England and Wales High Court (Administrative Court) Decisions

IN THE HIGH COURT OF JUSTICE
QUEEN'S BENCH DIVISION
DIVISIONAL COURT

		Royal Courts of Justice Strand London WC2
		28 October 2005

1. LORD JUSTICE MAURICE KAY: There are before the court applications under section 42 of the Supreme Court Act 1981 made by the Attorney-General to restrict the litigious activities of Mr and Mrs Leicester. There are two applications. The first in time (CO/4537/2004) was an application for a civil proceedings order. The second (CO/6126/2004) was an application for an all proceedings order. Both are listed to be heard today. Neither Mr nor Mrs Leicester is present.
2. The case was listed at 10.30. We made enquiries in respect of their absence and were informed by the court associate that on 28 July a member of the court staff had a telephone conversation with one or other of Mr or Mrs Leicester in which the recipient of the call said that they would not be coming to this hearing, and further stated that they are disabled. The member of the court staff asked for that to be put in writing. Nothing in writing has since been received by the court, nor in recent months has anything been received by the Attorney-General or his staff. I am entirely satisfied that Mr and Mrs Leicester know of today's hearing date. There is no medical evidence about their disabilities or whether they might be limited in time. In the circumstances, it is appropriate for us to consider the case and give judgment in their absence.
3. Before turning to the applications, I ought to say something about service of the proceedings on Mr and Mrs Leicester. As far as the first application is concerned, there is evidence that they were both served by a process server on 5 October 2004. There are affidavits of service to that effect. It seems that Mr Leicester subsequently disputed that he had received the claim form or the acknowledgment of service form. In any event, Mr Dingwall, of the Attorney-General's office, served a further copy of both documents by first class post on 18 October 2004. Mrs Leicester has acknowledged service on 21 October 2004. I am entirely satisfied that Mr Leicester was also properly served.
4. As to the second application, the process server had difficulty in effecting service. However, on 27 April 2005, Mrs Leicester was personally served. Again, she has acknowledged service, on this occasion on 9 May 2005. The acknowledgment gave as her address, Derek House, New Church Road, Hove in Sussex. The process server continued to experience difficulties in effecting service upon Mr Leicester, who was attempting to avoid contact with the process server.
5. On 11 May 2005 the process server placed all the relevant documents in relation to the second application through the letter box or outside the front door at Flat 63, Derek House, 45 New Church Road, Hove. That was the last known address of Mr Leicester. Moreover, on 10 February 2005, it is the address from which he wrote to the Attorney-General, and on 22 June 2005, he also wrote giving that same address. I am satisfied that service has deemed to have taken place on Mr Leicester on 12 May 2005, pursuant to CPR 6.7(1), and that the address was the appropriate address pursuant to CPR 6.5(6) as the last known address. Accordingly, both Mr and Mrs Leicester have been effectively and sufficiently served. I therefore move to the applications.
6. Ms Formby has explained that they are advanced in the alternative. The reason why an all proceedings order was made following the first application was that, as I shall describe, a point came in 2004 when Mr and Mrs Leicester transferred their attentions from the civil courts to the criminal courts. Ms Formby explains that she pursues the two applications in the alternative, but her primary submission is that an all proceedings order is appropriate.
7. Section 42(1) provides as follows:

"If, on an application made by the Attorney General under this section, the High Court is satisfied that any person has habitually and persistently and without any reasonable ground-

(a) instituted vexatious civil proceedings, whether in the High Court or any inferior court, and whether against the same person or against different persons; or

(b) made vexatious applications in any civil proceedings, whether in the High Court or any inferior court, and whether instituted by him or another; or

(c) instituted vexatious prosecutions (whether against the same person or different persons),

the court may, after hearing that person or giving him an opportunity of being heard, make a civil proceedings order, a criminal proceedings order or an all proceedings order."

