England and Wales High Court (Administrative Court) Decisions

IN THE HIGH COURT OF JUSTICE
QUEENS BENCH DIVISION
(CROWN OFFICE LIST)

MR JUSTICE COLLINS: The applicant, Sathasivam Ramanathan, is a citizen of Sri Lanka who is described as a travel agent and a Justice of the Peace. He is the chairman of a travel company in Sri Lanka and has business interests in the United Kingdom. He has visited the United Kingdom at least five times between 1989 and 1993 in connection with his business. He now seeks judicial review of a decision of the Entry Clearance Officer in Colombo, of 6th October 1993, refusing him an entry clearance to enable him to visit the United Kingdom. He has been informed that the basis of the refusal was that his admission would not be conducive to the public good because he has been involved in facilitating illegal entry to the United Kingdom and to other European countries of Sri Lankan nationals by means of false documentation.

The affidavit filed on behalf of the respondent by Mr McMahon, a Second Secretary at the High Commission in Colombo, states that he is free to make further applications to the Entry Clearance Officer for a visa but "it will be apparent that his prospects of obtaining one are poor."

Sri Lanka is a country whose nationals require visas in order to enter the United Kingdom. On 24th June 1991 the applicant was granted a multiple entry visa permitting him to visit the United Kingdom for a two-year period. In the summer of 1992 his passport was produced to the High Commission in Colombo following the applicant's report of its loss and its subsequent recovery. It was returned to him, following an interview in which he was questioned about his alleged involvement with a group of Sri Lankans who had travelled to Egypt and then to the United Kingdom where they subsequently applied for political asylum, with an endorsement which reads:

"Holder is subject to paragraph 86 of the Immigration Rules HC 251."

Paragraph 86 is headed "Exclusion conducive to the public good" and reads:

"Any passenger except the wife and child under 18 of a person settled in the United Kingdom may be refused leave to enter on the ground that his exclusion is conducive to the public good, where:

(a) the Secretary of State has personally so directed; or

(b) from information available to the immigration officer it seems right to refuse leave to enter on that ground -- if, for example, in the light of the passenger's character, conduct or associations it is undesirable to give him leave to enter."

His solicitors immediately pressed for removal of the endorsement and for an explanation. Eventually, on 22nd March 1993, Mr McMahon sent a fax to the solicitors from the High Commission which, so far as material, read as follows:

"Mr Ramanathan's United Kingdom multiple entry visit visa was endorsed with the words "Holder is subject to Paragraph 86 of the Immigration Rules HC 251" because we have become aware of information that indicates Mr Ramanathan has become actively involved in the facilitation of illegal immigration to the United Kingdom. You will be aware that, under current laws, an Entry Clearance Officer (ECO) is not allowed to cancel a U.K. visa once issued. The endorsement was therefore added to Mr Ramanathan's visa as a signal to the Immigration Officer at the U.K. Port of entry that Mr Ramanathan should be subject to further inquiry [that would be in pursuance of rule 17 of HC 251]. There is nothing to prevent Mr Ramanathan from travelling to the U.K. on this visa and the endorsement does not invalidate the visa. We have, however, no intention of removing the endorsement and will, in all probability, refuse any future U.K. visa application made by Mr Ramanathan.

The information which led to the endorsement being added to Mr Ramanathan's visa concerned his involvement in the attempted facilitation of 12 Sri Lankans to London via Cairo. Mr Ramanathan has already admitted that he made all travel arrangements for this group, he obtained his visa for his own travel to Egypt with those of the group, and has stated in an annex to a letter dated 8 July 1992 that he travelled with them and this is confirmed by your letter of 28 August 1992. We also know from Emirates in Cairo that the group arrived i~n Cairo on 15 March 1992 and were denied boarding on a British Airways flight to London because they held forged visas and were returned to Colombo on 18 March 1992.

