B e f o r e :
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XY |
Applicant |
|
- and - |
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XX |
Respondent |
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Mr Tom Haggie (Counsel instructed by WGS, Solicitors) appeared on behalf of the Respondent wife.
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Crown Copyright ©
"I am grateful to both Counsel for the way they have respectively conducted their cases before me, which was in equal measures helpful and skilful. Indeed both parties have been legally represented before me at a first class level; but it has, of course, come at a cost. The wife has incurred a total of £418,558 in legal costs and the husband a total of £540,849. Approaching one million pounds of family money has been spent on this dispute. It may be that both parties will want to reflect on the wisdom of their respective contributions to this costly, self-destructive and unhappy episode in their lives."
Joint
Family home[2] | 4,573,883 |
Arbuthnot Latham joint bank account (….9001) | 0 |
TOTAL | 4,573,883 |
Wife
Real property 1Dubai, UAE [3] | 331,007 |
Real property 2, Dubai, UAE [4] | 588,267 |
ADIB Bank accounts (….7908) | 143,471 |
Undisclosed Dubai Bank account in sole name | 290,675 |
Inheritance from W's mother | 135,000 |
UK Bank accounts in sole name | 5,953 |
Scottish Widows ISA | 14,437 |
Outstanding Legal Costs [5] | 0 |
Debts (i.e. litigation loans and monies owed to family) | -466,634 |
TOTAL | 1,042,176 |
Husband [6]
100% shareholding in Property Holdco Limited [7] | 2,288,072 |
100% shareholding in Property Holdco 2 | 11,372 |
100% shareholding in LT Limited [8] | 870,000 |
Director's Loan Account monies owed by LT to H | 151,000 |
100% shareholding in WR company Limited | 43,137 |
4 x Aston Martin motor cars | 1,005,000 |
Monies held by XY accountant ("the accountant") to the husband's order | 2,500,000 |
Bank accounts in sole name | 1,115 |
LV Fortis Pension CE (in payment) | 1,333,206 |
Outstanding Legal Costs [9] | -146,341 |
Debts (including litigation loans) | -261,524 |
TOTAL | 7,795,037 |
Wife | Husband | |
Own realisable assets | 1,042,176 | 7,795,037 |
Family Home | 4,573,883 | 0 |
Lump sum from H to W | 1,089,489 | -1,089,489 |
TOTAL ASSETS | 6,705,548 | 6,705,548 |
% ASSETS | 50% | 50% |
(i) The family home will be transferred to the wife on the terms about the mortgage that I have discussed above.
(ii) …
(iii) The other assets will remain in their existing ownership.
(iv) The husband will pay a lump sum to the wife in the sum of £1,089,489. I propose to order that the entirety of this lump sum will be paid by 31st October 2023 (to allow a little time for realisation of assets). Interest in default at the Court judgment rate (currently 8%) will run on any unpaid portions of this sum. If the husband wishes (at his election) to reduce the lump sum order by £666,603 and substitute for it a 50% pension sharing order of his JHT Pension then he should be allowed to do this.
(v) There will be a clean break, with both parties' income claims dismissed."
"The Family Procedure Rules have now been amended and as of 3 October 2016, there is a new rule 9.9A supplemented by a new paragraph 13 to PD9A and a new paragraph 4.1B to PD 30A (Appeals). The correct procedure, where it is sought to set aside a financial remedy order, whether made by consent or otherwise and where no error of law is alleged, is now to make an application to set aside within the proceedings to the same level of judge as made the original order…..As the new FPR r 9.9A provides specifically for the power of the court to set aside a financial remedy order (as opposed to any other type of order) then it rather than FPR r 4.1(6) should, as of 3 October 2016, be invoked where such relief is sought. FPR r 4.1(6) will continue to govern any other applications to set aside which are governed by the Family Procedure Rules."
"An application to set aside a financial remedy order should only be made where no error of the court is alleged. If an error of the court is alleged, an application for permission to appeal under Part 30 should be considered. The grounds on which a financial remedy order may be set aside are and will remain a matter for decisions by judges. The grounds include (i) fraud; (ii) material non-disclosure; (iii) certain limited types of mistake; (iv) a subsequent event, unforeseen and unforeseeable at the time the order was made, which invalidates the basis on which the order was made.
