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You are here: BAILII >> Databases >> England and Wales Family Court Decisions (other Judges) >> A, B & C, Re (Care - Welfare Decisions - Family Placement) [2025] EWFC 133 (B) (11 April 2025)
URL: http://www.bailii.org/ew/cases/EWFC/OJ/2025/133.html
Cite as: [2025] EWFC 133 (B)

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Neutral Citation Number: [2025] EWFC 133 (B)

IN THE FAMILY COURT AT Wolverhampton

Wolverhampton County Court
Pipers Row
Wolverhampton
WV1 3LQ
11th April 2025

B e f o r e :

District Judge O'Hagan
____________________

Re A, B and C (Care – Welfare Decisions – Family Placement)

____________________


____________________

HTML VERSION OF APPROVED JUDGMENT
____________________

Crown Copyright ©

    This judgment was handed down remotely on 11th April 2025 by circulation to the parties or their representatives by e-mail and by release to the National Archives

    District Judge O'Hagan:

    Introduction

  1. I am dealing with the final hearing of proceedings in respect of three children. They are:
  2. (i) A, born on * 2008, and now aged 16;
    (ii) B, born on * 2016, and now aged 8; and
    (iii) C, born on * 2019, and now aged 5.

  3. The proceedings were initiated by Sandwell Metropolitan Borough Council which I shall call "the Local Authority" throughout this judgment. The Local Authority applied for care orders in respect of all three children on 15th August 2024. The proceedings have been ongoing since that time, and they now come before me for final hearing.
  4. The issues that I have had to consider at this final hearing are:
  5. (i) whether I should make any orders under the Children Act 1989 in respect of A, and, if so, what orders I should make;

    (ii) whether I should make care orders in respect of B and C, and, in doing so, endorse the Local Authority's plan of placing them in long-term foster care;

    (iii) whether, in the alternative, I should decline to make a care order in respect of B and C, thereby enabling them to remain in the care of their grandfather;

    (iv) if the girls are to remain in the care of their grandfather, what orders I should make, if any, to support that placement;

    (v) if I am not satisfied that I have sufficient evidence to make decisions about the girls' placement with their grandfather, should I order further assessments;

    (vi) what should the arrangements for contact be between the girls and their brother since, on any of the proposals before me, they will, as now, remain separated; and

    (vii) in any event, what should be the arrangements be for contact between the children and their mother; and

    (viii) if the girls do not remain in his care, what should be the arrangements be for contact between them and their grandfather.

    Background

  6. The mother of the children is Ms D. She was born on * 1985, and so she is now aged 39. A's father is Mr E. He was born on * 1971, and so he is now almost 54. The father of B and C was Mr F, born on * 1977. Very sadly, he died in * 2020.
  7. It was unknown to all at the hearing whether Mr E is or is not named on A's birth certificate, and so whether he does or does not share parental responsibility for A.
  8. The Local Authority commenced care proceedings on 15th August 2024 because of escalating concerns about the welfare of the children. I do not need to go into great detail because it is accepted that the children had suffered significant harm. There is an agreed threshold document in the bundle which sets out the facts that underpin that. The core facts are that:
  9. (i) Ms D's relationships were characterised by violence and abuse;

    (ii) Ms D has a history of associating with risky adults to whom the children have been exposed;

    (iii) Ms D misuses alcohol, chronically consuming excessive amounts;

    (iv) Ms D has fragile mental health, and has expressed thoughts of suicide and self-harm;

    (v) Ms D was arrested after A alleged that she hit him in the face and stomach;

    (vi) there have been occasions when Ms D was intoxicated whilst caring for the children, leading to family and friends having to intervene;

    (vii) on 18th June 2023, Ms D was charged with alcohol-related child abuse, and, when the police visited three days later on 21st June 2023, she was found to be drinking alcohol with the children in her care;

    (viii) conditions within the family home were considered by professionals to be unacceptably poor; and

    (ix) Ms D did not engage consistently with professionals, including social workers and recovery services, to help her to address her substance use.

  10. Prior to the commencement of proceedings, the Local Authority tried to work co-operatively with Ms D. She had been known to them since 2015. There were three occasions when the children were the subjects of child protection plans. The first was between September 2019 and May 2021, and the second between December 2021 and November 2022, both under the category of emotional abuse. They were subject to plans for a third time from July 2023 until the commencement of proceedings under the category of neglect. Unfortunately, there was no sustained improvement.
  11. The Local Authority commenced its pre-proceedings process in January 2024. A parenting assessment was completed which concluded that Ms D was unable to provide safe and consistent care. Drug and alcohol testing confirmed chronic excessive alcohol use by Ms D. A psychological assessment was undertaken by Professor Wilcox which came to the conclusion that her alcohol use was at the core of her problems, and that she lacked insight into the impact that it had on her, and on the children. Mr E declined to engage in the assessment.
  12. By June 2024, Ms D was disengaging from professional services. It was in June 2024 that Ms D was arrested, and made the subject of bail conditions, following A's allegations that she had hit him. The Local Authority issued proceedings in August 2024 because of the cumulative impact of all these matters, and the lack of engagement and sustained change. At the point when proceedings were issued, A was in the care of his father, and the girls had been placed with their maternal grandfather, Mr D.
  13. The first hearing took place before Recorder Evans on 20th August 2024. Despite the fact that A was in his care, Mr E did not attend that hearing, and nor has he attended any subsequent hearing.
  14. 11. At the initial hearing, an interim supervision order was made in respect of A. It was agreed that he would remain in his father's care. No orders were made in respect of the girls. This was because there was a dispute between the parties as to the proper placement for them. The Local Authority sought interim care orders with a plan to remove the girls, and to place them in foster care. Ms D opposed that. The order recited that she "…contests the removal of B and C to foster care and the making of a care order should the local authority not agree for the children to remain with maternal grandfather." Although somewhat clumsily expressed, it appears that Ms D was not opposed to the making of interim care orders per se, but rather to the plan to remove the girls from their grandfather. The order recited that the Guardian supported the making of interim care orders, but it was silent as to whether she agreed with the Local Authority's plan of removal. The matter was listed for hearing before District Judge Redmond on 6th September 2024.

  15. The other point of importance that arose from the initial hearing was that it was clearly intended that the case should be dealt with in the Family Drug and Alcohol Court ("FDAC"), although it was not transferred there at that stage.
  16. At the hearing on 6th September 2024, the Court declined to endorse the Local Authority's plan of removal. Interim care orders were made in respect of the girls, but the Court exercised its power pursuant to section 38(6) of the Children Act 1989 to authorise the children to remain in their grandfather's care pending further assessment. The judge's reasoning is set out in a recital to her order in the following terms:
  17. "The Court expressed its concern that it is being invited today to consider removal of the younger two children to foster care, when the local authority statement indicates that there is no imminent risk to these children, and the Guardian's position statement lacks any analysis of why she supports the local authority case, and why she asserts that the welfare of the children B and C requires their removal to foster care from this family placement. Further, that the initial assessment identifies welfare issues which require further assessment, including Mr D ability to protect the children, the use of alcohol by Mr D, and his caring commitments for his grandson, but does not fully assess the risks which may be posed by this young person. The Court today expresses its preliminary view that in balancing the harm to the children of removal, the court would be slow to remove them today without a full and detailed analysis of some of these matters."

  18. The case came before District Judge Watson on 24th September 2024. The primary purpose of that hearing was to bring the case into FDAC. Judge Watson is one of the FDAC judges for the Black Country group of Courts. He timetabled the case through to an issues resolution hearing. He joined Mr E as a party to the proceedings, and he directed that there should be an assessment of him. He gave permission for Ms P, an independent social worker, to be instructed by Mr D's solicitors to undertake the assessment.
  19. The case came before me on 16th October 2024. It did so because I listed it of my own motion. That was because I had been told by the FDAC team, at a non-lawyer review shortly before, that they understood that Ms D was undergoing medical investigations because it was feared that she might have cancer. The team were understandably concerned that, if she did have cancer, the illness, and the treatment she would require, would have an impact on her capacity to engage in the trial for change. Fortunately, by the time of the hearing on 16th October 2024, it had been established that Ms D did not have cancer.
  20. During the hearing on 16th October 2024, another important development emerged. I was told that A had been arrested as the girls had made allegations of a sexual nature against him. The matter was being investigated by the police. As a result, the decision was made that the girls must be separately represented from A. Guardian 1 had been the Guardian for all three children until then. She continued to be A's Guardian. Guardian 2 was allocated as Guardian for the girls.
  21. The case was reallocated to me at that hearing, and I have been the allocated judge ever since.
  22. There was a further hearing on 20th November 2024. At that hearing, Guardian 2 expressed concern about the placement of the girls with Mr D. I directed that the Local Authority must prepare a safety plan in response to her concerns, but I also directed that, other than in an emergency, the girls must not be removed without the matter first being returned to Court. Concern was expressed during that hearing about the lack of coherent thinking by the Local Authority. In particular, it was noted that the authority had not convened a strategy meeting in response to the girls' allegations against A, and nor had it undertaken a section 47 investigation.
  23. The case was listed for an urgent hearing before me on 3rd January 2025 because of concerns about delay by Ms P in producing her assessment of Mr D. The report had been due on 3rd December 2024. It was produced on 3rd January, shortly before the hearing started, but there was insufficient time on the day for it to be considered by the parties or by me. Even though the report had been received, it was incomplete because there were outstanding DBS and medical checks. I directed a statement from Ms P to explain both her delay in producing her report, and her failure to inform her instructing solicitors that there would be a delay.
  24. By the time of this hearing, police and social work investigations into the allegations against A had concluded. The conclusion was that those allegations were unsubstantiated. I directed that restorative work should be undertaken to support A and his sisters to rebuild their relationships.
  25. By the time of the next hearing on 21st January 2025, which I heard sitting as a Recorder, the FDAC assessment of Ms D had been completed. Sadly, it was negative. It was noted that Ms D had been unable to achieve abstinence during the trial for change, and that she continued to drink alcohol excessively and to use drugs, both of which substantially undermined her parenting capacity. The assessment of Mr D by Ms P was also negative. The Local Authority, supported by A and his Guardian and by the girls' Guardian, sought to remove the girls from Mr D's care. Ms D did not attend the hearing, having relapsed, but she instructed her solicitor that she opposed removal. Mr D also opposed removal, asserting that the concerns raised by Ms P were matters that should be considered at a final hearing. Worryingly, Ms P had not filed a statement as directed by me on 3rd January 2025, and I was told that she had been uncontactable.
  26. I declined to order removal of the girls at the hearing on 21st January 2025, but instead I extended the time allowed for the issues resolution hearing listed on 18th February 2025 to allow for consideration of the issue of removal. In the event, it was not possible for me to determine the issue of removal at that hearing, and so the case was listed for a contested final hearing from 1st to 3rd April 2025.
  27. The final hearing

