B e f o r e :
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Between: |
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Bath and North East Somerset Council |
Applicant |
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The mother |
First Respondent |
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F1 |
Second Respondent |
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F3 |
Third Respondent |
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The father |
Fourth Respondent |
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A, B, C and D (children) by their guardian. |
Fifth to eighth Respondents |
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PA |
Intervener |
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Delia Thornton for the mother.
Linsey Knowles for 'the father' (4th Resp.)
Diane Martin for the children (except for A).
Naomi Owen for A.
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Crown Copyright ©
HHJ Wildblood QC:
Child (sex) | Age | Mother | Father (participated in case?). | Where are the children living? | Orders sought by L.A. (guardian agrees). | Resps' positions |
A (girl) | Early teens. | M | 2nd Resp. (No). He usually lives in the south-east but is now in drugs rehabilitation in the Midlands. |
Foster care on her own since March 2016. She moved to her current placement in January 2017; it is not in her home town. | Care with the intention of long-term fostering. | A opposes long-term care. M does not agree to a care order. She accepts that, if A is in care, she would contact her by phone twice a week and attend school events and that direct contact should be once a month to begin with. 2nd Resp. (A's father) supports L.A. |
B (girl) | 9 | M | Unknown (M has not given details). | Foster care with C since 5th May 2016. | Care and placement (on basis that B and C remain together and that a twin-track search for foster carers will also be carried out, an adoptive placement to be sought for 6 months only). | M agrees to care orders but not to placement orders. |
C (boy) | 6 | M | 3rd Resp. (No). He lives somewhere in the south-east but is not contactable. | Foster care with B since 5th May 2016. | Care and placement. | M agrees to care orders but not to placement orders. |
D (boy) | 3 | M | 4th Resp. (Yes) - 'the father'. Sentenced to 6 years and four months on 5.12.2016 for drugs related offences. Was living in this region, separately from M. | Foster care on his own since 16th November 2016. | Care and placement (to be placed separately from B and C). | M accepts that she cannot care for D and proposes that D should live with PA, the father's sister - either under a care order or a section 8 order. The father supports his sister, PA. |
i) The relationship between PA and the father is so emotionally and socially proximate that she would be unable to protect D from the harmful aspects of the father's behaviour and would continue to be under his influence. In my opinion that contention is plainly made out.
ii) Specifically, she was aware of her brother's criminal activity and involvement with drugs and did nothing to protect D (or, indeed, her own children) from that. The father's drugs contaminated paraphernalia - snap seal bags, scales, £400 and pressing plates - were found in her home on 8th October 2015 and she said, at the time, that she did not know how they got there [G571] even though she knew they were her brothers. She visited his flat regularly and he often visited her home. She knew about the metal gate and the press. They lived very close to each other. She knew that the father was not in lawful work but had a wealthy lifestyle. She knew of his criminal past. She knew he took drugs. Her daughter commented to her that the father sniffed, not because he had a cold but because of drugs. As Dr Airey recorded, PA cared for D in 2016 at weekends when her brother went out and must have known of his associates. She was in regular contact with him by phone; they contacted each other on the father's mobile five times a day on average between September and October 2015 – G576. PA accepted that she turned a blind eye to this, leading to the obvious question: 'How could she do so when she knew he was caring for D and also when she was allowing him into the home and society of her own two young children?. There was no answer to that other than that she is unable to protect children from the harmful influence of her brother.
iii) Thus, in generality, it is contended that PA would be unlikely to maintain the role of primary carer of D when faced with competing demands from the parents. In my opinion that contention is also plainly made out. In relation to the mother, I cannot envisage that the mother would distance herself from D if D were to live with PA. What mother would do so? I do not accept the analogy with the mother's support of her parents in the care of her twenty year old child, I am afraid, because that daughter was available to the mother by liberal family arrangement. Here it is suggested that, if D lived with PA, the mother should accept that she should not see her son, save under heavily supervised arrangements, despite the fact that D would be living very nearby. I have already expressed my opinion that the father would not release his influence over PA if D were living with her.