22. The use of the word 'include' in PD9A has created a certain amount of judicial debate as to whether the set aside grounds are just the 'traditional grounds' (for example as described by Munby J (as he then was) in L v L [2006] EWHC 956) or whether there is scope for extending them. Knowles J, in Akhmedova v Akhmedov [2021] 1 FLR 667, suggested that "Whilst the categories of cases in which FPR 2010, r 9.9A can be exercised are not closed and limited to those identified in para 13.5 of PD 9A, the jurisdiction to set aside is to be exercised with great caution, not least to avoid infringing upon the finality of judgments, subverting the role of the Court of Appeal, and undermining the overriding objective by permitting re-litigation of issues." Mostyn J expressed a different view in CB v EB [2021] 2 FLR 257 that the set aside power "had been confined by the law to the traditional grounds for decades. Interpreting s31F(6) purposively and with regard to its historical antecedents leads me to conclude clearly that in the field of financial remedies its lawful scope, or reach, starts and ends with the traditional grounds….In my judgment the language of FPR PD 9A, para 13.5 is misleading. It should not be read literally. There is no lawful scope for imaginative judges to unearth yet further set aside grounds. The available grounds are the traditional grounds, no more, no less."
"Therefore I think that applicable principles in relation to the mistake ground can be formulated as follows:
(i) The court may set aside an order on the ground that the true facts on which it based its disposition were not known by either the parties or the court at the time the order was made.
(ii) The claimant must show that the true facts would have led the court to have made a materially different order from the one it in fact made.
(iii) The absence of the true facts must not have been the fault of the claimant.
(iv) The claimant must show, on the balance of probabilities, that he could not with due diligence have established the true facts at the time the order was made.
(v) The application to set aside should be made reasonably promptly in the circumstances of the case.
(vi) The claimant must show that he cannot obtain alternative mainstream relief which has the effect of broadly remedying the injustice caused by the absence of the true facts.
(vii) The application if granted should not prejudice third parties who have, in good faith and for valuable consideration, acquired interests in property which is the subject matter of the relevant order."
(i) The principle suggested by Mostyn J in part derives from the judgment of Hale J (as she then was) in Cornick v Cornick [1994] 2 FLR 530 where she identified three scenarios where a court might be invited to intervene, one of them being where "a wrong value was put upon that asset at the hearing, which had it been known about at the time would have led to a different order. Provided that it is not the fault of the person alleging the mistake, it is open to the court to give leave for the matter to be reopened". Wilson LJ in the Court of Appeal in Judge v Judge [2009] 1 FLR 1287 endorsed the above comment by Hale J and this is referenced by Mostyn J.
(ii) There is Court of Appeal support in other civil cases, i.e. non-family cases, for the general proposition that the court is likely to be slow to come to the aid of a litigant where a mistake has occurred which is the fault of the person seeking to rely upon it to justify re-opening the order. For example, in Tibbles v SIG [2012] 1 WLR 2591 at p.2602: "Similarly, questions may arise as to whether the misstatement (or omission) is conscious or unconscious; and whether the facts (or arguments) were known or unknown, knowable or unknowable. These, as it seems to me, are also factors going to discretion: but where the facts or arguments are known or ought to have been known as at the time of the original order, it is unlikely that the order can be revisited, and that must be still more strongly the case where the decision not to mention them is conscious or deliberate".
