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You are here: BAILII >> Databases >> England and Wales Family Court Decisions (other Judges) >> M v F [2025] EWFC 114 (B) (29 April 2025)
URL: http://www.bailii.org/ew/cases/EWFC/OJ/2025/114.html
Cite as: [2025] EWFC 114 (B)

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The Judge has given permission for the judgment (and any of the facts and matters contained in it) to be published on condition that in any report, no person other than the advocates or the solicitors instructing them (and other persons identified by name in the judgment itself) may be identified by name, current address or location [including school or work place]. In particular the anonymity of the child and the adult members of their family must be strictly preserved. All persons, including representatives of the media, must ensure that these conditions are strictly complied with. Failure to do so will be a contempt of court. For the avoidance of doubt, the strict prohibition on publishing the names and current addresses of the parties and the child will continue to apply where that information has been obtained by using the contents of this judgment to discover information already in the public domain.
Neutral Citation Number: [2025] EWFC 114 (B)

THE FAMILY COURT
SITTING AT OXFORD

HEARD ON 24TH, 26TH, 27TH & 28TH MARCH 2025
Handed Down On 29th April 2025

B e f o r e :

HER HONOUR JUDGE OWENS
____________________

M

- and -

F

____________________

The parties and representation:
The Applicant, F, represented by: Mr Sajjad Mahmood, Solicitor Advocate instructed by Atif Abbas of MCR Solicitors
The First Respondent, M, represented by: Ms Joanna Lucas, Counsel, instructed by Eleanor Wood of Lawrence Stephens Solicitors

____________________

HTML VERSION OF JUDGMENT
____________________

Crown Copyright ©

    This judgment is being handed down in private on 29th April 2025. It consists of 31 pages and has been signed and dated by the judge. T

    Introduction

  1. This is a fact-finding hearing to deal with allegations made in Children Act proceedings. The parties are the two parents, F and M, and the proceedings concern their child A born in 2019. M and F married in 2004 and separated in November 2020. Their decree nisi was pronounced in May 2024.
  2. Background

  3. There is a very lengthy background to this fact-finding hearing. I have noted above that F and M were together for approximately 21 years and married for 16 years. On 17th November 2020 F was arrested following an allegation of physical assault made by M and it is at this point that they separated. F was charged with common assault and subsequently acquitted in the Magistrates' Court in May 2021.
  4. F applied for a Child Arrangements Order (CAO) on 30th December 2022 and the First Hearing Dispute Resolution Appointment (FHDRA) took place on 25th April 2023 before a District Judge. During the CAFCASS safeguarding enquiries made after F's application was issued a Family Court Adviser spoke to M who raised allegations of domestic abuse. The resultant safeguarding letter was filed on 24th April 2023 (pp383-386) and recommended that fact-finding should be considered in line with PD12J. However, at the FHDRA the Court carefully considered the parties' positions as recorded on the order at page 40 of the bundle, in which it was clear that neither party sought a fact-finding hearing, F agreed to undergo parenting and anger management courses, and M agreed that A could spend time with F and did not consider herself currently at risk from him. It is surprising to note that F agreed to undertake an anger management course despite his stated position that he did not have any anger management issues (p40) and curious that the Court endorsed this approach in light of F's position. However, the Court concluded that fact-finding was not necessary or proportionate in this case. CAFCASS were directed to file a section 7 report and a Dispute Resolution Appointment (DRA) listed after the completion of that report on 7th February 2024.
  5. The section 7 report was filed on 18th August 2023. Parties jointly requested that the hearing on 7th February 2024 be vacated and re-listed on the first available date after 1st May 2024, it seems so that the parties could be referred to the ICFA (Improving Child and Family Arrangements) service as recommended in that section 7 report. An addendum section 7 report following that referral was directed to be completed by 22nd April 2024. This date was subsequently extended to the end of May 2024 at the request of CAFCASS and the DRA moved from 8th May to 26th June 2024. By the date of that DRA CAFCASS had filed both the ICFA report and an addendum section 7 report. CAFCASS recommended that there should be determination of the allegations of domestic abuse made by M as part of a final hearing, CAFCASS having made recommendations in the alternative depending on whether those allegations were proved or not. A was to continue to spend time with F on a supervised basis pending the outcome of the final hearing. A final hearing to deal with both elements of fact-finding and welfare was directed, with the direction that this should be listed on the first available date after parties had filed their final evidence and after police disclosure had been received, with a time estimate of 2.5 days.
  6. That final hearing was duly listed to start on 11th November 2024, the listing happening to be before Ms Justice Henke purely because of judicial availability rather than any need for allocation to a High Court Judge. The hearing proved to be ineffective because by that point M had added further allegations of domestic abuse against F, M having indicated to the CAFCASS officer, Hannah Jones, in course of preparing the initial CAFCASS s.7 report that there had been significant and sustained sexual abuse of her during the marriage, and the omission of these allegations having been highlighted by Ms Jones. This led to Ms Justice Henke vacating the final hearing and utilising it as a case management hearing to direct that there should be a separate fact-finding hearing with a time estimate of 4 days. This was then listed before me commencing on 24th March 2025.
  7. In the course of this fact-finding hearing, I have the evidence filed in the bundle, which includes police video evidence in relation to the incident on 17th November 2020, and heard evidence from M, the CAFCASS officer, Hannah Jones, and F.
  8. I have to note at this point that I was extremely concerned about the quality of advocacy from Mr Mahmood during this fact-finding hearing. Even making allowances for his client potentially presenting him with challenges in terms of presenting a consistent and clear case in response to M's allegations, as was pointed out by Ms Lucas in closing Mr Mahmood's cross examination was unclear, confused and at times unnecessarily aggressive in tone. It took far longer than originally allowed, partly because at times his unclear questioning made it difficult for anyone to work out what was being put to M or Ms Jones. At one point, M became very distressed despite my attempts to avoid this by taking regular breaks and clarifying what she was being asked when I was unclear or asking Mr Mahmood to move on if he was repeating the same question numerous times. I ended up rising earlier than planned on the first day, part-way through M's evidence, to allow Mr Mahmood to ensure that he was using the correct version of the bundle (it having become apparent that he was not using the same version as everyone else), update his page references accordingly, and to refresh his knowledge of the Advocates' toolkit and the Family Procedure Rules when dealing with vulnerable witnesses in a Family court. He assured me that he was aware of this guidance, and I had hoped that the additional time to prepare before recommencing on 26th March (I was not sitting on 25th March) would have avoided further issues with his resumed cross examination. Sadly, this did not prove to be the case and, at one point when his cross examination of M resumed on 26th March, I had to stop him from raising his voice and aggressively questioning M about the allegations of sexual abuse. It was not at all what one would expect of an advocate when dealing with a case involving serious allegations of domestic abuse, including sexual abuse.
  9. Parties' positions