iv) PA had not alerted the Local Authority about the circumstances in which she knew that the children were living with M and the father before the start of these proceedings. I accept the points made, with skill, by Ms Knowles and Mrs Thornton that, during 2015 and 2016 there was statutory and court involvement with the family and that, following the issue of these proceedings, the court sanctioned the continuation of D's placement with his father when making an interim supervision order. I also accept that there were positive reports from the nursery, health visitor, social worker and guardian of the father's care of D during the first half of 2016. However, only now has the father's true lifestyle become apparent. The aunt knew of this father's lifestyle and knew that he was involved in criminal activity. She knew that he left his paraphernalia in her house on at least one occasion. She must have known that the father was totally unsuited to have the care of a young child whilst living in that lifestyle and that the father was concealing the truth. She did nothing about it. Therefore I have no difficulty at all in accepting that aspect of the Local Authority's contentions. As to PA's awareness of the state of the mother, that must have been apparent to everyone and I do not think that PA can bear the responsibility for that.
v) She had allowed a nephew ('N') to stay in her home, where her own two young children were living also, for six months from December 2011 at a time when he was on bail for attempted murder. This contention took a great deal of time to unravel because there was only shadowy information about it when the case started. In the end the contention was not pursued by the Local Authority, and rightly so. The nephew had lived with the aunt as a condition of his bail and was acquitted of the charge against him. Although, depending on the circumstances, the provision of a home to a person on bail for that sort of offence when caring for young children might be viewed as very unwise, the circumstances were so poorly defined before me as to render this contention nebulous.
vi) Realising that the child of her cousin had sustained injuries (which, it transpired included fractures) she did not alert professionals in 2012. This contention again was very poorly defined at the start of the case and necessitated the provision of unredacted material as the hearing progressed. However, as the material came to light it became increasingly clear that this contention has validity, as PA accepted in her closing address. In summary, PA's cousin had a child, J. PA was asked to be present when J's mother had contact. On four occasions J came to that contact with injuries. After the second injury PA knew that the father of J had not taken the child for further medical examination as he had been advised to do and also that the child was on the child protection register. When J attended with injuries on two further occasions she did not bring those injuries to the attention of the Local Authority involved, despite knowing of the authority's involvement. As events turned out, by the time of the fourth injuries, J had suffered multiple fractures that the court subsequently found were caused by J's father. J has now been adopted. Faced with the material that emerged, PA accepted that she had been naïve and wrong to have accepted the explanations given by J's father for the injuries and had not acted with sufficient protection of J.
vii) Her home is small and cluttered (it is 'festooned with clutter' – C250). This is a make-weight contention in my opinion. It certainly is not enough to lead to statutory involvement with her own children and does not raise issues that are proportionate to the orders sought. There must be many homes like this. I ignore this contention altogether.
viii) Each of the assessors doubted PA's ability to be truthful with professionals. In the light of the above I accept that it is highly unlikely that PA would feel able to work collaboratively with a supervising local authority if D were to be in her care. I have no doubt that she would be polite, as she was in court, and also would show a loving regard for D, as she does to her own children. However, if the father or the mother tried to influence her in the care of D, or involve themselves beyond the agreed parameters, as they would, I do not think that PA would be able to resist them and I do not think that she would reveal what was happening to others. The history of this case, the history of her relationship with her brother and the events with J make that very plain.