8. It follows from what I have already said that Mr and Mrs Leicester have had an opportunity of being heard. "Heard" in that context includes the making of oral submissions, but also the submission of any written material. In fact, the court has received no skeleton argument or evidence from Mr or Mrs Leicester. In these circumstances, I now turn to the litigation history which has resulted in the making of these applications.
9. The origin of Mr and Mrs Leicester's problems occurred in 1989 at a time when a luxury boat was being built for them. They saw it, at least in part, as a source of future income as a chartered vessel. This was to be achieved through the medium of a company known as Parimtree Limited. Unfortunately the boat was destroyed by fire on or about 1 August 1989. The Leicesters considered that they had an insurance claim against Nelson Hurst and March Marine Limited, but the insurers denied that effective cover was in place. That dispute dragged on. Serious offers to compromise were made by the insurers in 1991, but these were rejected.
10. Shortly before the expiration of the limitation period, Parimtree issued proceedings. This was the first of a sequence of litigious activity, to which I shall refer as "the Parimtree litigation". It was an action against both the insurers and their solicitors. On 30 March 1995 the defendants obtained an order setting aside service of the statement of claim. There was then a large temporal lacuna, until on 16 June 2003 Parimtree made an unsuccessful application to set aside that order.
11. On 4 July 2003 Thomas J dismissed the application, observing that it was, in effect, a repetition of allegations advanced in other intervening litigation (which I shall describe later), and adding also that it was "vexatious and an abuse of the process of the court".
12. I next turn to some of the other Parimtree cases. The second related to the issue of the writ against Mr Archard, one of the underwriters, on 28 July 1995. On 7 August 1996, Clarke J ordered Parimtree to provide security for costs in that action. Applications were made to Clarke J and to the Court of Appeal for permission to appeal, but permission was refused. A renewed application was made on 6 May 1997, but that too was refused by Millett LJ and Potter LJ. This did not stop further applications to like effect in March and April 2003, alleging fraud and perjury. These were refused by Thomas J. There was again an application for permission to appeal. In the Court of Appeal, Chadwick LJ indicated on paper that at the hearing consideration might be given to making a civil restraint order, though, in fact, on the occasion when permission was refused in court, no such order was made.
13. The third Parimtree case, although not involving Parimtree as a party, was one in which Mr Leicester was a defendant and the claimant was the firm of solicitors, Clyde & Co, who sued for unpaid fees. Mr Leicester counter-claimed, alleging fraud. His complaints included allegations against court staff, decisions of judges, allegations of perjury and perversion of the course of justice, fraud by Sir Nicholas Lyell QC and other such matters.
14. On 26 October 1999, HHJ Kennedy, sitting in Brighton County Court, stayed that counter-claim. In so doing, he referred to it as "an abuse of process", adding:

"I cannot in the County Court prevent Mr Leicester making applications, unless and until he is declared a 'vexatious litigant' by the High Court."

He dismissed the application that was being made by Mr Leicester as an abuse of process and one that was bound to fail, and it was on 18 December 2000, in the presence of both Mr and Mrs Leicester, that he stayed the claim because by that time bankruptcy proceedings were pending in relation to Mr Leicester. Judge Kennedy directed that all claims and applications issued by Mr Leicester in the Sussex group of County Courts be referred to him. He said he was trying to control the litigious activities of Mr Leicester.

15. I shall have to return to other Parimtree cases. For the moment, the scene shifts to another of the Leicester businesses, one known as Real Bite. This was a business involving food distribution. A creditor, Plumtree Farms, obtained a bankruptcy order against Mr Leicester in the Brighton County Court on 31 July 1997. After that, Mr Leicester sought a review and also pursued an appeal to the Chancery Division. In both cases he was unsuccessful. He sought a further appeal to the Court of Appeal in which he did not dispute the sum owed and he did not dispute that he did not have the means to discharge the debt. His submission was that he was unable to pay because of a conspiracy.
16. Permission to appeal was refused by Nourse LJ and Ward LJ. At the conclusion of the hearing, Mr Leicester sought permission to appeal to the House of Lords, which was of course refused. This led to him writing to the Queen on 22 February 1999, making wild allegations against judges, solicitors, other parties to the litigation and asking the Queen to "direct Government, the House of Lords or whoever to take necessary action by implementing Council of Lloyd's Judicial and City of London Police inquiries, to ensure Justice prevails and is seen to be just concerning all matter".
17. Following the bankruptcy, writs of execution were issued and bailiffs were instructed to seize goods. This led to further litigation by Mr and Mrs Leicester against the High Sheriff of Sussex, alleging embezzlement by the bailiffs, and alleging all debts fell to be discharged by the Sheriff. He made further attempts to set aside the bankruptcy order, but these were dismissed on 19 May 2000 by District Judge Jackson. He then sought to engage in correspondence with the court. The matter was referred to Judge Kennedy, who said:

"In my view it is wholly wrong for Mr Leicester to continue to write to the Court manager, to District Judge Jackson or indeed to myself asking for what he calls review of the District Judge's Order ... there must be a limit to the amount of Court resources allocated to any one matter and I regret to say that Mr Leicester has long passed it. District Judge Jackson's decision ends his function ... Mr Leicester must accept it or appeal it."

