AT NOTTINGHAM
Carrington Street Nottingham |
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B e f o r e :
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YVONNE TAYLOR | (Applicant) | |
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PHILIP DOUGLAS TAYLOR | (Respondent) |
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Mr Ian Cook, instructed by GHW Solicitors, appeared on behalf of the Respondent.
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Crown Copyright ©
JUDGE ROGERS:
(1) The wife has no experience at all in relation to the rental properties. To allocate them to her would be burdensome, unfair and given the vagaries to which I have referred would leave her with all the risk of uncertainty.(2) The husband's career is not yet over but his period at the very top level is finite. I reject with no hesitation the proposition that he can simply go on playing almost indefinitely. I would not regard it as reasonable to expect him to do so. In my judgment the probable lifespan of his top level career is two to four years. That is my bracket but it is the obvious inference from the evidence he gave which I accept. At the outer limit of that bracket he will be nearly sixty.
(3) The standard of living. The parties' joint evidence, which was not in any way substantially in doubt, shows that they lived to a high level but not a vulgar or extravagant lifestyle. The wife's legal team produced a schedule of the husband's spending. Many items related to fitness or health matters, no doubt designed to prolong his career. It is true there were luxury purchases but this couple have always had regard to the value of money. That is something which is completely to their credit. In my judgment for the future they are entitled to comfortable living in that context.
(4) The wife's budget is an issue which follows of course from item 3. I have already referred to the wife's honesty. However, I must frankly doubt some of the figures because of their vagueness or uncertainty. At C22 in the bundle the Form E schedule is given and items for gas and electricity, general household repairs, the car loan, petrol, and legal fees stand out as untenable. There are other figures too. The bottom line of £42,000 is therefore no more than a vague estimate. It inflates figures but also unhelpfully excludes obvious items. But equally I am not satisfied that the updated schedule helps much more. The oral testimony on which much of it was based was of limited help because there was so much guesswork. The wife's open position was £6,000 per month. That figure is completely unexplained. The new schedule is reduced to £58,000+ per annum but is still approximate and contains a number of unsubstantiated or rounded figures or figures that are purely aspirational. Budgets in this class of case always cause difficulty. The time and the expense required to produce a precise and completely accurate figure would be disproportionate. Miss Harrison says it is not an exact science and the court is entitled to have regard to some comparative analysis. She notes that the husband spends rather more. That can be of limited assistance, although the wife's need as an independent autonomous person is not obviously linked to the husband's expenditure, save as to a general indicator of lifestyle or standard of living. Mr. Cook argues for a radical reduction. Even on the new schedule he attacks the electricity and gas, the general household repairs, the petrol, the holidays, the weekend expenditure and the cosmetics. Miss Harrison in response says that that is disingenuous and mean minded. I do not accept that. If figures are wrong or unsupportable we should say so, but Miss. Harrison's better point is that the items on the page are not the last word and the Court should step back and assess a true figure for a reasonable budget based on need, bearing in mind the standard of living and the available resources. Because of the vagaries of the figures an exact calculation is impossible but my task is to take a view of all that I have heard and I do so and I assess a proper figure, in my judgment, at the current time to be £50,000 per annum.
"In Miller -v- McFarlane the sharing principle was based on the proposition at the end of a marriage the spouses as equal partners should be 'entitled to an equal share of the assets of the partnership unless there is a good reason to the contrary' per Lord Nicholls. The assets are described as 'financial fruits of the marriage partnership' or 'financial product of parties' common endeavour'. Baroness Hale refers to the partnership assets as being those 'built up by the joint efforts during the marriage' and 'the product of their joint endeavours'. In Charman-v- Charman (No. 4) matrimonial property is defined as 'the property of the parties generated during the marriage otherwise than by external donation'. The Confluence (that is the company involved in Mr. Justice Moylan's case) shares have been generated during the marriage. However, their economic value cannot be realised until some years after the end of the marriage. Insofar as their realised value reflects as it inevitable will what has occurred since the end of the marriage that value will in part be the product of the husband's endeavours, not the parties' joint endeavours. It matters not, in my view, whether that value is greater or lower than or even the same as the value as at the end of the marriage. It will still in part not be 'financial product of the parties' common endeavour generated during the marriage'. Accordingly the value realised from the shares will in part not be marital property.
142. This fact alone does not lead inevitably to the conclusion that the wealth including the realised value of the shares should not be divided equally between the parties. The sharing principle applies to all the parties' property, Charman -v- Charman (No. 4). However, as was said in Charman again 'to the extent that their property is non-matrimonial there is likely to be better reason for departure from equality'. I have also been referred to Jones -v- Jones and N v F.
143. The facts of the present case do not permit me to follow the approach adopted in these latter cases. However, the fact that I cannot identify specifically what part of the wealth is not marital does not in my judgment mean that I must divide the wealth equally. I must still decide as part of the discretionary exercise what weight to give to the husband's endeavours after the end of the marriage and the fact that as a result the value realised from the Confluence shares would in part reflect these endeavours and not the parties' joint endeavours".
He then goes on to discuss Jones -v- Jones and concludes:
"145. In my judgment the present case is different and some departure from an equal division is justified because of this factor as part of the discretionary exercise. The company is not static. As referred to above, I am satisfied that maintaining and developing the company in procuring its sale continues to require a great deal of important work. I am accordingly satisfied that that the value in due course realised on the sale of Confluence will reflect, in part, the husband's post separation endeavours".
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After delivery of judgment, I was contacted by the wife's junior counsel who sought permission for the judgment to be published. No objection was taken by the husband's advisers, nor were any representations as to anonymity made. I considered removing the parties' names, but given the content of the judgment, the identity of the husband would have been immediately obvious to any reader which is unavoidable in a case of this sort. Accordingly, the judgment is not anonymous.