  28. The Local Authority was represented during the final hearing by Ms Herbert of Counsel. Ms D was represented by Ms Briggs of Counsel. Mr D attended, and he was represented by Ms Sparrow of Counsel. Ms Miller of Counsel represented the interests of A. Guardian 1 was unable to attend the final hearing. I excused her attendance on the basis that the plans for A were uncontentious, and his Counsel was fully instructed. Ms Bains of Counsel appeared for the girls, and their Guardian, Guardian 2, was present throughout.
  29. Ms D did not attend the final hearing. She explained this in terms of being unwell. I suspect that there may have been an element of avoidance to her non-attendance, but I make no finding on that point. In any event, Ms Briggs had full instructions, and she was well able to represent her interests. Mr E also did not attend the final hearing, and nor was he represented. Sadly, as set out above, he never engaged in the proceedings, despite caring for A and being the subject of a positive parenting assessment. I was satisfied that he was aware of the hearing, and had chosen not to engage, and so that it was fair to proceed in his absence.
  30. During the hearing, I heard evidence from four witnesses who were:
  31. (i) SW, the allocated social worker;

    (ii) Ms P, independent social worker;

    (iii) Mr D, maternal grandfather; and

    (iv) Guardian 2, Guardian for B and C.

  32. During the hearing, I was conscious of the need to ensure that Mr D, the only family member in attendance, was treated with dignity and respect. I was mindful that he was in a vulnerable position as family members inevitably are when faced with care proceedings. That is particularly so when, as here, they are the subject of a negative parenting assessment, and they have the Local Authority and those for the children ranged against them. I was conscious of the guidance set out in the Equal Treatment Benchbook. I endeavoured to minimise the level of distress caused to Ms D whilst ensuring that the issues were robustly explored. Sadly, given the nature of the hearing and the issues that had to be considered, some distress could not be avoided. I wish to pay tribute to Mr D who mostly remained calm and dignified throughout, despite his obvious and understandable sense of trauma.
  33. The conduct of all advocates was, in my view, a model of good practice. Ms Briggs and Ms Sparrow were both running essentially the same case. They did so with determination and skill. I do not think that Ms D or her father could have been better represented. Those representing the Local Authority and the children made their points as they were bound to do, but they did so in a way that avoided confrontation or aggression. It was so pleasing to see five such capable advocates who were all focused on ensuring that the case was considered thoroughly and professionally. I am unable to see how the hearing could have been better conducted by any of them.
  34. Unfortunately, the hearing was not without its difficulties. Judge Watson was unavailable on Tuesday 1st April 2025, the first day of the hearing, and so I was the only FDAC judge sitting. Consequently, I had to conduct all the non-lawyer reviews scheduled that day for FDAC cases. As a result, half a day was lost on the first day of the hearing. On the second day, the fire alarm was accidentally set off twice. The Court building had to be evacuated both times. Much time was lost as a result. The parties and the advocates dealt with the situation with patience and good humour, but there was no getting round the fundamental point that the hearing was disrupted, and time was lost.
  35. As a result of these difficulties, there was insufficient time left either for the advocates to give their submissions, or for me to consider the case and give judgment. I directed written submissions from the advocates, and I indicated that I would hand down judgment in writing. The parties rightly identified that time was of the essence. That was because, if I were to agree with the Local Authority and the Guardians that the girls should be removed from their grandfather's care, the optimum time to do that was before the Easter holidays so that the girls could have the benefit of support from their school. I agreed with the parties a tight timetable for the parties to send me their written submissions, and for me to then give judgment.
  36. For the avoidance of doubt, although I sent the judgment earlier in the week, I listed the case for a purely notional hearing at 4 pm on Friday 11th April 2025 to hand down judgment. This was, as I say, a notional hearing, and the attendance of all parties was excused. All parties were aware that this was the point at which judgment would formally be handed down.
  37. The positions of the parties

  38. For ease of reading, I have followed the order in which I have listed the issues at paragraph 3 in setting out the parties' positions in respect of those issues.
  39. The Local Authority's position was:
  40. (i) A should continue to live with his father with the support of a child in need plan. No public or private law orders were needed. I was, however, invited to make a parental responsibility order if Mr E does not already share parental responsibility.

    (ii) I should make a care order in respect of the girls, endorsing the Local Authority's plan for them to be placed in foster care.

    (iii) The girls remaining in the care of their grandfather was not a realistic option for them. The placement would be unregulated, and there was no viable plan of support that the authority could put in place to ensure that their holistic needs would be met.

    (iv) The Local Authority did not express any particular view about the orders that I should make if I were to disagree with them about the girls remaining with their grandfather. Their view was that the level of support needed would exceed that which could be provided under any form of orders, including special guardianship and supervision orders.

    (v) The Local Authority did not consider further assessment to be necessary.

    (vi) The contact between the girls and A would be reviewed under the care order for them and the child in need plan for him. The authority would ensure that reparatory work took place in respect of the relationship between B and A.

    (vii) The level and frequency of contact between the girls and their mother would be kept under review, and the Local Authority would support a move to community based contact.

    (viii) The position in respect of contact between the girls and their grandfather was similar. The authority agreed that he should have contact separately from the children's mother, albeit that they would want there to be some overlap in the arrangements to enable the girls to see their grandfather on a day when they had expected to see their mother should she not attend. This would be to ameliorate the disappointment they would feel at not seeing their mother.

  41. Ms D's position was:
  42. (i) Ms D supported the proposal that no order should be made in respect of A. She was anxious that the child in need plan should include a commitment to restorative work to help repair her relationship with A. She made no comment about whether a parental responsibility order should be made.

    (ii) Ms D opposed the making of a care order. Her opposition was not to the order per se, but to the plan of removal into foster care.

    (iii) Ms D opposed the removal of the girls from her father's care since she believes that the benefits of the placement outweigh the deficits.

    (iv) Ms D believed that the girls' placement with her father should be under the auspices of a special guardianship order. Although she supported the continued placement of the girls with her father, it is right to acknowledge that she did so with misgivings. As set out in the position statement prepared by her counsel, she was anxious about the police and ambulance call outs in respect of her father's "grandson" J. She was disappointed by the lack of adequate focus on J, the risks he might present, and how such risks might by managed by the professionals in their assessments. Her view was that I should make a supervision order alongside the special guardianship order to provide a basis for the Local Authority to remain involved in supporting the family, and in assessing J.

    (v) Ms D considered the assessment of Ms P to be so deficient that I should place no reliance on it. She argued that the social worker has not done sufficient to make good the deficits in Ms P's work. It was her position that, if I were to be of the view that there was insufficient evidence to come to a conclusion about the girls' placement, I should, of necessity, order further assessment and delay the conclusion of these proceedings. The children are still comparatively young at 5 and 8 to embark upon a lengthy childhood in care unless I am absolutely sure that I have sufficient evidence to come to that conclusion.

    (vi) Ms D did not express any particular view about the frequency and management of intersibling contact. Understandably, her focus was on the arrangements by which she has contact with the children rather than on their contact with each other.

    (vii) Ms D would be content for her father to manage contact between her and the girls if they were in his care. She believed that he would support extended contact in the community, and that he would have the awareness and capacity to manage the situation if she were to attend contact when intoxicated. If the children were in foster care, she would invite me to make an order pursuant to section 34(3) providing for her to have a minimum of monthly contact for three hours each time.

    (viii) Ms D supported the girls' Guardian's view that she should have contact in the morning, and her father in the afternoon of the same day. That would ensure that were she to fail to attend contact, the girls would still see their grandfather.

