England and Wales High Court (Administrative Court) Decisions

IN THE HIGH COURT OF JUSTICE
QUEEN'S BENCH DIVISION
THE ADMINISTRATIVE COURT

		Royal Courts of Justice Strand London WC2
		27 April 2005

1. HIS HONOUR JUDGE MOLE: This application is made under Section 288 of the Town and Country Planning Act 1990 by Mr and Mrs Kernahan of Foxburrow House, on a lane off Saddlemakers Lane in Suffolk. They and their neighbours are aggrieved by a decision dated 8th October 2004, made by an inspector who was appointed by the First Secretary of State.
2. That decision letter allowed an appeal under Section 78 of the 1990 Act, against a refusal by Suffolk Coastal District Council. The development that was permitted by that appeal is the renovation of barns at Foxburrow Farm which, the helpful plan I have been provided with shows, is on the other side of the lane, effectively, from Foxburrow House.
3. I should say, the renovation of barns to form offices for the relocation of the main office of the Suffolk Wildlife Trust.
4. Further renovations and refurbishment are of buildings to form an education centre.
5. The Inspector permitted this application on appeal, subject to eight conditions that she imposed.
6. An informal hearing had been held on 21st September 2004, at which Mr and Mrs Kernahan and their neighbours objected to the development. They put in through NWA Planning a statement of case that supported that objection.
7. The point of Mr and Mrs Kernahan and their neighbours, of course, was that not only do they live close to Foxburrow Farm, but they use and, in the case of certainly some of the neighbours, are very close to the 400-metre unmade single track road that leads up to Foxburrow Farm. They say they would be detrimentally affected by the extra traffic that would be generated by this proposed development either as it is proposed, or as it might be expanded once permitted.
8. They now seek to quash the decision of the Inspector.
9. The grounds upon which they seek to quash this decision, I will briefly summarise at this stage as follows. They say the Inspector failed to have regard to the possibility that Suffolk Wildlife Trust might expand their operations, and that that could have potential adverse consequences in terms of traffic impact and generally, and therefore an impact on the residential amenity of the neighbours. It is right to note that it might also of course have adverse consequences for sustainability, although that is not something that can be regarded, it seems to me, as a very direct concern of Mr and Mrs Kernahan and their neighbours. The point is that the claimants say expansion was something that was required to be considered, either as a matter of policy or because it was a matter that was expressly raised by them before the inspector.
10. They further add, as a second ground, that the Inspector did not carry out a proper assessment of the traffic impact. More specifically, they say that she looked only at the additional traffic which was likely to be generated by the proposal. She failed to reach a conclusion as to a base line level of traffic to which that additional traffic would be added. And thus, she failed to assess the cumulative effect on traffic which, it is said, she should have done.
11. Thirdly and finally, the claimants put forward a reasons challenge, that is to say a challenge claiming that the reasons that the Inspector expressed in her decision letter were insufficient. They put that on the basis that it is impossible to spell out from the decision letter exactly what the inspection's conclusions about the existing level of traffic were, nor whether she thought that the cumulative impact would be acceptable. To cover these two issues, perhaps to a degree at my instigation but responding to the way Mr Shadarevian put his case, the Particulars of Claim were further amended (without opposition, it is only fair to note, from Mr Tromans) to add as a reasons point, that the Inspector also failed to explain her self sufficiently clearly on the expansion point, and failed to demonstrate either that she had taken the expansion point into account, or if she had taken it into account, how she had dealt with it. I granted leave for that point to be added to the Particulars of Claim, and it has been argued by both sides.
12. Now, I shall turn very briefly to consider the powers of the court on a challenge under Section 288 such as this, although this of course is trite law on such an appeal.
13. Section 288(5)(b) provides that the court may quash a decision of the Secretary of State action if satisfied that that action is not within the powers of the Act. In other words, if the decision is unlawful or, to put it yet another way, if the decision discloses that the decision-maker made an error of law.
14. Secondly, the court may quash if the interests of the applicant have been substantially prejudiced by a failure to comply with any of the relevant requirements in relation to it. The relevant requirement in this case is the requirement to give reasons which are intelligible.
15. I am going to put the reasons challenge to one side for the moment, and consider first the argument that the decision was flawed by an error of law.
16. The court, to be satisfied that the decision was unlawful, has to apply a number of principles. One of the principles is that the decision will be unlawful if the decision-maker takes into account an irrelevant factor, or fails to take into account a material one. This is an ancient principle, dating back to the words of Lord Denning in the Ashbridge case.
17. It is that basis upon which Mr Shadarevian for the claimants founds his challenge. Mr Tromans remarked with some justification that at one stage, it might have sounded as if Mr Shadarevian was arguing that a particular approach on traffic was one that no reasonable inspector could take, but I do not think that was really the way that Mr Shadarevian was putting his argument. He was simply putting in a forceful manner the suggestion that it was really quite clear that the Inspector had not taken a material factor into account at all.
18. Mr Shadarevian says the Inspector failed to take into account the expansion policy, that is to say the policy AP73(viii), and the Inspector must have misinterpreted that policy, and furthermore, the Inspector failed to take into account the traffic impact.
19. Now, to understand those points, it is necessary to turn to the decision letter. The Inspector identified the main issues in paragraph 3 in a way that is not challenged. She said the two main issues were: the effect of the proposed development on the amenities of neighbouring occupiers particularly with respect to noise and general disturbance; secondly, whether or not the appeal site is in an unsustainable location in terms of transport, and if so, whether employment activities at the appeal site would cause harm. It is worthwhile having those two issues and that division of them in mind when then turning to see how she deals with her reasons.
20. She starts by pointing out the relevant planning policy, in particular, she refers to Local Plan policy AP73, saying:

