England and Wales High Court (Administrative Court) Decisions

IN THE HIGH COURT OF JUSTICE
QUEEN'S BENCH DIVISION
DIVISIONAL COURT

		Royal Courts of Justice Strand London WC2
		21st November 2003

Friday, 21st November 2003
1. LORD JUSTICE KENNEDY: This is an application by Her Majesty's Attorney General for an order under section 42 of the Supreme Court Act 1981 against Ram Pratap Saxena in these terms:

"1. No civil proceedings shall without the leave of the High Court be instituted by you in any court;

2. Any civil proceedings instituted by you in any court before the making of the Order shall not be continued by you without the leave of the High Court;

3. No application, (other than an application for leave under section 42 of the Supreme Court Act 1981), shall without the leave of the High Court be made by you in any civil proceedings instituted by you or by [any person on your behalf] in any court."

2. The reason for the application is that it is contended that the respondent has "habitually and persistently and without reasonable grounds instituted proceedings in civil courts". If that is true, then we in this court may, after hearing the respondent or giving him an opportunity to be heard, make the civil proceedings order which is sought either for the specified period or without limit of time.
3. The authority to make this application was granted by the Solicitor General on 14th February 2003, and the proceedings which have led to today's hearing were commenced on 3rd October 2003. On 10th October 2003 the respondent was served personally with the material upon which the Attorney General relies in support of this application; and that is apparent from the statement of a process server, Mr Ben Murray, which has been placed before us.
4. Subsequently the respondent wrote to the Administrative Court Office, after having been advised that the date fixed for the hearing was today's date, asking that today's date be adjourned because he had a hospital appointment. That letter was received by the Administrative Court Office on 30th October 2003 and on 3rd November 2003 the office responded to Dr Saxena in these terms:

"Thank you for your letter received in the Administrative Court on 30th October 2003. I have been asked by the lawyer that you send in to us as soon as possible a copy of your hospital appointment details before a decision can be taken in respect of vacating the hearing date."

Since then, so far as the court is concerned, there has been no response. In those circumstances, we came to the conclusion at the outset of today's proceedings that we would not grant the adjournment sought and proceed with the matter today.

5. In summary, Dr Saxena has made 25 applications for judicial review since 1999, and since 1985 he has been involved in 22 other actions in various courts on which the Attorney General relies, details of which are to be found in the statement made in support of this application by Rowena Wisniewska and in the documentation which has been served on the respondent.
6. The litigation stems from two sets of proceedings for divorce and ancillary relief and from bankruptcy proceedings and, perhaps to a lesser extent, from four criminal convictions which have been recorded against Dr Saxena.
7. Turning to the first set of proceedings, the divorce and the ancillary relief; on 18th February 1986 the marriage of Dr Saxena to Dr Usha Saxena was dissolved by decree nisi in the Wolverhampton County Court. There were between 1994 and 1995 ancillary relief proceedings in relation to that marriage. On 22nd July 1994 District Judge Ellison, in the Leeds County Court, made an order which required Dr Saxena to transfer his interest in a house at West Ardsley, West Yorkshire, and two insurance policies to his former wife for the benefit of their son and daughter. He appealed against that order, and on 16th August 1995 Judge Altman dismissed that appeal with costs. There was a complaint by Dr Saxena in relation to his representation in the court below and he also complained that there had been a failure to take account of Asian culture. Judge Altman was asked on that occasion to grant leave to appeal from his judgment. In relation to that he said:

"Dr Saxena is trying to use these proceedings as a platform for raising general matters which he feels should be aired publicly. That is a misuse of the procedures of the court and accordingly his application for leave to appeal is dismissed."

Nevertheless, Dr Saxena applied to the Court of Appeal for permission to appeal. That application was eventually not pursued and was therefore dismissed.