i) Nature, law and common sense require that it be recognised that the best place for these children to live is within their natural family unless proven and proportionate necessity otherwise demands. Although the mother does not offer herself as an immediate carer for any of the children, if there is a realistic prospect that any of them could be cared for by her within a timescale that is consistent with their welfare, they should be able to do so. In relation to D, PA is the one family member who offers herself as able to care for him now; although she does not have an established family life with D in the terms of Article 8 of the European Convention, she is the only means, at present, by which D could retain a place within his own family. She is the only available family member. Therefore, if D can be placed with PA consistently with his welfare he should be.ii) In this case the stakes for these children are incredibly high. The Local Authority's care plans would see the three youngest children cut off from their parents, the rest of their extensive family members and, save for the joint placement of B and C, from their siblings. A would see her three siblings being adopted or, possibly in relation to B and C in long-term foster care if an adoptive placement cannot be found. B and C would lose contact with A and with D. The loss, as A would experience it, of her half-siblings and the continued separation from her mother may have a significant impact upon the extent to which A will co-operate with the Local Authority since she is bound to see it as the author of the family disintegration. D would lose contact with all three of his half-siblings. That state of affairs would be likely to endure throughout the lives of these children. The decimation of this family that would arise from making the orders sought should only be directed by the court if no other solution consistent with the children's welfare is available. These children know each other and were brought up together until their home lives fell apart in 2015 and 2016; understandably, A (at very least among the group) has a particularly strong protectiveness to her sibling group. Therefore the jurisprudence of Re B [2013] UKSC 33 is of considerable importance in this case.
iii) In circumstances like this where there are four children who each have different needs, the children have to be considered individually. The issues relating to A, B, C and D are interlinked on some factors but also each raise some very distinct and individual factors – the strongest example, and it is only an example, of what I mean is that PA only seeks the care of D.
iv) Society must be prepared to recognise that there is a wide range in standards of parenting and the court must not apply the yardstick of optimal parenting. It is only if the circumstances of the case are exceptional that children will be removed from their families under care and placement orders. The fact that a parent may take drugs or may engage in criminal activity does not mean that the children of that parent should be deprived of the right to be brought up by that parent. There has to be an holistic evaluation of each child's welfare and the ability of each parent and each relevant family member to care for each child. The only father directly involved in this hearing has been D's father and, although he cannot put himself forward as a carer of D, his wishes and feelings are important, both by operation of statute (section 1(4)(f) (iii) of the 2002 Act) and common sense; as D's father he has an important voice in what should happen to his son. The overview of the mother's circumstances as shown in the diagram above is devastating to her ability to offer herself as a carer of her children in the foreseeable future and that is deeply distressing for anyone to observe. The overview of the father is of a man who is a hardened criminal who has no realistic prospect of offering himself as a safe carer of a young child. The real complication about the offer of PA to care for D, in overview, is that she would never be able to resist the competing claims by both of the parents to be directly involved in D's care and would have no ability to protect D from the danger that her brother, the father, represents.
v) Before the court could consider making a care or placement order the threshold criteria in section 31 of The Children Act 1989 must be fulfilled. Here the threshold criteria are agreed in terms that will be attached to the order that I make. I will not repeat those terms here but I accept them. Therefore this case is focussed on the Convention rights of the family and the welfare provisions of the 1989 and 2002 Act, in which I include, for brevity, the provisions of section 52(1)(b) of the 2002 Act because of its reference to welfare.
vi) Article 8 of the European Convention on Human Rights is heavily engaged in relation to the Local Authority's applications. Care and placement orders involve a very significant invasion of the rights of this family to have a life together. That invasion can only be justified if it is a) necessary, b) proportionate to the proven circumstances of the case and c) in accordance with the law.
vii) The domestic law of this country is to be found in s31 of The Children Act 1989 (the threshold criteria to which I have already referred), section 1 of the Children Act 1989 (the welfare provisions of the 1989 Act relating to the care applications) and sections 52 and 1 of the Adoption and Children Act 2002 (relating to the placement applications).
viii) In this case there is no placement application in relation to A and, therefore, her welfare must be considered under the provisions of section 1 of the 1989 Act; by that statutory provision the welfare of A is the paramount consideration and, in assessing her welfare the court must apply the welfare checklist in section 1(3) of the 1989 Act.
ix) In relation to the three younger children the applications relating to them must be considered under both the 1989 and 2002 Acts. Because sequential analysis is logically flawed it is necessary to conduct the primary analysis concerning those three children by applying the provisions relating to the applications for the most invasive orders – that is the placement applications under the 2002 Act since they are dominant and the most invasive of family life.