I do not accept that the events described above are coincidental moreover this incident led us to review our records on Mr Ramanathan and this in turn brought to light the papers on a serious case of facilitation which had been misfiled. On 10 August 1987 a Mr N P Ganesharatnam, allegedly a director of Grandmet Ceylon Limited, (Mr Ramanathan's firm) had been granted a visa to conduct business in the United Kingdom, and Mr Ramanathan had issued a letter in support of this application."

The letter then went on to give further details about Mr Ganesharatnam ["G"] and referred also to an interview that had been held with Mr Ramanathan himself on 4th March 1993, in the course of which he appeared, according to the letter, to have conducted himself in such a way as to confirm the suspicions that he had been involved in Mr G's false identity.

The solicitors acting for Mr Ramanathan attempted to appeal the decision but were unable to do so because there was no right of appeal. Eventually, they decided that Mr Ramanathan would travel to the United Kingdom on the multiple entry visa which was valid until 24th June 1992 and then would seek an interview with the Immigration Officer on his arrival in the United Kingdom. On 8th June 1993 his solicitors wrote a letter to the Chief Immigration Officer at Heathrow, in which they said:

"We have now received a letter dated 12th May 1993 from the Consular Attache that their decision does not attract a right of appeal. Hence Mr Ramanathan has decided to travel to UK on the 12th instant [12th June] and place the full facts of his case for your consideration and in the event of your refusing entry to the U.K. then we would apply for an immediate Appeal before an Adjudicator.

Our principal Solicitor, Mr M.M. Wijesuriya & Counsel Mr B. Bannerjee of Chancery Chambers London will wish to be present at the Interview of our client on arrival on the 12th instant. What we are most concerned is that our client should not be put on detention. He will be bringing sufficient money with him in case you require Cash Security or else his brother-in-law a resident in U.K. will stand surety pending a decision either by you or by an Adjudicator."

Mr Ramanathan arrived on 12th June. He was then given temporary leave to enter and was interviewed on 29th June in the presence of his solicitor and counsel, who were given the opportunity to make representations. He was, as a visa holder, subject to rule 17 of the Immigration Rules which, so far as material, read:

"A passenger who holds an entry clearance which was duly issued to him and is still current is not to be refused leave to enter unless the immigration officer is satisfied that:

(c) refusal is justified on grounds of restricted returnability, on medical grounds, on grounds of criminal record, because the passenger is the subject of a deportation order or because exclusion would be conducive to the public good. The scope of the power to refuse leave to enter on these-grounds is set out in paragraphs 19 and 81 to 86."

Rule 18 reads:

"An immigration officer may examine the holder of an entry clearance so far as is necessary to determine whether any of the exceptions mentioned in paragraph 17 applies, and in determining this question may act on reasonable inferences from the results of that examination and any other information available to him. But the examination should not be carried further than is necessary for this purpose and for the purpose of deciding whether leave to enter should be given for a limited period and subject to any conditions."

Following the interview he was given leave to enter, as a visitor, for a period of 6 months, although he had only requested four to six weeks. The Immigration Officer had indicated to him that he could apply for deletion of the rule 86 endorsement to the Entry Clearance Officer. He did so, through his solicitors, in a letter of 1st July 1993. What that letter said, so far as material, was this:

"The Immigration Officer was satisfied that the endorsement made under Section 86 of HC 251 could not be maintained and granted our client leave to enter for six months although our client applied for 4 to 6 weeks.

The Immigration Officer advised us that we should apply to your Department regarding the deletion of the Entry under Section 86 and said that they would send their report and results of their inquiries to you for your consideration."

They forwarded Mr Ramanathan's passport. He wrote, on 7th September, to the Foreign and Commonwealth Office. In that letter the solicitors said this:

"A full enquiry lasting 3/4 hours was held by a specially appointed Immigration Officer who had all the papers from Sri Lanka. At the conclusion of the enquiry the Immigration Officer was satisfied of our client's bona fides and that he was not involved in any matters under Section 86 of HC 251 and granted our client 6 months leave to enter U.K. but the officer was unable to delete the endorsement and said that it was a matter for your office to deal with."