8. On 21st September 1998, some three years later, he applied to the Court of Appeal to reinstate his application for permission to appeal. That came before Thorpe LJ on 17th December 1998, when Thorpe LJ said that it was an absolutely hopeless application to reinstate, as hopeless as was the original application for leave to appeal.
9. I turn now to the second set proceedings of divorce and ancillary relief.
10. On 9th August 1996 Dr Saxena married KK. She obtained a divorce from him in 1999. In the proceedings for ancillary relief District Judge McGrath was highly critical of Dr Saxena, who had, as the District Judge found, obfuscated and misled the court about his assets. He was therefore ordered to pay 75% of the costs. Once again he appealed. That appeal came before Judge Bloom QC on 21st February 2003, and on that occasion Dr Saxena again was unsuccessful. He sought permission to appeal against that order unsuccessfully.
11. Turning now to bankruptcy, on 4th December 1997 Dr Usha Anand, Dr Saxena's first wife, served a statutory demand followed by a bankruptcy petition. On 28th January 1998 he attempted, unsuccessfully, to have the statutory demand set aside. In February 1998 he was sentenced to a period of imprisonment, and the first date for the bankruptcy hearing was adjourned because of his imprisonment. But the matter came back before District Judge Griffiths on 23rd April 1998, when the District Judge considered whether to adjourn the matter further because of Dr Saxena's imprisonment. He decided not to do so and adjudged Dr Saxena bankrupt. On 13th July 1998 he applied to set aside the bankruptcy order, and that application was dismissed by Jonathan Parker J, as he then was. On 27th July 1998 Judge Rich dismissed an application by Dr Saxena to annul the bankruptcy order, and on 12th August 1998 Judge Maddocks considered and dismissed four applications by Dr Saxena in relation to the terms of the bankruptcy order. Judge Maddocks also made what is described as a Grepe v Loam order against Dr Saxena, restricting any further application by him except by leave of the judge. It was not the only such order made against Dr Saxena in the course of his various forms of litigation.
12. Dr Saxena sought leave to appeal against the order of Judge Maddocks and the order made by Jonathan Parker J and the order of Judge Rich. That came before Pill LJ on 30th March 2000, when Pill LJ dismissed all of those applications.
13. In today's proceedings it has been made entirely clear by Mr O'Connor that the Attorney General does not rely on criminal matters; but it is necessary to set the background to the civil litigation and, as part of that background, it is therefore necessary to recall that on 5th February 1998 Dr Saxena pleaded guilty at Manchester Crown Court to two offences of perverting the course of justice and was sentenced to nine months' imprisonment. Indeed, that is the period of imprisonment to which I have already referred. He tried unsuccessfully to appeal against both sentence and conviction and between September 1999 and March 2000 he stood trial on three occasions and was convicted of offences under the Insolvency Act 1986, the Perjury Act 1911, the Forgery Act 1981 and of attempting to obtain property by deception. In April 2000, for those offences, he was sentenced to two years' imprisonment. He then sought leave to appeal, and when that was refused he renewed his application to the full court which dismissed that application on 19th July 2002.
14. Turning now to his application for judicial review, after his conviction in February 1998 Dr Saxena tried to persuade the County Court to reinstate his appeal. On 24th September 1999 he sought judicial review of the court's refusal to do as he asked and he made a series of complaints against the police, the prison service and the solicitors who had acted for him which, on the face of them, appeared extravagant. On 4th November 1999 Scott Baker J heard Dr Saxena in person and adjourned the matter at that stage in order to enable Dr Saxena, if he wished, to produce further evidence. The matter came back before Latham J on 1st February 2000, when it was once again adjourned to enable Dr Saxena to get some documentary evidence. It came back once again before Hooper J on 25th February 2000, when Hooper J dismissed the application, Dr Saxena on that occasion having failed to attend.
15. I turn now to an application made in respect of Bow Street Magistrates Court.
16. On 25th September 1998 Dr Saxena attended the Bow Street Magistrates Court and attempted to have a prosecution brought against his second wife, KK. On 26th September the Deputy Chief Clerk at that court wrote to Dr Saxena to indicate that, having looked at the bundle of papers, a Magistrate of that court had come to the conclusion that they did not offer sufficient information to enable a decision to be made. On 26th September 1999, that is to say a year later, Dr Saxena made an application for leave to apply for judicial review of the decision which he claimed had been made in the letter which indicated that there was insufficient information. The allegations which he was making at that time in relation to KK included adultery, attempted murder, drug dealing, prostitution, obtaining a visa to remain in the UK by fraud and deception, threats to kill, perverting the course of justice, assault and theft. He also alleged criminal behaviour on the part of a person working in the "emigration and visa office", as he described it, at Manchester Airport, and he made a number of other allegations, including institutional racism in the Greater Manchester Police and procedural irregularities in the way that Bow Street Magistrates Court dealt with his application.
17. On 4th November 1999 Scott Baker J adjourned Dr Saxena's application to enable a Crown Office lawyer to write to the Deputy Chief Clerk of Bow Street Magistrates Court to obtain some clarification as to what had happened. Subsequently, on 20th December 1999, Sullivan J refused permission to apply for judicial review. On 25th February 2000, Dr Saxena having once again made oral submissions, the Divisional Court confirmed the decision of Sullivan J and thus brought that matter to an end.
18. I turn now to proceedings in relation to Manchester County Court.
19. Following his first divorce and subsequent bankruptcy, Dr Saxena made an application dated October 1999 for judicial review and sought to set aside the bankruptcy order which had been made on 23rd April 1998. Those papers were lodged with the Manchester District Registry of the High Court on 10th July 1998. The respondents on that occasion were Dr Saxena's first wife, Usha Anand, and her solicitors, Henry Hyams & Company. The ground on which relief was sought was that Dr Saxena could not attend the hearing in which he was adjudged bankrupt and that his appeal in the Royal Court of Justice was, as he described it, "functional". On 29th December 1999 Sullivan J heard submissions from Dr Saxena and refused permission to apply for judicial review.
20. I turn now to proceedings concerning Barclays Life Assurance Company.
21. On 25th February 2000 Dr Saxena made an application for judicial review of the decision of that company, which was described on the claim form as "declining to honour a claim dated 22nd October 1997". It appears that Barclays was paying Dr Saxena a monthly sum pursuant to his claim under a policy that he had held since 1992. However, following his bankruptcy, Barclays ceased making the payment to him and began, properly on the face of it, to deal with the trustee in bankruptcy. In his supporting affidavit, Dr Saxena alleged that the trustee, was part of an establishment plot, and he stated:

