England and Wales Family Court Decisions (other Judges)

IN THE FAMILY COURT AT BRISTOL

		Bristol Civil and Family Justice Centre
		9th November 2016

HHJ Wildblood QC:

1. Introduction - With the support of the Guardian in these proceedings, Gloucestershire County Council applies for care and placement orders in relation to a nine month old baby boy ('B'). B currently lives with foster carers, where he has been for nearly six months, and has contact twice a week under supervision with his mother ('M'), who is in her mid-20s. B's father ('F'), who is also in his mid-20s, has disengaged from the proceedings and from B's life; his solicitors have now stopped acting for him, he did not attend this hearing and apparently he has now moved to a new town with a friend. There are no family members or other identified adults who are available to care for B if the mother does not. After a short period of reducing direct contact the amended care plan of the Local Authority proposes that the mother should only have indirect contact with B through what is called the 'letterbox' system.
2. In relation to the available options for B the position is as follows:

i) The mother would wish B to return to live with her. She would like him to return to her care in the near future if possible but recognises that her stronger argument is that the proceedings should be adjourned while she accesses therapy. That inevitably raised two issues about timescales: i) what length of adjournment would be necessary before the court could make an informed decision as to whether the mother might be able to care for B? and ii) how would a delay of that nature impact upon the welfare of B?

ii) The Local Authority and guardian propose that B should be placed for adoption and that nothing less than that life-changing order for him would meet the demands of his welfare. The evidence about timescales was very thoroughly scrutinised and the upshot, they both submit, is that the necessary period of adjournment would be manifestly contrary to B's welfare.

iii) The mother has also raised through her counsel that, if B does not return to the mother, the court should consider long-term fostering for him as an alternative to adoption since that would allow him to maintain his family identity and contact with his mother and, possibly, his half-sister and father.

3. The local authority contends that the mother is unable to care for B safely. She has been diagnosed by a consultant psychiatrist as 'presenting with symptoms suggestive of emotionally unstable personality disorder: impulsive type' [E5]. It is said that she is unable to regulate her emotions consistently and has outbursts of extreme volatility and aggression. As a consequence, the physical and emotional safety of B is a key factor of the reasoning of the Local Authority and the guardian as to why they suggest that the mother cannot care for B. All professionals say that the mother's basic care of B, when she is stable, is reasonable and that she undoubtedly loves him. However, the Local Authority and guardian contend that her own emotions so overwhelm and distract her that her parenting fails and becomes unsafe. To use everyday language, they say that she flies off the handle in such an extreme and unregulated way that she would be an emotional and physical danger to B if he were in her care.
4. There is clear evidence from those who have been supporting the mother in the community that, in the very recent weeks, she has made some improvements in her self-regulation. She accepts that she needs therapeutic and social support. Those improvements have occurred at a time when the mother has been living on her own in the community and has not had the demands of caring for a child. Those improvements, the mother's love for B, her ability to provide for B's basic care and the fact that she will be supported in finding the therapy that she seeks all combine to require a very careful judgment call when deciding this case.
5. Law – This case involves the following key legal considerations:

i) Nature, law and common sense require that it be recognised that the best place for this child to live is with his natural mother unless proven and proportionate necessity otherwise demands. Society must be prepared to recognise that there is a wide range in standards of parenting and the court must not apply the yardstick of optimal parenting. It is only if the circumstances of the case are exceptional that children will be removed from their parents under care and placement orders or, to put it another way, the making of the orders sought by the Local Authority is confined to circumstances where no other realistic solutions consistent with B's welfare are available.

ii) Before the court could consider making a care or placement order the threshold criteria in section 31 of The Children Act 1989 must be fulfilled. It is agreed, in this case, that they are fulfilled on the basis that, at the time and in the circumstances of the issue of the proceedings on the day after B's birth, he was likely to suffer significant harm and that the likelihood of harm was attributable to the care that was then likely to be given to him, not being what it would be reasonable to expect a parent to give to him. The basis of the fulfilment of the criteria has not occupied any great amount of time in court given the agreement between the parties; however there is a document at A6 that records the basis of the mother's acceptance.