The Foreign and Commonwealth Office replied to that letter on 15th September. They said:

"This Department has no authority to issue such an instruction but the ECO in Colombo has indicated that he has no objection to the endorsement being removed. I suggest, therefore, that Mr Ramanathan contacts the ECO on his return to Sri Lanka and he will arrange for the endorsement to be cancelled."

It is be noted that the letter of 15th September says nothing to contradict the assertions made by the solicitors in the letter of 7th September that the Immigration Officer had been satisfied of Mr Ramanathan's bona fides and that he was not involved in any matters which required the use of paragraph 86 of HC 251 against him. However, it appears that the solicitors understanding was incorrect. The Immigration Officer's report has recently been produced (I say recently. It was, in fact, produced when Mr McMahon swore his affidavit in this case in June 1994) and what is recorded by the Immigration Officer is this:

"The passenger sought entry for 6 weeks as a business visitor in order to find out how much it would cost to set up a new travel sales office in the U.K. He is a friend of President Wijetunga and has various other influential friends in Sri Lanka. I was, therefore, satisfied he qualified for entry on this occasion as a visitor and I was obliged to honour the visa he had presented. He was, therefore, granted leave to enter as shown following discussion with Mr I Abrahamsan, CIO.

However, I am in no doubt that the passenger is implicated in facilitation but there is no clear and conclusive evidence to prove this."

Mr Broatch complains that this is, in itself, an irrational approach. If there was no evidence to support the conclusion the Immigration Officer could not reasonably have been in no doubt that he was implicated. She was, in truth, saying that the basis for a finding that he should not be excluded was not established and that should have been an end of the allegations in relation to Mr G and the incident involving the Sri Lankans in Egypt.

I do not accept those submissions. It seems to me that the Immigration Officer was approaching her task in a proper manner. She was saying to herself, in effect, that she knew that the applicant was involved but she could not prove it. Accordingly, she should not be satisfied that the refusal was justified on conducive grounds notwithstanding her personal views because those views were not supported by clear and conclusive proof.

On his return to Sri Lanka the applicant visited the High Commission on 4th October 1993 in order to get the endorsements removed, which was done, and to apply for a visa to visit the United Kingdom for business purposes. He was not interviewed. On 6th October he was given a refusal notice which read:

"You have applied for an entry clearance to visit the United Kingdom but:

1. I am not satisfied that you have not been involved in the facilitation of illegal entrants to the U.K.

2. Should a further visa be issued to you I cannot be satisfied that you would not use it again to facilitate the illegal entry of persons to the U.K.

I am not satisfied therefore that you are genuinely seeking entry for the period and purpose as stated by you."

It was noted on the form that there was no entitlement to appeal against,that decision by virtue of section 13(3)(a) and/or 13(3)(b) of the Immigration Act 1971 which subsections had been inserted by the Asylum and Immigration Appeals Act 1993, which had come into effect on 26th July 1993.

It is accepted that the way in which the applicant was dealt with by the Entry Clearance Officer was unfair. He had not been told what the allegations against him were and he had been given no opportunity of dealing with them. It is elementary that where a decision is made which depends upon an (applicant's alleged misconduct he must know what he is supposed to have done wrong and must be given the chance to respond Furthermore, looking at the notice itself ground one is, to say the least, as Mr Burnett put it, inelegantly drafted. It seems to me to indicate an erroneous approach and a view that it was for the applicant to satisfy the Entry Clearance Officer that he was not involved in the facilitation of entry.