"Barclays is a racialist bank, proved in the past. They are still practising racialism".

Dr Saxena claimed that the maladministration (as he described it) of his case constituted a breach of human rights and was contrary to the rules of natural justice. On 3rd May 2000 Burton J considered written submissions in open court in the absence of the parties, Dr Saxena being in prison on that date, and refused permission.

22. I turn now to a matter concerning Bristol & West Building Society.
23. On 3rd August 1999 Deputy District Judge Woodcraft granted possession of Dr Saxena's home in Henley Road, London, to the Bristol & West Building Society. Until repossessed, the property was an asset in Dr Saxena's bankruptcy, and Dr Saxena had no authority to deal with it. Nevertheless, he made an application dated 29th November 1999 complaining about the building society's failure to complete and to return to him the form M1 12 for mortgage interest relief. On hearing the parties on 29th November 1999, District Judge Silverman suspended the warrant for possession on condition that all arrears were cleared by 4.00 p.m. on Wednesday 1st December 1999. The judge also made a Grepe v Loam order, preventing any further applications by Dr Saxena without leave of the Circuit Judge. Dr Saxena then applied on 23rd December for leave of the Circuit Judge to apply for relief against what he described as "deceitful activity by Bristol & West ... and making Defendant homeless". On 25th February 2000 he made an application for judicial review of the actions of the Bristol & West Building Society, claiming for the repossession of his home. The relief sought included a claim for compensation exceeding £50,000 based on the building society's failure to process the M1 12 form sent to it by Dr Saxena. In support of the judicial review application there was an affidavit which complained of unjust and illogical conduct on the part of the building society and corruption on the part of the trustee in bankruptcy. He said that the trustee and the building society told him that they would racially discriminate against him and that they had instructions from MI5 and MI6 to victimise him. There were also allegations that the trustee in bankruptcy locked Dr Saxena and his eight-year old son in a boarded-up house. On 3rd May 2000 Burton J considered written submissions in relation to that matter in open court and refused permission.
24. I turn now to matters concerning Robert Meens of Cook Gully and N A Bradbury.
25. On 25th February 2000 Dr Saxena sought leave to apply for judicial review once again in relation to his bankruptcy, but on this occasion concerning his trustee in bankruptcy. The claim form alleged that the trustee was corrupt and had tortured Dr Saxena. It repeated the allegation of false imprisonment of Dr Saxena and his eight-year old son and contended that certain property belonged to a family trust and was being wrongly held in bankruptcy. That application was refused by Burton J on 3rd May 2000.
26. On 27th July 2000 Moses J considered six applications and said of them:

"These are applications by Dr Saxena against the prison authorities, either the prison service or particular prison officers ... In all these applications the applicant, who is a prisoner, complains of different incidents in relation to his treatment in prison."

