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Jafton Properties Ltd, R (on the application of) v Lands Tribunal [2000] EWHC Admin 384 (31 July 2000)
URL: http://www.bailii.org/ew/cases/EWHC/Admin/2000/384.html
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[2000] EWHC Admin 384
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QUEEN and LANDS TRIBUNAL Ex Parte JAFTON PROPERTIES LIMITED. [2000] EWHC Admin 384 (31st July, 2000)
CO/1199/1999
IN THE HIGH COURT OF JUSTICE
QUEEN'S BENCH DIVISION
CROWN OFFICE LIST
Royal Courts of Justice
Strand, London, WC2A 2LL
Date:31st July 2000
IN THE MATTER OF AN APPLICATION FOR JUDICIAL REVIEW
B e f o r e :
THE HON MR JUSTICE LANGLEY
Between:
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THE
QUEEN
and
THE LANDS TRIBUNAL
Ex Parte JAFTON PROPERTIES LIMITED.
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Respondent
Applicant
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(Computer Aided Transcript of the Palantype Notes of
Smith Bernal Reporting Limited, 190 Fleet Street,
London EC4A 2AG
Tel: 0171 421 4040
Official Shorthand Writers to the Court)
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Mr
D. Mole QC(instructed by The Solicitor of Inland Revenue for the Valuation
Officer)
MS. C. Lockhard (for judgment)
Mr J. Taylor QC and Mr R. Wald (instructed by Messrs Gouldens for the
Applicant)
JUDGMENT
(As Approved by the Court)
INTRODUCTION
This application concerns the taxation of the costs of a hearing in the Lands
Tribunal. The applicants, Jafton Properties Limited (JPL) were awarded
one-quarter of the costs of the hearing in which they achieved "limited
success". Thereafter the costs were taxed before the Registrar. JPL sought to
challenge the taxation. The Registrar decided and the President upheld his
decision that the challenge was out of time under Rule 52 of the Lands Tribunal
Rules 1996 ("the Rules") and that it was not appropriate to extend time under
Rule 35. JPL contends that it was not out of time or if it was an extension
should have been granted.
THE RULES
Before turning to the chronology of events I should set out the relevant Rules
in order that those events can be seen in context.
Rule 52 provides that:
(1) ... the costs of and incidental to any proceedings shall be in the
discretion of the tribunal.
(2) The Registrar may make an order as to costs in respect of any
application or proceedings heard by him.
(3) A person dissatisfied with the order of the registrar under paragraph
(2) may, within 10 days of the order, appeal to the President who may make such
order as to the payment of costs, including the costs of the appeal, as he
thinks fit.
(4) If the Tribunal directs that the costs of a party to the proceedings be
paid by another party it may settle the amount of costs by fixing a lump sum or
direct that the costs be taxed by the registrar on such basis as the Tribunal
thinks fit, being a basis that would be applied on a taxation of the costs of
High Court or County Court proceedings.
(5) A party dissatisfied with a taxation of costs under paragraph (4) may,
within 7 days of the taxation, serve on any other interested party and on the
registrar written objection specifying the items objected to and applying for
the taxation to be reviewed in respect of those items.
(6) Upon such application the registrar shall review the taxation of the
items objected to and shall state in writing the reasons for his
decision.
(7) A person dissatisfied with the decision of the registrar under paragraph
(6),may within 10 days of the decision, apply to the President to review the
taxation and the President may make such order as he thinks fit including an
order as to the costs of the review.
(8) ...
Rule 35 provides that:
35. Extension of time
(1) The time appointed by or under these Rules for doing any act or taking
any steps in connection with any proceedings may be extended on application to
the registrar under rule 38.
(2) The registrar may extend the time limit on such terms as he thinks fit
and may order an extension even if the application is not made until after the
time limit has expired.
CHRONOLOGY
On November 14 1996 (amended on November 21) the Tribunal made an order in
respect of certain earlier substantive appeals by JPL that the respondent
valuation officer to the appeals
shall pay one-quarter of the Appellant's costs of , and incidental to, the
hearing of the substantive issues in November 1995.
All costs, if not agreed, are to be taxed by the Registrar of the Lands
Tribunal on the High Court standard basis.