Paragraph 86 is the material rule in this connection. I have already read it. It is less explicit than paragraph 17 and Mr Burnett submits that there is, as he puts it, a lower threshold for paragraph 86 than there is for paragraph 17. I accept that it is not particularly helpful to talk in terms of burden of proof in considering the duties upon an administrator in applying these rules. However, it does seem to me that it is for the Immigration Officer or the Entry Clearance Officer to make a positive finding that the relevant conduct, whatever it may be, is established and is such as makes it right to refuse leave. The more serious the conduct in question, the more reliable and probative must be the material relied on to establish it. Thus, although the language of paragraphs 17 and 86 is different, I do not think that a lower standard is appropriate in paragraph 86 to establish the conduct relied on. The difference is that the existence of the visa means that the relevant conduct will only lead to a refusal of entry if the Immigration Officer is satisfied that such refusal is justified. If there is no visa the Immigration Officer or the Entry Clearance Officer can refuse, if it seems right to do so. In reality I do not think there is likely to be any different approach since if the conduct which is established is such as would have made an Entry Clearance Officer think it right to exclude, it is difficult to envisage that an Immigration Officer would not be satisfied, by the same conduct, that exclusion was justified.

It may be that the difference in language can be explained on the basis that the Immigration Officer, when considering paragraph 17, ought not to regard conduct as justifying exclusion when that conduct was already known to the Entry Clearance Officer. Thus only fresh material available to the Immigration Officer should justify a refusal once a visa has been granted. Certainly, it would be contrary to good administration, on the face of it, for an Immigration Officer to take a different view on the same material to that taken by an Entry Clearance Officer. So much is established by the observations of Glidewell LJ in a case which was cited to me, R v. Secretary of State for the Home Department. ex parte Mowla [1992] l WLR 70, the relevant passage being at page 85, where at letter G Glidewell LJ said this:

"I also observe that in my view it clearly is desirable that so far as possible decisions made on the same facts about an applicant for entry or for leave to remain for an extended period should be consistent with each other.. If it can be shown that an immigration officer on facts which in no material way differ from those which were before the Home Office when it was decided to grant the applicant leave to remain for a limited period, has reached a different conclusion and has refused leave to enter, then it may well be that the later decision could be challenged in the High Court, either on the ground of irrationality or, I think more probably as Mr Collins suggested, on the ground of procedural unfairness: see IRC v Preston [1985] AC 835, particularly in passages in the speeches Lord Scarman at pages 851F to 852C and Lord Templeman at pages 866H to 867C".

Gibson LJ said much the same at the top of page 87 of the report.

I should also say that ground 2 is, on the face of it, unwarranted because there was no suggestion, as I understand the allegations that were made and relied on against Mr Ramanathan, that he himself had used his visits to this country to facilitate the illegal entry of persons to the United Kingdom. Furthermore, the entry clearance officer states:

"I am not satisfied therefore that you are genuinely seeking entry for the period and purpose as stated by you."

That, on the face of it, is a complete non sequitur. That was not the point. The point was that he did qualify for entry on the basis of his visa but his entry should be refused because it was not conductive to the public good. All in all, quite apart from the procedural improprieties which existed in relation to this refusal, the grounds themselves are singularly ineptly drafted and, as I have already said, so far as ground one is concerned, quite clearly put the burden wrongly on the applicant to satisfy the Entry Clearance Officer that he has not been involved in the facilitation of illegal entrants.

I should, I think, say that it is in my judgment a serious matter when one sees administration of this low standard, particularly where rights of appeal have been removed. I entirely accept that the existence or no of a right of appeal cannot properly affect the standard of administration that ought to be applied. Nonetheless, the absence of appeal rights makes it more disturbing to find this poor quality of decision-making in circumstances such as these. I can only express the hope that this is an aberration by an Entry Clearance Officer who, perhaps, had not learnt how to administer these matters as he ought to have done.

Following the refusal, as I have said, the solicitors made further representations and sought to obtain from the Foreign Office reasons why this decision had been reached. They received no substantive answers to their letters and on 23rd December 1993 they made their application for leave to move for judicial review because, of course, time was passing and they were conscious of the time limits which applied to the instititution of judicial review proceedings.