x) Each known father of the children has parental responsibility for the children concerned. In particular, the father has parental responsibility for D. Therefore the consent of the fathers of C and D has to be considered in relation to the placement applications.
xi) In relation to the placement application it is necessary for the Local Authority to satisfy the court under section 52 of the 2002 Act that the agreement of the parents with parental responsibility to their respective children being placed for adoption should be dispensed with on the grounds that the welfare of each child concerned so requires. That statutory provision has been interpreted in cases called Re P (Placement Orders: Parental Consent) [2008] 2 FLR 625 and Re B-S (Adoption: Application of s47(5)) [2014] 1 FLR 1035 in terms that are summarised at page 285 of the Red Book and which I will not repeat here.
xii) Section 1 of the 2002 Act contains the welfare provisions of that Act by which the welfare of each child subject to a placement application, throughout their respective lives, is the paramount consideration of the court. The application for a placement order overshadows the application for a care order and, therefore, the main welfare determination needs to be made by reference to the provisions of that Act and, in particular, the more stringent welfare checklist in section 1(4) of it.
xiii) In considering the competing options for the children's future the court must carry out an holistic or joined-up evaluation of them, weighing up the pros and cons that they represent. It is obviously wrong to look at the options one by one (in what lawyers have come to call linear analysis) because that can lead to a mistaken result where the order that is most invasive of family life is made by default.
xiv) In considering the care that a parent might be able to provide for a child it is important to recollect the concept of parenting with support. The President stressed the significance of the concept in a reported case called D (A Child) (No 3) [2016] EWFC 1 in which he referred to the decision of the then Gillen J in Re G and A (Care Order: Freeing Order: Parents with a Learning Disability) [2006] NIFam 8, para 5. The very purpose of the welfare state is to provide support for those in need (as was said in Soares de Milo v Portugal, ECHR, Requête no 72850/14, para 106). The Local Authority must place evidence before the court of the support that is available to parents so that the court is then able to make a satisfactory welfare evaluation – Re W [2013] EWCA Civ 1227. In this case the point is important because it is being suggested that, with support and education PA, might be able to care for D and it is also being said that, following support with drug and drink rehabilitation the mother might be supported to care for her children. For reasons that I have already made plain, I do not think that either point has any validity; no amount of support or education could render PA a safe carer of D in these circumstances and the mother will not be in a position to care for any of her children for a long time even with full rehabilitative support.
? I do not think that fostering and adoption can, in fact, be equated in terms of what they offer by way of security. I do not intend to embark on a comprehensive comparison of the two arrangements, merely to highlight some of the material differences. What I say should not be taken as a substitute for professional advice to the court from social services and/or the guardian in any case in which this is a significant issue.
? With that caveat, I make the following observations:
i) Adoption makes the child a permanent part of the adoptive family to which he or she fully belongs. To the child, it is likely therefore to "feel" different from fostering. Adoptions do, of course, fail but the commitment of the adoptive family is of a different nature to that of a local authority foster carer whose circumstances may change, however devoted he or she is, and who is free to determine the caring arrangement.
ii) Whereas the parents may apply for the discharge of a care order with a view to getting the child back to live with them, once an adoption order is made, it is made for all time.
iii) Contact in the adoption context is also a different matter from contact in the context of a fostering arrangement. Where a child is in the care of a local authority, the starting point is that the authority is obliged to allow the child reasonable contact with his parents (section 34(1) Children Act 1989). The contact position can, of course, be regulated by alternative orders under section 34 but the situation still contrasts markedly with that of an adoptive child. There are open adoptions, where the child sees his or her natural parents, but I think it would be fair to say that such arrangements tend not to be seen where the adoptive parents are not in full agreement. Once the adoption order has been made, the natural parents normally need leave before they can apply for contact.
iv) Routine life is different for the adopted child in that once he or she is adopted, the local authority have no further role in his or her life (no local authority medicals, no local authority reviews, no need to consult the social worker over school trips abroad, for example).