  10. M is the respondent but makes the allegations that are the subject of this fact-finding hearing, so I have started with her position. She seeks findings as set out in her schedule of allegations at pp102-105 and the updated schedule at pp338-342.
  11. F denies the allegations made against him by M. It is his case that M has fabricated all of the allegations against him, though he does accept that there was an argument on 17th November 2020 which led to the police being called, his arrest and subsequent acquittal.
  12. Relevant legal considerations

  13. Whoever makes an allegation has the burden of proving that it is true. They must do so to the civil standard, i.e. on balance of probabilities (Miller v Ministry of Pensions [1947] 2 ALL ER 372, and also considering Re B (Care Proceedings: Standard of Proof) [2008] UKHL 35, [2008] 2 FLR 141. An allegation will therefore be proved if the person making it establishes that it is more likely than not that it happened. The seriousness of the allegation or the seriousness of the consequences make no difference to the standard of proof to be applied in determining the facts. Findings of fact must be based on evidence and not on suspicion or speculation (Re A (A child) (Fact finding hearing: Speculation) [2011] ECWA Civ 12). Evidence is also not evaluated and assessed separately: "A Judge in these difficult cases must have regard to the relevance of each piece of evidence to the other evidence and to exercise an overview of the totality of the evidence in order to come to the conclusion whether the case put forward by the local authority has been made out to the appropriate standard of proof" (Butler Sloss P in Re T [2004] ECWA (Civ) 556). The court looks at the 'broad canvas of the evidence' and "the range of facts which may properly be taken into account is infinite" (H and R (child sexual abuse: standard of proof) [1996] 1 FLR 80). It is, however, not necessary to determine every subsidiary date-specific factual allegation (K v K [2022] EWCA Civ 468).
  14. I have taken into consideration the principles outlined in Re H-N and others (children) (domestic abuse: finding of fact hearings) [2021] EWCA Civ 448 with regard to domestic abuse allegations. Practice Direction 12J Child Arrangements and Contact Order: Domestic Violence and Harm is also relevant which provides key definitions of domestic abuse.
  15. A Court can take into account the demeanour of a witness or the way in which they gave evidence, but needs to be careful in approaching this, noting that in the case of emotive evidence a truthful witness may stumble and struggle whilst giving their evidence, whilst an untruthful witness may give their evidence in a composed manner. The Court may be assisted by internal consistency of evidence and considering how it fits with other parts of the evidence.
  16. The principles outlined in R v Lucas [1981] QB 720 may be relevant. Where it is alleged that a witness may be lying that there can be many reasons why someone may lie including shame, humiliation, misplaced loyalty, panic, fear, distress, confusion or emotional pressure, and that just because a witness may lie about one aspect of their evidence it does not necessarily mean that they may be lying about other aspects.
  17. I have borne in mind that a Court has to draw a distinction between abusive behaviour or actions that either cause or risk causing harm, and poor behaviour which falls short of being abusive or causing or risking causing harm. Hence the need for the Court to focus upon those findings which will have a material impact on child arrangements if proved.
  18. Analysis