On 17th March 1994 this application for leave to move was granted by Latham J. On 10th June 1994 there came the affidavit from Mr McMahon which, effectively, for the first time, gave the information to the applicant and his solicitors as to why the decision had been made. I should, I think, read the relevant paragraphs of Mr McMahon's affidavit. I start with paragraph 5:

"The information available to him (the ECO) was as follows. He had all the relevant material concerning the two matters which had prompted the earlier endorsement together with the Applicant's explanations of them. These were the two matters canvassed by the immigration officer in the interview of 29th June 1993 [that is, of course, the Egyptian allegations and the allegation about

Mr G] Despite the explanations of the Applicant it remained the ECO's view that he had sought to facilitate the unlawful entry into the UK of Mr G. There was sufficient doubt about the circumstances of the Cairo incident for it to be put aside for the purposes of the October decision. However, there were two further pieces of information available to the ECO (but not to the immigration officer) which confirmed the Applicant's involvement in the facilitation of illegal entry to the UK and Europe. Information was received from a British citizen, Mr C S Daniel, in Columbo on 27th July 1993 that the Applicant was the organiser of the largest immigration racket in Colombo. Mr Daniel has a criminal record and has himself been involved in facilitating illegal entry in the U.K. He was nonetheless considered to be in a position to know of the Applicant's involvement. Secondly, we were warned by the German Embassy in Colombo that they were aware that the Applicant had facilitated the illegal entry to Germany in 1989 of a Miss Anita Mary Godfrey.

6. In these circumstances the ECO believed that the Applicant had a substantial involvement in facilitating illegal entry to the U.K. and Europe and considered it right to refuse a visa.

7. The correctness of that judgment has been confirmed by information which has come to light subsequently. The British High Commission in New Delhi investigates possible cases of trafficking in immigrants. They seek to identify passengers travelling to the U.K. without proper documentation. Several Sri Lankan passengers travelling with forged or otherwise improper documentation interviewed this year at New Delhi on route to London have identified the Applicant as the organiser of their attempts to gain unlawful entry into the U.K. The Applicant's agent in India was identified as Murugeshu Pushparajah. He was arrested by Indian police on 8th April 1994. He described the Applicant as the principal of the organisation who arranged for forged passports to be obtained and provided the funds to pay all the interdiaries involved in the racket. In the light of their enquiries, the British High Commission in New Delhi are satisfied that the Applicant is the organiser of the substantial unlawful immigration racket."

Having received that, the solicitors, on 17th August 1994, wrote to the Treasury Solicitor in these terms:

"We have now had an opportunity to consider

Mr McMahon's draft affidavit with our client. It is disturbing that although it is said that the . was in possession of the 'Daniel' and 'German Embassy' information in October he gave our client no opportunity to deal with it then, nor was it ever referred to in the correspondence between your clients departments and ourselves following the decision of 29th June 1993.

These assertions are strongly denied, as are those in paragraph 7 of the draft [those are the allegations concerning Mr Pushparaja]. However, they are set out so vaguely, and with such a lack of particularity that it is impossible to refute them in detail as our client would wish to do.

We invite you to you expand upon them."

In reply to that the Treasury Solicitor's representative wrote on 22nd August:

"At the time our client did not consider it expedient to reveal this information. You will appreciate that the information is of a highly confidential nature and in considering whether to reveal that information serious considerations arose regarding the safety of the individuals involved."

It is, I suppose, possible that that might be the case in relation to Mr Daniel. It might conceivably be the case in relation to Mr Pushparaja, but it is difficult to see how it could conceivably be the case in relation to the information coming from the German Embassy in connection with Miss Godfrey, who was Mr Ramanathan's secretary at the material time. Be that as it may, it is now accepted by Mr Burnett that it would have been quite possible to have given Mr Ramanathan and his advisors sufficient information of the allegations that had been made against him in order to enable him to understand what was being said and to make a defence to them. It is quite plain, in my view, that the excuse based on expediency simply will not do.