  43. Mr D's position was:
  44. (i) I was not invited to make any order in respect of A. This was because it was understood that Mr E shares parental responsibility for him, and so a child arrangements order was not necessary to confer parental responsibility. I must say that I found this to be a puzzling position. Firstly, it was unclear on what factual basis, if any, Mr D understood that Mr E shares parental responsibility. Secondly, a child arrangements order would not be needed to confer parental responsibility on Mr E. Since he is a father, I could make a free-standing parental responsibility order.

    (ii) Mr D was firmly opposed to the making of a care order given the plan of removal.

    (iii) Mr D believed that the girls have done well in his care, and that they should remain there.

    (iv) Mr D was open to the possibility of a special guardianship order, a child arrangements order, or a supervision order. Understandably, he was focused on the practical issue of whether the girls would remain in his care, rather than on the legal issue of what order should be made.

    (v) It was argued on Mr D's behalf that the assessments of Ms P, SW and Guardian 2 were individually and cumulatively flawed. I was not invited to direct further assessment, but to have regard to the deficiencies in their assessments in carrying out my own welfare analysis.

    (vi) Mr D did not advance any particular set of proposals in respect of contact between the girls and A. It was said on his behalf that I could make "…if felt necessary, 'spends time with' orders that Mr D makes the girls available for such contact with A as it recommended by the local authority in the course of the supervision order."

    (vii) Mr D was supportive of contact between the girls and their mother. He would be willing to supervise such contact if they were in his care.

    (viii) Mr D was concerned that his own contact with the girls should continue if they were in foster care. He disagreed with the suggestion that this should be linked to Ms D's contact. A proposal made on his behalf was that it "Might it be better, for example, for the 'family time' to be arranged for the grandfather and one or 2 other family members or friends to attend and, if she is well enough, for the mother to join that and have some time alone with the children at the end?"

  45. A's Guardian, Guardian 1's position aligned with that of A himself. It was that:
  46. (i) A had thrived in his father's care, and he had managed the difficulties that he faced, including being the subject of the allegations that he engaged in sexually abusive behaviour towards his sisters. The only order needed in respect of him was a parental responsibility order given the uncertainty about whether Mr E currently shares parental responsibility.

    (ii) A supported the making of care orders in respect of his sisters.

    (iii) A believed that the girls should be removed from their grandfather's care. He had his own concerns about his grandfather, and he believed that he is unable to meet their needs.

    (iv) A expressed no view about the orders I should make if the girls were to remain in their grandfather's care. He was anxious, however, about Mr D's capacity and willingness to promote contact. If I were to make a special guardianship order, or any other order under which the girls would remain in Mr D's care, he invited me to also make an order that Mr D must make sure that the girls spend time with him.

    (v) A did not invite me to direct any further assessments.

    (vi) A sought to re-establish his relationship with both his sisters. He would like the Local Authority to ensure that this happens, and to undertake any remedial work.

    (vii) In respect of his own contact with his mother, A's position was that he will only want to re-establish his relationship with her when she has proven to him that she has changed.

    (viii) A expressed no view about the girls contact with their grandfather.

  47. B's and C's Guardian's position was:
  48. (i) Guardian 2 expressed no view about the arrangements for A, deferring to Guardian 1.

    (ii) Guardian 2 invited me to make a care order. She believed that the Local Authority's plan of a therapeutic placement for the girls was in their best interests. She advocated a short but focused transition plan for the girls.

    (iii) Guardian 2 did not support the girls remaining in their grandfather's care.

    (iv) Guardian 2 made no particular recommendation about the orders I should make if I were to decide that the girl's should remain in their grandfather's care.

    (v) Guardian 2 acknowledged that there are deficiencies in Ms P's work, but she believed that she nonetheless identified key areas of risk that would enable decisions to be made. Further, she said that any gaps had been filled by the social worker, and through her own assessment.

    (vi) Guardian 2 believed that the Local Authority must undertake urgent restorative work to promote the relationship between A and his sisters.

    (vii) Guardian 2 supported the girls having community based contact with their mother, and she recognised that this would need to be supervised. She urged the Local Authority to engage in practical social work to ensure that contact is managed in the girls' best interests. This would include such practical steps as visiting Ms D the day before each contact was scheduled to take place to assess her state of mind, and her capacity to engage in contact.

    (viii) Guardian 2 supported the ongoing promotion of contact between the girls and their grandfather.

    Burden and standard of proof

  49. In considering the issues before me, I have reminded myself of the basic principles. The burden of proof in respect of each of the allegations lies with the person making it. As these are care proceedings, the burden lies with Local Authority to prove its allegations against the parents. It does not lie with the parents to disprove the allegations.
  50. The standard of proof is the balance of probabilities. I follow the guidance in Re B (Children) [2008] UKHL 35 in saying that (i) neither the seriousness of the allegations nor the consequences arising from the findings made alters the standard of proof, and (ii) if I am satisfied that an alleged fact is more likely than not to have occurred, then it is made out and shall be treated as a fact, but if an alleged fact is not more likely than not to have occurred, then it is not a fact, and it shall not be treated as such.
  51. The witnesses

  52. It is right that I comment briefly on the witnesses from whom I heard, and the view that I formed of their evidence.
  53. The first witness from whom I heard was the social worker, SW. She was, I found a mixed witness. For the most part, she gave clear, cogent evidence. She was cross-examined by Ms Sparrow and by Ms Briggs. Their style was free from aggression, but they carefully and calmly probed her social work methodology and thinking about the case. I found her responses to be considered and thoughtful. She made appropriate concessions. For instance, she readily accepted that there was a lack of evidence to support factual allegations that were disputed by Mr D, but which had been accepted by Ms P as if they were matters of established fact. Nonetheless, she maintained her views where she did not agree with the point being put to her. She was well able to explain why she came to the views that she did.
  54. There were weaknesses in her evidence, and in her social work analysis. Having concluded that the children would be best placed in foster care, she struggled to say what she would do if I decided otherwise. This was despite the fact that she knew that the decision was a contentious one, and she should have had in mind how to manage were it not to go the way that she proposed.
  55. There was also, on SW's part, an element of lack of foresight, and awareness of the emotional and practical dynamics of the situation with which she was dealing. The most striking example of this was that she had not particularly considered what she would do to manage the transition of the girls from their grandfather's care to foster care if I were to agree with the Local Authority's plan. I found it surprising that not only had she not formulated a clear strategy for managing the situation if I disagreed with her position, but she had also not really considered what would follow if I agreed with her.
  56. This was compounded by the fact that the parties and I learnt at the start of the hearing on 1st April that SW was leaving the Local Authority a few days later on Friday 4th April. I do not criticise SW for moving on from her current role, and nor do I criticise the timing of it. It was bad timing for these children. I recognise, however, that it is inevitable that any date on which any social worker moves on will be bad timing for some of the children with whom he or she is working. That cannot be avoided. What was disappointing here was that SW had not recognised that the timing was bad for these children, and so she had not formulated any plan to mitigate the impact of it. In my view, she should have done so.
  57. Ms P was a paradoxical witness. I heard her evidence with a mixture of disappointment and concern. The overwhelming impression made on me was that she was someone whose thought processes were somewhat rigid and dogmatic, and that she was unwilling to think about the situations with which she was faced outside of tightly defined parameters.
  58. It was clear from her written and oral evidence that there were serious deficiencies in Ms P's social work practise in this case. These were set out by Ms Sparrow at paragraph 9 of her closing submissions as follows:
    • Ms P wrongly relied solely on the papers and her interviews with Mr D and did not make appropriate enquiries to formulate her assessment and triangulate information;
    • Ms P wrongly relied on assertions as fact on contested issues and based her analysis upon them. As set out in the position statement for the hearing these were:

    • The 'slap' incident outside the school on 15th November 2024,
    • J's behaviour as raised in the strategy meeting on 19th December 2024,
    • B and C being told they will not see their mother if they tell the local authority about their home life,
    • B and C not completing any homework whilst in the care of their grandfather,
    • That the grandfather's back pain 'will get progressively worse' (C277),
    • That it was the grandfather, rather than the social worker, who told the children they were going to be removed from the grandfather's care at the hearing on 21st January 2025,
    • That there has been no progress with the girls in the time they have been with their grandfather.
    • Although Ms P claimed to understand that it was for the court to determine the facts and that assertions had to be evidence based, her responses did not, it is submitted, suggest that she was able to apply that to the reasoning behind her analysis.
    • Ms P was defensive in her responses and unable to properly concede the extent of the deficiencies in her report.

