This judgment was delivered in private. The judge has given leave for this version of the judgment to be published on condition that (irrespective of what is contained in the judgment) in any published version of the judgment the anonymity of the child and members of the family must be strictly preserved. All persons, including representatives of the media, must ensure that this condition is strictly complied with. Failure to do so will be a contempt of court
Case No: BS16C00499
IN THE FAMILY COURT AT GLOUCESTER
Gloucester Family Court
Kimbrose Way, Gloucester
Date: 27/07/2017
Before :
HHJ WILDBLOOD QC
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Between :
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Applicant |
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A mother |
First Respondent |
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A father |
Second Respondent |
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A child (by the guardian) |
Third Respondent |
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Sarah Pope for the Local Authority
Ben Jenkins for the mother
James Cranfield for the father.
Grace Trenchard for the child.
Hearing dates: 27th July 2017
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JUDGMENT
7. Further, it is plain that the Local Authority itself had significant doubts about the legality of removal but no legal advice was sought at the time. I will refer to that in more detail later but I wish to draw at the outset from the case of G and N County Council [2008] EWHC 975 in which McFarlane LJ said that, in circumstances such as this, ‘the human rights considerations require that the quality of the process should be at least as high, if not higher, than in an emergency protection order case’.
i) Give a clear example of the enormity of the task that now befalls that team.
ii) Signal how important it is that the new leadership team is offered every support and assistance in putting right the things that have been going wrong before its time. I have met with the new leadership team and intend to continue to do so in order to offer any assistance I can. I do hope that others will also support the interim team as much as they can.
iii) Demonstrate the local need for a better understanding of what should and should not be done where there is a care plan for a child to be placed with a parent under a care order. I have offered my help with achieving this better understanding by attending lectures, conferences and other workshop events when I can.
20. However, the Local Authority took the view, according to a document filed on 31st May 2017 by the then social worker and the team manager [C38], that ‘unfortunately, Placement with Parent Regulations (PWP) were not completed prior to [the child] being placed with the mother in the community. It is my opinion that had this been presented to the Director of Social Services prior to the final care order being made that this case would not have met with the stringent requirements for a child to be placed within the community with a parent under a legal order due to the concerns already raised. This remains the case to date and I am very concerned that PWP regulations will not be supported by the Director of Social Services and in any event that I cannot recommend that they should be agreed’.
i) The care order was made by the court, having considered the evidence and the representations of the parties. The court considered that the care order was appropriate on the basis of the care plan. Once the order was made by the court it was the duty of the Local Authority to put it into effect. If it doubted the legality of its own actions the solution lay in either: a) remedying its own illegality by taking the steps required by the regulations or b) returning the case to the court. The remedy did not lie in removing the child in contravention of its own care plan and without proper notice to the parents.
ii) On making the care order, the court had the benefit of a report from the child’s guardian as well as a large amount of other evidence, including the evidence of an experienced psychologist. The Local Authority had been involved with this family for a long time, knew it well and had carried out extensive parenting and other assessments – they are detailed in the court bundle at C10. The mother and child underwent a long period of observation in a mother and child foster placement. The Local Authority would never have promoted the care plan that was made if it had not carried out sufficient assessment to do so.
iii) All relevant parties were represented upon the making of the original care order. They each supported the making of the order. Thus the Local Authority itself sought the order that was made on the basis of its own care plan.
27. The guardian says this in her position statement of 13th July 2017:
i) ‘The independent reviewing officer now takes the view that [the child] should not have been removed from the mother’s care. That decision was taken because the Local Authority was relying on the concerns collated by the previous social worker. These have now been reviewed and the Local Authority is of the opinion that some of the views expressed by the previous social worker were biased and the single assessment that she undertook was inaccurate. In particular, the health visitor has raised concerns that she was misrepresented within that assessment. The independent reviewing officer has scrutinised the revised care plan and the schedule of expectations for both parents and is now of the view that the child should be returned to the mother’s care [immediately] with the support package agreed. She also endorses the father’s contact being supervised for the time being….
ii) The project manager had raised concerns with her department from the moment that [the child] had been removed from the mother’s care. She had been present in the building at the time. Her view was that this was a knee-jerk response and that the department’s concerns for the child in the mother’s care could have been addressed within the mother’s home. She raised the matter with the independent reviewing officer and escalated her concerns to the director of Children’s Services. In particular, the project manager criticised the department’s lack of support around the mother’s transition to the community and the negativity towards the mother that the social worker at that time displayed. The project manager’s argument was that the mother deserved a fair opportunity to parent the child with the right support in place….