Mr Broatch submits that all this information upon which the Entry Clearance Officer relied was too unreliable and too insubstantial and so it was perverse to have based any decisions upon it. So far as the Daniel allegation is concerned, that has been expanded to some extent. There is before me a memorandum from an official in the High Commission in Colombo recording a visit made to him by Mr Daniel in which the allegations against Mr Ramanathan were made. They were coupled with the suggestion that he was involved in it with the wife of the then President. Mr Daniel himself is, as has been indicated, a man with a criminal record. He has since, in September 1994, sworn an affidavit which denies what is set out in the report from the official to which I have referred. What he says is this:

"Other than the three days mentioned above, [when he said he went to the High Commission to collect passports] I did not go to the British High Commission on July 27th 1993 as I had no necessity to go there [that was the date which the official said Mr Daniel had called in the High Commission]. I have never spoken to any of the officers at the Embassy regarding one Mr S Ramanathan, a person I did not know at all that time. I deny making any allegation against the said Mr Ramanathan as alleged in the Affidavit filed by Mr McMahon.

I also deny chat I am not a person with any criminal record -- involved in facilitating illegal entry into the U.K., nor an Island Wide Reconvicted Criminal as inferred by Mr McMahon's affidavit, since I have not been brought to any adverse notice by the Police in Sri Lanka or United Kingdom."

I have read that paragraph as it is in the affidavit. It looks as if he intended, on the face of it, to omit the word "not" but that is what he says.

Mr Broatch submits that whether or not one looks at Mr Daniel's affidavit, or takes account of his supposed background, on any view, he is the most unreliable source of information and it was quite improper for the authorities to rely upon him in the teeth of denials made by Mr Ramanathan. So far as the German Embassy information is concerned, all that we have is a letter from the German Embassy dated 16th February 1995 to the British High Commission which reads as follows:

"TO WHOM IT MAY CONCERN"

This is to confirm that Mr S. Ramanathan of Grandmet (Ceylon) Ltd. is registered by this Embassy on a 'warning list' since November 1989 as a suspected facilitator of Tamil nationals to Germany."

That is signed by the Second Secretary of the German Embassy.

Mr Ramanathan denies that he ever was so involved. He says that what happened, putting it shortly, was that he got a visa to go to Germany on business with his wife and, in addition, his secretary, Miss Godfrey. In the end he could not go but Miss Godfrey did and then she overstayed. He did not know she was going to overstay and he should not be held responsible for her having done so. It was nothing, he said, to do with him. It is also said on his behalf that it is unlikely that he would have been involved in such things. He refers to a letter of March 1990 which was sent to him by someone at the German Embassy thanking him for forwarding some tickets for the Sri Lanka Philharmonic Orchestra. As far as that is concerned, it seems to me that does not take the matter anywhere.

It is perfectly true that the allegations are very shortly made and very generally made, so far as the German Embassy is concerned. But it seems to me that the officials of the British High Commission and, more particularly, the Entry Clearance Officer, are entitled to have regard to such information. What weight he gives it is, of course, a matter for him. It may be that once Mr Ramanathan has denied that there was any wrongdoing have been considered necessary to pursue the allegations with the German Embassy and to find out, if possible, in a little more detail, what was the basis for the putting of Mr Ramanathan on the German Embassy list. That, of course, is one of the purposes behind giving an individual notification of what is alleged against him because it may be that it turns out that the German Embassy's concerns are, indeed, based on nothing more than gossip and insubstantial rumours. If that is the case, then no doubt the British authorities will not give it any weight. If, on the other hand, it transpires that there are substantial matters which led to that decision by the German Embassy then, no doubt, the British authorities will give those allegations greater weight.

So far as the allegations concerning Mr Pushparaja are concerned, there is before me a summary prepared by a Mr Feeney who is at present attached to the British High Commission in New Delhi.

That sets out in some detail the material upon which the allegation that Mr Ramanathan was involved, through Mr Pushparaja, in the facilitation of illegal entry was based. There is attached to it a statement of Mr Pushparaja in which he gave details of how the operation was carried out. That statement appears to be signed by Mr Pushparaja and is dated 9th April 1994.