  59. With real regret, but firmly nonetheless, I must and do find that those criticisms were well-founded. Ms P did not make the enquiries she could and should have made. She did not speak to important people involved in the case such as Ms D and the children themselves. She did treat disputed allegations as if they were matters of established fact. She struggled to understand why that was inappropriate. She was defensive.
  60. There were other criticisms that must also be made. It is a matter of fact that Ms P's report was a month late. It was ordered that this be filed by 3rd December 2024, but it was not filed until 3rd January 2025. I was disappointed not only by the delay, but by the fact that she did not alert the parties to the fact that there would be a delay, and nor did she give reasons for that. I was concerned to be told of the repeated difficulties that the parties experienced in trying to make contact with her. She did not comply with my order to provide a statement to explain her conduct. Looked at in the round, this was not an acceptable way for a professional to carry out her instructions. It fell short of what the parties and the Court were entitled to expect, and it did not comply with her professional responsibilities.
  61. The paradox is this: whilst the criticisms set out above are, sadly, fair and valid, the conclusions to which Ms P came in her report were essentially right. I am left in the position of having to deplore both elements of her methodology and her conduct whilst simultaneously agreeing with her conclusions about Mr D. I will set out my reasons for that in detail below. For now, it is sufficient that I acknowledge both her manifest failings in this case whilst also acknowledging that, in her assessment of the core issues, she was right.
  62. Mr D was the sole family witness. I found his evidence to be concerning. In fairness, I should acknowledge that he is not a professional used to giving evidence. I do not doubt that he found the experience difficult. That would have been all the more so because of what was at stake for him in this case. This is a man who dearly loves his two granddaughters, and who has been caring for them for the past eight months. He deserves credit and respect for that. Faced with a position in which all the professionals in the case advocated removing those granddaughters from his care, I recognise that he must have felt beleaguered, particularly given the criticisms made of him. His experience of giving evidence was not made easier by the fact that one of the two fire alarms that disrupted the second day of the hearing went off whilst he was being cross-examined.
  63. All that said, I heard Mr D's evidence with deep misgivings about its lack of reliability and insight. In terms of reliability, Mr D told me that he was unaware of the extent of Ms D's alcohol use, and the impact that it had. He claimed to regard Mr F, the girls' father, as a binge drinker rather than as someone with an alcohol problem, a somewhat meaningless distinction in this context since it was equally problematic for the children either way. He claimed not to be aware of the prevalence of domestic abuse in his daughter's relationship with Mr F. He denied having seen incidents of misconduct by his daughter, save for one in 2023 which he sought to minimise.
  64. That was all lacking in credibility. It was not disputed by any party, including Mr D himself, that Ms D has a long-standing and deeply entrenched problem of using alcohol chronically and excessively. There had been ongoing Local Authority involvement since 2015 for that reason. The children were subject to child protection plans on three occasions because of it. It is difficult to understand how anyone in regular contact with Ms D, as Mr D accepted he and his late wife were, could not have known what was going on. It seems to me that the only sensible conclusion to which I can come is that he did know, but he was not honest about that to me.
  65. During the course of cross-examination, Mr D sought to minimise and deflect when asked questions about this issue. A telling example was when he was asked questions about seeing Ms D drinking alcohol one Christmas morning. He described what happened that day as being Ms D having one or two drinks, and he sought to justify this by commenting that there will be many people up and down the country who have a drink on Christmas morning. Whilst it is true that there will be many people across the country who enjoy a drink on Christmas morning, this response entirely missed the point. The point was not whether having a drink on Christmas morning is inherently wrong or unusual. No one suggested either was the case. The point was whether it was concerning in the context that arose here of two parents, Ms D and Mr F, who had a significant problem with alcohol.
  66. This is all the more pointed because, as Mr D himself, accepted, Mr F called the police later that day. It is not clear exactly what led to that, but the fact that the police were called at all points to the level of difficulty within the household. Asked about the impact of that on the children, Mr D's evidence was he was not concerned because Ms D had friends around the corner who said that they would have the children. It did not seem to occur to him that the police being called, and then having to go friends around the corner because their parents were incapable of caring for them, would be deeply distressing and traumatic for the children.
  67. Another area where Mr D was not honest was in discussing his health. He was asked about that in the course of cross-examination. He accepted that he had a back problem which he said would be fine for months, but would then flare up, and cause difficulties for a week or so. He described taking simple analgesics for that. Amongst his medication disclosed earlier in the proceedings was oramorph which is clearly a more significant drug than simply analgesia. He said, when I asked him, that he receives Personal Independence Payment (PIP) at the standard rate for both daily living and mobility. He said that the mobility component related to his physical mobility only, and not to his capacity to plan and make journeys. I pointed out to him that I knew, as a former judge of the First-tier Tribunal dealing with social security appeals, that he must have told DWP that he could manage less than 50 metres repeatedly and reliably to receive the standard rate of the mobility component. He accepted that. It was not possible to reconcile the divergent accounts of the impact of his back problem. He had either exaggerated it to DWP to claim benefits to which he was not entitled, or he was minimising it to the professionals in this case. Either way, he was not being open and honest.
  68. Equally as worrying as the things that Mr D sought to minimise, or be dishonest about, were some of the things he readily admitted. I will give two instances here. The first was that, in talking about A, he accepted that there has been an occasion when A had come to his house, and that he had spoken to his late wife about things that were happening at home. He told me that she was upset by the conversation. He accepted that he told A not to return. He justified this in terms of his late wife being terminally ill at the time. He told me that he said to A that, "Enough is enough."
  69. I was struck by three points in his account of this. Firstly, it appeared not to have occurred to Mr D that his late wife might well have been upset for A and his sisters, rather than having been upset by A. Secondly, he appeared to have no empathy for A. The thought did not occur to him, it seems, that A was reaching out for help and support. His concern was entirely focused on his wife with none for his grandchildren. Thirdly, on his own account, he made no effort to offer himself to A as an alternative source of comfort and support if he felt that his wife was too ill at the time to fulfil that role. His own account was that he pushed A away with no thought for the impact of doing so on him. I should make allowances for the fact that this was a particularly difficult time for Mr D. His wife had cancer, and she was dying. Even so, the lack of compassion or concern for his grandchildren, and the harsh rejection of A, was troubling.
  70. The second example was when Mr D was giving evidence about the antipsychotic medication that his surrogate grandson, J, uses. This was a drug called aripiprazole. Mr D told me that J refused to take it because he believed it to be a poison. He, therefore, gave it to him without his knowledge by crushing it and putting it in his food. He appeared to think that there was nothing wrong in doing so. When challenged, he told me that someone from the GP surgery had approved of this course of action. It was pointed out that it was highly improbable that a medical professional would have done so because it is unlawful to medicate someone without their consent other than in limited circumstances such as where there is a community treatment order in place, or an order of the Court of Protection, or a detention in hospital under the Mental Health Act. He then said that he would stop if required to do so. He did not seem to be at all concerned by the impact on his relationship with J if he were to discover that he had been given medication without his knowledge or consent. He was seemingly equally unconcerned about the impact of a sudden cessation of significant mental health medication.
  71. The final witness from whom I heard was the Guardian, Guardian 2. I found her to be an intelligent and thoughtful witness. She had clearly given careful consideration to the case. She readily acknowledged the love and commitment shown by Mr D to the girls, but she explained in balanced terms why she considered that he was nonetheless unable to meet their needs. I was impressed by her willingness to consider each of the points put to her on cross-examination, and to give measured and fair answers.
  72. Mr D's capacity to care for the children

  73. This is the most contentious issue in the case. It will form a core part of my analysis of the welfare checklist so far as B and C are concerned. I have decided to grapple with it at this stage, rather than leaving it until I come to the welfare analysis that I will undertake later. That is because one of the matters I have been invited to consider is whether I need further evidence to evaluate this issue. If I were to conclude that I do, then the welfare analysis would have to wait since I would need first to invite submissions about what further assessments to direct and from whom, and then consider the resultant evidence. Only if I am satisfied that no further evidence is needed can I go on to conduct a welfare analysis through the prism of the welfare checklist.
  74. At paragraph 21 of her closing submissions, Ms Sparrow usefully set out four questions that she submitted I need to consider. They are:
  75. (i) Can Mr D care for B and C?
    (ii) Can he be supported to care for B and C?
    (iii) Are there risks and can those be ameliorated?
    (iv) Balancing the factors set out in the welfare checklist, undertaking a comparative analysis of the realistic options and giving due weight to importance of children remaining in family what is the best welfare outcome for B and C?

    The fourth of those questions will be addressed below. The first three will be the focus of this part of my judgment.

