting to the Minister on…any complaint made to the Minister as to the operation of any scheme which, in the opinion of the Minister, could not be considered by a consumers' committee …."
"The question at issue in this appeal is the nature and extent of the Minister's duty under section 19(3)...b) of the Act of 1958 in deciding whether to refer to the committee of investigation a complaint as to the operation of any scheme made by persons adversely affected by the scheme. The respondent contends that his only duty is to consider a complaint fairly, and that he is given an unfettered discretion with regard to every complaint either to refer it or not to refer it to the committee as he may think fit. The appellants contend that it is his duty to refer every genuine and substantial complaint, or alternatively that his discretion is not unfettered, and that in this case he failed to exercise his discretion according to law because his refusal was caused or influenced by his having misdirected himself in law, or by his having taken into account extraneous or irrelevant considerations.
In my view the appellants' first contention goes too far…Parliament must have conferred the discretion with the intention that it should be used to promote the policy and objects of the Act; the policy and objects of the Act must be determined by construing the Act as a whole, and construction is always a matter of law for the court. In a matter of this kind it is not possible to draw a hard and fast line, but if the Minister, by reason of his having misconstrued the Act or for any other reason, so uses his discretion as to thwart or run counter to the policy and objects of the Act, then our law would be very defective if persons aggrieved were not entitled to the protection of the court."
"There is a second consequence of the power in section 171(1) being conferred for the purpose of bringing the sections into force. As I have said, in my view the Secretary of State is entitled to decide not to bring the sections into force if events subsequently occur which render it undesirable to do so. But if the power is conferred on the Secretary of State with a view to bringing sections into force, in my judgment the Secretary of State cannot himself procure events to take place and rely on the occurrence of those events as the ground for not bringing the statutory scheme into force. In claiming that the introduction of the new tariff scheme renders it undesirable now to bring the statutory scheme into force, the Secretary of State is, in effect, claiming that the purpose of the statutory power has been frustrated by his own act in choosing to introduce a scheme inconsistent with the statutory scheme approved by Parliament."
1) There is no express provision in the Act which requires a WCA to act in this way nor is there an express provision conferring on WDAs a regulatory power or directing power over WCAs in the exercise of their functions as waste collection authorities. Section 51(4) of the Act only indirectly, and not sufficiently for the purposes of the Authority in these proceedings, creates such a power. The subsection enables a WDA, once controlled waste has been collected either by or on behalf of a WCA, to direct that it be delivered to a particular point for disposal and a WCA by section 48(1) is bound to obey such direction. This means that, in respect of household waste, WDAs have a power of direction over all or substantially all household waste because householders will want to use the free service which WCA's are bound to provide. In respect of commercial waste, however, where WCAs have the right to charge, commercial waste producers have a choice and that choice will be influenced by price. The power conferred by section 51(4) does not extend to directing WCAs so to fix their charges that waste producers will be likely to select the WCAs' service rather than that of a private waste contractor.2) The pattern of the regulatory functions contained in Part 2 of the 1990 Act is significant in coming to a conclusion as to whether the 1990 Act is to be construed in the way contended for by the Authority. The bulk of those functions are given to the Environment Agency see section 30(1) and include the granting of waste management licences under section 36; revoking licences in whole or in part under section 38(3) and (4); supervising activities carried out under such licences under Section 42; inspecting land of any person who wishes to surrender a waste management license under section 39(4); requiring occupiers to remove unlawfully deposited waste etc under section 59(1) (shared with WCAs); maintaining public registers of such things as waste management licences under section 64(1) and powers to obtain information under section 71(2).
Various regulatory functions are conferred on the Secretary of State by the 1990 Act; by section 35(7) to direct the form of waste management licences; by section 35(8) to give guidance to waste regulation authorities concerning their functions; by section 37(3) to require modifications to be made to existing licences; by section 38(7) to require licences to be revoked; by section 42(8) to direct WDAs to exercise their supervisory powers; by section 43(1) to hear appeals relating to licences; by section 57(1) to give directions to the holders of waste management licences as to their actions in that capacity; under section 57(2) to require any person who is keeping controlled waste on any land to deliver the waste to a specified person on specified terms with a view to its being treated or disposed of by the other person; and a further power to obtain information under section 71(2). Apart from the power to direct the delivery of waste in section 51(4) the 1990 Act, at the time of the Decision, conferred no regulatory powers on WDAs.In the light of the above it seems odd that if the legislature intended that WDAs should have control over controlled waste collected by WCAs in their area that it did not confer such control by express statutory provision similar, for example, to section 57(2).It also seems to me significant that Section 30 of the Act, as originally enacted, required waste regulation authorities who are also waste disposal authorities to keep those functions separate from each other.3) The absence of any such express provision is to be contrasted with the insertion by section 31 of the 2003 Act into the 1990 Act of a new section 51(4A) with effect from the 1st January 2005 which provides as follows:-
""(4A) A waste disposal authority in England which is not also a waste collection authority may in directions under subsection (4)(a) above [i.e. in directions issued pursuant to the "duty of direction"] include requirements about separation that relate to waste as delivered, but may do so only if it considers it necessary for assisting it to comply with any obligation imposed on it by or under any enactment."WCAs have a corresponding duty to comply with any directions as to separation see section 48(1A) also inserted. These provisions assist WDAs in the performance of any duty to recycle waste.As already set out by section 355 of the 1999 Act a WCA in Greater London must have regard to the Mayor's Strategy for waste disposal.Section 356(1) grants the Mayor a power to give WDAs and WCAs in London, directions as to how they exercise their functions where necessary for the purpose of implementing his municipal waste management strategy.A WCA must notify the Mayor of proposed waste contracts under section 358(1) of the 1999 Act and the Mayor may direct the waste collection authority to provide him "with such information about the contract as he may require for the purposes of deciding whether the contract would be detrimental to the implementation of" such strategy: see section 358(3). It is significant that at no stage in this process does the statute proscribe or even permit any involvement of a WDA.It seems to me that both these sets of provisions, flowing from the 1999 Act and the 2003 Act, are inconsistent with the existence of a power, implied into the 1990 Act, conferred on WDAs to control the operations of WCAs, in the manner contended or by the Authority.4) At paragraph 10 to 13 of this judgment, under the heading "duties on waste producers" I set out a series of provisions of the 1990 Act. From those provisions it emerges that, by contrast with household waste, in the field of commercial waste the 1990 Act and its predecessors have contemplated that, on the one hand, WCAs should be at liberty to charge for their collection services but, on the other hand, there should be a system of licensed private waste disposal contractors able to provide a similar service to commercial waste producers. Thus the 1990 Act contemplates that producers are to have a choice. Against that background it seems clear that the purpose of section 45(1)(b), or at least one of the purposes, is to protect commercial waste producers in a particular area from the possibility that private waste disposal contractors may not be available or, alternatively, are asking an extortionate price for their services. This conclusion seems to me to preclude the existence of any such statutory purpose or implied power in a WDA for which the Authority contends. Against this statutory background it seems to me that a WCA must have the power to fix its tariff of charges for its commercial waste collection services at the level appropriate to the provision of a residual service, if minded to do so, and provided that the tariff is "reasonable" for the provision of such a service.
