ON APPEAL FROM THE DONCASTER MAGISTRATES COURT
London, WC2A 2LL
B e f o r e :
MR JUSTICE NEWMAN
| Andrew Lee Stewart
|- and -
|Doncaster Youth Offending Team
Smith Bernal Wordwave Limited, 190 Fleet Street
London EC4A 2AG
Tel No: 020 7421 4040, Fax No: 020 7831 8838
Official Shorthand Writers to the Court)
The Respondent did not appear and was not represented
Crown Copyright ©
Lord Justice Scott Baker:
- Burglary committed on 3 February 2001.
- Theft committed on 11 January 2001.
- Theft committed on 17 January 2001.
- Possession of a Class A drug committed on 17 January 2001.
"A detention and training order is an order that the offender in respect of whom it is made shall be subject, for the term specified in the order, to a period of detention and training followed by a period of supervision."
"The period of supervision of an offender who is subject to a detention and training order ...
(a) shall begin with the offender's release, whether at the half-way point of the term of the order or otherwise; and
(b) subject to subsection (2) below, shall end when the term of the order ends."
Section 103(6) provides:
"The offender shall be given a notice from the Secretary of State specifying –
(a) the category of person for the time being responsible for his supervision; and
(b) any requirements with which he must for the time being comply."
And section 103(7):
"A notice under subsection (6) above shall be given to the offender –
(a) before the commencement of the period of supervision; and
(b) before any alteration in the matters specified in subsection 6(a) or (b) above comes into effect."
The justices recite in the case:
"After carefully considering all of the evidence presented to us, we found the case proved."
1. The information alleges breach of one detention and training order of 18 months which reflects the effect of section 101(13) of the 2000 Act. The memorandum of conviction is wrong because it suggests conviction for four different offences reflecting detention and training orders. The memorandum should be rectified to reflect the true position as set out in the information. There is, however, a different point about duplication, not taken at the trial. This could, however, have easily been rectified and in the event caused no injustice to the appellant.
2. Proof of service under section 103(7) of the 2000 Act is required. Proof by inference, as in the present case, is sufficient.
3. (i) Terms of the supervision requirements of which breach is alleged have to be proved, and were proved in the present case.
(ii) Ms Topliss was entitled to give evidence about the terms of the licence.
(iii) It was not, in the circumstances of the case, necessary for the actual licence to be produced. Ordinarily it would be preferable to do so.
(iv)The fact that Ms Topliss was unable to give direct evidence of service of a notice under section 103(7) of the 2000 Act was not fatal.
4. Ms Topliss' evidence about the log book was appropriately admitted under section 24(1) of the C.J.A. 1988.
5. Hearsay evidence that the appellant had not resided at the required address would not ordinarily be admissible. If, the evidence of Ms Topliss was that the appellant had by inference told her that he was not living at the Sunshine Guest House that would be sufficient.
6. The court was right to convict the appellant.
I would accordingly dismiss the appeal.
Mr Justice Newman: I agree.
LORD JUSTICE SCOTT BAKER: For the reasons given in the judgment that has been handed down, this appeal is dismissed.