  19. The first group of allegations made by M relate to physical abuse of her on various occasions between 2004 and 2020. The incident on 17th November 2020 is the first item on the schedule, and it seems both parties accept that there was an incident on this date which led to their separation. As I have noted above, it is not in dispute that there was some sort of incident on 17th November 2020 involving M and F, with A present, which led to the police being called by M and F being subsequently arrested and charged. It is also not in dispute that F was subsequently acquitted on 28th May 2021 of common assault in connection with this incident. The police disclosure confirms that F was made subject to a six-month Restraining Order on acquittal on 28th May 2021. However, when questioned by Ms Lucas, F appeared to dispute that he was the only one made subject to a Restraining Order and insisted that M had also been made subject to a Restraining Order. As Ms Lucas put to him, there is no evidence before this Court of M also being made subject to a Restraining Order and, in fact, it would have been very unusual for a criminal court to make both parties subject to a Restraining Order in my experience. Such an order was deemed necessary by the criminal court to protect M from "further conduct which amounts to harassment" of her by F as the order records (p480) and it prohibited direct or indirect contact to M by F save for the purposes of child contact or civil proceedings via a third party or solicitors.
  20. M's evidence about the incident on 17th November was broadly consistent in terms of what she first told the officers in her statement to them (pp470-472), and her statement to this Court in September 2024 (pp110-112), as well as her oral evidence to me in this hearing, I find. She was cross-examined in some depth about this by Mr Mahmood (albeit not as expected as noted earlier), and despite this her evidence remained consistent, credible and compelling. She accepted that her police statement recorded an incorrect date in relation to one of the other alleged instances of physical assault but pointed out that this was a police error not hers. She was clear and consistent that she accepted she had been upstairs in a remote meeting, had come downstairs to find F with A and had become frustrated that neither F nor the maternal grandmother had prepared food for A. It is not in dispute that F had collected A from nursery prior to this incident, and that there had been ongoing concerns about how much food A was consuming when at nursery. It seems from the evidence of M and F that both had been concerned about A's feeding, though F denied that this had caused him 'anxiety' when asked by Ms Lucas about this. M accepted that she said something to F to the effect that there were two adults apart from her in the house and neither had prepared food for A and that an argument ensued with F. She was clear that she had prepared some noodles to give to A, that she started to feed these to A and then F said something insulting to her, A became very upset and started to cry and then the argument escalated with M shouting back to F before the argument degenerated into physical violence with F subjecting her to a sustained assault. She described F slapping and punching her, whilst she curled in a ball to try to protect herself, then being dragged by her leg by F to the floor where the assault continued with F kicking her to her body, but not her head because he could not reach her head. At some point the maternal grandmother had stepped between them to try to stop the assault and took A from M to protect A. M said that she was going to call the police, and F told her to go ahead, so she did. The police evidence about this incident confirmed that M was extremely distressed when she spoke to the call-handler and when the officers spoke to her. The police evidence also noted that F appeared to be controlling when the police arrived at the property (statement of PC White p474), and calm but not appearing to want to give specific answers to the officer's questions. At p459 is the note of M's account to the first officer to speak to her on 17th November, which is again broadly consistent with her other accounts and also contains the first recorded mention of allegations numbers 1(iii) and (iv).
  21. F's case, as put by Mr Mahmood and in F's written and oral evidence, made much of the fact that there are two discrepancies in the police evidence from M and the maternal grandmother when compared to M's evidence to this Court. As I have noted above, one of those related to a difference in the date of the incident that is in allegation 1(iii), but that could be credibly explained by M's evidence that this was an error by the police. The other apparent discrepancy is about whether or not F used the phrases that form part of allegation 2(i), in particular calling her a 'bitch', 'psycho', 'bastard' and accusing her of 'barking like a bitch'. The police evidence records that M described F using derogatory words and names towards her on 17th November 2020, and in her police statement it specifically says that F was using "words to the effect of go away and 'you have a really harsh tone' and you 'don't talk nicely'" (p471) as well as other specific terms of abuse towards her and her family (p472) such as 'bastards'. The police statement by M did not record verbatim what M recalled F saying as the use of the phrase 'words to the effect' makes clear, this does not therefore appear to be a significant discrepancy in my view and certainly not one that undermines M's overall credibility about this allegation. M also accepted, very fairly, nearly five years after the incident her recollection now was bound to be less good, and she may have forgotten some of the details as a result. It did not seem as if she was exaggerating or deflecting with her evidence to me about this incident, accepting as she did, that she was partly responsible for the start of the argument. There is also a curious detail about how M came to be the one who called the police on 17th November 2020. F does not challenge that M called the police, and that is what the police records show. However, F tried to suggest that he told M to call the police on his behalf when giving me his evidence, explaining when Ms Lucas queried why he had not called them himself that he did not have access to his phone. What is curious about this is that the video clearly shows F producing his phone from his pocket to the officer when asked to do so. It is clear from this that F had his phone in his pocket so it is simply not credible for F to suggest that he could not access it and that is why M called the police for him. It also doesn't make sense even on F's account that M would call the police for him, rather than for herself, immediately following a violent argument between them since F's account was that M had been the aggressor. M was very clear, both at the time of the November 2020 incident and in her evidence to this Court, that she had not reported previous incidents to anyone in authority and only called the police this time because she thought that F would actually kill her. She was asked a lot of questions by Mr Mahmood about not reporting her allegations to anyone in authority, but not about whether or not she believed that F was going to kill her in November 2020 or why she called the police on this occasion. It is also significant, in my view, in terms of the timing of M's allegations since November 2020 that the police noted that M did not seem to properly appreciate the general risk that F may pose to her apart from on 17th November 2020 (p459). As Ms Lucas submitted, M believing that F was going to kill her and this prompting her to call the police, has the ring of truth to it, and I found M's evidence to be both compelling and credible about this incident. It is also consistent with the fact that the police noted M to be very distressed when they arrived at the property (p458), something that F disputed maintaining in his evidence that both of them were calm when the police arrived. This is in marked contrast to what F said to the officers in the video, and in contradiction to his other evidence at times about this incident to me where he tried to portray M as the one who was agitated, shouting and angry, not him.
  22. In fact, F's evidence about this incident was remarkably inconsistent and lacking in credibility overall. He was adamant when cross examined by Ms Lucas on 26th March that he could recall every detail perfectly and had recently rewatched the police body worn video taken when officers first arrived at the property, spoke to him and then arrested him. It is agreed that the police arrived within minutes of being called so that body-worn video provides a very important piece of evidence about what F said at the time and how he was behaving. He was initially adamant that he had not admitted to the officer that he had hit M at times including during the incident on 17th November 2020, or that he said A was crying non-stop in the incident, or that he told the officer he was angry during the argument with M. He denied that he had shouted at all during the incident, saying repeatedly to me when answering Ms Lucas' questions that he never shouted, and that M was the one who always shouted, and he always told her not to shout. His evidence about what he said when the officer was videoing him was confused, initially not accepting that he had said they were both hitting each other, and then saying that what he meant by that if he had said it was that he had thrown a water bottle at her, she had picked up a chair and attempted to hit him with it, and he had meant he made contact with her to try to stop her rather than 'hitting' her. He was also adamant on 26th March in answering Ms Lucas' questions that he had told the police that M had only attempted to hit him with a chair and