i) Fostering would allow the children to maintain their family identities and to revert to the care of their parents if any of the parents rehabilitate themselves sufficiently for this to occur. That is a particularly important factor relating to the children's relationship with the mother.ii) Fostering would allow the sibling group to maintain its identity even though they would be living in three separate households. The children would not feel that they have lost each other.
iii) Fostering would allow the family to maintain contact both as between the siblings but also with the parents and other family members, including the parent's elder children and the grandparents.
iv) In later life the children would avoid the potential sense of loss of identity and family that those who have been adopted sometimes feel as adults.
v) Fostering would also involve professional involvement with the children through statutory reviews and might make access to professional help easier. Adoption aftercare for adopters who encounter difficulties with adopted children is not always as easy to find as is sometimes suggested - I have direct experience of this from at least one other case.
i) He regarded it as positive that the mother has started to address her long standing addiction problems. However, this has been a very recent development and that leads him to conclude that the time has passed for the three younger children to be able to wait – they need permanence now, he said.ii) Given A's age and circumstances she is in a different position to the other children. It would be very important for the Local Authority to share PR so as to have some sort of control over the arrangements for her. Six months may well be an unrealistic timescale to consider before A could be returned to the mother – there are many steps that the mother needs to take before this could be achieved. It is really important that the mother should support A in her placement because of the risks of A absconding and being vulnerable to all the other risks that would obviously then arise.
iii) He does not support the return of D to the family. The evidence has shown the closeness of the relationship between PA and the father. PA's loyalty to the family and her inability to see the risks that the father presents mean that she could not care for D independently from him.
iv) He was asked whether it would be better for the three children to remain in foster care where they can maintain their family attachments and might be able to revert to the family when they are older. Mrs Thornton asked: would not the shattering of attachments through adoption have such a harmful effect on them that fostering would be in the interests of B, C and D, rather than adoption? If they were adopted, would there not be a distinct risk that the adoptive placement would come under profound pressure from the breaking of attachments and the very real possibility that the children may try to contact each other through social media? Each of the questions was put to Mr Plummer and he recognised their significance as I do. However, in D's circumstances long term fostering would not offer him the stability, security and permanence that D needs, the guardian replied. In B and C's case there is a more difficult balance between the two options given their different ages and experiences, he accepted. However, Mr Plummer thought that it was important for both children to have the opportunity of permanence in an adoptive placement if one can be found. There would be at least an equal risk of breakdown in foster care. Further an adoptive placement would create a place for the children within their adoptive families that would endure throughout the children's lives whereas foster placements would not.
i) She said that the mother misled her about the contact that she had with the father since his imprisonment. On 14th February 2017 the mother told the social worker that she had only visited the father once in prison whereas in fact she had visited on another occasion, that is on the very day before the conversation took place. In her statement, dated 7th February (a week before the conversation), the mother said at C311 that she did not intend to visit the father in prison but then did so on 13th February. The mother suggested that there had been a misunderstanding on 14th February 2017 and that she did not think that she needed to tell the social worker about the visit the day before. I do not accept that is so. It is clear that the mother wanted to keep quiet about the second visit.ii) It would be short-sighted to base a decision on the mother's recent progress in drug and drink rehabilitation given the duration of her addiction. She said that the children's lives cannot be put on hold any longer.
iii) She recognised that the mother is very able to occupy the children's time during contact and to give them attention. She said that the last two contacts with B and C have been particularly positive as the contact records show.
iv) She said that she thought that, for any children, the severance of the tie between them and the natural family would be a major step but that the ties between the mother and these children have been weakened already. B and C have enough recollection of how things were when they lived at home and this has led B to say that she doesn't wish to return to her mother. As far as I am concerned, the tie may have been weakened but that does not detract from the enormity of the decisions that are being proposed by the Local Authority or from the principles of law that I have stated.
