England and Wales High Court (Administrative Court) Decisions

IN THE HIGH COURT OF JUSTICE
QUEEN'S BENCH DIVISION
THE ADMINISTRATIVE COURT

		Royal Courts of Justice Strand London WC2
		19 May 2003

1. MR JUSTICE OWEN: On 8th July 2002, an information was preferred against the appellant that, on 6th March 2002, he drove a motorcar on a restricted road, the A443 at Hallow in Worcestershire, at a speed in excess of the speed limit, contrary to section 81(1) and 89(1) of the Road Traffic Regulation Act 1984 and Schedule 2 of the Road Traffic Offenders Act 1988. The appellant pleaded not guilty. Having heard evidence, the magistrates found the following facts: that on 6th March 2002, Police Constable Powell was conducting speed enforcement duties on the A443; that it was subject to a restricted speed limit of 30 miles per hour; that PC Powell was operating a Speedmaster DS3 device and the detection of speed was by automatic camera, which recorded the appellant's vehicle travelling at a speed of 36 miles per hour in a 30 mile per hour speed limit area.
2. It was apparently contended by the appellant before the magistrates that the equipment used to calculate his speed was used incorrectly as there was no corroboration of the recorded speed. He sought to rely on section 89(2) of the Road Traffic Regulation Act 1984, stating that a person prosecuted for speeding:

"Shall not be liable to be convicted solely on the evidence of one witness to the effect that, in the opinion of the witness, the person prosecuted was driving the vehicle at a speed exceeding a specified limit."

3. It is important to stress that that was the issue that was addressed by the magistrates and was the issue central to the case that they were required to state. When the matter came before me today, Mr Duck candidly acknowledged that was not a ground that he could or should pursue. He put the case today in a different way. He referred me to the operating instructions for the Speedmaster DS3, and pointed to the requirement within the manual that where the machine is being operated on automatic, a means of cross-checking the accuracy of the machine should be provided. That is done by fixed markings on the road surface. The difficulty, of course, is that, as I understand it, the evidence adduced before the magistrates simply did not go to that issue. It would, of course, have been open to the appellant to have raised that issue in cross-examination of the police officer, but he did not do so.
4. Accordingly, the magistrates found that "the automatic camera device was accurate and functioning correctly", that "the machine was certificated and approved by the Secretary of State", and that the machine took "two readings thus corroborating itself, if the readings do not match then the machine aborts". They therefore convicted the appellant.
5. I have been taken today to the statutory provisions, in particular to section 20 of the Road Traffic Offenders Act 1988. That section provides for the admissibility of evidence of speeding offences by prescribed devices. Subsection (4) provides that:

"A record produced or measurement made by a prescribed device shall not be admissible as evidence of a fact relevant to proceedings for an offence to which this section applies unless -

"(a)the device is of a type approved by the Secretary of State, and

"(b)any conditions subject to which the approval was given are satisfied."

6. Subsection (5) provides:

"Any approval given by the Secretary of State for the purposes of this section may be given subject to conditions as to the purposes for which, and the manner and other circumstances in which, any device of the type concerned is to be used."

7. There is nothing before me to indicate whether or not the Secretary of State made his approval of the device in question subject to any conditions. Again, the issue was simply not raised before the magistrates. I am satisfied that the magistrates were fully entitled to arrive at the decision they did on the material that was before them. In essence, the appellant is seeking now to reopen issues of fact that ought to have been explored before the magistrates, or alternatively on appeal to the Crown Court on the decision of the magistrates.
8. It follows that, in my judgment, this application is without substance and will be dismissed.
9. MR WEITZMAN: My Lord, the applicant has the benefit of legal services funding. Can I ask there should be a summary assessment? Unfortunately, those who instruct me only operate in the Crown Courts and did not realise that they needed to provide an assessment of costs to be summarily assessed. I would simply ask for a detailed assessment not to be enforced without a consideration of the applicant's means.
10. MR JUSTICE OWEN: Yes. You may have your order in the terms you have sought it.