(iii) Mr Turner has argued that the very recent decision of the Court of Appeal in Adodo v Tan [2024] EWCA Civ 1288 should be regarded as (in effect and indirectly) disapproving Mostyn J's observations (iii) and (iv) in DB v DLJ (supra). In Adodo v Tan (supra), a District Judge conducted the final hearing of a financial remedies dispute. The wife had a CPF account in Singapore which she asserted could not be accessed until she was aged 65, which was some nine years away. The husband accepted the wife's assertion in this respect, not realising that it was incorrect, and the District Judge not surprisingly proceeded on what was, at that stage, an agreed (albeit incorrect) position. It was not (in the end) suggested that the wife had deliberately misrepresented the position, rather that both parties had been mistaken. After the order was made (which significantly relied on the current non-availability of the CPF account) the husband further investigated the position and discovered some new documents (by conducting an internet search of publicly available documents) which seemed to establish that the CPF account could in fact be accessed now and that the wife's assertion at trial had been incorrect. It later emerged that some (but not all) of the documents found by the husband had been previously disclosed by the wife to the husband and one of them was actually in the trial bundle at the District Judge's hearing, but the wording in those documents was not clear enough to alert the husband at the time to the headline fact that the wife's assertion was incorrect. The husband appealed to the Circuit Judge and sought to rely upon all the documents he had discovered. The wife's Counsel argued before the Circuit Judge that the husband should not be able to rely upon the new material because he could have found it with reasonable diligence before the District Judge's hearing. This argument found favour with the Circuit Judge who declined to allow in the new material and dismissed the appeal. The husband appealed again to the Court of Appeal. Moylan LJ gave the lead judgment and, in allowing the appeal, said: "
"the primary relevant obligation fell on the wife because the CPF account was her resource and, in my view, she cannot seek to avoid the consequences of her misrepresentation by saying that the true position could have been discovered by the husband. This would be to reverse the
parties' respective obligations. My response is in the same vein as Lord Wilson's response to the husband's reliance on the recital in Gohil as set out above, namely: "One spouse cannot exonerate the other from complying with his or her duty to the court". As applied to the facts
of this case, the equivalent might be that one spouse cannot avoid the consequences of giving inaccurate evidence of their financial resources by contending that the other spouse could have discovered that it was inaccurate. Accordingly, I am satisfied that the Judge should have admitted the new evidence by which I mean all the evidence which was not before the District Judge. It was not within the husband's "reasonable diligence" obligation; it would have had, at least, an important
influence of the result; and it is clearly to be believed. I would add that it was plainly necessary in the interests of justice that the new evidence be admitted so that the court could determine whether the wife's inaccurate evidence and the resultant mistake in the District Judge's assessment of the parties' respective resources were material and justified the appeal
being allowed."
These observations by Moylan LJ do not, it seems to me on analysis, undermine the correctness of Mostyn J's points (iii) and (iv). Rather, they go no further than qualifying them in particular circumstances by establishing that if the first party accepts the correctness of an incorrect assertion by the second party in relation to an issue for which the second party had the primary obligation of disclosure, then it should not be open to the second party to assert that the first party is at fault for not taking the steps which could have been taken to establish that what the second party asserted was incorrect. I do not think, in fact, that this obviously sensible qualification has any great bearing on the present case.
2.10 If any Capital Gains Tax would be payable on the disposal now of any of your real property or personal assets, give your estimate of the tax liability".
TOTAL value of ALL your potential Capital Gains Tax Liabilities: £0.00
"I also formed the conclusion that the husband has significant shortcomings as a witness. It is a matter of public record, which he has confirmed to me, that he deliberately perjured himself in the course of a High Court civil trial in 2020 and the history of what happened can be seen in the Court of Appeal's judgment Of course, I give myself a Lucas direction and remind myself that just because somebody has lied once it does not follow that they are always lying; but I have formed the clear view that the husband has been similarly dishonest in the present proceedings, as Ms Clarke's skilful cross-examination was able to establish and his effort to tell me that he was now a reformed character in this respect after his experiences in the civil litigation were rather empty. I note, for example, that, in a moment when he was contemplating suicide in October 2021, he asked his accountant to transfer assets to a lady with whom he had had a relationship and hide this from the wife in the event of his death. I do not accept his explanations for material non-disclosure in relation to the Property Holdco transactions and have found him to have been deliberately dishonest about this. I do not accept his account of his dealings with his accountant (and regard it as significant that the husband did not call his accountant as a witness at the trial, despite my express permission to do so in my order of 1st March 2023). I do not accept his assertions about the Aston Martin motor cars. Overall, I do not consider the husband to be a reliable or honest witness and have reached the conclusion that I should treat the husband's evidence with a significant degree of caution. I note Ms Amaouche's drawing to my attention in her final submissions that the husband had expressed his "disappointment" to her that his own lawyers "did not intervene to manage the intensity of the cross-examination" in the context of his mental health medication (diazepam). In response to that, I comment that the husband was expressly given the opportunity by me to take such breaks as he wished in the course of his oral evidence (indeed we took an extended lunch break at his request in the middle of his evidence), that I saw nothing inappropriate in Ms Clarke's cross-examination and that I observed nothing which suggested to me that his answers were being affected by dizziness or tiredness caused by his medication."
"I also wish to say this. I am entirely satisfied that the husband deliberately and dishonestly sought to hide this asset from the wife and the court in the hope that he would not have to share it with the wife. I entirely agree with Ms Clarke's submission that the total absence of any reference to this company or its underlying assets in the Form E and the deliberate misleading of the SJE Mr Pearson by the husband in league with his accountant (when Mr Pearson was pursuing the issue in the context of his valuation of the LT Ltd - see his letter dated 11th November 2022) can only be explained by the above conclusion. This was an extremely unattractive piece of litigation misconduct by the husband in which his accountant was also heavily involved".