iii) The guardian is deeply saddened by the behaviour of this Local Authority towards the child and towards this vulnerable young mother. Unnecessarily separating this child from the mother will have caused the child emotional and psychological harm and will have disrupted what appears to have been a secure attachment to the primary carer. Moreover no thought was given to the fact that the child was still being breast-fed when removed from the mother’s care, potentially causing the child physical harm. It is the guardian’s view that the Local Authority breached the child’s human rights (Article 8; right to respect for private and family life).
i) The author, a social worker, purports to comment on the quality of a psychological report that was prepared for the care proceedings and to compare, in a negative way, that report with a much earlier report by another psychologist [C27].
ii) The author went so far as to say that the evidence before the court at the time of the making of the care order suggested that the mother could not work with the Local Authority ‘and [meaning or] other professionals’ and prioritised her own needs [C27]. Manifestly that was not the view of the social work team at the time of the order and, if C27 had been right, the care plan would have been very different. At C7 of the court bundle there is a statement from the social worker involved at the time of the care order which states that the mother co-operated with parenting assessments, had demonstrated a positive improvement in her parenting, had worked closely with the health visitor to address parenting needs and demonstrated a good understanding of the child’s needs. C7 is entirely inconsistent with C27.
iii) The chronology of events that follows in the assessment at C28-32 certainly is expressed in terms that appear to be strongly negative.
iv) The analysis section of the assessment at C37-39 contains the passage that suggests that the approval under the 2010 Regulations would never have been given if it had been sought. It once again refers to the 2013 psychological report and ‘concurs’ with it in preference to the report of the other psychologist who reported in 2016 [C37]. Again it is expressed in strongly negative terms.
32. That arrangement was patently wrong:
i) It was plainly wrong to act with that degree of subterfuge and immediacy.
ii) As the guardian says, the fact that the mother was still breast feeding the child appears not to have been taken into account to any adequate degree.
iii) Nowhere have I seen any consideration of any arrangements being considered that might have kept the mother and child together if further assessment was to take place – for instance a return to a mother and baby foster placement.
37. There is very clear legal authority on this point and I have no doubt at all that, if legal advice had been sought by the then social work team at the time of removal, the legal team of the Local Authority would have advised upon it. In the case of Re DE [2014] EWFC 6 Baker J said:
i) Previous decisions have identified that the local authority's duties under Article 8 are not confined to substantive obligations to refrain from inappropriate interference with the rights to family and private life but also incorporate procedural safeguards. The procedural element includes the duty to ensure that the processes by which decisions about children are made are fair and that the parents (and the child, depending on his age and level of understanding) are sufficiently involved in that process: see Re L (Care: Assessment: Fair Trial) [2002] EWHC 1379 (Fam) [2002] 2 FLR 730, Re G (Care: Challenge to Local Authority's Decision) [2003] EWHC 551 (Fam) [2003] 2 FLR 42, and Re W (Removal into Care) [2005] EWCA Civ 642 [2005] 2 FLR 1022. As Munby J (as he then was) observed in Re G, Article 8 "requires that the parents are properly involved in the decision-making not merely before the care proceedings are launched, and during the period when the care proceedings are on foot ….but also … after the care proceedings have come to an end and whilst the local authority is implementing the care order …."
ii) At paragraph 45 of Re G, Munby J spelt out the local authority's obligations in clear terms: "In a case such as this, a local authority, before it can properly arrive at a decision to remove children from their parents, must tell the parents (preferably in writing) precisely what it is proposing to do. It must spell out (again in writing) the reasons why it is proposing to do so. It must spell out precisely (in writing) the factual matters it is relying on. It must give the parents a proper opportunity to answer (either orally and/or in writing as the parents wish) the allegations being made against them. And it must give the parents a proper opportunity (orally and/or in writing as they wish) to make representations as to why the local authority should not take the threatened steps. In short, the local authority must involve the parents properly in the decision-making process. In particular the parents (together with their representatives if they wish to be assisted) should normally be given the opportunity to attend at, and address, any critical meeting at which crucial decisions are to be made."