  76. In considering the first of these questions, whether Mr D can care for the B and C, I am sadly driven to the conclusion that he cannot. I say "sadly" partly because I recognise that it is always a sad circumstance when a family member cannot care for children. That is particularly so when, as here, the family member dearly loves the children, and when, again as here, he is the only option for them to be cared for within the family.
  77. In considering this issue, I should and do acknowledge the positives in Mr D's care for the children. He does love them dearly as I have said. That has never been in dispute. It is also right that I acknowledge that many aspects of his care have been positive. He plainly stepped in last August to care for the girls, and he has cared for them ever since. Being there is an important virtue, and an underrated one. I should give credit for it, and I do. That said, the credit I give is tempered by the fact that he could and should have stepped in to protect the children a very long time ago. He was, as I say above, well aware of what was going on, and he did nothing. He rebuffed and rejected A when he reached out for help. He did not, as he might have done, make referrals to social services, or offer himself as a carer, until matters deteriorated to such an extent that he had no alternative. Had he acted sooner, the harm that these children have suffered might have been lessened.
  78. It is also right to say that Mr D has met the physical needs of the girls to a reasonable standard. They have been clean and fed in his care. They have attended school reliably and punctually. They have been well presented when they did so, albeit reportedly smelling of cigarette smoke. He has had support in doing that from his daughter Ms M and from his friend Ms SE. I make no criticism of him for obtaining support. That was, in my view, a reasonable thing for someone suddenly assuming the care of two young girls to do.
  79. I should also be clear about the things that I do not weigh in the balance against Mr D. I do not weigh his health against him. As I understand it, he has suffered from a reactive depression since the loss of his wife. Such an illness is a natural and normal response to such a significant bereavement. I do not take the view that any child should be insulated from loss, nor the impact of loss on someone's mental health. Such things are a normal part of life. I do not think that children can be insulated from it, and nor do I think that they should be. Further, I am conscious of the need not to stigmatise mental illness. Many of us will experience mental illness at some point in our lives. That someone is mentally unwell does not, of itself, prevent that person from caring for a child. That is unless the illness is of a nature and severity that it does so seriously impair their capacity to care that it cannot be managed with support. That is not the case here. The evidence points to Mr D having a reactive depression, managed by a first line antidepressant, mirtazapine, at a dose of 15mg which I know, from the medical advice I received as a Tribunal judge, is the lowest clinically effective dose of that drug.
  80. A similar point arises in respect of Mr D's physical health. From the evidence of his medication that emerged in the course of the hearing, he is being treated for high cholesterol and high blood pressure. Both conditions are typically asymptomatic. They are serious because of the heightened risk they present of heart disease and strokes. Provided that they are managed effectively by medication, they should cause no particular difficulty. The back condition is more significant. I found it difficult to gauge the severity and impact of this. As set out above, Mr D seems to have given divergent accounts of this, telling professionals in these proceedings that it is a manageable and intermittent condition whilst telling DWP that it is significantly debilitating. I do not know which of these is right, or whether the truth lies somewhere in between. It does not matter. If the issue were one of physical difficulty, and I remind myself that the evidence does not suggest that Mr D has struggled to care for physical reasons, my response would be that appropriate support would need to be put in place. I do not consider that the possibility of a family placement should be discounted for reasons of physical health unless it were genuinely so severe that no realistic support package could be put in place.
  81. The concerns I do have about Mr D's parenting capacity for these girls firstly relates to issues that would be relevant to any girls in his care. I listened to Mr D's evidence about meeting the girls' personal care and hygiene needs with some alarm. Essentially, his view is that their personal care and hygiene needs should be met by women. Currently, he draws on the support of his daughter Ms M and Ms SE to do so.
  82. Asked how he would manage if they were unavailable, Mr D said that he would bathe the girls, but that they would have to wear pants when he did so. He did not say why they would have to do so. The obvious supposition is that he would ask them to do so because pants would cover their genitals. Presumably, the message that this was intended to convey is that he is not a man with any desire to see the genitals of pre-pubescent girls. Whilst I understand the anxiety not to be perceived as a man with a desire to see girls' genitals, I am concerned. This is not a case in which there has ever been any suggestion that professionals are concerned that Mr D poses a sexual risk of any kind. Given that this has never been suggested, his anxiety about undertaking a very usual part of the parenting role, one undertaken by many men for their children and grandchildren, is difficult to understand.
  83. Even if I take this in the context of Mr D possibly being anxious about the risk of false allegations, following on from allegations having been made by the girls against their brother, I have to say that it displays a worrying attitude towards the girls, their bodies, and the perception of what is normal. The risk here is what his attitude towards this issue would do to the girls' sense of self, their sense of identity and their feelings about their own bodies. Without meaning to do so, by requiring the girls to cover their genitals in the bath, he would effectively be communicating to them that their bodies were in some way "wrong" or shameful. That would not, I am sure, be his intent, but it would be the likely impact.
  84. I then move to the girls' emotional needs. These girls have suffered repeated traumatic experiences over a prolonged period. They have experienced both parents drunk and incapable of caring for them so that friends and neighbours had to step in. They have experienced domestic abuse between their parents. They have experienced the death of their father when they were still very young. They had experiences that led to their making allegations of sexually abusive behaviour against their brother. I do not know what led to that. I should not speculate, and I do not. I simply recognise the obvious: something in the girls' experiences led to them saying the things they did. I make no findings about what that something was, but plainly the bare fact of such things being said by them was indicative of trauma even if what was said was not well-founded.
  85. The question, then, is whether Mr D could meet these emotional needs. With regret, but firmly nonetheless, I find that he could not. To meet these needs, he would require a degree of insight and empathy that sadly he lacks. This came across very strongly in his own evidence to me. He was unable to express any understanding of why it was that A wanted and needed to speak to his late wife, for instance. I have already set out my views about his response to that above. He displayed no insight or understanding into the girls' emotional needs. He was given many opportunities to do so during the course of cross-examination. Sadly, he seemed wholly unable to display any understanding that went beyond the most basic acknowledgement, when pressed, that their experiences would have had an impact on them.
  86. To my mind, this is a profound difficulty. The girls' experiences will inevitably have an impact on them, now and as they grow and develop. It will play out in various ways in the years to come, particularly as they move through adolescence. I cannot know and predict how it will manifest itself. I can predict with a high degree of confidence that it will manifest itself, even if the way it does so is unknown to me. Mr D is very poorly placed to deal with that. He has no starting point since, I find, he lacks insight and understanding beyond the most superficial.
  87. This extends to the very basic level of being unable to acknowledge their lived experiences. A striking feature of Mr D's evidence to me was that he was unable to acknowledge, even now, the severity and impact of his daughter's use of alcohol. He sought consistently to minimise it. If he could not acknowledge it when asked in Court, I have to be concerned about how he would respond when the girls want to talk about it as they will inevitably need to do in the years to come.
  88. I then move on to the issue of J. J is a 19 year old. He was the grandson of Mr D's late wife. Although not biologically related to Mr D, he had been involved in J's life since he was a baby, and he is, and always has been, treated by him as if he were a grandson. He lives with Mr D, and he has done so throughout the entirety of these proceedings.
  89. So far as J is concerned, I accept the point that there has been no proper risk assessment undertaken by social work professionals. That there has not been an assessment is lamentable. That said, there was sufficient evidence before me to cause me acute concern. It was common ground that he has been diagnosed with attention deficit hyperactivity disorder (ADHD) and autistic spectrum disorder (ASD). In themselves, these labels tell me little. Both diagnoses cover a very broad constellation of possible signs and symptoms. The issue is not the diagnostic label, but the need to form about how the conditions manifest in the individual case.
  90. The best evidence I have about this came from Mr D himself. He accepted that J can be volatile, unpredictable and aggressive. He denied that the girls had ever seen this since they had been living with him. That denial is contentious since it is documented that C reported to school that J had been "kicking off", and that he had kicked over a chair. Whether that was right or not, it seems to me that the fundamental point is that he is volatile and unpredictable in his behaviour, and that he can be aggressive such that, again on Mr D's own account, he needs physical restraint at times.
  91. A sense of this came from an incident which I was told happened on the weekend before the hearing. Mr D's account was that he told J to tidy his bedroom, and he threatened to throw him out if he did not. J became angry, and he called the police. The police were unconcerned, and they took no action. I treat that account with some caution because I struggle to see the reasons for the leap from an argument about tidying a bedroom to the police being called. The obvious concern is that there was rather more to it than Mr D was willing to tell me, but I do not know and I make no finding.
  92. Even taken at face value, the incident was concerning. Matters seem to have escalated with worrying swiftness from an argument about tidying a bedroom to the police being called, and threats to throw J out of his home. It is reasonable for me to consider the risk of Mr D doing similar to the girls in the future, given how he behaved towards A, and his own account of this incident.
  93. Further, in this context, even if the girls have not yet seen anything of the kind, the risk that they might do so if they remain in Mr D's care is a substantial one, such that it cannot sensibly be ignored. What would flow if they did would depend on the nature and severity of the incident. That cannot be predicted, but the risks of something seriously untoward occurring are, in my judgment, very real. Dependent on what happened, the consequences for the girls could be grave.
  94. The risks are, if anything, elevated at the present time if Mr D's evidence on the third day of proceedings is to be believed. It was his account that he had ceased to give J his medication aripiprazole from the Friday before the hearing (ie 28th March 2025) because he had had seizures resulting in an ambulance being called. I treat that evidence with caution because the interrupted evidence from Mr D on the second day was that J continued to have the medication. Taking at face value the account that it had stopped on Friday 28th March, I note that Mr D's account was that J had shown no ill effects as a result. I treat that with caution. Even if right, this evidence was given less than a week later, and so it would have been too soon to know what impact the sudden cessation of the drug would have. I note that, on his own account, the cessation was done without medical advice. It is possible to be troubled at the way in which the drug was being given clandestinely without J's consent, and also to be troubled at its sudden cessation.
  95. A further point is the clandestine administration of drugs. Two concerns flow from that:
  96. (i) I found it worrying that Mr D considered to be an appropriate thing to do. I accept that he is not versed in the law, or legal concepts of consent. One does not need to be so to appreciate the obvious point that medicating someone without their knowledge or consent is a serious step to take. I was troubled by Mr D's casual attitude to this. I have to be concerned about the risk that he might behave in a similar way with the girls in the future should he consider it to be necessary.