There followed a claim by JPL for costs and objections on behalf of the
valuation officer. Lawyers Financial Management (LFM) a firm of costs
draughtsmen engaged by JPL, lodged the Bill of Costs with the Lands Tribunal on
December 17, 1997.
A Costs Hearing took place before the Registrar on April 24, 1998. To quote
paragraph 4 of JPL's "Grounds" in support of the present application:
At this hearing, the Registrar assessed sums to be paid by the valuation
officer pursuant to the order of 14 November 1996, including costs incurred by
the applicant in respect of its representation at the hearing of 24th April
1998.
It is the Respondent's primary case that time for objections to be made to the
taxation under Rule 52(5) ran from April 24, 1998. The amount of costs allowed
(at 100%) was £304,953.86 and the costs of taxation (at 100% and including
VAT) were allowed in a sum of £4282.87.
There followed a number of disputes. First there was a dispute whether the
costs of the taxation itself were to be borne entirely by the valuation officer
or only as to one-quarter under the terms of the original November 1996 order
made by the Lands Tribunal. That dispute was the subject of submissions to the
Registrar made by letters in May and June 1998. By letter dated June 15 the
parties were notified of the Registrar's decision that "the costs of taxation
are part of the total costs in these appeals and are subject to the costs order
that has been made."
That drew a response from LFM dated June 22 in which they said the position was
"still not entirely clear" and asked for confirmation of the actual sum for the
costs of taxation which the Registrar had allowed and raised the further
question whether the taxing fee payable (at 5%) should be based on the amount
allowed (25%) on taxation or on 100% of the costs taxed. The letter stated:
"Until these matters are dealt with, the taxation is not, and cannot be
concluded".
On July 7 the Tribunal wrote stating the costs of taxation allowed were
£3645 (exclusive of VAT) and that "exceptionally" the Registrar was
prepared to agree that the taxing fee should be calculated on the 25% of the
total bill to be paid by the valuation officer. It is the Respondent's
secondary case that time for objections to the taxation under Rule 52(5) ran
from July 7. LFM responded with their understanding of the overall figures to
which this gave rise which, subject to them being accurately quoted, the
Registrar agreed in a letter dated July 17, 1998. This letter was received by
LFM on July 20.
It is JPL's case that it was only at this date that the taxation was completed
and the 7 day time-limit under Rule 52(5) started to run for service of
objections to the taxation. Objections were served on July 27, 5 working days
after July 20. They were objections to the taxation of three specific items in
the Bill of Costs (rates, hours and one disallowed item for the costs of
evidence which the Tribunal had rejected) and to the allowance of only 25% of
the costs of taxation and the taxing fee.
The Registrar replied on July 31:
The Registrar directed that as this Bill was taxed on 24 April 1998 your
objections are about 3 months out of date. In the circumstances the Registrar
is not prepared to review the taxation in the above matter.
This decision was confirmed by letter dated August 24. JPL sought a reference
of the matter to the President of the Lands Tribunal as it was entitled to do
under Rule 38 of the Rules. That led to an oral hearing on February 1, 1999 at
which JPL was represented by Mr Taylor QC. The President upheld the Registrar's
decision. LFM asked for written reasons for this decision which were supplied
in a letter dated February 16. In summary, the reasons were that:
(1) "Whether or not the taxation was incomplete" because "questions about the
costs of taxation itself, subsequently raised, were left outstanding" the Bill
of Costs was fully taxed on April 24, 1998 and constituted a taxation for the
purpose of Rule 52(5) so that any objections to it had to be served within 7
days of April 24.
(2) The costs (£3645 exclusive of VAT) of the taxation had also been
determined on April 24 and the valuation officer's obligation to pay 25% of
that sum was a consequence of the orders made in November 1996.
(3) The decision on the taxing fee payable was made in the letter of July 7,
and in any event was no part of the taxation itself.
(4) As regards discretion to extend time the objections were made almost 3
months late and "having considered your representations" there was no
justification for extending the time to make objections.
THE APPLICATION
The Application for judicial review of the President's decision was made on
March 19, 1999 and permission was granted by Burton J on April 4, 1999.
Three grounds were advanced in support of the Application, namely that:
(1) Rule 52(5) was complied with as the taxation was not completed on April 24,
1998 but only on July 20.