iii) To my mind, where a care order has been granted on the basis of a care plan providing that the child should remain at home, a local authority considering changing the plan and removing the child permanently from the family is obliged in law to …have regard to the fact that permanent placement outside the family is to be preferred only as a last resort where nothing else will do. Before making its decision, it must rigorously analyse all the realistic options, considering the arguments for and against each option. This is an essential process, not only as a matter of good practice, but also because the local authority will inevitably have to demonstrate its analysis in any court proceedings that follow the change of care plan, either on an application for the discharge of the care order or an application for placement order under the Adoption and Children Act 2002. This process of rigorous analysis of all realistic options should be an essential feature of all long-term planning for children. And, as indicated by Munby J in Re G, the local authority must fully involve the parents in its decision-making process. While this process is being carried out, the child should remain at home under the care order, unless his safety and welfare requires that he be removed immediately.
iv) In submissions before the district judge, and before this court, it was argued on behalf of the local authority that its removal of D from the family home was lawful simply by reason of the care order. That submission is fundamentally misconceived. The local authority's removal of the child would only be lawful if necessary to safeguard or promote his welfare. Any other removal, or threatened removal, of the child is prima facie unlawful and an interference of the Article 8 rights of the parents and child. In such circumstances, the parents are entitled to seek an injunction under s.8 of the HRA.
38. In the case of DE, Baker J also stated as follows:
a) To avoid the problems that have arisen in this case, the following measures should be taken in future cases.
(1) In every case where a care order is made on the basis of a care plan providing that a child should live at home with his or her parents, it should be a term of the care plan, and a recital in the care order, that the local authority agrees to give not less than fourteen days notice of a removal of the child, save in an emergency. I consider that fourteen days is an appropriate period, on the one hand to avoid unnecessary delay but, on the other hand, to allow the parents an opportunity to obtain legal advice.
(2) Where a care order has been granted on the basis of a care plan providing that the child should remain at home, a local authority considering changing the plan and removing the child permanently from the family must have regard to the fact that permanent placement outside the family is to be preferred only as a last resort where nothing else will do and must rigorously analyse all the realistic options, considering the arguments for and against each option. Furthermore, it must involve the parents properly in the decision-making process
(3) In every case where a parent decides to apply to discharge a care order in circumstances where the local authority has given notice of intention to remove a child placed at home under a care order, the parent should consider whether to apply in addition for an injunction under s.8 of the HRA to prevent the local authority from removing the child pending the determination of the discharge application. If the parent decides to apply for an injunction, that application should be issued at the same time as the discharge application.
(4) When a local authority, having given notice of its intention to remove a child placed at home under a care order, is given notice of an application for discharge of the care, the local authority must consider whether the child's welfare requires his immediate removal. Furthermore, the authority must keep a written record demonstrating that it has considered this question and recording the reasons for its decision. In reaching its decision on this point, the local authority must again inter alia consult with the parents. Any removal of a child in circumstances where the child's welfare does not require immediate removal, or without proper consideration and consultation, is likely to be an unlawful interference with the Article 8 rights of the parent and child.
(5) On receipt of an application to discharge a care order, where the child has been living at home, the allocation gatekeeper at the designated family centre should check whether it is accompanied by an application under s.8 of HRA and, if not, whether the circumstances might give rise to such an application. This check is needed because, as discussed below, automatic legal aid is not at present available for such applications to discharge a care order, and it is therefore likely that such applications may be made by parents acting in person. In cases where the discharge application is accompanied by an application for an order under s.8 HRA, or the allocation gatekeeper considers that the circumstances might give rise to such an application, he or she should allocate the case as soon as possible to a circuit judge for case management. Any application for an injunction in these circumstances must be listed for an early hearing.