iii) Article 8 of the European Convention on Human Rights is heavily engaged in relation to both of the Local Authority's applications. Care and placement orders involve a very significant invasion of the rights of this mother and this child to a family life together. That invasion can only be justified if it is a) necessary, b) proportionate to the proven circumstances of the case and c) in accordance with the law.

iv) The domestic law of this country is to be found in s31 of The Children Act 1989 (the threshold criteria to which I have already referred), section 1 of the Children Act 1989 (the welfare provisions of the 1989 Act relating to the care application) and sections 52 and 1 of the Adoption and Children Act 2002 (relating to the placement application).

v) By section 52 of the 2002 Act it is necessary for the Local Authority to satisfy the court that the mother's agreement to B being placed for adoption should be dispensed with on the grounds that B's welfare so requires. That statutory provision has been interpreted in cases called Re P (Placement Orders: Parental Consent) [2008] 2 FLR 625 and Re B-S (Adoption: Application of s47(5)) [2014] 1 FLR 1035 in terms that are summarised at page 285 of the Red Book and which I will not repeat here.

vi) Section 1 of the 2002 Act contains the welfare provisions of that Act by which the welfare of B, throughout his life, is the paramount consideration of the court. The application for a placement order overshadows the application for a care order and, therefore, the main welfare determination needs to be made by reference to the provisions of that Act and, in particular, the more stringent welfare checklist in section 1(4) of it.

vii) In considering the competing options for B's future the court must carry out an holistic or joined-up evaluation of them, weighing up the pros and cons that they represent. It is obviously wrong to look at the options one by one (in what lawyers have come to call linear analysis) because that can lead to a mistaken result where the order that is most invasive of family life is made by default.

viii) In considering the care that a parent might be able to provide for a child it is important to recollect the concept of parenting with support. The President stressed the significant of the concept in a reported case called D (A Child) (No 3) [2016] EWFC 1 in which he referred to the decision of the then Gillen J in Re G and A (Care Order: Freeing Order: Parents with a Learning Disability) [2006] NIFam 8, para 5. The very purpose of the welfare state is to provide support for those in need (as was said in Soares de Milo v Portugal, ECHR, Requête no 72850/14, para 106). The Local Authority must place evidence before the court of the support that is available to parents so that the court is then able to make a satisfactory welfare evaluation – Re W [2013] EWCA Civ 1227.