(2) The refusal of an extension of time was "irrational" because of the "shared
assumption" of the parties that "the resolution of certain matters of taxation
remained ongoing".
(3) The reasons given for the refusal of an extension were "irrational" because
by the reference in the letter dated February 16, 1999 (which I have set out)
to "whether or not the taxation was incomplete" the Respondent had acknowledged
that there were separate aspects of the taxation remaining to be resolved.
CONCLUSIONS
(1) HAD TIME EXPIRED?
In my judgment the first question to which this Application gives rise is
whether or not on April 24, 1998 there was a "taxation of costs" within the
meaning of Rule 52(5). I do not find it helpful to express the question in
terms of whether a taxation was then "completed" or "concluded" or a
certificate of taxation was or could then have been issued or whether the
Registrar was "functus officio" which were all expressions which Mr Taylor
sought to deploy in submission. The words of the Rule itself are intelligible
and applicable as they stand. Moreover I think there can realistically only be
one answer to the question which does arise which is "Yes". There is no doubt
on the evidence that on April 24 the Registrar taxed JPL's Bill of Costs for
the substantive proceedings and the costs of the taxation itself in accordance
with the Tribunal's order. Taxation (on the standard basis) involved the
assessment and allowance of a reasonable amount in respect of all costs
reasonably incurred by JPL in the proceedings. That is precisely what the
Registrar did. Neither party sought an adjournment of the taxation. It ended
with assessment of the relevant figures.
Moreover there was no issue then before the Registrar as to how the November
orders were to be applied to the costs of the taxation itself nor as to the
taxing fee payable, no doubt because (rightly in my judgment) those were not
seen to be matters for assessment on the taxation. Indeed the taxing fee can
only be determined after the taxation as it is a fixed percentage of the sum
taxed; and the only issue on the costs of the taxation was one of the effect of
the November orders not as to the taxed amount of the costs.
In my judgment, therefore, the objections were considerably out of time when
they were first put forward on July 27. They should have been submitted no
later than May 1 (7 days after April 24) to comply with Rule 52(5), and the
President was right so to conclude.
(2) SHOULD TIME HAVE BEEN EXTENDED?
Whilst it can be said that the reasons the President gave in the letter of
February 16 for refusing an extension of time were succinctly stated I see no
reason to doubt that he had, as recorded, considered the representations made
on behalf of JPL. In particular it was accepted that the valuation officer had
not suffered any specific prejudice from the delay and that during the period
of delay the questions about the costs of the taxation and the fee had been
under debate.
The question for this court is not whether it would have reached the same
decision as the President but whether the decision that he reached was
"Wednesbury unreasonable". The basis of the decision as expressed was that
against a statutory short time limit (7 days) there had been a delay of nearly
3 months in which the major objections sought to be made to the taxation had
not even been raised whereas other matters had been raised and debated. It is
also material to the exercise of discretion in my judgment that the consequence
of a refusal of an extension was not to prevent JPL recovering any costs but
only from arguing that the actual amount should be increased. That is in
contrast to the cases cited by Mr Taylor of
Southwark London Borough Council
v Nejad TLR January 28, 1999 page 68 and
Toniello v Top Deck Ski Ltd
TLR 7th December 1998 page 777. It will also often be the case that a
non-objecting party will suffer no specific prejudice from a delay in service
of written objections but that is no more than a factor in the exercise of
discretion, and a factor to be weighed against all the other factors including
the deliberate provision of a short time limit and the length of the delay.
In my judgment there is no realistic basis for an attack on the rationality (or
indeed 'fairness' in Mr Taylor's alternative way of expressing the issue) of
the President's decision.
I should perhaps record that Mr Taylor (entirely rightly in my judgment) did
not press the submissions that there was "a shared assumption" that the
taxation was incomplete or that the President had acknowledged as much. As JPL
did not make any of the objections to the taxation it now seeks to pursue until
after the 'assumption' is said to have arisen no assumption could have applied
to them. The President's letter, read as a whole, plainly contained no
acknowledgement.
In these circumstances, in my judgment, and as I indicated at the conclusion of
the hearing, this Application must be refused and I will if necessary hear the
parties on any consequential orders they may seek.
Order: Application dismissed with costs agreed at £5,000.b
© 2000 Crown Copyright