England and Wales High Court (Administrative Court) Decisions

IN THE HIGH COURT OF JUSTICE
QUEEN'S BENCH DIVISION
DIVISIONAL COURT

		Royal Courts of Justice Strand London WC2
		Tuesday, 15th July 2003

Tuesday, 15th July 2003

1. LORD JUSTICE DYSON: This is an application for permission to challenge a default costs certificate issued by the Solicitors Disciplinary Tribunal ("the Tribunal") on 4th October 2002 against Dr Adoko in the sum of £6,119.80.
2. The history of this matter is fully set out in the statement of Jonathan Goodwin and the summary that follows draws heavily on that statement.
3. The Tribunal decision which has given rise to these proceedings related to the conduct of Dr Adoko in publishing allegations against individuals based on information that had come into his possession whilst he was acting for a client as an unadmitted clerk in a solicitor's practice. The Tribunal found that he had been guilty of conduct of such a nature that it would be undesirable for him to be employed as a solicitor or a solicitor's clerk, and ordered that no solicitor should employ him without the permission of the Law Society.
4. The order was made pursuant to section 43(2) of the Solicitors Act 1974.
5. The Tribunal has jurisdiction to award costs against a solicitor in such a case by virtue of section 43(1)(a) and 43(4) of the Act. In this case, on 14th June 2001, the Tribunal ordered that he pay "the costs of and incidental to the application and inquiry, such costs to be subject to a detailed assessment if not agreed between the parties".
6. Following that order, Mr Goodwin, who is a solicitor who is acting for the Office of the Supervision of Solicitors, the OSS, wrote to Dr Adoko on 17th July 2001, setting out the details of the costs that had been incurred. Dr Adoko replied on 24th July, saying that he disputed both the award itself and the quantum, but he gave no details as to the basis upon which he did dispute them.
7. There was further correspondence, but he continued to fail to articulate any objection to the costs bill, other than to say in a letter, which is wrongly dated 14th June 2001, but was apparently written on 14th August:

"As you are aware, I have lodged cases in court, against the Tribunal, its Chairman and secretary challenging the legal validity of the proceedings. As far as I am concerned, the proceedings was a nullity and the conduct of all those who participated in it, including your conduct, amounted to a criminal offence of perversion of the course of public justice".

8. On 13th March 2002, Mr Goodwin served a notice of commencement of assessment bill of costs on Dr Adoko. Dr Adoko failed to serve any points of dispute. On 30th September, Mr Goodwin filed and served on Dr Adoko a request for a default costs certificate pursuant to CPR47.9. The default costs certificate in the sum of £6,110.80 was issued on 4th October 2002 and served on Dr Adoko by letter dated 14th October.
9. Dr Adoko sought to challenge the underlying decision of the Tribunal, as well as the default certificate. In the first instance, he issued private law proceedings. These were struck out by Hooper J on 5th November 2001 as an abuse of process. Dr Adoko then sought to launch the same challenge, at any rate in respect of the default certificate, by way of judicial review proceedings. Permission was refused by Lightman J on 2nd December 2002 on the grounds that any challenge should have been by way of statutory appeal to the High Court, but that, in any event, such a challenge would have been quite hopeless. Dr Adoko now seeks to appeal against the certificate.
10. The correct way to challenge the default costs certificate is by way of an application to set aside the certificate under CPR47.12 and not by way of an appeal. As Miss Phelps points out in her skeleton argument, for which we are grateful, no appeal can lie in respect of a default costs certificate, since the correct route is the one to which I have referred.
11. Moreover, an application under CPR47.12 must be supported by evidence demonstrating "a good reason why detailed assessment proceedings should continue": see CPR47.12(2). No such reason has been adduced.
12. If Dr Adoko had wished to challenge the order for costs itself, then the proper approach would have been to appeal to the High Court pursuant to section 49 of the 1974 Act. Such an application had to be made within 14 days of the filing of the decision with the Law Society, that is to say by 26th September 2001.
13. It follows that any challenge to the order for costs itself would now be hugely out of time. None has yet been made. The only route to challenge the default costs certificate is the one to which I have referred. It has not been pursued. It is also far too late to explore that avenue as well. For the reasons that I have given, Dr Adoko cannot appeal against the default costs certificate. This application/appeal is therefore dismissed.