v) She was asked what would happen if A does not return to the mother's care – would A be containable in foster care? She said that there will be a real struggle to maintain her foster care if the mother does not support it and, if the foster care broke down, A could ricochet around the care system. She said that A needs to be told that the long-term plan is that she will remain in care –the care that she experienced when at home with the mother was so dire that she cannot be left with the idea that she will return to her. She said that A will not be containable if the message is not clear or if she thinks that foster care is no more than a short-term arrangement. I think that the arrangements for A and what A is told about them will require very sensitive handling. If she feels ignored and trapped in long-term care there is a real danger that she will rebel against it; if she sees foster care as a temporary arrangement she would not settle and may well reject any exercise of authority over her by the foster carers and the Local Authority.
vi) She was asked why B and C should be placed for adoption rather than in foster care. She said that C is only aged six and so he would be in the care system for a long time if fostered. Adoption would offer them a chance of permanence and commitment and that would be of particular importance to them, if it were to be achievable, given their backgrounds. She said that neither child has any contact with their respective fathers and that the mother's contact with the children has been very spasmodic. She said that she believes that B and C have detached from their mother and do not have any expectations of her in the light of the chronic neglect that they experienced when living with her. Having considered the totality of the evidence I do not accept that B and C have detached entirely from their mother; the last two contact sessions have chosen their continued affection for her and they have a natural connection to the mother with whom they lived until last year. However, I do accept that the neglect that they experienced when living with their mother and the limited contact that they have had with her have significantly weakened their trust in their mother and the depth of their attachment.
i) After the father left drugs paraphernalia in PA's house in October 2016 leading to her arrest and interviewing by the police in early 2016, why did PA allow her brother into her house at a time when she was caring for her own two children. In my opinion the Local Authority made a very strong and valid point about this. If PA were not to have been so enmeshed with her brother she would surely not have allowed him back into her house after he had behaved in that way towards her. What sensible parent would allow a brother back into her house in those circumstances? By the end of the case PA accepted the point.ii) PA must have been aware of the father's criminal activities. By the end of the case PA said that she knew that he took drugs and turned a blind eye to his other criminal activity.
i) He said that, during their relationship, the mother would sometimes have a bit to drink and there would be arguments; however, he said, there was never any violence. The mother's evidence was that there was never any serious violence but there was pushing and shoving. I accept that I have not been referred to any evidence of repeated police call-outs or injuries to the mother. I therefore accept the mother's evidence and do so in preference to that of the father.ii) He said that he thinks that D should stay with PA. He said that it is obvious that the mother loves D but she has to keep off the drugs and 'we can't take the risk of placing D with her'.
iii) He said he understands the concerns about his involvement with drugs and he understands the risks that his lifestyle poses for D. I therefore asked him what those risks were. He said that he could have got robbed and people could have come after him for money. He did not mention the risks to D of living in a household where there are Class A drugs nor did he mention the lack of responsibility that he would be showing to his child by involving himself in that lifestyle – normalising drug taking, associating with other drug takers and making his lifestyle appear acceptable to a young child.
iv) As to the paraphernalia found in PAs property on 8th October [G570], he accepted they were his and said that PA did not have anything to do with them. He then went on to give a manifestly untruthful account of why he left the items in her house. He said that he had taken the paraphernalia to someone else's house by foot that day. He watched the other person use them, that is weighing and pressing drugs with them, and he then walked back to his sister's house with them. He then took the items into her house and hid them there while she was on the phone speaking to a sister in the USA. He then drove off in his car with drugs in his possession. The obvious point that he was asked was this: 'Your flat is just across the road from your sister's house. Why did you not leave the paraphernalia there?' He had no credible answer to that question. The only explanation is that he used his sister's house as a safe-house – he hid some of the items on top of a kitchen cupboard, the pressing plates in a kitchen cupboard under the sink and the £400 upstairs next to some of his jewellery which he also left at her house. By the end of the case PA said that she realised the seriousness of what he had done and how he had used her. The father suggested that PA would have gone 'mad' if she had known what he was doing; if that is true, and I am in no position to say whether it is, then it merely adds to the irresponsibility of his actions.
v) He also said that this was not the first time that he had left paraphernalia at PA's house and said that there was another occasion. I am quite unable to rely on a word the father said and could not possibly rely on his assertion that he only behaved in this way twice. Why should he have done so only twice, given the duration of his involvement in drugs?