that this was on the police video. At this point I had to rise at the end of the court day and adjourned to the next day to continue with Ms Lucas cross-examining F. When I recommenced sitting on 27th March, the police video was played in full to F by Ms Lucas, and it was clear in that video that F referred to both hitting and kicking each other, accepted to the police officer that he had shouted, and did not use the word 'attempted' when describing M hitting him with a chair. It was also clear in the video that F described A as crying throughout, not that A only cried at one point towards the middle of the incident as he had said in his evidence to me on 26th March. These discrepancies were put to him by Ms Lucas and F refused to accept that there were differences in his accounts, apart from the one word 'attempted' which he dismissed as not a significant difference. His account at this point was already contradictory and confusing, not just when compared to the video, but also in terms of what he said when questioned by Ms Lucas, I find. However, it became even more confused as F went on to say to me that he did say in the video that M had hit him with a chair, but she only tried to hit him with a chair and persisted in saying that this was not a difference in his account and if it was a difference this was because his English was not good at the time. Ms Lucas put it to him that he had been in the UK for about a year by the time of the incident in November 2020, had worked internationally, appeared to have a very good grasp of English, and when spoken to by the police in November 2020 did not raise any issue of not understanding English or needing an interpreter. When re-examined by Mr Mahmood F then gave a further different version of what he said had happened on 17th November 2020, mentioning for the first time that his finger had been injured by M hitting him with a table. When I tried to clarify what he meant by this, it seemed he was describing M somehow coming into contact with the table and the table then hitting his finger causing injury to the finger, possibly by simply pushing against his finger, though it was difficult to follow what F was describing by this point as he also seemed intent on trying to deflect any responsibility for the incident onto M rather than explaining clearly what he was saying had happened. Frankly, his evidence about the incident on 17th November 2020 was wholly lacking in credibility by this point. Unlike M, he had also sought at times to exaggerate his account, alleging in answer to Ms Lucas's questions that M and the maternal grandmother had been holding A "hostage" from him at one point in the incident, though this appeared from his further answers to simply be the maternal grandmother holding A as she had in fact described in her original statement to the police (p468) and her first account to the police (p478).
  23. The maternal grandmother gave both the above-mentioned statement to the police in November 2020 and a brief statement exhibiting that statement in these proceedings on 16th September 2024 (pp96-101). She was not called to give evidence in this fact-finding hearing, M's solicitor having served a notice of intention to admit hearsay (pp93-94) which was not opposed by F. Very sadly, it is clear from that notice that the maternal grandmother has dementia which has now progressed to the point that she would be unable to give evidence at court. Mr Mahmood submitted that little weight should be given to her hearsay evidence as a result. It is clearly potentially a relevant part of the overall broad canvas that a court must consider when assessing whether or not M has proved her allegations on balance of probabilities. There is internal consistency in the maternal grandmother's police statement and her first account to the police in general terms, in that she described an argument started between M and F whilst she was upstairs (something that is also consistent with the evidence from M though I am less clear what F's evidence was about this), she did not hear what was said in that first part of the argument, she came downstairs to find a physical altercation which included F hitting and kicking M, and she stepped between them and took A away. I find her evidence is also consistent with that of M and the other police evidence about this incident. It is also significant that her accounts to the police were contemporaneous, and therefore at a time when it was more likely that her recollection of events was better than they would have been now even if she had been well enough to give evidence in this hearing. Based on these aspects, it is not appropriate to completely discount her evidence, or to give it little to no weight, but instead appropriate to give it some weight in terms of providing some consistent evidence within the overall broad canvas of evidence. However, it cannot be determinative of the allegations given that it was not capable of challenge in this hearing. To be fair to M, it is not adduced as such overwhelming or determinative evidence, rather it is adduced in support of the evidence M relies upon including that from the police about the incident on 17th November 2020 and her own account at various points.
  24. At no point was it put to M by Mr Mahmood that M had influenced the maternal grandmother to provide the accounts that she gave to the police, and it is clear from the police log and the video that the police actually separated and spoke to the various individuals concerned as soon as they arrived at the property, and did so despite F objecting to the police speaking to M without him being present. It seems from this that there would have been no time for M to try to influence what the maternal grandmother told the police in any event. The recorded accounts from the maternal grandmother are also critical of both M and F at points, which also suggests it is the maternal grandmother's honest account to the police rather than one that sought to paint M in a wholly positive light. On balance I find that the evidence of the maternal grandmother should be given some weight as supporting the evidence from M in relation to her allegations.
  25. One aspect of the police evidence that F sought to rely upon to counter M's evidence about this allegation related to the noodles that M said she had been attempting to feed A when the argument started. F's evidence was that there were no noodles and that the police evidence which notes that the house was clean and tidy (p460) and the absence of noodles on the floor in the video supports this. The video does not show the whole of the sitting room or the floor, in fact, and M's evidence was that it was only a very small bowl of noodles for a small baby. Despite the police noting that the property was generally clean and tidy, the video does show a large part full bottle of water lying on the floor in front of the television, and it seems this is the bottle that F accepted he had thrown at M. It is also consistent with both M and F's evidence about how this incident started that there would have been some food for A because both accepted that M was initially frustrated that neither F nor the maternal grandmother had fed A on his return from nursery.
  26. In addition to the written and oral evidence that M relied upon in relation to the allegation on 17th November 2020, it is not disputed that the police at the time photographed various injuries on M, which are in the bundle at pp481-485. Those photographs document various marks and bruises to the left side of M's body. M's evidence about the cause of those injuries was that they were caused by F hitting and kicking her. She was clear when questioned by Mr Mahmood that the reason she did not have any visible injuries to her head was because F could not reach her head when she was on the floor, and that she had a bump on her head hidden by her hair from him slapping her earlier in the incident. M also mentioned bruising and discomfort to her head as a result of this incident in her victim impact statement given in March 2021 (p479). M was credible and consistent about how she sustained these injuries. In contrast, I have already noted the inconsistencies in F's account about whether or not he made physical contact with M in his evidence to me. His account in these proceedings of how M sustained the injuries was that she fell over when she attempted to hit him with the chair. When I consider the other inconsistencies in his evidence about this, noted above in this judgment, I am satisfied that F was not credible when he sought to account for M's injuries in this way. F does not bear a burden of proof, however had he provided a credible alternative explanation, or other credible evidence about this incident, that may have undermined what I have found to be the otherwise credible and consistent evidence from M. Given my conclusions about this incident, including that A was present and would have seen F violently assault M and was clearly distressed by the incident, it is clear that this incident also caused A emotional harm (allegation 2(vi)), and F was the one responsible for that emotional harm, I find.
  27. The first incident alleged by M in chronological order is that F slapped her to her face in 2004 (allegation 1(x), p107 in her first statement). It was her evidence that F lost his temper and hit her over an issue about money. It was part of M's evidence throughout this case that F is very concerned about money, something that F has denied. However, F has also raised financial motivation as a reason for M making what he says are fabricated allegations against him in this case. On his own account, it seems F believed that M owed him a significant sum at the point that they separated in November 2020. It is clear from the police evidence that he asked the officer in the case repeatedly to contact M on his behalf about that money (p465). F was asked about this by Ms Lucas, and his answers made it abundantly clear that he did not see anything wrong in repeatedly asking the officer about this money or to contact M on F's behalf when F was on bail not to contact M directly or indirectly. It was compelling evidence of how important money is to F.