6. Background – Very sadly, the mother has a background herself of having been in care from the age of 14 after she experienced neglect and physical abuse from her own parents. While in care she lived with foster carers and also in children's homes. Her education was severely disrupted due to the difficulties that she faced and the number of moves that she underwent. She became involved with drink and drugs. None of that is any fault of the mother's and she deserves every sympathy for it. One additional burden for her to bear arising from that past is that she has very limited support within the community; she is apparently beginning to develop a new relationship with her mother and has a friend, 'K'.
7. At the age of 16 the mother met a 19 year old man by whom she has a daughter ('G'). G now lives with the former partner of the mother's cousin under a special guardianship order after being removed from her parents' care when only a few weeks old. In care proceedings relating to her, a judge decided that the injuries to G had been inflicted either by her mother (i.e. M) or by her father. The judge also decided that, whichever parent did not perpetrate the injuries against G, failed to protect her. Therefore the judge concluded that she would not be safe in the care of either of her parents.
8. G's father was later convicted of assault occasioning actual bodily harm against G on the day concerned and the sentencing remarks relating to him have been transcribed and appear at B52. It therefore appears that G's father was responsible for the assault but the mother's failure to protect remains a feature of the past.
9. These proceedings were started in February 2016 on the day after B's birth. The local authority had become aware that the mother was pregnant and, as a result, it had carried out a limited amount of assessment of her prior to the birth. Necessarily, the main bulk of assessment, however, was not carried out before the birth and, as a consequence, these proceedings have been delayed while there have been extensive investigations of whether the mother can care for B.
10. A few days after his birth, B went to live with the mother in a mother and baby foster placement where he remained for about three months, save for one week where mother and child went to a respite foster carer together. However the mother's placement there broke down after three months amid complaints that she did not cooperate and was aggressive and challenging to the foster carer [C92E]. On the day before a court hearing in May 2016 the mother left the mother and baby foster placement and, at court next day, it was acknowledged that the placement had broken down and B went to live with his current foster carers.
11. At that stage of the proceedings the mother was regarded as very difficult to work with and tending to lose her temper with professionals quickly. It was following the breakdown of that placement that an order was made in May 2016 for a psychiatric assessment of the mother. The resultant report arrived in June and it was that report that diagnosed the mother's personality disorder which has become an accepted feature of this case. This was the first time that this diagnosis had been made of the mother and so, she says, she has taken some time to adjust to it but now accepts that she does suffer from it.
12. The psychiatrist also recommended that the mother should undergo an intensive programme of treatment in a therapeutic and residential assessment unit. To its credit, the Local Authority accepted that recommendation and funded a place for the mother in a residential assessment unit in the Midlands where she could be assessed and could also receive psychotherapeutic support.
13. The mother went to the residential unit in mid-August. However six weeks into the assessment the placement was brought to an end on the recommendations of the staff there due, they said, to the mother's aggression and volatility. There are two reports from the residential unit and a worker from it came to give evidence.
14. Whilst the mother was at the unit a linked organisation called 'P' provided her with therapy. The social worker and the mother's family mental health practitioner have tried to obtain information from P about the therapy that was offered to the mother whilst she was at the unit. The mother says she gave permission for the therapist to speak to the social worker. Notwithstanding the obvious need for P to provide information the repeated attempts by the social worker and by the mental health practitioner to obtain it went unanswered, I was told. If that is so it is obviously unsatisfactory. I have therefore given permission to the Local Authority to serve a copy of this judgment on the residential unit and P so that they can explain to the Local Authority the apparent omission.
15. As matters stand the only information that I have about the work by P is at C157 where the author of the report from the residential unit says; 'the mother continued to engage with therapy through P weekly, which she stated she found useful and was able to discuss techniques and strengths that she learnt from this'. In her final statement at C320 the mother stated that she felt that she was offered insufficient therapy and that which she was offered was rushed and directed to anger rather than the causes for her underlying anxiety.
16. While the mother was at the residential unit, B was brought from the foster carers her for contact, as part of the assessment process. Initially, the contact took place for three hours twice a week. On the fourth week it increased to 6 hours twice a week and then on one occasion it occurred for a full day and overnight. However, it was shortly after the contact had increased to overnight that the placement was brought to an end because of the level of the mother's anxiety and lack of self-regulation. The staff considered that the mother did not cope with the stress of having more responsibility for B and that stress was manifested by her increased volatility and aggression.
17. Thus, the officers of the residential unit formed the view that the mother could not care for B safely and have recommended that she should not care for B in the community. The officer from the unit who gave evidence was of the opinion that it would not be safe for her to care for B now.
18. Although the mother was considered to have made some progress with self-regulation when at the unit, and although her basic care and love were not in doubt it was said that [C219]:

i) There continued to be numerous occasions when the mother displayed disproportionate responses resulting in verbal outbursts and aggression. The report from the residential assessment unit summarises the extent of this issue at C192;

ii) It was very difficult to work with the mother because of the aggression and expressions of dislike that she directed at staff;

iii) Some of the incidents took place in front of B;

iv) When the incidents took place it was 'impossible to have any level of communication with the mother until she had time to calm down [which could] often take a significant period of time'.

v) The staff at the unit also had concerns regarding the mother's ability to protect B from other 'risky' adults. The mother spoke about her wish to be a family unit with the father despite the allegations of domestic violence within their relationship (as reported by the unit at C198 and as the mother outlined in graphic terms to the psychiatrist at E3 – 'he was very volatile…and was extremely violent towards her, for example hitting her, throwing her down the stairs and attempting to strangle her') and she also appeared to have formed a liaison with another man who has a history of domestic abuse.