"Local Planning policy AP73 provides for the re-use [and she means 'adaptation'] of rural buildings for employment use, which is encouraged subject to criteria being met.

"The criteria include provisions to prevent the loss of residential or rural amenity (i), traffic generation should not materially harm living conditions of local residents (ii) and businesses should be small and preferably provide jobs and/or services for the community (vii). Small is defined as a business that employs 25 persons or fewer on the site in question."

21. Then, under the heading of "Reasons" in paragraph 5, she set out an account, not suggested to be insufficient, of the position of Foxburrow Farm, and the basic facts relating to the access to it.
22. In paragraph 6, she continued:

"It was agreed at the hearing that the proposal would generate between 44 and 78 additional vehicle movements per day. There is background noise in the vicinity of the appeal site from the well-trafficked A12 that lies fairly close to the north but I consider that the additional vehicle movements along Foxburrow Farm Lane would be noticeable particularly at two of the passing places with starting and stopping of vehicles opposite dwellings. In addition, I noted that one of the proposed passing places would be behind a blind bend, when approaching from Saddlemakers Lane, unless the roadside vegetation is significantly reduced. In my opinion, passing places would be necessary for the proposed increased usage of the lane and I am satisfied that less harmful passing places could be agreed with the Council. Details could be covered by conditions. On balance, having regard to the ambient background noise, I consider that the additional vehicle movements would not generate such noise and disturbance as to unacceptably harm residents' amenities. I consider that the use proposed would accord with the aims of LP policy AP73(i) and (ii)."

23. Paragraph 7:

"There are concerns that any additional visitor activity or letting of the space within the buildings to other bodies would unacceptably increase harm to amenities. The appellants indicate that they do not propose to create a visitor centre at the farm, but rather a headquarters office. There have been farm trails with an interpretation board and leaflets available at the carpark since 1998 and this would not change. There are regular events at the Education Centre but these have taken place in roughly the same form for the past 10 years, except for a one-off event by an outside organisation that, the appellants advise, would not be repeated. The proposal includes sizeable meeting rooms that if let on a regular basis to other organisations could result in a large amount of additional traffic to the detriment of residents' amenities. In my opinion, in the interests of neighbouring occupiers' amenities, it would be necessary to limit the use of the converted building to the activities of the Suffolk Wildlife Trust, and this could be covered by conditions."