  28. Similarly, F repeatedly alleged that M somehow had a financial motive for fabricating her allegations against him in this case. It was very difficult to work out precisely how F was saying that M potentially benefitted financially from making these allegations because F's written and oral evidence about this was lacking in specific details. It seems to boil down to F's belief that M made the allegations to put pressure on him to agree to the financial settlement under consideration in the wholly separate financial remedy proceedings which have now concluded. There is no evidence that conduct was relied upon in those proceedings, so the logic of what he was saying was a bit difficult to accept, but F did confirm to me when I attempted to clarify his evidence about this that he felt that it was designed to put him under pressure, so perhaps it was more about his perception than reality. Regardless of his perception, the logic of what he was alleging about this was also not borne out by the chronology of M's actions, it seems. M was not challenged about first telling her mother-in-law about F assaulting her in 2007. The maternal grandmother's statement to the police and M's evidence to the police both show that the maternal grandmother was also aware in 2020 of previous incidents of F physically assaulting M. The incident on 17th November 2020 led to the parties separating, but there is no evidence before me to show that they contemplated separation prior to this. In fact, both M and F told me how much they wanted the marriage to continue up to this point (F in fact wanting it to continue afterwards as he told me). It is hard to see what financial motive M could have had for telling her mother-in-law, her mother and then the police about her allegations of physical assault prior to there being even a suggestion that the parties would separate, I find. It is equally difficult to understand how M could benefit financially from making allegations in these Family proceedings when, as she very clearly told me, she did not initially want a fact-finding hearing partly because of the likely cost to her in circumstances where both parties have by now incurred the costs of privately funding legal representation. She was also very clear that she had approached the Child Maintenance Enforcement Commission (CMEC) about maintenance from F and had been in receipt of their assessed payment of £26 per month since May last year, though it seems this is due to increase since F is now in full-time employment as both told me. F somehow seemed to think that M should be criticised for obtaining maintenance via CMEC rather than accepting his offer of payment, something that was again difficult to follow the logic of since whether it was via CMEC or not, maintenance would still be paid by him and it seems he did not pay anything on his own evidence between the date of separation and the commencement of the CMEC payments in May last year.
  29. Also in 2004, but this time in June of that year, it is agreed that F had had a serious operation and had to spend about a month recuperating in bed. M's allegation (number 1(viii) on the schedule) is that whilst in bed F would throw things at her, and she gave an example of him picking up a sandal, attempting to throw it at M but instead it made contact with F's aunt. Ms Lucas in closing accepted that this was not a terribly serious incident. M was very clear that F was able to pick up a sandal and throw it in his frustration at being bed bound, he aimed at her, but he missed, and it hit his aunt who was trying to block it from hitting M. F's case, as put by Mr Mahmood and in F's evidence to this Court seemed to be that he was not capable of bending down to the floor to pick up a sandal because of the operation. F denied being frustrated at being bed bound, repeatedly emphasising that he did not get frustrated, just as he denied getting angry or not being calm during the November 2020 incident, in fact. Ms Lucas pointed out in closing that the relative lack of seriousness in M's account of this incident tends to suggest its authenticity. As she said, if M had fabricated this incident, surely she would have made up something that is more serious? I found M's account about this allegation to be credible and compelling and F to lack credibility about his not becoming frustrated whilst bed bound following an operation.
  30. Allegation 1(vii) is the next alleged incident in time, said by M to have occurred in March 2005 on the day of their first wedding anniversary. Despite some prevarication from F about this when first asked about it by Ms Lucas, it seems as if it is not disputed that they both did travel to see family on this date. M's evidence is that they were driving home from that visit, F responded badly to an attempted joke from her, he proceeded to hit her whilst driving, M tried to open the car door whilst F was driving to get away from his assault, but F grabbed her shirt to stop her so she failed to get away, and the assault also continued when they got home and had gone into the house. Her evidence was that the assault then continued for some 3 or 4 hours and included F hitting her with an ashtray and a 2-litre full bottle until she fainted. When she regained consciousness, F was on the phone to his father telling him that M had collapsed because F had hit her too much (p114). F's evidence about this allegation was again a little difficult to follow in terms of the case he was putting, but it seemed both from that evidence and what was put to M in cross-examination by Mr Mahmood that F took issue with some of the details of the allegation but not necessarily all of them. For example, F seemed to accept that they were in the car and that there may have been an argument of some sort, but he took issue with the allegation that they were on the motorway and seemed very anxious to tell me about the precise sort of vehicle concerned and why that was not capable of driving on the motorway rather than dealing with the other details of this allegation. Mr Mahmood put to M that if the assault had been as sustained as M alleged, and had resulted in the injuries she described, that M would have reported it, but M has been very clear throughout that she accepts she did not tell any professional about the allegations until she spoke to the police in November 2020. It is also a notable feature of this allegation that it involves F reacting badly to what M thought was a joke, resulting in F losing his temper on M's account, and it also involved the throwing of a water bottle, just as F accepted happened during the 17th November 2020 incident.
  31. By the end of 2005 it is not in dispute that M and F were staying in another country in Europe and were temporarily staying with close friends. The next allegation is that in November F pressed his shoe onto M's head whilst she was lying in bed 1(iv). It seems to be accepted by F that at one point whilst staying with the friends in question they were sleeping on a mattress on the floor, which is what M described in this incident, though F did say that they only slept on this mattress for a short period and otherwise used a proper bed elsewhere in the property. Quite what that had to do with this allegation was never clear from his evidence, I am afraid, I can only guess that he seemed to be trying to suggest that this incident could not have happened as M alleged because they only used the mattress on the floor for a short period, though this was never actually put to M in cross examination. M's account about this was consistent and compelling. She said that they had been out, F was rude about her family in front of their friends and she responded, which F reacted badly to and then, when they were in private, F "entered the room where [M] was lying on the floor on a mattress and forcefully pressed his shoe on [M's] head as [M] cried" (pp113-114). In her evidence to me she added that F said something about her being under his feet whilst pressing his shoe to her head. F's evidence, both in his statement and orally during this hearing, sought to make much of what he said was normal custom and practice in the country in question to remove shoes when entering the house, F suggested that this made it impossible for him to have acted as M alleged. He also said it was nighttime which also made it less likely that he would have been wearing shoes. It does appear from M's account that the household had gone to bed by this point, but she did not allege that F had also gone to bed. F's own evidence in response to this was silent about whether he had undressed for bed or not. M remained clear despite repeated questions from Mr Mahmood about this that this incident happened, that F was wearing a shoe and that she was very frightened by the incident. On balance, I found her to be the more credible witness about this allegation, and this incident also shows credible evidence of F reacting badly to M attempting to stand up to him which is another part of this group of allegations (1(vi) on the schedule).