19. Thus the mother returned to her flat in this area and had supervised visiting contact with B twice a week. On the whole, save for on one occasion, the mother has been able to meet B's needs and show him appropriate attention and affection during those contact sessions.
20. The exception arose on 28^th September 2016. On the day before, 27^th September 2016, there was a court hearing at which the Local Authority stated that its care plan would propose that B should be placed for adoption. On the following day, 28^th September 2016, there was a contact session of which there is a record in the bundle. The mother was distressed and said that she did not feel that she could cope with the contact session as she believed that B would be adopted. The session ended a few minutes early and the supervisor contacted the social worker expressing concern that the mother was a suicide risk.
21. The social worker then spoke to the mother and, the social worker said in evidence, the mother sounded as though she had taken something and told the social worker that she had done so. The social worker and the deputy team manager therefore went round to the mother's flat; the mother was standing on the third floor balcony covered in blood with broken crockery about her; whilst they were there the mother was saying : 'do you think I would die if I jumped from here'. Her friends then arrived and, for the second time, the mother ran towards the edge of the balcony and was pulled back by her friends. The mother then sat on the floor and said to the social worker that she wanted to kill the social worker and stamp on her head. As the social worker left the mother ran at the social worker, shouting at her. The social worker then left with the mother shouting that she would kill the social worker. The police and an ambulance then arrived. Later the mother wrote to apologise for her behaviour.
22. That scene was very distressing indeed for all concerned and also it is understandable that the social worker felt in danger. Although I think that it must be placed in the context of the events that had taken place at court the day before it is also an example of very extreme behaviour.
23. I have not been provided with contact records for all of the contact sessions since then although the summary of the social worker's evidence is as above (i.e. the contact was, on the whole, reasonably positive). There is a contact record for 11^th October 2016 in which it was said that 'the mother seemed unsure of what she should be doing with B…she seemed fixed that the judge would rule in favour of her having B'. The next record is that of the contact on 18^th October which states that 'B responded positively to M…M remained calm and interacted well with B'.
24. Since leaving the residential unit the mother has continued to receive support from the following:

i) The local children's centre. I heard one of the workers from the centre in evidence. She was an impressive witness who knows the mother well and gave evidence that, despite the improvements that the mother has made in her self-regulation in recent weeks, B would not be safe in her care even with the continued involvement of the current package of support.

ii) A heath visitor. The health visitor also gave very impressive and careful evidence. She spoke of the improvements that the mother has made recently but did not want to express a view as to whether the mother could care for B safely. Since B has not been with her the mother has been receptive to advice. The health visitor said that, if the mother thinks that a professional is working with her as part of a team she is much more receptive than if she feels she is being criticised. She said that the health visiting service could also remain involved if B returned to the mother's care.

iii) The local family mental health team. Another impressive witness, from that team, gave evidence at very short notice. She also spoke of the improvements that the mother has made in recent weeks but did not want to express an opinion about whether B would be safe in her care now. She also gave evidence of the therapeutic mental health support that would be provided to the mother; I need to say more about that below because it raises central issues concerning timescales. I would wish to record my gratitude to the family mental health practitioner not only for the support of the mother but also for the quality of the evidence that she provided both orally and, through endeavour, in documentation.

