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Manchester Sitting remotely |
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B e f o r e :
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MR S |
Applicant |
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MRS S |
Respondent |
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MR P. MARSHALL QC for the Respondent
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Crown Copyright ©
HIS HONOUR JUDGE BOOTH:
Background
Valuation of assets
Allegations
The assets available to the parties
The parties' open proposals
a) Mr S's open proposals. He wished the former matrimonial home to be sold and, after repayment of the mortgage and Capital Gains tax, the net proceedings to be divided equally. He made proposals for him to pay the outgoings and continue to pay the interim periodical payments to Mrs S, but to claw back 50 percent of his payments following sale. He proposed to sell four of the buy-to-let properties with the net proceeds divided equally. He proposed to sell a further four with Mrs S to receive the proceeds of sale. On that basis he would retain eight of his buy-to-let properties. The joint policy was to be cashed and split equally. There was to be a pension sharing order in respect of his most significant pension as to 57.6 percent which would, pursuant to the pension report of the jointly instructed expert, have achieved equality of income. All of that was on the basis of a clean break, with no order as to costs. He wished to retain items of jewellery belonging to his mother. That proposal was on the basis it would give Mrs S approximately £850,000 to rehouse in the locality of the former family home;b) Mrs S's open offer was that she should receive the former family home free of mortgage, with Mr S to pay the costs of transfer and Capital Gains Tax arising on the transfer, Mr S to retain the whole of the buy-to-let portfolio and the joint policy, but to pay a lump sum of £210,350 designed to repay Mrs S's outstanding legal costs. Mrs S proposed a pension share of 63.59 percent of the largest pension, calculated on the basis of adding back in lump sums drawn from his pension by Mr S. Mr S was to continue to pay the interim maintenance until the transfer of the house. All of that to be on a clean break basis, together with a payment by Mr S to Mrs S of a further £98,162 in respect of her costs since her open offer following the FDR, but otherwise no order as to costs. It was said on Mrs S's behalf that that would divide the totality of the assets 54.25 percent to Mrs S, 45.75 percent to Mr S.
The law
a) The income, earning capacity, property and other financial resources which each of the parties to the marriage has, or is likely to have in the foreseeable future, including in the case of earning capacity any increase in that capacity which would, in the opinion of the court, be reasonable to expect a party to the marriage to take steps to acquire;
b) The financial needs, obligations and responsibilities that each of the parties to the marriage has, or is likely to have in the foreseeable future;
c) The standard of living enjoyed by the family before the breakdown of the marriage;
d) The age of each party and the duration of the marriage;
e) Any physical or mental disability of either of the parties to the marriage;
f) Any contribution which each of the parties has made, or is likely in the foreseeable future to make, to the welfare of the family, including any contribution by looking after the home or caring for the family;
g) The conduct of each of the parties if that conduct is such that it would, in the opinion of the court, be inequitable to disregard it;
h) In the case of proceedings for divorce or nullity of marriage, the value to each of the parties to the marriage of any benefit which, by reason of the dissolution or annulment of the marriage, that party will lose the chance of acquiring.
i) The analysis must be gender neutral and non-discriminatory -- White v White [2001] AC 596 HL;ii) The starting point in every inquiry is a two-stage process. First, computation, then distribution -- Charman v Charman (No 4) [2007] 1 FLR 1246 CA;
iii) In considering section 25, there are three main distributive principles: needs; compensation; and sharing, shaped by the overarching requirement of fairness -- Miller v Miller; McFarlane v McFarlane [2006] 1 FLR 1186 HL;
iv) The objective of financial orders is to meet the needs of the parties to enable a transition to independence to the extent that that is possible;
v) The main needs in this case, as in most cases, are for housing and present and future income, including income in retirement;
vi) "Need" will be measured by assessing available financial resources and assessing the standard of living during the relationship. Generally, the longer the relationship's duration, the more important the standard of living will be;
vii) "The main drivers in the discretionary exercise are the scale of the payer's wealth, the length of the marriage, the applicant's age and health and the standard of living, although the latter factor cannot be allowed to dominate the exercise" -- FF v KF [2017] EWHC 1093 (Fam), per Mostyn J. I feel sure Mostyn J did not intend his reference to age and health to be taken out of context. The age and health of both parties may be equally relevant, as here.
i) The rare cases where "gross and obvious" personal conduct has a financial consequence and which may be reflected in the substantive award;ii) "Add backs" in cases of wanton and reckless dissipation which may be reflected in the substantive award;
iii) Litigation misconduct -- this can be penalised in costs but should not affect the substantive award;
iv) Drawing of adverse inferences: this is part of the process of computation rather than distribution.
The facts in dispute
Distribution