  32. In December 2005 it is agreed that there was a trip to McDonalds to celebrate F receiving his first paycheck. It is also not disputed that it seems this was a trip that involved the friends too, and that in McDonalds one of the family friends asked F what he had bought for M with that paycheck. M's allegation (number 1(v)) is that F reacted very badly to this and threw hot coffee over her, but she was not injured because she was wearing a coat. F's evidence about this was that he did not throw coffee at her and could not have done so because it was a crowded public place. The fact that somewhere is a crowded public place does not prevent this sort of incident from happening, and it is not always the case that someone present would have called the authorities in those circumstances either, as I think Mr Mahmood tried to suggest to M when questioning her. Again, Ms Lucas pointed out in closing that it is the relative mundanity of this allegation that lends it an air of veracity, in other words if M was going to fabricate something it is more likely that she would fabricate something that was far worse. There is also a consistency in the way in which F is said by M to have reacted badly to something that someone said innocently, possibly in jest, and it also involved the subjects of money and F's sense pride, both of which seem to be important to F as he made clear in his evidence to me repeatedly. For example in relation to his sense of pride, F repeated several times in evidence to me that he was someone who was held in high regard in his professional life and who had a successful career even though this was not relevant to the actual questions he was being asked by Ms Lucas at the time. M also told the police in November 2020 about her fears that F would not want to end the relationship because he would find it "humiliating" (p459) and she was not challenged about this.
  33. In 2007, M alleges that F punched her in the left eye causing serious injury (number 1(iii) on the schedule). This is totally denied by F, and it seems from Mr Mahmood's cross examination of M that F's case was that if it had happened as M alleged then either M would have reported it to someone in authority or someone that she was working with would have noticed the resultant injury. M's evidence about this was again that this was precipitated by F reacting badly to something done in jest. As Ms Lucas noted in closing, M referred to this allegation when she spoke to the police in November 2020 (p472), though the date recorded in her police statement is 2004 which M told me was an error on the part of the officer taking her statement. Her account to the police officer who first spoke to her on 17th November 2020, recorded at page 459, also refers to an incident when F had punched her eye causing serious injury, but no date is mentioned there. It is entirely possible that an officer taking down her subsequent witness statement may have recorded the date of 2004 in error. Mr Mahmood questioned M about whether anyone at her work noticed the eye injury, and M replied that her colleagues had noticed and asked her what had happened, but she had told them that she had fallen from the stairs. She accepted that she had not sought treatment, saying that this was because her eyesight came back within a short space of time and the bleeding stopped. She also said that she had called her mother in law, who then told F that he had to stop assaulting her. It is of note that this allegation is the last one that M makes of physical assault until 2020. As Ms Lucas submitted, it would support a conclusion that M did ask her mother-in-law to help with stopping F from assaulting her, and that worked until 2020. In 2020, of course, the country was in the throes of Covid lockdowns, F had lost his employment as he accepts, and they had a child who was the source of some concern in relation to his food intake as I have already noted. All of these would be likely stressors for anyone. F accepted to the police in the video after the November 2020 incident that he had had difficulties with lockdown and losing his job, though F's evidence to me tried to portray a very different picture of someone who was not stressed by those issues and certainly not someone who would be frustrated and more likely to lash out at M as a result. M gave very credible evidence in her written statement (p116) about this and Mr Mahmood did not question her at all about this allegation, presumably because it is simply denied in its entirety by F, but this means that M's written evidence was not challenged. However, when questioned by Ms Lucas about this allegation, F accepted that there had been an occasion when he had bought chocolates for A and that this was the time that M was also referring to in this incident because F said that A had the chocolate after his dinner, not before. Somewhat oddly, F at this point refused to accept that there had been anxiety about A's eating, agreeing with Ms Lucas that there had been " a big concern" about A's food consumption, but refusing to accept that this would have been bound to cause both M and F 'anxiety'. Bizarrely he was very keen to tell me, without Ms Lucas asking anything about this, that A's weight was getting better and better, with 'fat cheeks' and this was down to F's actions. The implication of this was that M had not done anything to address the issue, which this is concerning in terms of what it says about F and his negative attitude to M, I find. Looking overall at the evidence from M, but also that of the police officers from November 2020, it seems more likely than not that F was frustrated by losing his job and the Covid lockdowns as he acknowledged to the police in November only a short period after this alleged incident occurred. In turn, given that F seems to react badly to seemingly insignificant things at time (the question in McDonalds, jests from M during the car journey in 2005 and prior to the punch to her eye in 2007), it is credible that F would react badly and out of misplaced frustration when A took some chocolate as M alleged.
  34. The second group of allegations relate to emotional abuse of M by F (numbers 2(i) to (iii)). I have already noted some of the evidence about F being insulting towards M and her family in considering the physical abuse allegations above. M's evidence about this is markedly consistent, with similar terminology being deployed by F on her account. The minor difference in her statement to the police about what F said to her during the 17th November 2020 incident does not undermine M's credibility, as I noted in relation to the physical abuse allegation. Ms Lucas submitted that it is also of note that F has raised issues with CAFCASS and in his written evidence about his concerns about the impact of children being brought up in what he called 'broken' families. I found his oral evidence to Ms Lucas about this confusing, and it did not dispel the impression created by the evidence of both M and Ms Jones that this was something that F was oddly exercised about. This impression adds weight to a conclusion that it is more likely than not that someone like F with such views about 'broken' families would be likely to use insults referring to someone as not being born of a legitimate union, I find. M's evidence about this was also very compelling and consistent in terms of what she said F had called her and her family. Crucially, despite his denial of these allegations, F did accept when questioned by Ms Lucas that he had criticised M's family for their broken nature when he spoke to the CAFCASS officer, and in his subsequent communications with M after their separation. The maternal grandmother also confirmed to the police in November 2020 that she had seen F be verbally abusive towards M and using these sorts of terms of abuse as outlined by M in her allegations (p467). As I have noted earlier in this judgment, given the timing of the initial account from the maternal grandmother and that statement (which was only taken the day after on 18th November 2020), it is not credible as F tried to allege that M somehow coached the maternal grandmother into providing a statement that contained consistent, corroborating evidence.
  35. Allegation 2 (v) on the schedule is that F taught A when only approximately 13 months old to hit M. She was challenged about this by Mr Mahmood in cross examination but remained steadfast that F had done this. It is also something that she mentioned to Ms Jones in answer to the domestic abuse questionnaire that she completed with M in August 2023. Although F told me that A was not walking or talking, this was not put to M by Mr Mahmood, and A's age at the time of this allegation would not rule out that he would be crawling, cruising or starting to walk properly and beginning to talk. And, of course, a child does not have to be fully mobile and fully verbal for a parent to begin to encourage them to behave abusively. In the context of a child who, on M's account (and that of F's as videoed in relation to the 17th November 2020 incident), has witnessed violence between his parents, this is also a troubling allegation because it could form part of a child learning that it is acceptable to behave abusively towards a parent. On balance, I found M to be credible about this allegation.