25. The workers that I have described above, therefore, each gave impressive evidence and also they each confirmed that they had liaised with each other to discuss the mother and the issues that now rise. That inter agency co-operation was also impressive, I thought.
26. Evidence  - The case began with the evidence of the social worker. She adhered to her view that the mother could not care for B safely and that the only order that could be made consistently with his welfare was one placing him for adoption.
27. On the basis of the mother's extreme behaviour on 28^th September the social worker initially thought that the mother would not cope with anything more than two more direct contact sessions and that direct contact should then cease. As the case developed the Local Authority indicated that it would be prepared to implement a longer period of phasing out of direct contact subject to the mother's state of mind. I was handed a list of five dates when it is now proposed that contact should take place under the care plan, subject to a continuing review of the mother's state of mind. Mr Carron asked me to record that, if B was still with the current foster carers at the date of his birthday, consideration might be given to some form of additional contact for the mother around that date if I make the orders sought.
28. The permanency team social worker from the Local Authority who gave evidence later thought that there would need to be a period of no direct contact before B moved to adopters to allow him to be settled when he first went to them. She thought that it could take until the beginning of February before an adoption placement occurred. She was also asked questions about the incidence of adoption breakdown and said, as research clearly shows, that the incidence of breakdown (or 'disruption') in young children is very low.
29. The officer from the residential unit gave evidence and adhered to her views as stated above and as expressed in the two reports from the unit at C176 and C188. She said that, at one point, there was improvement in the mother's aggressive responses after a meeting was held with her, however as soon as the mother's contact with B was increased matters deteriorated very quickly. She said that anything that was said that the mother perceived as criticism led to her being aggressive.
30. The community worker from the Children's centre (to whom I have referred above) described in evidence how difficult it had been to work with the mother – she said that the mother is OK one day but then another day will be aggressive. She said that it is not possible to predict what will occur when trying to work with the mother. She said that home visits of once a week would be the most that could be offered by the centre although the mother could use the children's centre as much as necessary. She said that the support that could be offered is very time focussed and is available only during the day. It would not be available at night. She could see that many stressful situations for the mother would occur and since support is not always available 24 hours a day it would mean that the mother would be unsupported at important times. She said that the mother gets angry very quickly and there would not be an emergency service available to cover that eventuality.
31. The family mental health practitioner, to whom I have referred above, said that she has seen the mother probably about once a week since she left the residential unit. She said that the mother is doing quite well at the moment - she is calmer and is taking her medication, being now on a therapeutic dose of sertraline. She said that the future progress of the mother is difficult to predict. The mother has been prepared to work with her and, the witness said, the mother has been able to regulate her emotions better recently. I will set out her evidence about timescales later after referring to the evidence of the consultant psychiatrist.
32. The consultant psychiatrist said that the mother's disorder is evidenced by an extreme and dramatic display of emotions – often combined with being overwhelmed by other people. It is also often associated with self-harming and inconsistency of parenting. She did not wish to express an opinion about whether B would be safe in the mother's care and, although she expressed the obvious emotional and physical risks that currently arise, she did not wish to evaluate the degree of those risks.
33. Recent information led the psychiatrist to be more optimistic than previously about the prospects of the mother responding to treatment. The mother's disorder is one that is commonly encountered and the treatment of this type of disorder is very limited and badly resourced.
34. The therapy that would be offered to the mother through the NHS would be psychodynamic therapy and possibly art therapy – that should address the impulsivity of the mother and help with the anxiety from which she suffers. In the longer term it might address the mother's problems, she thought.
35. As to timescales, she said that, in two months, possibly three months due to Christmas, 'we will have a much better idea about how drug therapy has impacted upon the mother. We would also be better informed about whether the necessary therapy would be available'. She was of the opinion that six months of therapy would probably be necessary to see if it was proving effective, although after about 2 -3 months 'we would be able to say, with a pretty high degree of confidence, whether the mother is on a pathway to addressing her difficulties'. An email from the family mental health practitioner that I was shown just before closing speeches gave more detail of timescales.
36. Although the psychiatrist thought that six months of therapy only would be available under the NHS, the family mental health practitioner thought that it might be possible for it to be extended to two years.
37. The mother gave brief evidence having filed a very recent statement and having had the courage to write to me directly [C318 and C329]. She spoke of her heartfelt and entirely genuine wish to do everything that she can for B and her determination to engage in therapy.
38. The very experienced guardian adhered to the recommendations that she had made in her final report in support of the Local Authority's applications. She considered that it was clear that B could not be cared for safely by his mother now. She was of the very firm belief that the prospects of the mother being able to care for B after therapy were so uncertain and the delay involved so great that it would be contrary to the welfare of B for these proceedings to be adjourned. She made the point that, even if the mother did engage successfully with therapy, there would still have to be a period of testing out of her care of B in the community before it could be said whether the mother could care for B in the long-term. She said that the period involved would leave B with the Local Authority foster carers for a very significant amount of time – he could be 18 months old or more before it was known whether she could care for him fully. That would mean that he would have been with the current foster carers for 15 months and it is clearly uncertain whether the mother would be able to care for him at the end of that period.
39. Timescales – By the time of closing speeches there was no real disagreement about the timescales that would be involved in the event that the proceedings were to be adjourned while the mother underwent therapy. The evidence breaks down in this way:

i) A referral would have to be made and that need take no more than a week (i.e. it would be done by about 16^th November).

ii) There would then be one or two sessions of therapy to assess the mother's suitability to engage in longer term therapy. That assessment would probably be completed within a month –i.e. by mid December.