24. I interpose in parentheses that indeed, the Inspector did decide that conditions should be imposed to control use, and those are conditions 6 and 8 to be found in paragraph 14.
25. Then, the Inspector turned to the issue of sustainability.
26. Before I turn to sustainability and what she said about that, I think it would be sensible to address the points that are made about traffic impact, because although of course, the points about traffic impact and expansion are linked, a separate point was made by Mr Shadarevian about traffic impact. He said that it is not clear what the Inspector concluded on two points.
27. Firstly, the level of traffic generated by the existing uses. There are a number of uses over the site, it is agreed. The claimants say that some of these are rather amorphous and of unclear planning status, to put it at its lowest; indeed, they go further and say that some of them may well be unlawful. Yet, those uses generate a significant amount of traffic.
28. Secondly, the claimants as objectors had conducted traffic surveys and sought to measure the existing traffic levels. These were presented to the Inspector. They were the subject of some challenge, although I am told, and it is not contested, that it does not sound as if the challenge was particularly fundamental.
29. But the point is that the Inspector does not say if she accepted these figures with or without reservations. She is completely silent about the existing surveys.
30. Mr Shadarevian goes on to say that since she made no findings about those matters, she is in no position to assess what he says she must assess, which is the cumulative effect of the additional traffic when added to the existing traffic, whatever that might be. She was not in any position to make that assessment. She did not do so, but she should have done.
31. Mr Tromans replies about that that it is for the Inspector to decide in the circumstances of each particular case how to assess traffic impact.
32. It is not inevitable that in every case, a base line has to be established, and the additional traffic on top of the base line, making up a cumulative total, has to be taken into account in order to see whether or not the proposal is acceptable or not. That depends upon the circumstances.
33. It is perfectly possible, and sensible, in the right case, to conclude that whatever the existing traffic is, it is broadly of such a level and in such surrounding circumstances that it is possible to assess the additional traffic on its own and to consider whether or not, in the circumstances, the additional traffic is likely to make much difference.
34. In some cases, it might be crucial to consider the cumulative impact. In other cases, it is not necessary to do so, or may not be necessary to do so. In this particular case, the Inspector decided says Mr Tromans it is quite clear from the way she approached the matter in paragraph 6 -- that it was sufficient to look at the additional traffic against the circumstances she records, and to say about them, given that she had an agreed range, that the traffic within that range would not create an unacceptable disturbance.
35. That, says Mr Tromans, is an approach that in this case was reasonably open to her. It was neither perverse nor irrational, and discloses no error of law.
36. On that point, I agree with Mr Tromans. It seems to me that it is an approach that was legitimately open to the Inspector. Indeed, where there is doubt about the base line traffic, and where to establish it would require a complicated and possibly lengthy analysis of difficult factual matters, such as a decision as to what uses there were, what roles and weight should be given to separate uses within the planning unit and so on, a difficult examination at any time, in the context of an informal hearing, it was a sensible approach to look first at the additional traffic, and see whether or not it was possible to say that that was, in the circumstances, sufficiently small not to give rise to any concern, regardless of the base line to which it would be added. That is the approach the Inspector seems to have taken. It was perfectly open to her to do so, in my judgment, and so I reject the claim on that basis.
37. But I return to the arguments that arose under the heading of "Sustainability". What the Inspector said was this:

"The appeal site is in the countryside outside the physical limits of any settlement and is not served by public transport. Employees would have to travel by car. The proposal would relocate existing jobs from the centre in Ashbocking that is served by limited public transport. Nevertheless, the appellants advise that most of the existing employees live in the south western end of the county and already travel to work by car as the public transport is not available at suitable times for the journey to work."

38. Again in parentheses, I remark that that is purely a sustainability argument and not an impact argument at all. We then come to paragraph 9 and this is a paragraph that has given rise to some difficulty:

"There would be 14 full-time and 15 part-time staff (working parts of weeks not every day) the equivalent to about 22/23 full-time staff. Future expansion could take the use out of the definition, but the policy does not refer to the future expansion of the business or impose limits on expansion. I consider that the proposal would be for a business that would fall within the definition of 'small' in the LP policy AP73(vii). The jobs created would not necessarily be for the local community but the policy only refers to a preference for the business use to provide local jobs not a requirement:"

39. To understand that, it is necessary to look at the policies, particularly policy AP73. Policy AP73 is headed "Re-use and Adaptation of Rural Buildings for Employment Uses". I read that out because Mr Shadarevian -- fairly, it seems to me -- makes the point that re-use and adaptation of rural buildings tends to be the sort of operation that takes place once and is not a continuing thing that will re-occur, at least not in the same building, time and time again. It must be contemplated, at least, that it could well be a once-only sort of an operation.
40. The policy then continues this way:

"Outside Towns and Villages, proposals for employment uses in existing buildings, parts of dwelling houses or buildings within the curtilage of dwelling houses will be encouraged and supported subject to the following criteria being met."