He described himself as a "male political prisoner", he alleged that he had been strip-searched and tortured, including being strangled by his own shirt collar, and also made references to threats to kill him. He also complained that when he was in difficulties, rather than receiving sympathy and medical treatment, he was given what he described as "antisimitic order to get up".

27. On 27th July 2000 Moses J delivered a short judgment in relation to all of those related applications. Dr Saxena appeared on his own behalf. As to the application, what the judge said was that two of them complained essentially about the same incident, and he adjourned the proceedings so that Dr Saxena might obtain legal advice. In relation to four other applications the judge said that they were wholly without merit. On 6th October 2000 the matter came before Hooper J and Hooper J then refused permission in relation to the two remaining outstanding applications. On 16th May 2001 Dr Saxena appeared before the Court of Appeal seeking permission to appeal from the decisions of both Moses J and Hooper J. Longmore LJ then considered the applications and he dismissed all of them.
28. I turn now to proceedings concerning the Home Office.
29. On 6th October 2000 Dr Saxena filed a claim form for judicial review in which he referred to what he described as an unauthorised "doctored" phone card which was found on his person during the random search on 28th September 2000. He said that he had been "tortured many times these last eight months. They even tried to take my life". He argued that the search in question was designed to humiliate an Asian/coloured prison medical officer. He had at one time been a prison medical officer, as far as I can discover, in a locum capacity. On 1st December 2000 Rafferty J considered the papers and refused permission for judicial review.
30. I turn now to other proceedings against the prison service.
31. On 1st February 2001 Dr Saxena applied for judicial review of the decision of the prison service not to offer him home detention curfew as an alternative to continued confinement. One of his allegations on that occasion was that they "paralysed my sixth cranial nerve by hitting". The claim form was accompanied by witness statements and a chronology; the chronology appeared to contain a good deal of incomprehensible and irrelevant material including:

"20 October 1995: Defendant hooked with help of a girl (Double agent); 25 October 1995: Every day death in custody; 28 February 1998: Lecturing in public on Princess Diana. Freedom of speech; 3 January 2001: torture regimen".

32. On 12th March 2001 Sullivan J refused permission in relation to that application. Dr Saxena renewed his application for permission at an oral hearing on 23rd May 2001, and Ouseley J delivered a short judgment, refusing permission, in which he stated that it was "in the worst sense an entirely academic application" and that "no useful purpose would be served by these proceedings and no useful remedy could be granted". He found, in any event, that the decision on the home detention curfew had been "carefully considered" and was "not legally challengeable".
33. I turn now to proceedings concerning Henry Hyams & Company and the Official Receiver.
34. Following his release from prison on 28th February 2001, on 19th March 2001 Dr Saxena issued a judicial review claim form seeking the discharge of the bankruptcy order and claiming damages of £8 million (approximately) against Henry Hyams & Company, the solicitors formerly acting for his first wife. The witness statement in those proceedings contained allegations of fraud and conspiracy against an individual solicitor of Henry Hyams & Company, Mr Lloyd Bergan, and an allegation that Mr Bergan used what was described as his "freemasonry influence" with the judges in order to obtain Dr Saxena's bankruptcy. The apparent legal basis for the application was the decision in Levy v Legal Services Commission (Court of Appeal, 10th November 2000) that a costs obligation in family proceedings is not a debt provable in bankruptcy. That is a decision to which Dr Saxena has made reference on more than one occasion. He repeated his allegations against Lloyd Bergan in a further typed affidavit and described his behaviour as behaviour which "will be classed as Osama bin Laden and his training camp".
35. On 15th August 2001 Scott-Baker J refused permission on the papers, observing that "the application is long out of time quite apart from being unarguable". On 10th October 2001, following a renewed application for permission in an oral hearing at which Dr Saxena appeared in person, Elias J gave a brief judgment, referring to the proceedings as "wholly misconceived", when refusing permission. Dr Saxena then applied to the Court of Appeal for permission to appeal which was refused by Auld LJ on 20th February 2002.
36. I turn now to proceedings concerning the Department of Trade and Industry and the Official Receiver.
37. On 22nd March 2001 Dr Saxena lodged an application for judicial review on the grounds that the then Secretary of State for the Department of Trade industry, Peter Mandelson,

