QUEEN'S BENCH DIVISION
THE ADMINISTRATIVE COURT
B e f o r e :
|THE QUEEN ON THE APPLICATION OF ABDUL KADIR TRAORE||(CLAIMANT)|
|IMMIGRATION APPEAL TRIBUNAL||(DEFENDANT)|
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(Official Shorthand Writers to the Court)
MR A SHARLAND (instructed by Treasury Solicitors) appeared on behalf of the DEFENDANT
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"As to his fear of arrest on his return to Guinea, I take the view that this is not merited. There is no reason to believe that the Guinean authorities would be aware of his arrest, or, if they were, that they would not accept that he had been arrested as a result of mistaken identity. Although the judiciary is routinely subject to undue influence in politically sensitive cases, there is nothing in the evidence before me to indicate that the appellant would not be given the opportunity to explain his case."
"The objective evidence that was before the Adjudicator, in any event, was in no way indicative of a change in circumstances in Guinea sufficient to establish that the risk on return was no longer that of a reasonable degree of likelihood/real risk. Indeed, the objective evidence was indicative of A's [that is the claimant's] claim being plausible (as accepted by the Adjudicator). The remarks of General Issa Sesay -- quoted by the Adjudicator at paragraph 23 of her determination -- as certainly not indicative that A would now be able to explain his innocence (when he clearly could not before). Indeed, the US State Department Report under the sub-heading 'Torture and other cruel inhuman or degrading treatment or punishment', is indicative of police brutality that is comparative to the brutality he experienced in February 2001."
"The Adjudicator found that the claimant was, on the whole, a credible witness. She accepted his account of events. On the particular circumstances and in the light of the country information, it was open to her to find that, whilst the claimant was at risk when he left Guinea, he would not be at risk on return. The grounds of appeal seek to misapply Arif. In the circumstances of this case the burden of proof does not shift to the respondent, evidentially or otherwise."
"(6) The Tribunal shall not be required to consider any grounds other than those included in the application.
(7) Leave to appeal should be granted only where:
(a) the Tribunal is satisfied that the appeal would have a real prospect of success; or
(b) there is some other compelling reason why the appeal should be heard."
" . . . the appellate authorities were neither limited by the arguments actually advanced nor required to engage in a search for new grounds; and that, since they were obliged to ensure that the applicant's removal would not contravene the United Kingdom's obligations under the Convention and Protocol, where there was a readily discernible and obvious point in his favour, which had not been taken on his behalf, they, and the High Court exercising its supervisory jurisdiction by way of judicial review, should nevertheless apply it."