    (ii) I also have to wonder what J's response would be if he were ever to learn the truth. The risk of that happening is real since secrets of this kind are difficult to keep. The possibility of seeing or hearing something that would alert him is a real one. Given that, on Mr D's account, he considers the drug to be a poison, it is not difficult to imagine his anger were he to learn the truth. That is not a speculative risk, but one that is all too real, and which could so easily materialise.

  97. The possibility was raised that the situation of J could be resolved by his living elsewhere. Mr D expressed that in stark terms by saying that, if need be, J would have to leave. He said that he had told J this, and he understood and agreed. I have to say that his evidence on this point caused me real concern. Mr D seemed to have no emotional or practical awareness of what that would mean to him or to J. J is a highly vulnerable young man of 19 with significant difficulties. He has lived with Mr D most of his life. Although not biologically related, Mr D is a de facto father/grandfather to him. It would be naïve to believe that it would be as simple as Mr D telling him to go, and his moving out. The likelihood is that it would not be easy if it could be done at all. In passing, I do have to wonder whether Mr D would be similarly blasé about asking one or both girls to move out at some time in the future were the circumstances to arise.
  98. A more moderate version of the same proposition was put forward in submissions. That was that steps could be taken to support J to move to semi-independent living. That is more realistic, but it would take time to do it properly, and, even then, there are no guarantees that J could successfully make the transition. These girls cannot afford to wait in the uncertain hope that this would happen, and that it would be successful.
  99. 83. There is a further area of real concern to me. That is in respect of Mr D's capacity to promote a relationship between the girls and their brother, A. Mr D said that he would promote this when asked. I do not believe him. I do not do so because his assertions that he would do so were grudgingly given when pressed on cross-examination. They flew in the face of his evidence about A as a whole. That was characterised by anger, disdain and simple dislike. I have already described the callous way in which Mr D dismissed A when he sought help. Throughout his evidence, it was clear that he sees A in wholly negative terms. He said that he "…came to the house talking like a gangster…" He said that he needs to stop "smoking the wacky baccy", a somewhat ironic criticism from the man who willing minimised his own daughter's chronic alcohol misuse, despite the impact that it had on the children. He said that A would need to turn his life around for him to accept him back, and to lift the ban that he had imposed on his coming to the house. He was unable to explain how A would demonstrate this, given that he had effectively cut all channels of communication between them. He made it clear that the onus lay, in his mind, on A to take the initiative. He told me that he needed to "show some respect". He was unable to show even the slightest glimmer of compassion for A, and for the adverse experiences he had been through in Ms D's care.

  100. Having heard the evidence, I was driven to the conclusion that Mr D would be wholly unable to promote a relationship between the girls and their brother. I found his assertions to the contrary to be tokenistic and insincere. They were given when pressed because he knew that he had to give them. There was no conviction to any of it.
  101. Having identified the extent to which Mr D can care for the girls, and also the limitations on that and the risks, I will go on to consider whether he can be supported to care for them, and whether the risks can be ameliorated.
  102. Looking at this, the two main areas of concern can be encapsulated as arising from Mr D's lack of insight, empathy and understanding, and secondly the risks presented by J. Taking those in turn, I have considered whether Mr D could be supported to develop insight, empathy and understanding so as to ameliorate the risks that his lack of them presents.
  103. In my view, sadly, Mr D cannot be supported to develop these things to the extent needed, and that is no realistic means of ameliorating the risk. I say so for two main reasons:
  104. (i) There is insufficient by way of starting point in terms of insight, empathy and understanding on which to build within the timescales that these girls require. The point was made on Mr D's behalf that it is not realistic or reasonable to expect him to have a sophisticated understanding of trauma, and how it should be managed, particularly as he has had no teaching on the subject. That is both entirely right, and entirely beside the point. Of course, it would be unreasonable to expect Mr D to have the sophisticated understanding of a trained psychotherapist or counsellor. No one does, or ever has, expected that of him. What is expected, and is sadly lacking, is for him to possess the usual level of empathy and insight that anyone might be expected to possess. One does not need to be a psychotherapist to understand that these girls have experienced really difficult things, and that has had an impact on them. It did not require a qualification in counselling, to appreciate that, on the day when A came to speak to Mr D's late wife, he was upset, and he was reaching out for help. That required no more than a normal degree of human understanding. Mr D was unable to display that then. On the evidence I heard, he remains unable to display it still now, even when pressed on cross-examination for some sign of it. Training and guidance might help someone to develop their skills and understanding. I struggle to see how it would create something that is simply not there.

    (ii) The evidence of the social worker was that she did try to signpost Mr D to various resources, but he was not interested, and he rejected everything he suggested. I accept that. It was consistent with the tenor of the man I heard give evidence that he would behave in such a way. It was said on his behalf that the social worker could perhaps have done more, and that her efforts were half-hearted and tokenistic. Maybe so, but I do have some sympathy with the social worker not making too much effort in this respect when faced with a man who rejected everything she did offer. Social work is a partnership between the professional and the family. It is unlikely to be effective where the family is disengaged and disinterested in what the professional has to offer.

  105. There is one further point to be made. Mr D made it clear in his evidence that he dislikes and distrusts every social work professional with whom he been in contact, including the allocated social worker and the Guardian. He was fiercely critical of them for being unable to respond to routine contacts from him as swiftly as he thought they should. He showed no awareness that they might be doing their best under immense pressure with heavy demands on their time, and that, inevitably, they have to prioritise. I struggle to see how he would effectively engage with any support they offered from that starting point.
  106. Decisions for A

  107. I will deal with A separately from his sisters for the obvious reason that his circumstances are entirely different, and so is the plan for him. A has been placed with his father throughout these proceedings. I have read the positive assessment of Mr E. From the evidence before me in the papers, he has done a commendable job in caring for A, and in meeting his complex emotional needs. There is no suggestion from any party that A should be anywhere other than in his father's care. No one considers that any order is needed in respect of him.
  108. I remind myself that, as section 1(5) of the Children Act 1989 provides, I should not make any order unless I consider that doing so would be better for A than making no order at all. In this case, I am quite satisfied that the parties are right, and that no order is needed.
  109. There is one important caveat to that. It is unclear from the papers whether Mr E shares parental responsibility for A. Unfortunately, I did not register that until after the hearing had concluded. When I did, I raised it with the other parties. It seems that no one else had registered it either. It was somewhat surprising that it was not identified at the time of the hearing when Mr E was joined as a party. That is because it would have been unnecessary to join him if he shared parental responsibility since he would have been an automatic respondent. In any event, the position at the time of preparing this judgment is that it is still unknown whether Mr E does or does not share parental responsibility.
  110. If Mr E does not share parental responsibility, it is unarguable that he should be granted parental responsibility by the making of an order pursuant to section 4(1)(c) given that A is in his full-time care, and so he will remain. The parties invited me to make the order on a precautionary basis now. I indicated that I was unwilling to make an order on an "in case" basis. I preferred to establish whether it was necessary. I invited the Local Authority or A's solicitors to obtain his birth certificate. The only realistic path by which Mr E may already have acquired parental responsibility is if he is named there. That is easily established. If an order is needed, it can be made.
  111. In preparing this judgment, I have looked again at the Act itself. On doing so, I noted a point that I had forgotten at the time when I discussed this issue with the parties. Section 4(1) provides that:
  112. Where a child's father and mother were not married to each other at the time of his birth, the father shall acquire parental responsibility for the child if—
    (c) the court, on his application, orders that he shall have parental responsibility for the child.

    As the text I have highlighted makes clear, this is one of the rare occasions when the Act does not empower me to make an order of my own motion. Mr E would have to apply. I would urge the parties to establish the position as a matter of urgency. If Mr E does not share parental responsibility, he should be encouraged and supported to make an application. Since that would be uncontentious, I see no reason why the application could not be submitted to me with the consent of Ms D accompanying it, and it can then be dealt with on the papers without the need to trouble either parent to attend Court.

  113. The Local Authority intends to support A's placement with his father through a Child in Need plan. I have no lawful authority to impose requirements on the Local Authority in their implementation of that. I do not purport to do so. I would urge, not order, them to ensure that they focus on two critical issues: (i) restorative work to support and promote a relationship between A and his mother, and (ii) work to support and promote a relationship between A and his sister. Both sets of relationships are of the greatest importance to him, and I hope that the Local Authority will support and promote them.
  114. I would like to conclude my consideration of A by saying some words to Mr E. I would ask A's solicitor to relay them to him. They are, "Mr E, we have never met. I am the judge who has been dealing with the proceedings in respect of your son. I simply want to say thank you. Thank you for being there for A. Thank you for stepping up to the mark when your son needed you. Thank you for the care that you have given him. I was so very happy to read about the progress he has made in your care. It cannot have been easy for either of you, but you have both done so well. Thank you, and good luck for the future. I wish you both so very well."
  115. I am happy to write to A himself, but I am uncertain whether he would like that. I would invite his solicitor, in consultation with his Guardian, to let me know.
  116. Decisions for B and C

    Threshold

  117. I have considered whether the legal grounds for making a care order are made out. The question I have to consider is whether I am satisfied that each of the children has suffered significant harm, or would be likely to do so, and whether the harm, or likelihood of harm, is attributable to the care given to them, or likely to be given if the order were not made, not being what it would be reasonable to expect a parent to give. This is known as "the threshold criteria", and it is set out at section 31(2) of the Children Act 1989. The relevant date is 15th August 2024 when the Local Authority commenced proceedings.
  118. In relation to this, I can be brief. The Local Authority has filed a schedule of the allegations on which it relies in order to establish that the threshold is met. An amended schedule was filed during the course of the final hearing, including some requested changes. The parties, save for Mr E who has played no part in the proceedings, agree that the threshold has been crossed on the basis of the matters set out in the amended document. I have attached a copy of the agreed threshold document as an appendix to this judgment. I have had regard to the matters set out within it in making my decisions. Based on those matters, I must and do conclude that the threshold has been crossed.
  119. The fact that the threshold has been crossed means that I can make care orders. It does not mean that I must do so, however. To decide whether to make a care order, I turn to consider the welfare considerations that must be evaluated in making such a decision.
  120. Article 8

    100. I have also reminded myself of article 8 of the European Convention on Human Rights. Article 8 provides that everyone has the right to respect for his private and family life, his home and his correspondence. There shall be no interference by a public authority with the exercise of this right except such as in accordance with the law, and is necessary in a democratic society … for the prevention of disorder or crime, for the protection of health or morals, or for the protection of the rights and freedoms of others.