"... tried to make many people bankrupt specially the couple in ancillary relief. Specially those who have two or three houses or factories".

Once again there was reference to the decision in Levy. The claim form contained further complaints relating to Price Waterhouse Coopers, who were acting as trustee in Dr Saxena's bankruptcy, and it was asserted that the Secretary of State and Price Waterhouse Coopers were involved in bribery and corruption. There was a witness statement filed in those proceedings which made further reference to Dr Saxena's second wife, who was alleged to be "an illegal immigrant and under police investigation for other activities" and "a shield for the police to convict me". He submitted what he described as a skeleton argument, in which he said:

"Price Waterhouse Coopers is also paedophile promotor.".

He concluded that

"there is a witch-hunt against a reformer/doctor who is linked to Princess Diana Institute of Stress".

The Treasury Solicitor acknowledged service of the application and lodged summary grounds for contesting the claim. The matter came before Scott Baker J on 15th June 2001, when permission was refused on the papers and the judge observed that the application was out of time, quite apart from other difficulties outlined in the acknowledgement of service.

38. I turn now to proceedings concerning the probation service.
39. This application arose out of a refusal of the probation service to allow Dr Saxena to travel abroad whilst on probation. He filed an application on 22nd June 2001 seeking certain remedies, namely:

"(1) stop the sleaze; (2) stop the racialism; (3) claimant is loosing his self esteem due to dictator behaviour of probation officers;... (4) I cannot go out of country to practice medicine I am losing a lot of money".

The matter came before Harrison J on 31st August 2001 when permission was refused on the papers and the judge observed:

"The papers do not disclose any arguable grounds for judicial review."

There then followed an oral hearing and a renewed application for permission on 29th October 2001, when Scott-Baker J refused permission and awarded costs against Dr Saxena whilst ordering that the files relating to Dr Saxena be sent to the Attorney General for consideration of the institution of the proceedings which have come before us today.

40. I turn now to another set of proceedings concerning the Official Receiver of the court and Price Waterhouse Coopers as an interested party.
41. In this application, made on 29th June 2001, Dr Saxena sought the annulment of the bankruptcy order against him and the return of various properties. The claim form made a number of allegations of professional negligence and criminal behaviour against the trustee in bankruptcy. The defendant, Price Waterhouse Coopers, wrote to the court office on 14th May 2002 drawing attention to the Grepe v Loam order made by His Honour Judge Maddocks, and the court, the Chancery Listing Office, then ordered that the application be vacated because he had not sought leave to make it. At about the same time, on 4th January 2002, Dr Saxena commenced proceedings in the Chancery Division of the High Court against the same defendant, apparently dealing with similar facts. Those proceeding were considered in judgments of Pill LJ on 23rd July 2002 and 11th October 2002, and Dr Saxena's application in those proceedings were struck out as an abuse of process by Judge Holman on 9th June 2003.
42. I turn now to proceedings concerning the Legal Services Commission.
43. On 17th September 2001 Dr Saxena complained about the refusal of legal aid in the ancillary relief proceedings between himself and his second wife and also in relation to an application for judicial review. The Legal Services Commission had suspended Dr Saxena's certificate for legal funding in the ancillary relief proceedings on 20th August 2001, following counsel's unfavourable opinion. The remedies sought in the claim form included "lift the embargo, counsel's unfavourable opinion, allow legal aid, please". On 12th October 2001 Elias J made an order refusing permission on the papers. Dr Saxena renewed his application for judicial review orally and appeared before Jackson J on 8th October 2002. Jackson J refused permission in a short judgment, stating that the proposed proceedings were doomed to failure. Dr Saxena then applied to the Court of Appeal for permission to appeal. Latham LJ found that Jackson J's dismissal of the application

"was based on his conclusion that there was no prospect of success for the reasons he fully and clearly set out in his judgment with which I entirely agree. This was a hopeless application."