vi) He said he is a tough man and a controlling man. He accepts that he has put his sister through hell and put her at risk, leading to her being arrested. I agree with all that. He said that he had learnt his lesson; I do not agree with that - there is no evidence to support it beyond his mere assertion.
vii) He accepted that he was taking drugs at the time that he was caring for D as the Lextox tests show. He said he was getting the drugs from dealers that he knew, sometimes paying, sometimes not.
viii) He accepted that he was having a relationship with the mother when D was with him and, initially, said that he agreed that he was putting D at risk by continuing a relationship with M at the time given the condition that she was in. He then said that, when he went to see the mother, he left D with his sister PA but did not tell his sister that he was going to see her. None of that was reliable evidence.
ix) He accepted that he had lied to the court and to the Local Authority about the continuation of his relationship with the mother. In his statement at A23 he had said that he had been seeing the mother until February 2016; that was not true because he was seeing her after that. He accepted that he gave a false account to the social worker about his relationship with the mother and that he was untruthful in his statement at page C118e when he said; 'in the relation to the other allegations of me being in contact with M by telephone etc this is completely fabricated….I am not in a relationship with M and I do not appreciate the Local Authority trying to make up evidence to suggest this'. At A47 the father said in January 2017: 'the father is not in a relationship with M and was not in a relationship with her until he went to prison as has been suggested…It is correct that M is currently living in the father's flat as he is in prison'; he was in a relationship with her until he went to prison.
x) On 3rd August 2016, the day when police came to his flat as described at C104 and found the mother there, he said that he had allowed the mother into the flat to collect some things that she had stored there. He said that he did not know she had drugs on her. He was referred to the photograph at C111 which shows the mother's clothes on the bed in his one bedroom flat. As on other issues I could not rely on anything that this father said and I think it highly improbable that the mother was simply there to collect some belongings – if she was, why was her loose clothing on his bed [C111]?
i) She said that she is a good mum and has cared for her own children well. I have no reason to doubt that. However, I accept that the issues relating to D are very different to any issues relating to her children.ii) She said that she knew that her brother, the father, had a big red press in his flat, which she visited, but did not ask 'what is that?'; she said that she did not want to ask the question. When I asked her why she did not want to ask the question she did not give a satisfactory answer at all – she said that she thought it might be connected with crime but she did not know what sort of criminal activity. She knew about the metal gate across the door and said her brother said that it was to prevent the police coming into his flat – she said that she believed her brother when he told her that. She said that she did not think that the metal gate was there to prevent other criminals entering the flat; I do not believe that.
iii) She sought to suggest that she was naïve about the father's involvement with drugs and did not know the extent of it. I do not believe her. Their relationship is very proximate both emotionally and geographically, the signs of his drug involvement were obvious from his flat (which she did visit) and his way of life was unexplained by anything lawful.
iv) She said that she knew that the mother was taking drugs and was drinking but sought to suggest that she was unaware of the extent of the mother's difficulties despite the fact that, in February, D was taken from the mother's care by the father and despite the fact that PA was seeing her brother regularly and was also seeing D regularly. I found her evidence wholly unsatisfactory and untruthful. Of course she knew what the problems were and, of course, her brother told her.
v) She accepted that she was too trusting of her cousin in relation to the injuries suffered by J.
i) I am very sorry indeed to be the one who has to cause so much pain to this mother by making those orders.ii) If, in later life, any of the younger children should read this judgment I would wish them to know that nothing that has happened to them is their fault. How could it be? Their mother loves them hugely but has just not be able to care for them in the way that she wants. She has had enormous difficulties in her own life and I hope that they will view her with the same sympathy that I do.
iii) This case is a very clear example of the damage that drugs can do. People like this father are all too keen to profit from the drugs market but the damage that is done through drug distribution can be seen in the decimation of this family. What to some vulnerable or impressionable people may seem cool in their teens or early twenties leads to this dreadful type of picture in later life. I hope that there is sufficient education so that this type of potential ruination is known.
Stephen Wildblood QC.
27th February 2017.