iii) There would then be a referral for full therapy. It was anticipated that this would probably be done by the end of December given the intervention of Christmas.

iv) Full therapy would commence within three months of that referral – by the end of March although possibly earlier (Mr Carron suggested the end of February 2017).

v) From the evidence of the consultant psychiatrist three months of therapy would be needed to see if the mother was on the pathway to responding to therapy but six months of therapy would be needed before it could be said whether it was effective. That would be August / September 2017.

vi) If the mother was responding positively to therapy it would be necessary to test the mother's ability to care for B in the community through increased contact (as started to occur in the residential unit). I accept that it would be inevitable that there should be that degree of testing at that stage and that it would take at least six weeks. Thus it would be October / November 2017 before B could be moved to the mother's full-time care if everything went well.

40. Although Mr Carron advanced arguments that I should put pressure on the Local Authority to fund the therapy (thus avoiding the NHS delays):

i) There is no power in the court to order a Local Authority to fund therapy. Mr Carron's suggestion that I should leap through the barriers surrounding the provision of therapy on the grounds of proportionality was attractively argued but would require an unavailable pole-vault rather than a simple leap.

ii) Adjourning the case for the Local Authority to re-think its position about private finding of therapy would achieve nothing since the Local Authority will not do so – why should it when NHS funded therapy is available? An adjournment for that purpose would simply add to the delay in any event.

iii) Private funding of therapy would probably only shorten the timescales by about a month at most since there would still have to be assessments, waiting lists and six months while therapy took effect. There would still have to be post therapy community assessment as well.

41. Key factors - In my opinion there are the following key factors within the evidence that I have heard:

i) The mother loves B profoundly. Her wish to care for him is heartfelt and genuine.

ii) The mother's basic care of B is satisfactory. She is very capable of providing the nuts and bolts of parenting.

iii) The mother has a tendency of extreme volatility and aggression that has been characterised as demonstrating symptoms of emotionally unstable personality disorder: impulsive type.

iv) There has been a very lengthy period of detailed assessment of the mother's ability to care for B. The Local Authority has carried out its own assessments, there was the period of testing when the mother was at the mother and baby foster placement, there was the residential assessment, the guardian has carried out her assessments and there has been the impressive evidence of those caring now for the mother in the community.

v) The overwhelming preponderance of evidence is that mother could not care for B safely in the community as matters currently stand even with the impressive support that is available. I have no doubt that B would be at very significant risk of emotional and physical harm if he were with her, even under supervision. In the light of the assessments that have taken place it would be irresponsible to place B with the mother now. When the mother loses self-regulation, she does so quickly and dramatically and there are no adequate community crisis facilities or techniques (such as mindfulness) that could mitigate the risk adequately. I note in particularly how quickly the residential assessment broke down once contact started to be increased.

vi) There is reason to hope that the mother would respond well to a combination of drug and psychological therapy. However, it is far from certain that she would do so in the long–term to the extent necessary to render her a safe parent of B.

vii) Even if she did engage fully in the lengthy process of therapy that I have outlined above, that process is way beyond the timescales for B. It could not possibly be in his interests, either in the short-term or in the long-term, for him to remain in interim foster care, probably for the next year, while the mother undergoes the course of therapy and assessment that I have set out. It is always possible to extend the time-table for cases where to do so is 'necessary to enable the court to resolve the proceedings justly' – see s 32(5) of the amended Children Act 1989 and, e.g. Re NL (Appeal: Interim Care Order; Facts and Reasons) [2014] 1FLR 1384 and Re M-F (Children) [2014] 2014] EWCA Civ 991. However, in this case, it would be positively unjust to the child and contrary to his welfare to do so.