"JUDGE HESS: What is the CGT position here? Is it slightly different from the other one, is it?
MS CLARKE: Well-
JUDGE HESS: Or, maybe it is not. Let us just think that through. We have not got any CGT here at all, have we?
MS CLARKE: No, because as things stand, H – his evidence has been repeatedly – there is no CGT; he hasn't addressed the question of any UK CGT. Obviously, in circumstances where we hadn't yet got a value for the property – I'm-
JUDGE HESS: If you are right that it is his company and there is not a trust, what would be – would you accept there should be CGT, or not?
MS CLARKE: Not sure because given it's a company, it's not owned by H personally; this is a company which is incorporated by him and he is the sole shareholder in Dubai. I don't – I don't-
JUDGE HESS: So, if he sold them in Dubai and put the money in a company and then liquidated the company and took the money out for himself-
MS AMAOUCHE: There would be no tax in Dubai on the liquidation of the company-
MS CLARKE: No-
JUDGE HESS: There would be no tax – and no tax in England either?
MS CLARKE: Well, I suppose there is not.
JUDGE HESS: Could we agree it is only payable in Dubai?
MS CLARKE: To be fair to H on this point, one imagines that's exactly why he created it in that way and so, certainly, my learned friend's team have never suggested that notwithstanding the arguments about the beneficial ownership, that we should be deducting any capital gains tax in relation to assets held within Grand Baie so, that presentation-
JUDGE HESS: So, it is common – so, if-
MS AMAOUCHE: That is a fair presentation.
JUDGE HESS: I make clear; I have absolutely no view on the trust issue at the moment.
MS CLARKE: Of course.
JUDGE HESS: If the wife is right, then you would accept there would not be any CGT on extracting the money from there? Right.
MS CLARKE: And that, of course, applies to all of those properties within that entity."
"JUDGE HESS: Yes, just hang on a sec. So, supposing all the properties in Property Holdco were sold-
MS CLARKE: Yes?
JUDGE HESS: - we have got £2.7 million in there-
MS CLARKE: Yes.
JUDGE HESS: - and he wanted to access that £2.7 – how can he do that without paying tax?
MS CLARKE: Well, Your Honour, one of the features of this case is, is that we have to rely on the presentation by H. H, keen as he always is to minimise his wealth, H, through his counsel, and you specifically asked the question, you should not treat them as liable to any tax. So, it's not my place, Your Honour, to consider H's position in relation to potential tax. But what is absolutely clear-
JUDGE HESS: So, Property Holdco is a company incorporated in-
MS CLARKE: In the Ali Free Zone; the Jebel Ali Free Zone; that's the point. That's why I said about the sophisticated financial planning that goes on.
…
MS CLARKE: So, that's what I referring to, sophisticated planning.
JUDGE HESS: So, that is where Property Holdco is?
MS CLARKE: Yes.
JUDGE HESS: Okay, so-
MS CLARKE: And there is going to be no tax payable; that's the case that he advances.
JUDGE HESS: So, no tax payable there so-
MS CLARKE: Just take it out; sell them, take it out.
JUDGE HESS: He could just say, well, that loan is waived-
MS CLARKE: Of course.
JUDGE HESS: - 'I am going to sell the properties. I have got £2 million in cash; I will pay it to myself, no tax.'
MS CLARKE: Bearing in mind, H has been saying repeatedly, as he said it to me, the loan is irrecoverable. That is what he is saying. He is saying it for a different reason. He is saying it is irrecoverable because as he freely accepted, he doesn't intend to call for it back; that's a different point. But the fact that he's saying it's irrecoverable, obviously, it is perfectly permissible for him to conclude, running a company that he owns entirely, that it is to be written off, of course. So, Your Honour, I'm going to move past that, if I may-
JUDGE HESS: So, if you pay yourself a dividend in the Jebel Ali Free Zone-
MS CLARKE: That's how it's distributed; from the Jebel Ali Free Zone company, yes, that's his case.
JUDGE HESS: - you do not pay tax on it, is that right? And then, you can just bring the money back offshore without any tax on it?
MS CLARKE: That's H's case.
JUDGE HESS: Okay.
MS CLARKE: And, no doubt, as I say, that's why a structure of that sort was taken up in the first place."
"JUDGE HESS: And then, the – all of those other businesses – so – so, £870,000 is the agreed figure, is that right?