  121. Article 8 is clearly engaged in this case since the application by the Local Authority for care orders in respect of the girls, with a plan of removal into foster care, is a fundamental interference by a public authority in the lives of each member of the family. I have been mindful that I should sanction such interference only if I am satisfied that it is necessary, proportionate and in accordance with the law.
  122. Care order

  123. In deciding whether or not to make a care order, I have reminded myself of the principles set out in the Children Act 1989. Whilst it is neither necessary nor helpful for me to set those out in full here, it may assist the parties in understanding my decision if I set the key principles. They are as follows:
  124. (i) In making decisions about the children's upbringing, their welfare shall be my paramount consideration (section 1(1)).
    (ii) In considering whether or not to make one or more orders under this Act with respect to the children, I shall not make the order or any of the orders unless I consider that doing so would be better for them than making no order at all (section 1(5)).

  125. In evaluating the welfare checklist, the law is clear that none of the items that makes up the checklist is, in general, more or less important than any other item on the list. That said, in the circumstances of the particular case, some items may be more important than others in evaluating what is the right welfare decision for the children concerned. Sometimes, the circumstances may be such that one or more items on the checklist assume a magnetic importance such that they become determinative of the outcome.
  126. I turn to the welfare checklist, and address it as follows:
  127. (a) The children's ascertainable wishes and feelings, considered in the light of their age and understanding

    B has expressed a very clear wish to live with her grandfather. From the record of her conversation with the Guardian on 5th February 2025, set out at pages E130 – E132 of the bundle, I read of the confusion that B feels about her circumstances. The account was a moving one. From it, I understand that B would ideally like to live with her mother, but she appreciates the difficulties. Alternatively, she wants to remain with her grandfather. I have read of the positive contact that B has had with her mother, and I understand that she wants to see her. Disappointingly, although the contact has been loving and of good quality when it has occurred, there have been many occasions when Ms D has not attended. I recognise that contact with her grandfather will be important to B. So far as A is concerned, she is currently unwilling to engage in contact.
    In the case of C, her views are less considered and insightful, understandably so given her age. Nonetheless, it is clear that she loves the important people in her life, most significantly her sister, her grandfather and her mother. Pleasingly, she has engaged in contact with A, and they are rebuilding their relationship. I understand that she would ideally want to continue living with her grandfather.
    More broadly, I take it as a given that these children would want what all children want: to be part of a family in which they are loved and secure, and in which their needs are met now and into the future. I also take it as a given that the girls want to remain together.

    (b) The children's physical, emotional and educational needs

    The girls physical and educational needs are being met by the grandfather, and I take it that they would continue to be so, were they to remain in his care. The caveat to that is that I am concerned about the potential for an incident involving J. I have no reason to find that he would deliberately harm them. I make no such finding. The risk is that, if there were to be an episode of impulsive, aggressive behaviour, they would be caught in the crossfire.
    I am deeply anxious about the girls' emotional needs. Their lives have been characterised by trauma and loss. Their mother loves them. That is not in dispute. Sadly, they have experienced neglectful, chaotic and unacceptably poor parenting in her care. Her alcohol use, and her pattern of abusive relationships, has meant that she has been unable to meet their needs. They have been exposed to all that, and it must have been traumatising for them. In addition, they have experienced the loss of their father. That, of itself, would normally be the most profound trauma that children of their ages might be expected to have endured. In this case, the trauma of that loss, profound as it is, is simply one of the many traumas they have endured.

    The realistic options before me are to decide that the girls should remain in their grandfather's care, or be placed in foster care. I have already addressed the difficulties with that in considerable detail above. I do not need to repeat that material here, but I have carefully borne it in mind. Notwithstanding the very real concerns I have about the emotional care that he can afford the girls, I do recognise that removing them from his care would be another trauma for these girls, another loss that they would have to endure. I am all too aware of the impact that it would be likely to have on them. Against that is the point that the Local Authority has identified a therapeutic placement with carers with the skills and awareness to recognise and need their needs. I recognise the benefits of that to their emotional wellbeing, now and in the future. The deficit is the obvious one, that the carers would be strangers to the girls, people with whom they would have to build a relationship. In two lives characterised by loss, I readily appreciate that they are likely to find that difficult. The question is whether the difficulties would be outweighed by the possibility of receiving the excellent emotional care they so desperately need.

    (c) The likely impact on the children of any change in their circumstances

    This is difficult to predict with any precision. Leaving the girls where they are now has the obvious attraction that it is somewhere known and familiar to them both. It would mean continuing to live with their grandfather whom they both love, and who in turn loves them. It would avoid their having to experience another loss, another traumatic experience. The benefits of that are obvious. Sadly, so too are the deficits. It would mean leaving them in the care of a man who, despite his love for them, is severely lacking in insight and understanding. At best, he would struggle to meet their emotional needs because he lacks the capacity to recognise what those needs are. At worst, he would be actively harmful by denying the reality of their lived experiences given his inability to acknowledge the nature and extent of those experiences in the care of his daughter. It would also mean being exposed to the ongoing and unpredictable risks posed by J.
    The alternative is to place them in foster care. That, too, is fraught with difficulty. I recognise the force of the position advanced by the Local Authority and by Guardian 2 about the need of these girls for skilled carers able to provide the loving, therapeutic support they need so very much need. Against that, is the impact on the girls of more loss, another separation. On balance, I think the benefits would outweigh the deficits. It would be naïve, however, to assume that the transition would be easy. It will not be. I fully endorse the point made by Guardian 2 that such a transition would need to be carefully support with a short but focused transition plan. It would also need, in my view, careful ongoing support to manage the difficulties that are likely to arise. I cannot say what those difficulties will be. The form they will take is difficult to predict, but it is not difficult to predict that there will be difficulties, particularly in the transitional period and possibly beyond, which will require sensitive social work intervention to manage. It would be naïve to suppose otherwise.
    The other point that I would make is the need of these girls for placement stability. I am all too aware of the changes of placement, sometimes frequent changes, that can be the experience of children in long-term care. The risks to these girls' long term mental and emotional health if that were to happen to them are obvious. I would urge the Local Authority to be very alive to the need to ensure placement stability for these children who simply cannot manage further trauma.

    (d) The children's age, sex, background and any characteristics of theirs which I consider to be relevant

    B is a girl aged eight. C is a girl aged five. They are British children of white ethnicity. They have additional emotional needs as a result of bereavement, trauma and other losses as described above.

    (e) Any harm which the children have suffered or are at risk of suffering

    The sad reality is that the children have suffered and are at risk of suffering harm because of those matters specified in the threshold document, and identified already in this judgment.

    (f) How capable is each of the parents, and any other person in relation to whom I consider the question to be relevant, of meeting the children's needs

    There are two people to be considered: Ms D and Mr D. So far as Ms D is concerned, I can be brief. She is unable to meet the needs of the girls, now and in the foreseeable future. She loves them, but she is unable to provide them with safe and consistent care. Her capacity to do so is subsumed by her need for alcohol, by her propensity for violent and abusive relationships, and by her chaotic lifestyle. To her credit, she herself recognises this. She does have the capacity to meet their needs in the more limited context of contact. It is critically important to the girls that this is promoted. It is also important that it is carefully managed to ensure that they do not experience repeated disappointment of expecting contact only for it then not to take place. Guardian 2 said, in her evidence to me, that she would advocate active social work management of the situation. Her suggestion was that a social worker should visit Ms D each time contact is due to take place to ensure that she is going to attend, and that she is emotionally able to meet the children's needs. I entirely agree with her.
    The position of Mr D is more complex. I have set out my analysis of it already, and I do not propose repeating that here. The critical point is that he can meet their physical and educational needs. There are no deficits in these elements of his care that could not be met through appropriate support and intervention. The problem is that he is unable to meet their emotional needs. Even if these were two girls with no emotional needs above and beyond those which all children have, I think that he would struggle. With support, he might possibly manage. These are not girls whose emotional needs are simply those any child might have; they are children with extensive additional emotional needs. Mr D cannot even recognise what those needs are, and still less can he meet them. I do not see that any amount of support would make good the deficits; they are simply too extensive. Further, he is wholly unable to meet their need for a relationship with their brother.