41. Again, I simply state in parentheses the obvious, that it seems that that means that if a development does not meet the criteria, it will not be encouraged or supported by this policy; and if it is not encouraged or supported by the policy, it may well be that the planning authority will say that it is contrary to the policy and that Section 54A of the Town and Country Planning Act would apply to rule it out in the absence of any other affirming consideration.
42. The criteria then follow. There are eight of them. (i) and (ii), which were expressly referred to by the Inspector, are these:

"(i) There should be no significant loss of residential or rural amenity, or of best and most versatile agricultural land, or material detriment to the environment generally;

"(ii) The proposal should not lead to increased traffic movements that would prejudice highway safety or the free flow of traffic, or materially harm the living conditions of local residents, particularly by increased commercial vehicles."

43. Now, I turn to. (vii) which says:

"Businesses should be small, and preferably provide jobs and/or services for the local community."

44. 'Small', is defined in a footnote, as a business which employs 25 persons or fewer on the site in question.
45. That explains the Inspector's reference to the numbers in paragraph 9.
46. Paragraph (viii) says:

"The subsequent expansion of the activity on the site will only be permitted if it can be demonstrated that it would have no adverse impact on the surroundings and, under certain circumstances, the District Council will consider seeking the removal of rights under the General Development Order."

47. The explanatory note in paragraph 4.93 emphasises the encouragement that the District Council wishes to offer to the formation or expansion of small businesses, and says that it will endeavour to overcome planning objections by attaching appropriate conditions to the planning permission, or by the use of legal agreements, and goes on to say:

"For example, these can be used to provide firm limits to expansion...",

And so on. Perhaps, when I say "and so on", I should add:

"... and ensure that other environmental and highway safeguards are carried out."

48. Paragraph (vii) in that policy is what most people would understand very clearly as being a criterion. (viii) is rather more difficult to see in that light. It refers to an expansion, or a subsequent expansion, of the activity on the site. And of course, the subsequent expansion of activity, as opposed to the expansion of the site, making it more intense, encouraging more people and more traffic -- may very well not require any permission at all.
49. Some expansion would anyway be permitted by the General Development Order and hence the policy foreshadows the possibility that that permission might be removed by direction. It does not say "by direction", but that is what it means. Equally of course, the expansion of activity would require a subsequent permission if it had been limited by condition to a particular level at the time that the first permission was granted.
50. It is also clear that, although (viii) follows (vii), they are dealing with different interests. (vii) is about a requirement that it should be small businesses that are encouraged. It is an employment and economic point.
51. Paragraph (viii) is clearly concerned with impact, the same matters that criteria (i) and (ii) are concerned with, and its point is to ensure that the expansion should not adversely increase that impact.
52. It seems to me that (viii) is in a sense, and I do not mean this pejoratively to it, something of an afterthought to the bundle of policies that are to be found in (i) to (vii). It is a reminder or perhaps a warning, and as such, it is one that ought, Mr Shadarevian says, to be heeded and to be shown to be heeded.
53. Indeed, he goes further and says that it is actually a free-standing criterion in its own right, not just for subsequent applications but for the first application, that makes it necessary for the decision-maker to at least consider the possibility, or likelihood, of an expansion of activity on a proposed site, and to give the decision-maker's mind as to whether or not it is necessary to limit by condition, or not. In other words, the Inspector is required, he says, by this policy, to have regard to the possibility of expansion at the stage of that first permission, because only then can the decision-maker control subsequent activity.
54. As to paragraph 9 of the decision letter, to turn back and understand the submissions about that, Mr Shadarevian says that the Inspector's meaning is obscure when the Inspector says in the second sentence that:

"Future expansion could take the use out of the definition."

