England and Wales High Court (Administrative Court) Decisions

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Cite as: [2004] EWHC 654 (Admin)

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		Neutral Citation Number: [2004] EWHC 654 (Admin)

IN THE HIGH COURT OF JUSTICE
QUEEN'S BENCH DIVISION
THE ADMINISTRATIVE COURT

CO/5542/2003
Royal Courts of Justice
Strand
London WC2

Wednesday, 18th February 2004

B e f o r e :

MR JUSTICE PITCHFORD
____________________

	THE QUEEN ON THE APPLICATION OF KUMAR	(CLAIMANT)
	-v-
	THE LORD CHANCELLOR'S DEPARTMENT	(FIRST DEFENDANT)
	THE HOME OFFICE	(SECOND DEFENDANT)

____________________

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____________________

The CLAIMANT appeared as a litigant in person
The FIRST DEFENDANT was not represented
MISS K GRANGE (instructed by the Treasury Solicitor) appeared on behalf of the DEFENDANT
____________________

HTML VERSION OF JUDGMENT
____________________

MR JUSTICE PITCHFORD: This is a renewed application to proceed with a claim made on 21st October 2003 for judicial review of decisions made by the court in two civil actions; the first proceeding in the Stoke-on-Trent County Court, and the second in the High Court Stoke-on-Trent Registry.

The claimant, Mr Kumar, is a litigant in person and has, throughout, acted as such in his civil claims. The claim is made against the Lord Chancellor's department as first defendant and the Home Office as second defendant. The Home Office is represented today by Miss Grange, instructed by the Treasury Solicitor.

Mr Kumar's application was refused on paper by Munby J on 20th December 2003 when he observed, the claims arising out of the proceedings in the Stoke-on-Trent District Registry, if they have any merit at all, which I very much doubt, are not a proper subject of proceedings before the Administrative Court. The claimant's remedy is by appeal. The proceedings in the Administrative Court are an abuse of the process.

On 17th February the court received a letter from the claimant seeking an adjournment of this matter on the grounds of his ill health, but fortunately Mr Kumar is able to be here and has addressed me in person.

The claimant brought proceedings against the Home Office by issuing a claim form on or about 19th May 2003. The claimant says that the claim was issued on 19th May; the claim form itself is endorsed 20th May. It matters not, for present purposes, which is the correct date. By those proceedings the claimant sought damages for personal injury. The grounds of his claim were that the Home Office unlawfully retained his passport for a period of weeks following 3rd March 2003. As a result, the claimant claimed that he had suffered psychiatric injury, a loss of confidence, a sense of anger and betrayal, and so on.

In the course of the proceedings, the claimant issued two applications for judgment in default of defence. The first, apparently, on 13th June 2003 and the second on 2nd July 2003. On 3rd July the court listed one or both of the claimant's applications for hearing, to take place on 7th August at Stoke-on-Trent County Court. Meanwhile, on 3rd July the Home Office made application for a stay of the claim for a period of 3 months to enable further enquiries to be made or, in the alternative, for an extension of time to file a defence.

That application was heard by Deputy District Judge Anderton, sitting at Stoke-on-Trent, on 18th July 2003. The claimant appeared in person and the defendant was represented by counsel. The deputy district judge ordered that the application by the claimant for judgment in default should be dismissed, that the hearing listed for 7th August 2003 should be vacated, that there should be an extension of time for the defendant to file a defence until 29th August 2003, and finally, that there should be costs in the cause. That was, of course, a judicial decision based upon the material and submissions placed before him by the claimant, on the one hand, and counsel for the defendant on the other.

On 26th August 2003, District Judge Schroeder heard an application by the claimant for interim relief and the defendant's application to strike out the claimant's claim. He ordered that both of those applications should be adjourned to be heard together before a High Court judge sitting at Birmingham on the first open date after 3rd September 2003.

In his claim for judicial review, Mr Kumar seeks an order quashing the order of Deputy District Judge Anderton of 18th July 2003. However, at paragraph 11 of his detailed grounds of claim, Mr Kumar avers that he filed a notice of appeal against the decision of 18th July, on 24th July 2003 and that that appeal was still pending at the time when the claim for judicial review was issued.

All those events have been overtaken by a hearing which took place before Poole J at Birmingham Civil Justice Centre on 28th November; the hearing listed in pursuance of the order of District Judge Schroeder. Poole J, having heard the claimant in person, and counsel for the defendant, struck out the claimant's claim. He dismissed the claimant's cross-application, presumably for interim relief, and ordered the claimant to pay the costs.

The claimant's second action was issued in the High Court against officers or employees of Staffordshire University Students Union on 2nd June 2003. He claimed damages for libel, breach of trust, harassment, injury to feeling, and serious non-professional conduct by the student advisor. The file, including the claim form, was examined by District Judge Chapman on 9th July 2003, clearly exercising his case management powers. As the rules provide, in the exercise of his discretion he issued the following order without hearing the parties: That the claim should be stayed until 29th July 2003, save for the purpose of carrying out the rest of the order.

That comprised an order that the claimant must, by close of business on 28th July, file and serve an amended claim giving full particulars of the publication of the alleged liable; failing which, the claim or liable would be struck out. Further, the first defendant was to have permission to issue an application for summary judgment and if that were to occur by 28th July, the time for filing and serving of a defence would be extended to the date of determination of that application. Finally, any party affected by the order had liberty to apply to set it aside, vary it or stay it.

The claimant, Mr Kumar, purports to challenge that order in these judicial review proceedings, on grounds set out at paragraph 22 of his detailed grounds. He submits that the order was wrong in law and that there had been a breach of the obligation to act according to the demands of natural justice. The claimant sought to appeal that order and, in the meantime, he issued applications for summary judgment. The appeal was heard at Birmingham Civil Justice Centre on 14th August by His Honour Judge Fletcher. He heard the claimant in person, in absence of the defendant, and refused permission to appeal. There was no further appeal from that refusal of leave.

On 13th October 2003 Deputy District Judge Collis heard the defendant's application to strike out the claim. The claimant attended in person, the defendant was represented by solicitors and counsel. The deputy district judge ordered that the claim against the first defendant be struck out on the basis that the claim was without any foundation, and ordered the payment of costs to the defendant. As Mr Kumar rightly observes in his grounds, there is a clerical error in the publication of the order. It says that the claimant appeared by solicitors and counsel and the defendant was in person. It was, of course, the other way around.

Mr Kumar did not appeal the order of Deputy District Judge Collis of 13th October striking out his claim. It follows that in respect of each of these civil actions, the proceedings were terminated by orders that the claims be struck out. Against each of those orders, the claimant enjoyed a right of appeal. He did not exercise that right of appeal and may still, out of time, seek leave to appeal. Whether or not he would be successful must be regarded as a matter very much in doubt.

In my judgment, in common with Munby J, this claim for judicial review, for the reason I have just given, is manifestly an abuse of the process of the court. The claimant enjoyed a right of appeal against each of the orders which he now seeks to attack, by means of prerogative orders of the Administrative Court. Assuming for the moment that the court has, in exceptional circumstances, the power of regulation over judicial and/or administrative proceedings in the County Court and the High Court, this is manifestly not an appropriate case for the exercise of that jurisdiction. The claimant has, in my judgment, no prospect whatever of establishing otherwise and the application must be refused. Thank you both very much.