Ground II: The alleged failure to have regard to relevant considerations
a) The Mayor's Strategy
b) The Draft Joint Municipal Waste Management Strategy;
c) The failure to justify the assumption, in calculating its tariff to commercial waste customers, that its customer base would drop to 10% of its existing level.
d) The charges imposed by other Constituent Boroughs.
e) Past experience of increased charges and the effect on the customer base;
f) The environmental impact of the Decision.
"If there are matters that need further clarification, or any matters that the Council should properly take into account before taking the proposed decisions of the 3rd August, WRWA [the Authority] should let us know without further delay, in the interests of good administration and good relations among all the Western Riverside Authorities."
The Mayor's Strategy
"67 The defendant is unable to demonstrate that it had any or due regard to the Mayors Strategy. Neither paper 04-609 nor paper 04-069B refers to the Mayor's Strategy at all. Consequently, there is no consideration of the implications of the Decision or its implementation, in particular the proposed tariff and their compatibility with the Mayor's Strategy.
68 As a result of this failure, the defendant failed to consider any alternative which is consistent with its duty to collect commercial waste under section 45(1)(b) or, alternatively, a tariff which is consistent with the Mayor's Strategy."
"19. It is not, however, necessary to decide whether either of these possible interpretations of section 57(3) applies if the Minister's powers or duties on an appeal are spelt out elsewhere. In section 57(7) in the exercise of his functions on an appeal the Minister "shall have regard to" the relevant provisions of the development plan and to any material consideration. The words the Minister "shall have regard to" are to be contrasted with the words the Board "shall not grant" in section 17. On the face of it there is a clear distinction. Under section 57 there is no absolute embargo on the grant of planning permission. The Minister must have regard to the development plan. He cannot ignore it altogether. But once he has had regard to it he may still grant or refuse planning permission. Under section 17 the Board cannot grant permission if the development would be at variance with the development plan.
20. This is the approach which has been adopted in cases where the same words have been used in United Kingdom legislation. Thus in Simpson v. Edinburgh Corporation 1960 S.C. 313 where the requirement under section 12 of the Town and Country Planning (Scotland) Act 1947 was to "have regard to the provisions of the development plan so far as material thereto and to any other material considerations", Lord Guest said at page 318:-
"It was argued for the pursuer that this section required the planning authority to adhere strictly to the development plan. I do not so read this section. "to have regard to" does not, in my view, mean "slavishly to adhere to". It requires the planning authority to consider the development plan, but does not oblige them to follow it. In view of the nature and purpose of a development plan, to which I shall refer later, I should have been surprised to find an injunction on the planning authority to follow it implicitly, and I do not find anything in the Act to suggest that this was intended. If Parliament had intended the planning authority to adhere to the development plan, it would have been simple so to express it.""
"26 …as a member of [the Authority] as the Executive Member for the environment on Wandsworth Council, and as Wandsworth Council's representative on the Association of London Government [the body that discussed at some length the Mayor's Strategy and its implications for London Councils before implementation,…] I could not fail to be aware of the Mayor's Strategy or the fact that as an Executive Member I had a duty to take the Strategy into account when making any decisions on [Wandsworth's] waste management. I did not consider that the Mayor's Strategy was inconsistent with what [Wandsworth] were proposing."
The Draft Joint Municipal Waste Management Strategy
"What has to be emphasised is that it is only when the statute expressly or impliedly identifies considerations required to be taken into account by the authority as a matter of legal obligation that the court holds a decision invalid on the ground now invoked. It is not enough that the consideration is one that may be properly taken into account, nor even that it is one which many people, including the court itself would have taken into account if they had to make the decision."
"There will be some matters so obviously material to a decision on a particular project that anything short of direct consideration of them by the Ministers …would not be in accordance with the intention of the Act."
"These two passages are, in my view, a correct statement of principle. In the present case the statute neither prohibits the Secretary of State from consulting the Board before adopting a policy change in the exercise of his discretionary power to grant parole nor requires him to do so. In deciding to adopt the new policy without consulting the board the Secretary of State took into account the factors of deterrence, retribution and public confidence in the administration of criminal justice. These were plainly material matters for his consideration in the exercise of his discretion. He cannot therefore, be said to have acted unreasonably in having regard to them. Accordingly I reject the submission of unreasonableness and with it the contention that failure to consult the board was unlawful."