QUEEN'S BENCH DIVISION
THE ADMINISTRATIVE COURT
B e f o r e :
|THE QUEEN ON THE APPLICATION OF FASUYI||(APPELLANT)|
|FIRST SECRETARY OF STATE||(RESPONDENT)|
Smith Bernal Wordwave Limited
190 Fleet Street London EC4A 2AG
Tel No: 020 7404 1400 Fax No: 020 7831 8838
(Official Shorthand Writers to the Court)
MR J AUBURN (instructed by Treasury Solicitors) appeared on behalf of the DEFENDANT
Crown Copyright ©
Monday, 9th June 2003
"The appellant has drawn my attention to the planning history of 24A Plumstead High Street and seeks to argue that any residential use of the first floor in the past has been unauthorised. However, this matter is not before me and I shall therefore deal with the appeal as submitted on its planning merits, as being for the change of use of the first floor from residential to business/office use."
"Planning permission will not be granted for a change of use or redevelopment that would result in the net loss of residential accommodation."
There are then limited exceptions, which are not applicable in this case. S20 is as follows:
"In all shopping areas residential uses above shops will be retained (except in the circumstances identified in Policy S19)."
"Accordingly, the former provisions at section 53 of the 1971 Act have been repealed and replaced by an entirely new and fully comprehensive code in Part VII of the 1990 Act. In the light of these new provisions it is clear, in my judgment, that in relation to the very limited and specific points arising in this case, the authorities of Wells and Western Fish Products in relation to the former sections 43 and 53 cannot represent the position arising from the new and different statutory provisions. It would no longer be consistent with the scheme of the Act as a whole for an applicant to be able to require the local planning authority or the Secretary of State to determine whether planning permission is required as part of a planning application. Such a determination would side-step the detailed and comprehensive scheme enacted by Parliament whose provisions, of course, are for the protection of the interests of the public, as well as those of the applicant and the local planning authority. Accordingly, in my judgment, it can no longer be open to an applicant, as part of an application for planning permission under section 62 of the Act, expressly or impliedly to seek a determination that planning permission is not required for the development for which planning permission is expressly sought, nor does the determining authority have jurisdiction to make such determination."