MS CLARKE: Yes, can I just explain the position in relation to this, Your Honour? £870,000 is the updated figure from Mr Pearson's second report for a break-up value of XYs 100% holding of the LT Limited – we will refer to it as LTL, probably for the course of this case but the entirety of the group which he values within it. That – and we've given the reference, so far as Your Honour needs it, over in the right-hand column. So, that is not in dispute. The line item below, which is the director's loan account, is simply-
JUDGE HESS: So, I entirely understand your mathematics – do you want to comment or-
MS AMAOUCHE: No…"
"The accountant is a long-standing employee and close colleague of the husband and has been the finance director for LT Limited for much of this period. They have worked together since 2008 and, I am satisfied on the evidence, are extremely close and the husband is fairly dependent onthe accountantfor accounting and finance matters. In 2010 the husband gifted to the accountant a 5% shareholding in LT Limited. On 23rd January 2020 the husband paid £3,700,000 to the accountant, on the face of it in return for his surrendering his 5% shareholding in LT Limited to the husband. On the face of it, this is a very curious transaction. If this had been intended to represent a share buy out figure on a pro rata value basis then that would place a value on the company of £74,000,000, way, way above the valuation figure set out above and way above what the husband believed it to be even in the most optimistic period of his work…The husband has been asked to explain this transaction and he has said in writing (and repeated to me orally) that "there was no rhyme nor reason for the figure of £3,700,000" and "the figure had nothing to do with the overall value of his shareholding but was considered by both of us as a fair and realistic amount given his hard work and contribution over many years". I ask myself why a rational person, and a businessman as experienced as the husband would enter into such a transaction. Why would a 95% owner pay the 5% owner much more than what appears to be the entirety of the value of the business to acquire the 5% shareholding? I heard a good deal of oral evidence on this subject from the husband; much of which I regarded as evasive and unconvincing. He was, for me, simply unable to explain the logic of this transaction.Further, Ms Clarke's closing written submissions included this colourful passage:-
'But of course there is then the elephant in the room - The deafening silence of the witness from whom you have NOT heard; from whom you have NOT had a statement, despite permission having been given to do so - the accountant– H's long term friend and associate. The man who is in at the heart of every transaction this husband engages in (the man, you heard yesterday, who went with Sacha to Dubai when he and H were endeavouring to set up a company in her name). - The man who, apparently, engaged in an arms length transaction for LTL to buy back his tiny, 5%, holding inLTL, for a sum vastly in excess of any possible value (by the time of the transaction of de minimis value, remembering that there had been an offer of £1m for that part of the business which generated the vast majority of turnover); The man who, apparently, drew up the trust accounts which have made such a recent appearance in this case (and which are completely inconsistent with the filed HMRC returns); - The man who, apparently, loaned H £598,000 in 2020 but when H was completing his Form E (no doubt with help from the accountant) completely forgot to mention it; - The man who H trusted in the event of his death to effect the clandestine transfer of a property and £100,000 to a woman with whom H was in an inappropriate relationship; - The man, as we have seen, who was prepared deliberately to deceive the SJE accountant in an attempt to hide the LTL loan to Property Holdco and, thus, the valuable property assets held within it - The man who knows everything there is to know about H's financial affairs - But a man who, seemingly, has his line in the sand. Having solicitors write a letter in support of your old friend's story is one thing; signing to a statement of truth, coming to court to speak to it – that is quite another. - So perhaps it is no coincidence that the accountant has taken himself off to the depths of California while this trial is going on - We submit that the absence of the accountant is one of the most telling pieces of (non) evidence in the case - Your Honour can and should draw the inference from his unwillingness to provide a statement that the accountant knows all too well the extent of the non-disclosure and falsehoods which run through H's evidence and is just not prepared to engage further than he has already in H's attempts to deceive.'
I agree with the detail and sentiment of these comments...For me, the most likely explanation of the £3,700,000 transaction is that the husband wished to protect some money, possibly from the wife or possibly from others involved in the civil litigation, or possibly both and thought that the best way to do this was to lodge some money with the accountant with the figleaf of the 5% share transaction as cover. In reality that money, or at least a substantial portion of it, was really the husband's money being held to his order. This is one of the suggestions made by the wife in her statement / pleading dated 16th May 2023, at paragraph 27. Given that the husband was aware that this was what the wife's case would be, if he wished to counter this argument it is very curious indeed that the accountant was not called upon to give evidence to defend the situation. A finding to this effect seems to me to be entirely consistent with the legal principles on adverse inferences referred to above. There may be a specific and hidden agreement between the husband and the accountant to this effect, but it has not emerged so I have to do the best I can to make a broad and reasonable quantification of what the accountant still holds for the husband and include that in my asset schedule in the husband's column. Making such a broad assessment, and allowing for the fact that the accountant was entitled to something for his shares and that he has already paid back to the husband approximately £600,000 or even a little more, I propose to make the broad assessment that the accountant is holding £2,500,000 to the husband's order and that this is an asset available to the husband which should be included in my asset schedule."