55. It sounds as if she might be referring to (vii) but to say, "The policy does not refer to the future expansion of the business or impose limitations on expansion", if that refers to the policy AP73 generally, is simply wrong, since paragraph (viii) clearly does refer at least to the future expansion of the business, and the potential of limitations on expansion.
56. Mr Shadarevian also points out that policy AP73(viii) was expressly brought to the Inspector's attention. There are a number of references to it in NWA Planners' statement of case. Although in some of them perhaps AP73(viii) is not specifically mentioned, there is a clear reference later on. AP73(viii) is expressly mentioned at paragraph 5.28 of those references under the heading of "Future Expansion". Without repeating what is said, it is expressly set out that concern about expansion is indicated by that policy, and it is worth noting the last sentence of paragraph 5.28 of those representations, which read:

"It is considered that this expansion would be difficult if not impossible to control by planning condition and therefore it adds a further reason why planning permission should be denied."

57. So, the case put on behalf of Mr and Mrs Kernahan was not that what the Inspector should do is condition the planning permission, it was that she should refuse permission because she could not sensibly condition the permission.
58. At an earlier stage in these representations, NWA Planning had addressed in some detail their reasons for being concerned about the possibility of expansion. That starts at paragraph 5.8. Without setting this out in detail, the point was taken that there were a number of members, apart from the staff of the Trust, who might visit the headquarters. The point was taken that nothing had been said about the likely future expansion of the Trust's activities or its employment.
59. Then, in 5.9, a further point was made about what had happened in the past. It was said that in the past, between 1996 and 2002, the number of staff had increased from 35 to 49, an increase of 40 per cent in six years, and there was no reason why a similar increase could not occur in the future. The representations went on to point out that there was a considerable amount of floor space, which might be regarded as open to use by staff, and so, there was the flexibility to accommodate increases in the Trust's activities and employment.
60. The Inspector took account of some of the flexibility, clearly, in the passage that I have just read, and in the need that she saw to impose conditions on certain types of extra activity, the additional visitor activity or letting the space to other bodies, for example.
61. But NWA made a point in connection with employment too, and the point that Mr Shadarevian makes is that there is nothing said about that in the decision letter.
62. In fact, it seems, from the Inspector's witness statement, that this issue was addressed at the informal hearing. The Inspector, who says that she is making the witness statement not to explain or amplify her reasoning but simply to provide information on a number of factual matters, set out at paragraphs 5.8 and paragraph 5.9, which I have just summarised. In paragraph 4 of her witness statement she referred to paragraph 5.9 and the point that it could be seen that there had been a substantial increase in staff over a short number of years and the same thing might happen again. She said:

"This passage was the subject of discussion at the hearing. The appellants clearly explained that historically many of the staff were employed by the Trust's trading company and therefore, did not appear as Trust employees. When the trading company became part of the Trust charity, these staff became Trust employees. The increase in staffing was therefore due to an administrative change and was not a genuine increase in employee numbers. The evidence of the appellant on this was not challenged at the hearing."

63. I comment about that that the reported response of the Suffolk Wildlife Trust does of course cover the point made against them, that because there had been a big expansion in the past therefore there could be an expansion in the future. But that was not the whole of the point that the objectors made. It does not, as the Inspector sets it out in her witness statement, directly address the underlying point that was clearly in the representations, that that was not only room for more visitors, there was room for more staff, the 22/23 equivalent full-time places.
64. The Inspector may well have drawn the inference that was that because the Suffolk Wildlife Trust had not really increased their employment from 1996 to 2002, over six years, there was no reason to suppose that they were going to do so in their new premises. That may have been her reasoning. If it was, she does not say that it was, still less why she thought that that was a conclusion that it would be right to draw, it not being a self-evident proposition.
65. In answer to the points Mr Shadarevian makes about this policy, what Mr Tromans says is that the policy needs to be interpreted generously. Not every criterion needs to be expressly addressed. What needs to be addressed depends upon the circumstances; only the relevant policies needs to be addressed. The Inspector says as much, and clearly does not address every criterion. She makes it plain what her approach is.
66. Furthermore, although she does not expressly say so, it is clear from her witness statement that she did actually address the issue of the expansion of headquarters staff.
67. As for paragraph 9, says Mr Tromans, that has to be read reasonably generously as well. It has to be read in context. If, for example, in paragraph 9, the Inspector had started with the third sentence, so it had started:

"I consider that the proposal would be for a business that would fall within the definition of 'small' in the LP policy AP73(vii)."