18. Mr Leicester did indeed continue to try to appeal or seek a review of the decision, asking the courts "to take action to stop the terrorism against me, my wife and family, and use their inherent powers to unravel the crimes committed against us".
19. Mr Leicester's next attempt to avoid bankruptcy was in the form of an application for permission for judicial review of the decision of District Judge Jackson. This was refused on the papers by Turner J, pointing out that judicial review was not the appropriate remedy. However, Mr Leicester renewed his application for permission, and it was refused by Scott Baker J on 17 October 2000. Mr Leicester then made a further application to annul the bankruptcy in the County Court. This was heard by District Judge Lay on 6 November 2002. District Judge Lay said:

"Mr Leicester makes wild shotgun allegations. He accuses members of the Insolvency Service of lying to the Court, let alone to him, and of false accounting ... Mr Leicester has failed to show any act which would have caused the Court not to have made the bankruptcy order on 13 July 1997 ... He appears to believe that if he makes an allegation more than once it becomes a fact ... None of these allegations insofar as I can determine them have any merit to justify making the application let alone the annulment."

The application was dismissed with costs and Mr Leicester was ordered not to make any further applications to annul his bankruptcy without permission of the designated civil judge in the Brighton County Court.

20. District Judge Lay's decision was then appealed to the Chancery Division, where it was dismissed by Lloyd J on 17 January 2003. Mr Leicester persisted in seeking to reopen the matter, and was joined by Mrs Leicester who, on 15 December 2003, sought herself to appeal the bankruptcy. She was unsuccessful. On 10 December 2003, Mrs Leicester appealed against the appointment of Mr Beat as the trustee in bankruptcy. Lindsay J heard her application and also heard from Mr Leicester as Mrs Leicester was said to be too ill to attend. The appeal was dismissed. Mr Leicester then produced a note of the judgment of Lindsay J which he asked the judge to approve. The judge declined because "it bears little resemblance to what [was] said". As before, Mr Leicester continued to make allegations against the judges before whom his or his wife's applications and appeals had been heard, referring to "compelling prima facie evidence of misconduct in public office by District Judge Lay and Lindsay J".
21. In the Chancery Division consideration was being given to the making of a civil restraint order. In that regard, Mr Leicester but not Mrs Leicester appeared before Etherton J on 24 February 2004 in pursuit of some appeals. Etherton J described the appeals as:

"... quite hopeless, and in the case of application 1, a plain abuse of process ... the appeals of Mrs Leicester are parasitic on those of her husband ... I dismiss all the applications before me, subject to the variation of District Judge Lay's order of 25 November 2002 ... this hearing has taken place over three days. Having considered all the material before me and heard Mr Leicester at great length over many hours, I have come to the conclusion that it is necessary to restrain his ability to make further applications in or arising from his bankruptcy proceedings."

22. A civil restraint order was made from 24 February 2004 preventing Mr Leicester from making any further applications or taking steps in any court arising out of or concerning any matters involving or relating to or touching upon or leading to the bankruptcy proceedings without prior permission.
23. The next day Mr Leicester wrote to Etherton J asking for a retrial before a jury. In the following month (March 2004) Mr Leicester appealed an order of HHJ Kennedy. This was heard before Etherton J's civil restraint order had been sealed. Park J dismissed the appeal, taking into account the overriding objective and the allocation of an appropriate share of the court's resources to any particular case.
24. On 5 April 2004, Mr Leicester sought to appeal Etherton J's order. A similar appeal was made by Mrs Leicester, and on 10 June 2004, Mummery LJ and Chadwick LJ refused permission to appeal and extended the civil restraint order to include Mrs Leicester. At some point at around this time in relation to the bankruptcy litigation, Mr Leicester also made an application to the European Court of Human Rights in Strasbourg.
25. Thus far I have been concerned with parts of the Parimtree litigation and also with the bankruptcy proceedings. I now turn to another Leicester company, Wilton Fair Limited. On 14 May 1997, it was wound up by order of the court on the petition of a creditor, Lyedale Limited. It seems that Lyedale was another Leicester family company, with other members of the family involved, and was itself in voluntary liquidation at the time. Lyedale had lent Wilton Fair money to buy and develop a residential property in France. On 2 July 2002, the Leicesters applied to strike out the winding up order. That was an unsuccessful application. Mr Leicester then sought permission to appeal various matters. Ultimately the matter was considered by Arden LJ on 12 March 2002. She refused permission to appeal an order that had been made by Rimer J, adding "the relief which Mr Leicester sought was not relief of a kind which the court could grant". She was in fact considering appeals not only from Rimer J, but also from Ferris J and Jacob J.
26. The winding up order was further considered by Lightman J on 29 November 2002. He said this:

"I can see no conceivable requirement of justice in this case for any rescission of the winding up order ... Mr Leicester makes ... complaints which do not go to the substance of the matter before me. This is a very sad case. It is plain that Mr Leicester feels a very real sense of grievance, but, as it seems to me, whether or not any sense of grievance on his part is justified, and the larger part of his grievance is against his son, I can see no conceivable reason for the multitude of applications which he has made to the court in relation to this matter, which now cause the liquidators to incur huge costs."