    (g) The range of powers available to me under the Act

    I have considered the options available to me as follows:
    1. No order – this is the least interventionist course I can take. It would have the benefit of enabling the children to main with their grandfather, and of bringing to an end the interference by the state in the lives of these children and their family that is the inevitable consequence of care proceedings. With regret, I must say that it is not a realistic option in this case. As I have said, the evidence before me is that Mr D is not able to meet the emotional needs of these two vulnerable girls, and also to safeguard them from the risks posed by his grandson J. The ongoing intervention by the state is necessary and proportionate because the children would not otherwise be safely and consistently cared for.
    2. Child arrangements order – such an order would provide a legal basis for placing the children with Mr D. It carries the same advantages as making no order at all, and some additional advantages in that it would secure a placement of the children with him. It would also confer parental responsibility on him for so long as it remained in force. Although it has advantages, it has the same disadvantages as making no order at all.

    3. Special guardianship order – the position is much the same as with a child arrangements order. There are two additional advantages. For so long as it remained in force, it would confer enhanced parental responsibility on Mr D. I think that would be more illusory than real as an advantage. I have to ask against whom would he exercise the enhanced parental responsibility. Sadly, the girls' father is dead. Their mother has accepted that she is unable to care for them. She might possibly cause difficulties where the capacity to exercise enhanced parental responsibility would assist. More probably, she would not. The benefits would be remote. There would also be a support plan. The practical benefits of that would assist Mr D. The difficulty is that the concerns in this case focus on his capacity to recognise and to meet the girls' emotional needs. A support plan would not assist with that in any meaningful way.

    4. Supervision order (either on its own or in tandem with a child arrangements order or a special guardianship order) – In many ways the position is the same as that which arises in making no order or a child arrangements or a special guardianship order, and the benefits and deficits would be similar. There would be some additional safeguards that would not be present with those because the Local Authority would have a duty to advise, assist and befriend the children. The role of the Local Authority would be limited both legally and practically. Legally, a supervision order would not confer shared parental responsibility on the Local Authority, and nor would it allow them to control the parents' exercise of their parental responsibility. The Local Authority would not have the legal responsibilities that they have when a child is in their care. Further, a supervision order can be made for only 12 months. That can be extended by a further 12 months if an application were made. It can be extended only twice, and so the maximum period would be three years. If I were to make such an order today, and two applications for extensions were made and granted, the order would still expire by the time B was 11, and C was 8. Practically, I am not confident that a supervision order would provide sufficient safeguards to address the level of concern that would exist in any placement within the family.
    5. Care order – a care order would enable the Local Authority to share parental responsibility with Ms D. It would provide a basis on which they could continue to accommodate the children in a therapeutic foster placement on a long-term basis which is their plan. In my view, it is the only realistically viable plan for these children. I am satisfied that a care order is the appropriate order to make, that it is in the best interests of the children, and that it is necessary, proportionate and in accordance with the law. I am, therefore making care orders in respect of both children.

    Contact

  128. There is one further issue that I need to address, and that is contact. There are three components to this which I will address below. Before doing so, there are some generalised observations I should make.
  129. The obvious question that arises in cases of this kind is why contact should be reduced following the conclusion of proceedings. The answer lies in the difference between the situation that existed whilst the children were the subject of care proceedings, and that which will exist once those proceedings have concluded. Whilst the care proceedings were ongoing, final decisions had yet to be made about the children's futures. The Local Authority had a positive responsibility to promote a high level of contact in recognition of the fact that the Court might ultimately decide that some or all of the children should be rehabilitated to, or remain in, family care. That is a clear obligation on them. Were they to do otherwise, were they to reduce contact on the basis of their belief that rehabilitation was not a viable option, they would rightly be accused of pre-empting the Court's decision. Now that the proceedings have concluded, the position is different. They maintain an obligation to promote contact as section 34 makes clear, but they no longer have to do so on the basis that they must not pre-empt the Court's decision.
  130. There are child focused reasons for reducing the level of contact. Throughout the proceedings, the children would have been told that the no final decisions had been made about with whom they should live. They would all have lived with the knowledge that the future was uncertain. C has been insulated from that to some extent because of her age. B has been all too aware of it. Both girls now need to understand that the uncertainty is over, that decisions have been made. They need to know that where they are going is where they will continue to be long-term. I think that the social workers are right to say that, if contact continues as it has been, it will be much more difficult for the children to assimilate that message. It would, in my view, be harder for them to feel secure and settled.
  131. Contact between the girls and their mother

  132. I have considered the position with care. The quality of contact between the girls and Ms D has been good when it has taken place. The problem, of course, is that it has not taken place with any regularity and reliability. In my view, future contact will need to be managed with care. I do, of course, want it to be promoted. The difficulty is how that is to be done whilst safeguarding the children from the risks that arise: (i) Ms D being intoxicated when she attends, and (ii) Ms D not attending at all.
  133. The plan is for monthly contact. I think that the frequency of that is right. I do, however, strongly endorse the Guardian's view that there should be proactive social work before each contact takes place, ideally with a visit to Ms D each time the day before it is due to take place, to establish that she intends to go, and that she is in a position where she can do so. There will need to be careful management of the girls' expectations to try to minimise the harm caused when, as I fear will be inevitable, there are occasions when they are disappointed. I do not agree that the grandfather should inevitably be a part of the contact because, when things are going well, that will detract from the time that the children have with their mother. Provided Mr D is willing, I think it would be better to have him on standby so that he can step in if needed. Again, that will require careful social work engagement. It would also be wise for the foster carers to have considered contingency plans each time for what they will do if the girls are let down.
  134. I do not think it is appropriate for me to exercise my powers under section 34 to make orders to regulate contact. There are too many variables and unknowns. Obviously, if the need arises, applications can be made in the future. I hope that will not be necessary.
  135. Contact between the girls and their grandfather

  136. This is perhaps easier than contact between the girls and their mother because Mr D is likely to be more predictable and reliable. I would urge the Local Authority to bear in mind that, whatever his deficits, Mr D loves these children, and they love him. That relationship must be preserved and promoted. The girls cannot afford more loss.
  137. I would support contact every two months as a minimum, but I hope that it can be more extensive than that. It will all depend on how the girls adapt to being in foster care, how Mr D adapts to their being there, and on the relationships that develop between him and their carers. These are matters that I cannot predict, but I hope that it will go well. If it does, then I think that there may well be scope for imaginative and creative options to be considered. I hope so.
  138. As with Ms D, I do not think it is appropriate for me to exercise my powers under section 34 to make orders to regulate contact. There are too many variables and unknowns. Obviously, if the need arises, applications can be made in the future. I hope that will not be necessary.
  139. Contact between the girls and A

  140. This is the area where I feel least able to be prescriptive. I certainly think that every effort should be made to foster the relationship between A and C, and also to support the rebuilding of a relationship between A and B. The pace at which that is done, the level of contact and how that should take place are all matters for careful consideration, in consultation with the foster carers, over time.
  141. There is one matter that does concern me. I do not know why the girls made the allegations they did against A. It is possible that nothing further will be said, and that the situation can safely be put behind them all. It is, however, also possible that further things may be said. I do not in any way intend to speculate on the likelihood of that. I merely acknowledge that it is a possibility. Were that to happen, there would need to be thoughtful management of the situation. I would urge the Local Authority to learn from the earlier mistakes when the first set of allegations were made, and to convene a strategy meeting to allow a forum for considered and nuanced decision making.
  142. Conclusion

  143. For these reasons, I decide that no orders should be made in respect of A, other than a parental responsibility order, if it is needed and Mr E applies, and that final care orders should be made in respect of B and C. I endorsed the plan put forward by the Local Authority, and this included the proposals both for placement and contact subject to the observations made in this judgment.
  144. I want to conclude by saying a few words to Ms D and to Mr D.
  145. Ms D

  146. I know how much you both love all three children. Sadly, because of your struggles in your own life, you have been unable to provide them with the care they need. You have been brave in accepting that. I hope that you will now focus on addressing your own problems. I believe that you deserve so very much better than the life you are currently leading, and so do your children. I cannot do it for you. Only you can do it, but you do not have to do it alone. There is help out there for you if you choose to take it. I believe that you are worth it, that you matter. If you are able to take the help that is available, you will benefit so very much, and so will your children. I wish you well.
  147. Mr D

  148. I know that much of what I have said in this judgment will make for painful reading for you. I am sorry. I did not want to hurt you, but I have had to grapple with the issues before me, and there were things that had to be said. I want now to reiterate some of the positives. I do not doubt that you love B and C very much. I know that you wanted to care for them for the best of reasons. I do not think that you can for the reasons I have given. I do think that you can and should continue to play a full role in their lives. Building positive relationships with their new carers will assist with that as will trying to build better relationships with the social worker. One advantage of there being a new social worker is that you can have a fresh start. Please take advantage of it. Please also reflect on your relationship with A, and think about what you can do to restore it. I wish you well also.

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