68. Then everything in the rest of the paragraph would have fallen in after it, and it would all have made perfect sense. It would have been clear quite beyond any doubt that what was being talked about was policy 73(vii), and that that was in the context of sustainability.
69. He says that with a generous reading that passage is easily understood. Perhaps it could have been a better expressed, but nonetheless, that is the sense of it. It is not muddled. It is dealing with only AP73(vii) on a specific point that is not related so much to impact, or indeed at all to impact, but to the "small" policy, namely that expansion might push the numbers above the definition of "small".
70. In my view, these policies do indeed need to be read generously. They are drafted by planners not only for planners, but for people who have to operate the plans as well. But they are not drafted by Parliamentary draftsmen. They have to be read in a way that makes the best of them. They must not be looked at in the same way that a statute ought to be interpreted. They must not be treated in a nitpicking way.
71. In my view AP73(viii) does not require the decision-maker expressly to test development against it. All the sections of policy AP73, (i) to (vii), which are criteria more properly so-called, will require examination by the decision-maker simply to see how applicable they are. But not all of them will be relevant and not all of them need be mentioned.
72. Whether or not it is very sensible to describe AP73(viii) as a criterion or not, it is quite clear that it looks to the future and to future impact, and it seems to me that it is a useful reminder that, should be taken into account by the decision-maker. But it is not a compulsory hoop that the Inspector, or the decision-maker, must demonstrate that they have passed through.
73. It does not seem to me that there is any error of law involved in not expressly testing the development against that policy in the circumstances of this case.
74. In any event, policy AP73(viii) was expressly raised before the Inspector, in the context of expansion and the traffic that that would bring. Sensible points were made by NWA about that. It was answered, and the answer was not challenged. The inference that I am invited to draw by Mr Tromans is, and it is only an inference because the Inspector did not actually say this, that the Inspector accepted that, and concluded that the risk of any significant expansion of activity from headquarters staff was so low that it could be disregarded.
75. Now, of course, that inference is not an inference, it seems to me, that could be reasonably drawn unless the person drawing the inference had been at the informal hearing, and knew what had been put in evidence and discussed. But then of course, the objectors were at that hearing, and are to be taken to have that knowledge.
76. In my judgment, the question of expansion in this case is one of those matters where consideration of it could have made a difference to the decision. It is one of those instances that Glidewell LJ spoke of in the case of Bolton Metropolitan Borough v the Environment Secretary and Manchester, (1990) 61 P&CR
77. The passage I have in mind is at page 353(6). I do not think it is necessary to set the passage out.
78. My judgment is that this is a matter that could have made a difference to the decision, a difference either in tilting the balance towards refusal, or in leading to consideration of the imposition of a condition as had been imposed under conditions 6 to 8. It is certainly something the Inspector should have taken into account on that basis. As I say, policy AP73(viii) does not require her to do so. That is a matter for her judgment. But it is a relevant indication of the issue's potential importance; it is not a trivial point. However on the facts of the case as revealed in the Inspector's statement, it is sufficiently clear that she did actually take it into account.
79. The issue was covered by evidence, and the inference is -- and, as I say, it is only an inference; she does not say so -- that she was satisfied by the evidence of the Suffolk Wildlife Trust that there was no real likelihood of significant expansion of staff in the headquarters, and so therefore, nothing needed to be done about it. That is an inference that I am prepared to draw. I am not prepared to say that she did not have regard to this issue. On the evidence in front of me, I conclude that she did take it into account. So therefore, the claimant does not succeed on that point.
80. There remains the question of reasons, however. The approach to reasons is set out in the South Bucks case, the case of South Bucks District Council v Porter [2004]~1 WLR, where the most authoritative summary of the principles that govern a reasons challenge is set out by Lord Browne. Lord Browne says, starting at paragraph 36:

"The reasons for a decision must be intelligible and they must be adequate. They must enable the reader to understand why the matter was decided as it was and what conclusions were reached on the 'principal important controversial issues', disclosing how any issue of law or fact was resolved. Reasons can be briefly stated, the degree of particularity required depending entirely on the nature of the issues falling for decision. The reasoning must not give rise to a substantial doubt as to whether the decision-maker erred in law, for example by misunderstanding some relevant policy or some other important matter or by failing to reach a rational decision on relevant grounds. But such adverse inference will not readily be drawn. The reasons need refer only to the main issues in the dispute, not to every material consideration. They should enable disappointed developers to assess their prospects of obtaining some alternative development permission, or, as the case may be, their unsuccessful opponents to understand how the policy or approach underlying the grant of permission may impact upon future such applications. Decision letters must be read in a straightforward manner, recognising that they are addressed to parties well-aware of the issues involved and the arguments advanced. A reasons challenge will only succeed if the party aggrieved can satisfy the court that he has genuinely been substantially prejudiced by the failure to provide an adequately reasoned decision."

81. I have to, ask myself whether an informed reader, somebody who had known what had gone on at the informal hearing, would think that the only reasonable inference, not the only possible but the only reasonable inference, to be drawn from the Inspector's silence on the expansion point was that she had regarded Suffolk Wildlife Trust's response to NWA's statement of case as a complete explanation.
82. More than that, I think, would such an informed reader of the decision have understood how and why the Inspector had come to that conclusion? Not of course in any particular detail; a general understanding would be enough.
83. I do not find the point a particularly easy one. It is good to keep decisions concise. As I have said, they must not be read in any nitpicking way, and I have held that I am not prepared to say that the Inspector, on the evidence, failed to consider this point. I think she did consider it.
84. But when I stand back and I look at the reasons, or rather, complete absence of reasons that she gives about dealing with this expansion point, it seems to me the answer is that her reasons are not adequate. It is, of course, fair that the gap can, to a degree, be filled by the knowledge of those who were at the informal hearing. But there are too many blanks on this particular issue to say that they can be filled in by the knowledge of those who were the objectors to this proposal.
85. It seems to me that the Claimants do deserve a fuller explanation of the Inspector's reasoning on this point, rather than having to do what is, perhaps, little more than guess at what she might have said. I regret to say that I find that these reasons fall short of the necessary standard, treating them with all the generosity that is clearly urged upon the courts by authority.
86. For those reasons, and on that ground alone, it seems to me that this application must succeed, and the decision of the Inspector will be quashed.
87. MR SHADAREVIAN: I am grateful for that, my Lord, and may I apply for costs.
88. My Lord, ordinarily, anything less than one day can be summarily assessed. We do have assessments, each of us, and know that the first defendant has been issued with one element of that. Whether your Lordship wants to deal with that today or would rather have the costs issue dealt with, as it were, in another way, treating it as a case longer than a day, I do not know. But I can indicate by passing up to your Lordship what elements of our statement of costs are being challenged.
89. HIS HONOUR JUDGE MOLE: Yes. If it was a case longer a day it would be assessed adminstratively, in effect, would it not?
90. MR TROMANS: My Lord, that is my understanding. If it is less than a day, then normally it is summary assessment; if that is more than a day, then a detailed assessment, if not agreed.
91. HIS HONOUR JUDGE MOLE: Strictly speaking the case has lasted longer than a day. It started at 3pm yesterday and it is now 3.20pm.
92. MR SHADAREVIAN: That must be right, even by twenty minutes.
93. HIS HONOUR JUDGE MOLE: Twenty minutes is quite enough for me not to have to go into costs this afternoon. I am quite prepared to deal with it as if it were a case lasting longer than a day, and leave it to an administrative assessment.
94. I will simply say that in principle, it seems this to me that you are entitled to your costs, of course. Mr Shadarevian and I will leave them to be assessed adminstratively as a case that has lasted fractionally longer than a day.
95. MR SHADAREVIAN: I am very grateful.
96. HIS HONOUR JUDGE MOLE: Very well, thank you both for your helpful arguments and assistance.