44. I turn now to proceedings against the manager of the bankrupt estate, that is to say of the Official Receiver and Price Waterhouse Coopers, begun on 19th September 2001, when Dr Saxena sought judicial review of the Official Receiver's failure to apply for annulment of the bankruptcy order and an interim injunction requiring the Official Receiver to deliver up to Dr Saxena possession of a pharmaceutical factory and residence, as well as a claim for "2. certiorari; 3. damages; 4. costs". Dr Saxena once again complained of having been declared bankrupt in his absence. He said that the bankruptcy was wrongly ordered and that there was fraud on the part of the Official Receiver. That particular application appears to be still formally on paper without any further order having been made in relation to it.
45. In May 2002 Richards J heard three applications for judicial review by Dr Saxena. The first was an application by him for review of the decision made on 11th September 2001 by the Driving and Vehicle Licensing Centre, refusing his application for a driving licence on the recommendation of a medical adviser. The judge mentioned that a statutory appeal procedure existed in relation to such a refusal which could be challenged in the Magistrates Court. Dr Saxena had made use of that appeal procedure and his appeal had been refused. The judge therefore refused permission, saying:

"I am satisfied that Dr Saxena's attempt to relitigate the issues that he had already dealt with on appeal before the Magistrates Court was wholly misconceived."

46. The second application Richards J considered was an application filed on 28th September 2001 in which he alleged that the Home Office had issued a visa for his second wife on the basis of bribery. Scott-Baker J refused permission on the papers on 15th March 2002, and Dr Saxena renewed his application for permission orally before Richards J, who refused permission again. On that occasion the judge found that no reasons were advanced why any such decision, if it exists, was said to have been unlawful. The claimant's claim was clearly unsustainable on the documents. It is plain that it is a wholly misconceived application and it is frankly wasting the time of the court.
47. The third application was an application for judicial review of the National Health Service Pensions Agency to refuse Dr Saxena an ill-health pension. A letter had been sent from the Pensions Agency on 28th February 2002 which indicated that the pension in question was withdrawn because it had come to light that Dr Saxena had provided a false date of birth and used an unauthorised address in support of his application. The judge found that there was simply no ground of challenge to the Agency's stance and refused permission.
48. Dr Saxena appealed all three refusals of permission to the Court of Appeal, and Nourse LJ considered the application on 10th October 2002, when Dr Saxena did not attend. Having read the documents and the judgments of Richards J, Nourse LJ did not find it necessary to say any more than that all three applications were conspicuously misconceived and that Richards J had been right to refuse permission in each case for the reasons he gave.
49. Dr Saxena then made an oral application, which came before Auld LJ on 26th February 2003, in which he sought to reopen the matter. The applications were refused. It was argued that by determining the matter in his absence Nourse LJ had breached Dr Saxena's right to a fair trial under Article 6 of the European Convention on Human Rights. Auld LJ found that there was no substance or merit in the application to reinstate his application for permission and that Dr Saxena could not complain about Nourse LJ proceeding in his absence. Auld LJ said that Dr Saxena had been clearly notified that the matter was listed, but, having failed to show any good reason medical or otherwise why he did not attend to prosecute the application, the matter would therefore have to remain as had been decided. In relation to the complaint against the Home Office and Dr Saxena's second wife, the Lord Justice said that he was as baffled as Richards J was as to the basis upon which Dr Saxena could possibly have asked the Administrative Court to intervene in what was essentially matrimonial and/or possibly even criminal matters, matters for entirely different tribunals, if at all.
50. I turn now to a matter concerning Price Waterhouse Coopers and the Department of Trade and Industry.
51. On 20th December 2002 this matter came before Lightman J. It was, on the face of it, a further application for judicial review challenging the conduct of the trustees in bankruptcy, Price Waterhouse Coopers, and seeking to challenge the Grepe v Loam order made in 1998. Lightman J informed Dr Saxena that the Administrative Court could not deal with the matters which he was then seeking to raise.
52. Dr Saxena also brought property proceedings against his second wife, including a claim, lodged in September 2001, for the recovery of property and a claim, lodged in January 2003, for the recovery of other property. Master Bowles gave summary judgment against Dr Saxena under Part 24 of the Civil Procedure Rules in the first of those actions on 19th April 2002; and Dr Saxena applied eventually to the Court of Appeal for permission to appeal against the order for costs and was unsuccessful. Master Bowles struck out the second of the claims, which repeated the content of the first claim, with costs on 20th June 2003. Dr Saxena also instituted proceedings in the Edmonton County Court in March 1990 alleging professional negligence against the solicitors whom he had instructed in the ancillary relief proceedings between himself and his first wife. That claim was struck out by District Judge Silverman on 14th July 1990, then Dr Saxena's appeals were dismissed by Judge Riddle on 22nd September 1999 and by Pill LJ on 30th March 2000.
53. Since the statement of Rowena Wisniewska was prepared, there have come to light two further sets of proceedings. On 3rd September 2003 the Vice Chancellor considered yet more proceedings in relation to Price Waterhouse in which, once again, Dr Saxena was seeking to challenge the orders originally made, to which I have already referred. In the judgment which he gave on that occasion, the Vice Chancellor said this:

"It is clear from the documents before me that Mr Saxena has a long-standing resentment against the courts and the manner in which he has been dealt with. He makes a number of allegations about freemasonry, breaches of human rights and serious allegations against solicitors who acted for Price Waterhouse Coopers at an early stage. I am not concerned with any of those allegations. I am concerned solely with the simple question of whether I should give permission to appeal from the order of Lloyd J to which I have referred.

Under the rules permission to appeal is granted if there is a real prospect of success; that is to say a prospect more than merely fanciful, or alternatively, if there are compelling reasons why the matter should be investigated by the Court of Appeal. I do not think that either of those tests are satisfied. I can see no ground at all, reasonable or otherwise, for considering that an appeal, if I gave leave to appeal from the order of Lloyd J, has any prospect of success at all; and I can see no reason why the Court of Appeal should be engaged in discussing the other matters which Dr Saxena has referred to which do not appear to me to be relevant to the order which he seeks to appeal."

54. On 2nd October 2003 Dr Saxena appeared in person before May LJ. On that occasion he was seeking to appeal an order of Pitchers J made on 31st March 2003. Once again, the Lord Justice said (at paragraph 7 of his judgment) that in his view there was

"no important point of principle or practice here, nor other compelling reason, why the appeal should proceed".

A little later:

"Whatever the procedural complications as to what happened subsequently may have been, Pitchers J was, in my view, entirely correct in reaching the conclusion that there was no prospect of success in appealing the order of Master Ungley. I reach exactly the same conclusion, and it seems to me in those circumstances that this claimant has no real prospect of successfully appealing Pitchers J's order."

55. Mr O'Connor submitted to us that one of the reasons, when looking at the matter as a whole, for this court deciding that a civil proceedings order would be appropriate is the persistent attempts to appeal the unappealable; and those two recent decisions are examples, as it seems to me, of just that.
56. In all these circumstances I am satisfied that the respondent, Dr Saxena, has habitually and persistently and without reasonable grounds instituted proceedings in the civil courts. Consequently, this court has the discretion, after he has been given (as he clearly has) the opportunity to be heard, to make the Civil Proceedings Order which the Attorney General seeks. In my judgment that discretion should be exercised in the way for which the Attorney General contends and the order should be made.
57. The question then arises as to whether the order should be made for a specified period or without limit of time. In my judgment, having regard to the length of time over which Dr Saxena has been habitually and persistently and without reasonable grounds instituting proceedings and continuing proceedings, the only appropriate course at this stage is to make the order sought without limit of time.
58. Accordingly, I will so order.
59. MR JUSTICE MACKAY: I agree.
60. MR O'CONNOR: I am grateful, my Lord. There is no application for costs.
61. LORD JUSTICE KENNEDY: I am grateful to you. Thank you very much for your assistance.
(The Court Adjourned)