(6) On hearing an application for an injunction under s.8 HRA to restrain a local authority removing a child living at home under a care order pending determination of an application to discharge the care order, the court should normally grant the injunction unless the child's welfare requires his immediate removal from the family home.
b) The guidance set out in the preceding paragraph has been seen and approved by the President of the Family Division.
c) Finally, this case has highlighted a further major problem. These parents face the prospect of losing their son permanently. If this prospect had arisen in the context of care proceedings, they would be entitled as of right to non-means tested legal aid. It is difficult to see why similar automatic public funding should not be available where the local authority proposes the removal of a child living at home under a care order and the parents apply to discharge that order and for an interim injunction under s.8 HRA. The justification for automatic public funding in care proceedings is the draconian nature of the order being claimed by the local authority. Where a local authority seeks to remove a child placed at home under a care order, the outcome of the discharge application may be equally draconian. Because this father is working, and earns a very low wage from which he has contributed to the support of his family, he, and possibly the mother, are disqualified from legal aid. Miss Fottrell and Miss Sprinz and their solicitors are at present acting pro bono. It is unfair that legal representation in these vital cases is only available if the lawyers agree to work for nothing.
i) If a Local Authority acts in breach of the guidance in Re DE, it acts in breach of case law and Convention rights (i.e. Articles 6 and 8 of the European Convention on Human Rights).
ii) If the Local Authority has any doubt about whether it has acted or is about to act in breach of those legal provisions it could make an application to the court for the court’s direction.
iii) Part 18 of The Family Procedure Rules 2010 provides the procedure by which this could be done. I accept that Part 19 is unlikely to be applicable since that relates to cases where the court’s decision ‘is unlikely to involve a substantial dispute of fact’. Part 18 applies where an application is made ‘a) in the course of existing proceedings; b) to start proceedings except where some other Part of these rules prescribes the procedure to start proceedings; or c) in connection with proceedings which have been concluded’.
42. I would wish to emphasise very strongly indeed that I am in no way suggesting that every departure from a care plan requires the Local Authority to apply to the court for ratification. That would be absurd and would also be directly contrary to the intention of the Children Act 1989 where care orders are made. A court does not have a supervisory role where care orders have been made save to the very limited extent provided by statute (e.g. in relation to contact under section 34). There will be cases where immediate removal is both lawful and necessary. However, in the extreme and exceptional circumstances of this case, where a breastfed child is removed from a mother without notice and the Local Authority itself questions the legality of what has occurred I do not see why the Local Authority should not be able to restore the issue to the court. To leave the matter to a traumatised and vulnerable young mother seems to me to be essentially wrong.
43. Ninth point – what scrutiny was there? – To my mind this is probably the most concerning part of this case. There may well be cases where a social worker, or indeed a social work team, acts in a way that is either wrong or mistaken. In this case, the errors were only remedied because the mother took action. In other circumstances, for instance through learning disability, other disability, litigation fatigue or other cause a parent might not. I note that on 29th June 2017 an email was sent by the Local Authority’s legal department stating: ‘I have now taken instructions and I am advised that the decision to remove the child from the mother without notice was not taken lightly. Careful thought and consideration was given to this course of action. I have asked the team manager who was part of the decision to prepare a statement about what led to the removal’.
44. The previous team manager states in his statement at C116 that the views that he expressed were based on ‘regular discussions and supervisions with the previous social worker…discussions with the IRO and other agency professionals…and supervision with the safeguarding officer and line manager’.
45. As Mr Jenkins submits:
‘The email from the Local Authority’s legal department, in the context of making clear the Local Authority’s position that there will be no further assessment of the parents, made the same points: ‘No further assessments will be conducted…there had also been an escalation of concerns by the IRO around the same time which was not resolved until the end of May. The IRO had the same concerns on multiple occasions due to the parents’ behaviour’’.
46. Mr Jenkins goes on to submit, correctly that ‘the information the author of the email was given by the professionals is not reflected in the statement from the IRO’.
47. The consequence of this was that not only was the original removal wrong but the professionals concerned were stating that there would be no review of the decision to remove. None of the fail-safe mechanisms that should have kicked in against wrongful removal did so. Local Authority management and IRO scrutiny did not lead to any effective challenge to what had occurred.
48. Tenth point – conflicting accounts of what did happen in professional discussions. In my opinion this does not require much expansion. It is already clear from what I have set out above that there is disagreement between professionals about what was said at important meetings. There is a record of the strategy discussion on 31st May 2017 but that note is not complete. It does not record the misgivings of the police about removal without notice, the timing of legal advice that had been sought (with the IRO assuming that advice had been taken recently when it had not) or, apparently the actual information given by the health visitor. The point that arises is that there must be accurate recording where steps of this significance are taken.
49. The future – The case will proceed now on the mother’s application to discharge the care order and I have given directions in relation to that. There are also likely to be claims for damages for breaches of Convention rights.
HHJ Stephen Wildblood QC
27th July 2017