  36. The next allegation on the schedule relates to coercive and controlling behaviour (allegation 3). Again, this is totally denied by F, and Mr Mahmood did put some questions to M about the extent to which she was able to exercise autonomy in the relationship, though these were largely focused on her ability to manage her own finances. It seems from M's evidence that she does not allege financial coercive control in the sense of F not allowing her to have her own bank account. Her allegation is about more subtle behaviours by F, including his unpredictability and emotional abuse of her. It is not disputed that she was able to complete education, work and open her own bank account during the marriage, but these are not necessarily aspects that mean she was not subjected to coercive and controlling behaviour by F. It is notable that F was felt by the police officers who attended the property on 17th November 2020 to be trying to behave controllingly towards them. Having viewed the video, I agree with this assessment of what F was trying to do. He constantly asked the officers to make sure that he had certain items placed in his property bag to go to the police station, directed what they were to do with his other possessions, and tried to persuade them to remove the handcuffs several times despite being told that was not an option. It is also noteworthy that F was clearly not happy about M speaking to the other officers without F being present. This could have been because of concern about what M might say to the officers about what F did during the incident in case it did not match F's account, but it could also be because F simply wanted to try to control what M was saying. Having viewed the video carefully several times, it seems clear that there was an element of F wanting to control what M was saying. He seemed genuinely shocked that the police could think it appropriate to speak to M on her own without him, in my view, and that is consistent with someone who believes that they can control what is going on. There is also a consistent and credible account from M of F behaving unpredictably towards her and this inhibiting what M did and said around him, I find. That would amount to coercion of M because it made her modify her behaviour in ways that sought to avoid F losing his temper, as she very credibly told me. She also gave me very compelling evidence that, because she really loved F, she tried very hard to make the marriage work and part of that was trying to avoid doing things that might set him off. In contrast to F's evidence to me that he did not have an issue with anger, I find that he does have a tendency to quickly become frustrated or angry and to take that out on M, however I am concerned that he is also able to control when he displays that anger or takes it out on M as the incident when he put his shoe on M's head in November 2007 demonstrates.
  37. I have also taken into account the evidence about what F said to Ms Jones about reconciliation when considering the allegation that F was coercive and controlling of M. Ms Jones recorded in her section 7 report at p392 that F asked her if she could help him reconcile his marriage because he missed M so much. F completely denied that he asked Ms Jones this, telling me instead that it was Ms Jones who raised the possibility of reconciliation, asking him if he wanted her to help him with this. The report in which Ms Jones raised her concerns about F's views of the relationship and his request to her to help with reconciliation is the August 2023 report (pp387-395). This post-dates M having raised most of the domestic abuse allegations that are the subject of this fact-finding hearing. Ms Jones was very clear in her evidence to me that F was the one who raised the issue of reconciliation, not her. F raising this in this way is consistent with what F did by inappropriately asking the police officer in connection with the 17th November 2020 incident to contact M on his behalf. It is also consistent with correspondence to M from F that is exhibited to M's 30th September 2024 statement in the bundle in which F refers to wanting to reconcile issues and move on from 'arguments' (p131). F consistently sought to tell me during this hearing that their relationship was perfect, yet he admitted to other violent arguments, including hitting M when he spoke to the police on 17th November 2020 as I have noted. He also admitted in the course of Ms Lucas questioning him that there had been other occasions when he had hit M apart from the ones in the schedule. As a result I did not find him credible in his protestations that there had never been problems in their relationship, or that he never lost his temper with M.
  38. The final two groups of allegations on the schedule relate to sexual abuse (numbers 4 and 5). I am not going to mention the precise and specific details of these allegations here, mindful of the current Guidance on Anonymising Family judgments which makes it clear that such allegations should not be set out in detail because of the potential risk of emotional harm to those affected by the allegations, and also makes the point that such specific details may also carry with them a risk of jigsaw identification. I am also mindful of the fact that A may wish to read this judgment when he is old enough.
  39. M's evidence about allegation 4 is that this would occur repeatedly without consent and often following an incident of physical abuse. Much has been made in the earlier stages of these proceedings and in part during this hearing about whether M knew that what she alleged was abuse before she says she became aware, and the timing of these last allegations. It is not in dispute that these last two groups of allegations were not made by M in the early stages of these proceedings. They were also not something that M referred to when speaking to the police in November 2020 in connection with the incident on 17th November 2020. In fact, very unusually, these allegations were not initially raised by M in these proceedings. They were first raised with Ms Jones of CAFCASS. On 4th August 2023 Ms Jones interviewed M for the purposes of completing a directed section 7 report. As Ms Jones set out in her written evidence at p427, she used a CAFCASS tool designed to understand the details of domestic abuse in a relationship without the victim needing to talk in detail about what had happened. The tool used and completed was exhibited by Ms Jones to her statement and is in the bundle at pp432-435. The section 7 report was filed on 18th August 2023 and the analysis of the answers given in completing the questionnaire that is the tool used is in that report at pp391-392 in the bundle. Ms Jones recommended that the parties complete the ICFA and she would file an addendum report after that. It then seems as if there was considerable drift or delay in the proceedings, with Ms Jones trying to chase what was happening with the solicitors and Court based on her letters in the bundle at pp 396-397 and 398-399. As I noted earlier, a listed DRA in February was adjourned at the joint request of both parties and it seems the case was not the subject of an effective DRA until 26th June 2024 which, in turn, led to the abortive final hearing before Ms Justice Henke. On 7th November 2024 M's solicitors lodged an application to adduce further evidence, and it seems that this is the first time that it was clear that M was seeking to pursue the allegations that had been outlined to Ms Jones and which had led to Ms Jones contacting M's solicitors. As is set out in M's statement dated 7th November 2024, filed with her request to adduce additional evidence and to rely upon these additional allegations, it was Ms Jones contacting M's solicitors which seems to have been the trigger for that application and these allegations forming part of these proceedings (p266). M was not questioned about this detail of her written evidence by Mr Mahmood so that evidence was unchallenged.
  40. The disputed issues about these allegations are about whether the alleged sexual abuse occurred, M alleging that it did and F denying it entirely. A complicating factor in assessing whether M has proved these allegations on balance of probabilities, is that M has been very clear in her evidence at pp266-268 that her own cultural and religious beliefs meant that she did not initially perceive what she alleged happened as sexual abuse of her. Ms Justice Henke very properly directed that neither party nor the Court would consider wider aspects of cultural or religious beliefs in connection with this fact-finding hearing, but the individual understanding and beliefs of the parties was clearly relevant to assessing the broad canvas of the evidence and in assessing credibility. It is also relevant, in my view, that these last allegations are seen in the context of what M has alleged was a very abusive relationship lasting for around 16 years. If, as she alleged, M has been a victim of physical, emotional, coercive and controlling abuse, then that would be bound to affect issues such as her ability or willingness to report additional allegations. Regardless of individual cultural or religious beliefs, I also have to remember that a victim may not report any allegations of abuse for a considerable period of time, may not report all allegations if they do eventually report some, and that this can be for variety of complex reasons including fear of consequences, shame or denial. So, the fact that M has only belatedly made these allegations is not per se something that significantly undermines her credibility, it is simply part of the complex jigsaw of evidence that a Court assesses in determining whether the allegations are proved or not to the civil standard.
  41. It is not disputed that the parties initially formed a relationship based on mutual love, and married despite their families being concerned about this being a rather swift relationship. There is some dispute about how welcome each family found the other partner but that is not relevant to my determination of these allegations at this point. Similarly, the details of how they met, which F disputes, as described by M in her written evidence are also something that it is not necessary or proportionate to devote time to despite F's case being that this is evidence of M's ability to fabricate accounts. I would simply note that, given the amount of time that has passed and the human tendency to view things from our own rather than another's perspective, as well as the fallibilities of human memory, it would not be surprising if each had a different recollection of the details of how they met. What is relevant is that they both accept that initially their relationship was mutual, and that included sex in which each participated without objection. Much was made by F in his evidence and in the cross examination of M by Mr Mahmood about the agreed fact that the couple had had sex outside of marriage despite cultural and religious pressures against this. It seems, though again this is not entirely clear from F's evidence or the cross-examination of M, that F's case is that this somehow counters M's written evidence about why she did not report these allegations to anyone sooner. I think this was on the basis that M's evidence was that she did not realise she could object to sex with F based on her own cultural and religious beliefs, but F alleged that she does not have those beliefs and knew that this would be abusive behaviour towards her if it happened.