42. Holistic evaluation of options – Returning B to his mother now is unsafe and out of the question. Adjourning the case while the mother undergoes therapy might lead to B living with her eventually and, if he did so, it would mean that he was living in his rightful place, with his mother who loves him and wants to look after him. However, it would also involve the very real possibility that, at the end of the period of therapy and assessment, he still could not live with her and needed to be cared for by others. It would also involve a delay of such length that it would contrary to his short-term and long-term interests; the longer he remains in interim foster care the more difficult it becomes for him to move on (wherever that might be) without long-term emotional damage having been caused to him.
43. If a placement order is made now it is very likely that he will be found a secure and permanent home in the near future where he will have a stable upbringing. It will mean that he will lose the chance of an upbringing within his natural family and possible contact with his half-sister and father, losses which may, particularly in later life, cause him some emotional distress; however that emotional distress is far outweighed by the advantages that adoption would confer and the damage that would be caused by delayed decision making.
44. Long-term fostering is not a viable solution for him, in my opinion. It would not provide him with anything like the same degree of necessary security, permanence or integration. Further, fostering would be subject to applications by the mother for discharge of the underlying care order. Importantly, in my opinion, when B became adult, the legal connection between him and the foster carers' family would end, unlike with adoption which would provide him with a lifelong place in the adoptive family. I have read and noted the differences between adoption and fostering identified by Black LJ (with caveats expressed in para 95 of her judgment) in para 96 of Re V [2013] EWCA Civ 913.
45. Welfare checklist analysis – B is too young for his wishes and feelings to be ascertained. He needs to be provided with secure and permanent parenting as soon as possible; he has experienced long delays already in relation to that and more delays must be avoided. His mother cannot meet his needs now and, although it is possible that she might be able to meet them in the long-term future, there is a very real possibility that she will not and the delay that would be involved in finding out is inconsistent with his welfare.
46. If he ceases to be a member of his natural family he will lose his chance of a family life with his mother and possible contact with his half-sister (and his father); however the benefits of an adoptive placement and the damage that arise from adjournment far outweigh those losses. B is now nine months old and has the background of a child with a disrupted start to his life who needs permanence.
47. He is at such risk of emotional and physical harm if returned to his mother now that such a return is obviously contrary to his welfare. He is at risk of significant harm through delayed decision making if these proceedings are adjourned on the basis advanced by the mother. He is also at risk of emotional distress in the long-term future from the loss of his natural family but, in my opinion and as stated above, that risk is outweighed by other factors.
48. He has an emotional attachment to his natural mother which can be seen by the interaction between them at contact and reflects the amount of time that they have spent together, including the four months that they lived together before the break down of the mother and baby foster home. Given his age and the fact that contact has been only at a modest level since the mother left the assessment unit, it may well be that there will be little immediate impact on B from a cessation of direct contact but there may well be long term emotional consequences for him as he realises that, in the past he has lost his relationship with his mother who loves him. However, his mother is not able to care for him and is not able to offer him a secure environment in the future within timescales that are consistent with his welfare.
49. Conclusion – I am driven to the conclusion that B's welfare requires that I dispense with the agreement of the mother to B being placed for adoption. In relation to the father, I also dispense with his agreement on the same legal grounds; there is no prospect of this father being able to care for B and he does not suggest that he should. Further, the father has not engaged in these proceedings to express opposition to the orders sought.
50. I regard the making of a placement order as necessary, proportionate and in B's paramount interests throughout his life. I therefore make a placement order and an underlying care order.
51. I deeply regret the distress that this will cause to this mother. I hope that she will continue to pursue therapy. This case is yet another reminder of just how important it is for early therapeutic intervention to be offered to young parents; if this mother had been offered, and had engaged in, therapy in the non-proceedings stage when she was known to be pregnant the outcome might have been very different and the very high cost and misery of these proceedings might have been avoided.
52. There is at least a possibility that B might ask to read this judgment in later life (as Designated Family Judge I now have frequent applications by adopted people to view their adoption files). If he should do so I would wish to say to him that I hope that this proves to be the correct outcome for him in the long-term and that he finds happiness in his life. I hope that he will accept that a lot of thought and care has gone into this decision. None of what has happened has been his fault – how could it be? He is only nine months olds.
53. Finally, because I type all of my judgments and do so without reserving them, this judgment would seem to me to fall squarely within the transparency guidelines for publication. I would ask the advocates to consider this and inform me of their opinions on that issue by 4 p.m. on 11^th November 2016 by when I would also ask to receive corrections to any typographical errors or failures by me in anonymisation.

HHJ Stephen Wildblood QC

9^th November 2016.