"H is in the highly unattractive position of asking the court to improve his outcome viz a viz tax on assets he did everything to hide from W and the court. Once disclosed, he largely denied beneficial ownership. Once disbelieved, he has now discovered there may be tax consequences in complying with the court's order. The tribunal can have no sympathy if the dishonesty and disarray of H's presentation up to trial caused him to overlook, neglect, or fail to properly investigate the potential tax liabilities on dealing with his assets. The court, having afforded him every opportunity at trial, owes him no further duty to save him from his own mistakes. No support for his position is found in the authorities."
(i) I consider that the strong public policy of respecting the finality of sealed orders should carry some significant weight here. This is particularly so when the wife has had to spend very significant sums of money to identify the various areas of dishonesty in the husband's presentation. The court should recognise that requiring her to commit to another bout of expensive (and not necessarily straightforward) litigation when she was entitled to assume the matter was settled risks being unfair to her.
(ii) I consider that the principle that it is incumbent on a litigant to bring to the first instance court hearing (preferably in compliance with case management directions) the material to be relied upon relevant to the issues before the court should also be given significant weight here. It is clear to me that it was the primary responsibility of the husband to raise these issues and, for whatever reason, he failed to do so.
(iii) I consider it of real significance here that the court is likely to be slow to come to the aid of a litigant where a mistake has occurred which is the fault of the person seeking to rely upon it to justify re-opening the order and that that person could, with reasonable diligence, have ensured that the court was not presented with mistaken information at the trial. It is absolutely clear that the fault here lies solely with the husband. It is clear to me, especially with an experienced and expert legal team at his disposal, that the husband could and should have exercised the reasonable diligence to explore these matters before the final hearing and before decisions were taken and, if the fact that he did not was in any way connected to the fact that he was distracted by running a different, and in the end dishonestly unsuccessful case, then the court should be slow to come to his aid.
(iv) I do not think I would have refused this application solely or even partially on the basis that the husband delayed between August 2023 and March 2024 to bring his set aside application, but it could be said that he did not act with very much promptitude.
(v) Whether or not the husband has cause to blame his legal advisers for his default here I am unable to say because I am not privy to their communications and I do not know how the original legal team would respond to the charge, and I do not attach very much weight to this factor, but it is not impossible that the husband has another root to obtain alternative mainstream relief which has the effect of broadly remedying any injustice he may have suffered.
(vi) I do not think that any third parties are involved here or would be prejudiced by a decision in one direction or another and this is therefore not a significant factor here.
HHJ Edward Hess
Central Family Court
8th November 2024.
Note 1 All United Arab Emirates Dirham to UK Sterling currency conversions use 1AED = £0.22 [Back] Note 2 This figure is based on a value of £6,000,000 less sale costs at 3% less the outstanding mortgage of £1,246,117 = £4,573,883 [Back] Note 3 This figure is based on an agreed value of AED1,700,000 = £374,000 less sale costs at 3% less UK CGT of £31,773 = £331,007 [Back] Note 4 This figure is based on an agreed value of AED3,450,000 = £759,000 less sale costs at 3% less UK CGT of £147,963 = £588,267 [Back] Note 5 This figure is based on a total of incurred fees of £418,558, all of which have been paid [Back] Note 6 The property No 3 , Dubai is not included in this schedule as it is owned by the parties’ daughter. Nor does it include the money properly gifted into the Family No. 2 Settlement [Back] Note 7 This figure is based on the net value of three properties owned by the company: I have disregarded the £1,100,000 loan owed by Property Holdco Ltd Limited to LTLimited on the grounds that H owns 100% of each. [Back] Note 8 I have disregarded the £1,100,000 loan owed by Property Holdco Ltd to LT Limited on the grounds that H owns 100% of each. [Back] Note 9 This figure is based on a total of incurred fees of £540,849 less a total of fees paid of £394,508 = £146,341 [Back]