  42. Part of F's case in challenging M about why she had not understood that what she alleged was abusive was to refer to M having been a victim of sexual abuse as a child. It was not disputed by M that tragically this happened to her. Quite why F chose to put in his statement words to the effect that this meant M was not a virgin when they first got together and that somehow this undermined her credibility remains a mystery to me. It is entirely reasonable that someone who has been a victim of sexual abuse as a child would not view subsequent consensual adult sexual relations as the same as their childhood experiences, and that would probably also be the view of most reasonable adults who have never had such awful childhood experiences either. There was no evidence from F or challenge to M to allege that she did make any official report of that childhood abuse, and thus no evidence to show that she did know how and why to report sexual abuse arising from that, though. In fact, the way in which F presented this in his evidence was more concerning in terms of what is said about his view of M – effectively F seemed to have thought that it would somehow discredit M and show her in a bad light when in fact it is a reference to something that is no doubt deeply distressing and tragic from her childhood. I saw no evidence of F being able to appreciate the emotional impact of his evidence about this on M.
  43. The way in which these allegations have come out in the course of these proceedings is significant, as F's case also acknowledges. M was asked repeatedly by Mr Mahmood why she had not reported any physical or sexual abuse from F to anyone apart from the isolated reports I have covered earlier in this judgment. It is not in dispute that M conceived A after many rounds of IVF and this necessitated her having numerous medical appointments. It was in dispute whether or not F attended most or all of those appointments, based on the cross-examination by Mr Mahmood, though. It was put to M that IVF required both parties to be present for appointments, but M pointed out that this was not necessarily the case, with some of the processes concerned taking place in a petri-dish without either parent being present. It seems that both parties wanted to have a child, but M was consistent and credible in her evidence that she was 'desperate' for a child and attended the majority of appointments for IVF on her own. Mr Mahmood questioned her as to why no clinician at these appointments had either noticed physical signs of sexual abuse or been alerted by M to the abuse. In terms of the former, of course, it is very rarely the case that there are any overt external injuries associated with sexual abuse, and which would present to a clinician (who is not necessarily an expert in sexual abuse) as obviously suggestive of such abuse. Similarly, although M alleged that the final allegation did result in some physical injury on one occasion some years ago, it is also not something that would have been apparent to a clinician carrying out an examination for other purposes not necessarily at the same time as the injury occurred.
  44. In relation to M not reporting this abuse to any professional or clinician, as I have noted, there can be any number of reasons why abuse may not be reported if it has taken place. In this case, M's evidence is clear that she did not initially view this as abuse. It was put to her, and reiterated by Mr Mahmood in closing, that she is also an educated woman who would therefore have known that this was abuse if it happened as she alleged. However, as Ms Lucas noted in closing, the level of education that a woman has does not necessarily correlate with likelihood of reporting abuse. It was also recorded in the questionnaire by Ms Jones that M answered yes to F having harmed family pets. It is not in dispute that the family had no pets, but Mr Mahmood highlighted that this may cast doubt on the veracity of M's account to Ms Jones. However, as I clarified with Ms Jones, it may simply be that she ticked the wrong box in relation to that question about harming pets. Ms Jones was very clear that she had correctly recorded what M said about sexual abuse, though, and I found her to be credible about this.
  45. Although M had apparently answered Ms Jones' question with the answer 'always', M's evidence about consent is actually a bit more nuanced. I have already noted that both parties accept that they did have consensual sex at the beginning of the marriage. Her evidence to me was also that F simply did not obtain her consent prior to sex with her, and it seems she did not always object despite that from her own account. It is clear, therefore, on her own account not every single instance of the couple having sex was non-consensual. M also provided evidence in relation to the final allegation that, prior to the first occasion, F "begged" her to allow him to try this and she eventually, reluctantly, agreed. However, what she had agreed to was not what she described happening as she had not consented to sudden force and injury. Her account of what happened that first time, including some of the details of her distress, was extraordinarily compelling, I find. Ms Lucas submitted that it had 'the ring of truth' and I find that is the case. M has also provided credible and compelling evidence about F tending to subject her to non-consensual sex after he had physically abused her in circumstances where she was clear that she would not have consented and would have been distressed and sometimes injured. Again, her evidence about this is compelling and credible, I find. Despite F's complete denial that there was ever any non-consensual sex in their relationship, I prefer the evidence of M in relation to this and accept her account. I am also satisfied, as Ms Lucas submitted in closing, that F subjecting M to sexual abuse in the immediate aftermath of physical assault is also evidence of coercive behaviour towards M, and abuse that would have caused her emotional harm.
  46. F's case was also that M fabricated the allegations against him as a means to stop him having a relationship with A. His evidence about this was yet again far from clear, but it was referred to several times in his evidence when answering questions from Ms Lucas. Considering the chronology of events, F applied for a Child Arrangements Order at the very end of 2022. This was over two years after the 17th November 2020 incident and parties separated, and over a year after he had been acquitted in the criminal proceedings that followed. Despite what M told the initial safeguarding CAFCASS officer about domestic abuse, M was not opposed to A spending time with F. She also agreed with the recommendations later made by CAFCASS in terms of A spending time with F and did not seek any element of fact-finding as the order from the first DRA recorded. Even after she had told Ms Jones about sexual abuse, she agreed with the recommendations that A should spend time with F. F's evidence about one of the sessions of supervised contact in July last year is relevant at this point. He adduced part of the record from that contact at p258 as an exhibit to his statement dated 31st October 2024. He had highlighted the part where it recorded that M arrived late. However, as Ms Lucas explored in her cross-examination of him, the full record is in the bundle at p495 and that shows that M rang the contact centre 40 minutes before the start time to say that a major road was closed, and she was trying to make her way to the centre, but was having difficulty on unfamiliar roads. It was difficult to follow what F was saying about why he thought this evidence was significant. He accepted that M was not responsible for traffic disruption and that she had contacted the centre in good time to indicate that she was having difficulties getting there. F's focus seemed to be that he only had limited time with A and that he was aggrieved by losing any of that time, no matter if the reason for that loss was something outside of M's control and there despite evidence of M doing all that she reasonably could to keep everyone informed of the delay. As Ms Lucas submitted, it seems more likely than not that F adduced the single page from the contact session as a clumsy attempt to make M look bad. Again, it is concerning evidence of F's view of M, I find, rather than anything that evidences M has not been ensuring that A spends time with F.
  47. Findings

  48. In light of my consideration of the evidence above, and my conclusions about that evidence, my findings in relation to the schedule are as follows:
  49. 1 (i) proved
      (ii) proved
      (iii) proved
      (iv) proved
      (v) proved
      (vi) proved
      (vii) proved
      (viii) proved
      (ix) proved
         
    2 (i) proved
    (ii) proved
    (iii) proved
    (iv) proved
    (v) proved
    (vi) proved
         
    3   proved
         
    4   proved
         
    5   proved

    Conclusions

  50. I have found all of M's allegations proved. CAFCASS will now need to consider what further steps and evidence may be required to enable the court to proceed to consider what is in A's welfare interests in light of the findings. I would ask that CAFCASS also consider whether there needs to be an element of risk assessment and what steps may need to be considered to protect both M and A from any further direct or indirect harm from F.
  51. HHJ Owens

    29th April 2025

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