Lightman J then indicated that any further applications might result in a Grepe v Loam Order. Mr Leicester then expanded his claims to include the liquidators of the two companies, and on 2 July 2003, Lindsay J made a Grepe v Loam Order in respect of all applications in or arising out of the liquidation of Wilton Fair and Lyedale. Nevertheless, further applications were made and were dismissed. The applications and permission to appeal the Grepe v Loam Orders were refused by Mummery LJ and Chadwick LJ on 10 June 2004.

27. The next action is one by Mr Leicester as claimant against Lawson Lewis & Co. This resulted in a judgment of HHJ Kennedy on 13 February 2003. He said:

"I have not the slightest doubt ... that Mr Leicester wanted to use this claim to ventilate a number of historical complaints against those who have dealt with his various legal affairs ... He sees erected against him a whole wall of conspiracy leading him to make serious allegations against Lloyds, the judiciary and even a masonic conspiracy. I have had to live with Mr Leicester's allegations ... I have had 100s of pages from Mr Leicester. They contain wild allegations. Nevertheless, a judge ought if possible to see his way through that. The district judge was right to say that the claim as pleaded was a non-starter ... The instant claim is absolutely hopeless. In the circumstances I have no choice as to what to do, and will refuse permission to appeal."

It seems that this prompted the applications for trial by jury and further appeals. One endeavour was an application for permission to apply for judicial review, which on renewal Richards J described as "a waste of the time of this court". Permission to appeal was finally refused by Mummery LJ and Chadwick LJ on 10 June 2004.

28. It is now necessary to pick up the Parimtree saga again, and refer briefly to a number of separate actions, all of which were eventually struck out by Master Bowman on 19 October 2001. One action was by Mr and Mrs Leicester and Parimtree against Steve Exwood. Having been struck out by Master Bowman, Jacob J made a Grepe v Loam Order on 6 December 2001.
29. Another action was by Mr and Mrs Leicester and Parimtree against Harold Wilson Financial Services Limited. This was consolidated with, and considered alongside, the Exwood case, as was a further action by Mr and Mrs Leicester and Parimtree against Charles F Booth and Son Limited. There was also a claim of that type brought in the name of Mrs Leicester alone. This came before Hallett J on 8 July 2004. She described it as "totally devoid of merit", and said that the claim form "which seeks to repeat those allegations is vexatious and an abuse of the process of the court". On that occasion, she made an extended civil restraint order for two years embracing both Mr and Mrs Leicester, together with Parimtree, forbidding applications in claims against a number of parties in relation to matters touching upon the contract of insurance, which was the disputed matter in the Parimtree litigation.
30. There was another action by Mr and Mrs Leicester and Parimtree against Wilson Insurance Broking Group Limited. It was one of those in respect of which Jacob J made the Grepe v Loam Order on 6 December 2001, and there was a similar action against the Wilson Organisation (a firm), which had the same result. Indeed, there was at least one other action with the same claimants, this time against Harold Wilson (Insurances) Limited, which was dealt with in the same way, first by Master Bowman and then by Jacob J, and a further action by the same claimants against Holmes Hardingham Walser Johnston & Winter, which met the same fate.
31. I must next return to the Real Bite litigation. Mr Leicester sought to sue the bailiff in relation to enforcement of writs of execution. That was struck out by the County Court, and upon application to Park J for permission to appeal on 22 January 2003, he said:

"It is not easy to follow all the details of Mr Leicester's complaints but I am in no doubt ... they are without merit and that the claims which Mr Leicester has attempted to plead against the defendants in the two cases have no chance of succeeding."