Mr Pushparaja has gone back on that statement. There is evidence before me that he has indicated that he was not involved at all, and certainly that Mr Ramanathan was not involved, with this illegality.

It seems to me, having looked at the material, that the Entry Clearance Officer was entitled to rely upon it, on the face of it, as supporting the contentions made by the British Authorities that Mr Ramanathan had been involved in facilitating illegal entry Mr Broatch submits that so far as the "G" allegations are concerned, those have already been disposed of, in effect, by the decision of the Immigration Officer back in June 1993 and they cannot be resurrected unless there is fresh evidence specifically relating to them. That does not seem to me to be correct. It is open, or would be open, even assuming that the Immigration Officer had rejected those allegations (and it is clear from what I have already referred to that she did not) that if there were evidence available that showed a pattern of involvement in facilitating illegal entry then that could support the material that was available and properly satisfy the authorities that Mr Ramanathan was also involved in "G". But, of course, the Entry Clearance Officer must take into account any explanations that are given by the applicant and must bear in mind that he has to be satisfied, because these are serious allegations, to a high standard.

I have already touched on the submission that the immigration officer had effectively disposed of the "G" allegations. In fact, as we know, she did not positively find in Mr Ramanathan's favour, she merely indicated that the evidence available to her was not conclusive. It seems to me that in those circumstances, whether or not the Entry Clearance Officer was entitled to rely on evidence of other involvements to support "G" in the circumstances of this case, even if he had relied on the same material, it would have been open to him to have reached a different view. But, as I say, there was other material available upon which he was entitled to rely.

Mr Burnett accepts that the Entry Clearance Officer's decision of 6th October 1993 is flawed and cannot stand. I have already made observations about it and that concession by Mr Burnett is an inevitable one and is clearly properly made. Mr Burnett further accepts that there must be, if the applicant wishes, a reconsideration of the whole case in the light of all available material. That must include any explanations given by the applicant, he having had put to him the material upon which the Entry Clearance Officer intends to rely. That being so, Mr Burnett submits that no relief is necessary and that I should refuse, in the exercise of my discretion, to grant the applicant any relief.

It seems to me that it is of the greatest importance in fairness to this applicant, having regard to the errors that have been made in the course of considering his case, that the reconsideration should be completely fresh and with a clean sheet. It must be made clear to everyone involved, including the Entry Clearance Officer, that everything that has happened before must be put on one side ;and that any application made by the applicant will be considered solely on the material which is available to the Entry Clearance Officer and on the basis that anything adverse is made known to this applicant and he is given the opportunity of dealing with it.

Mr Broatch suggests that he ought to be allowed to have with him, if he wishes, a legal advisor or legal advisors when he is interviewed by the Entry Clearance Officer. I do not think that there is any obligation on Immigration Officers or on Entry Clearance Officers to listen to legal representatives, or to allow them to be present, or to address them. It cleanly is within their discretion to allow that to happen. We can see that from what the Immigration Officer did on 29th June 1993. It may be (but this is a matter entirely for the Entry Clearance Officer) that the authorities will decide that, having regard to the background of this case and having regard to the serious matters that have been alleged, it would be helpful to permit such representation, but I emphasise that is and must be a matter for them. If they decide that they do not wish to have any representation on behalf of the applicant who, after all, is, it must be said, on the face of it, a successful and no doubt articulate businessman, then they are fully entitled to take that view.

In all the circumstances it seems to me that having regard to the background I have detailed in this judgment it would be right for me to grant relief at least to the extent of quashing the decision of 6th October 1993.

MR JUSTICE COLLINS: Mr Broatch that is, at the moment, the only relief in the light of what I have said that I think is appropriate but I shall listen, of course, to any submissions.

MR BROATCH: I think I have almost said everything that I wished to say about the other forms of relief. If your Lordship turns to my amended 86A at page 5. The certiorari which will go will mean that the application of 4th October now has to be redetermined. It would be ideal for me to press for a mandamus.