32. The next phase of litigation involves actions against members of the judiciary and various public officials. One action was against District Judge Lay, another against the High Sheriff of East Sussex, another against the Registrar of Companies, another against Lindsay J, District Judge Robinson and D Wraith. Mr and Mrs Leicester then spread the net a little wider. There was an action against the Lord Chancellor, Hallett J and a number of private parties. There was a further action by Mrs Leicester against the Lord Chancellor, Mummery LJ, Chadwick LJ and the trustee in bankruptcy; another against the Lord Chancellor, Mummery LJ, Chadwick LJ and Smith & Williamson. They were all utterly misconceived and all were struck out in due course, some of them by Collins J on 10 September 2004.
33. I have referred to some of the restrictive orders that had been made by the civil courts. This no doubt explains why in the middle of 2004 Mr and Mrs Leicester then turned their attention to the criminal courts. On 15 July 2004 they sought to lay a private prosecution against the trustee in bankruptcy in the Wilton Fair litigation. The next day, Mr Leicester sought to lay a similar application against the trustee in bankruptcy, this time for "evicting Mr and Mrs Leicester from their home", at the same time attempting to re-open issues that had arisen in the bankruptcy proceedings. The application was dismissed as an abuse of process.
34. Further litigation has been instigated against people whom I have already mentioned or others connected with them. In July of this year, after service of the applications that the court is now considering, Mr and Mrs Leicester brought further proceedings which came before Park J and related to Wilton Fair.
35. Whether or not that is a complete catalogue of relevant litigation activity, it suffices for present purposes. What is to be said of this frenzy of litigation? In my judgment, the following. First, it has been entirely unsuccessful and has resulted in strike outs or stays and refusals of permission to appeal in every case. Secondly, without exception it has been misconceived. Thirdly, it has resulted in a number of Grepe v Loam Orders and civil restraint orders. Fourthly, as each door has been closed, Mr and Mrs Leicester have attempted to open another, the most recent manifestation of which has been the resort to private prosecutions. Fifthly, all this activity bears the hallmarks of vexatious litigation, as described by Lord Bingham of Cornhill LCJ in the case of Barker (16 February 2000) (unreported). I set out two passages to demonstrate just how typical Mr and Mrs Leicester are of vexatious litigants:

"19. The hallmark of a vexatious proceeding is in my judgment that it has little or no basis in law (or at least no discernible basis); that whatever the intention of the proceeding may be, its effect is to subject the defendant to inconvenience, harassment and expense out of all proportion to any gain likely to accrue to the claimant; and that it involves an abuse of the process of the court, meaning by that a use of the court process for a purpose or in a way which is significantly different from the ordinary and proper use of the court process."

36. At paragraph 22, he added:

"From extensive experience of dealing with applications under section 42 the court has become familiar with the hallmark of persistent and habitual litigious activity. The hallmark usually is that the plaintiff sues the same party repeatedly in reliance on essentially the same cause of action, perhaps with minor variations, after it has been ruled upon, thereby imposing on defendants the burden of resisting claim after claim; that the claimant relies on essentially the same cause of action, perhaps with minor variations, after it has been ruled upon, in actions against successive parties who if they were to be sued at all should have been joined in the same action; that the claimant automatically challenges every adverse decision on appeal; and that the claimant refuses to take any notice of or give any effect to orders of the court. The essential vice of habitual and persistent litigation is keeping on and on litigating when earlier litigation has been unsuccessful and when on any rational and objective assessment the time has come to stop."

In my judgment, those passages fit exactly the facts of the present case in relation to both Mr and Mrs Leicester.

37. The Attorney-General's application is made out, and overwhelmingly so. It is a clear case of proven vexatiousness on the parts of Mr and Mrs Leicester. It is as clear a case as one could have the misfortune to find. It is a serious step to make orders of the kind sought, but I am entirely satisfied that they should be made in order to put a stop to what has been going on. It comes as no surprise to discover that in 2005 there has been a discernible slow down. I have no doubt that that is only because of the issue of the Attorney General's applications.
38. As it has become apparent that Mr and Mrs Leicester are as prepared to resort to the criminal jurisdiction as to the civil jurisdiction, in my judgment the appropriate orders in each of their cases are all proceedings orders in accordance with the primary submission made on behalf of the Attorney-General.
39. MR JUSTICE PENRY-DAVY: In my judgment, this is the clearest possible case. I agree entirely with what my Lord has said.
40. MS FORMBY: My Lords, that leaves the question of the first application in time being the civil proceedings order, and it would be the Attorney's intention simply to withdraw that application.
41. LORD JUSTICE MAURICE KAY: Certainly.
42. MS FORMBY: I am grateful.
43. LORD JUSTICE MAURICE KAY: In view of Mr and Mrs Leicester's absence, and having regard to what they say of disability, we will direct that they be provided with copies of the judgment at public expense. Thank you very much.