England and Wales Family Court Decisions (other Judges)

Case No:CM15C05449

IN THE FAMILY COURT SITTING AT Chelmsford

Priory Place, new London Rd CM20PP

Date:29.6.16

Before :

HHJ MURFITT

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Between :

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Mr Casey (Counsel instructed by Thurrock BC ) for the Local Authority

Mr Cumming solicitor for the Mother

Mr Reed solicitor for the child by their Guardian Faith Senior

Hearing dates: 27-29 June 2016

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JUDGMENT

HHJ Murfitt :

1.                   On 30.12.2015 Thurrock Borough Council (TBC) issued proceedings for a care order in relation to a young girl named BB who is now aged eleven. She was born on 15 January 2005 to CW, the first respondent in those proceedings. BB's father sadly died of a heart attack on the 9 ^th May 2009, when BB was only four, and it is clear she was deeply affected by the loss. In due course her mother developed a new relationship with Mr MW, with whom she began living in the autumn of 2010, and to whom she is now married. They have since had two further children who are BB's half siblings, and BB also has two older brothers.

2.                   The threshold for the local authority's intervention is undisputed and the making of a care order has also been agreed. I will nevertheless refer to the background facts in a little detail since they are also material to and intertwined with the matters giving rise to a second application which is before me, and which was instituted on BB's behalf by her Guardian. That application was issued within the care proceedings on 23 May 2016 seeking a declaration under s7(1)(b) of the Human Rights Act 1998 that Thurrock Borough Council (TBC) had failed to act in a manner compatible with BB's Article 6 and Article 8 rights under the European Convention on Human Rights and Fundamental Freedoms. The grounds are set out in an attached claim, which also sought payment of damages and costs by the Local Authority.

3.                   Although initially defended that claim has also been compromised, and TBS has accepted liability and agreed with the child's Guardian that certain declarations as to its breaches are appropriate, together with an award of damages. Subject to the Court's approval, the quantum of Damages has been agreed in the sum of £7,500.

4.                   Whilst negotiations at Court between the parties continued with regard to the details of the final care plan, the main area of issue in submissions before me has related to the payment of BB's legal aid costs. The Guardian seeks an order for her costs of the care proceedings and related HRA claim to be paid by the Local Authority. Whilst the Local Authority is willing to pay costs of the child's HRA claim, it resists any order which encompasses her costs of the care proceedings. The issue is an important one because the Legal Aid Agency has confirmed in an email dated 27.6.2016 that despite BB having two certificates, the statutory charge will be applicable to both certificates due to the proceedings being related. Since BB's fixed legal aid costs are expected to amount to at least £8,085.46, this means that the benefit of any damages she receives may well be rendered nugatory by the impact of that charge.

5.                   The background facts are these: Following the loss of her father BB's behaviour at home deteriorated and her mother struggled to cope with her challenging behaviour. When in April 2011 BB's mother moved to Hertfordshire, she left BB in the care of her maternal grandparents, from where BB moved on to live with her maternal aunt Mrs WL a couple of months later in June 2011. On 2.11.2011 a residence order was made for BB to live with her aunt. On 20.11.14 BB told her school teacher that she was scared to return home to her aunt because her cousin had bitten her, and when she complained her uncle, he had told her to 'shut up'. She also complained that her uncle and hurt her head and her leg by treating her roughly 2 months earlier. In the subsequent local authority investigation BB's aunt made it plain she did not believe her niece, and asked for her to be accommodated in local authority care. Neither BB's mother nor her grandmother felt able to care for her at that time, and in those circumstances the local authority sought her mother's agreement to BB remaining in care under s20 Children Act.

6.                   For the next 13 months, until these care proceedings commenced in December 2015, BB remained in foster care. No steps were taken by the local authority to discharge the residence order in favour of the aunt Mrs WL, or to seek parental responsibility in relation to BB, although it was clear that neither Mrs WL nor Mrs W were minded to exercise parental responsibility for her. In their threshold the Local authority rightly submits that the s31 threshold was met in relation to BB at the point when she was received into care back in November 2014, in that she was suffering and likely to suffer significant harm by reason of the care she had received, and was likely to receive, that care not being what it would be reasonable to expect her parent or carer to provide.

7.                   On 1.12.2014 the case was presented to a local authority threshold panel with a recommendation to institute care proceedings, but that decision was not approved. On 29 June 2015 the newly allocated social worker again presented BB's case to the panel requesting permission to commence care proceedings, and again this was not agreed. The decision makers took the view that a family group conference should be convened instead, notwithstanding that all family members with whom the local authority were in contact at the time, were saying they could not care for BB.

8.                   Bearing in mind that it was accepted that BB was unable to live with her mother, that a family placement with her aunt had already broken down, that no other family member was coming forward to care for her, and no one was exercising effective parental responsibility for BB, I am satisfied that the local authority's delay in issuing proceedings left BB in a drifting position of unacceptable uncertainty, and deprived her of a timely hearing as to her future placement and home. The absence of proceedings also deprived her of the benefit of having an independent children's guardian to represent her wishes and safeguard her interests. Had proceedings been commenced access to the Court would have enabled BB to have the requisite help to control and timetable the authority's planning for her, and impose timescales for her family to come forward if they wished. The desire to hold a family group conference in this case was no good reason to hold up the issue of proceedings, and such a conference could have been progressed after issuing the proceedings in any event.

9.                   By November 2015 the Independent Reviewing Officer (IRO) was expressing concern that the care planning for BB had not moved forward, and that this was impacting upon BB's emotional wellbeing. Amongst the issues which the local authority had failed to address proactively was BB's contact with her family. BB was expressing ambivalent feelings about contact with her mother, saying that she was not ready to see her 'yet,' however no work was undertaken with BB to explore what might help in achieving any rapprochement between them. I accept the Guardian's submission that even if the Local Authority were justified in concluding that BB's mother was also ambivalent about seeing her daughter, they had a duty to support BB's contact with her wider family proactively, in order to mitigate BB's feelings of abandonment. A LAC review on 10.12.15 recorded that BB had agreed to have a session of contact with her mother, but the authority failed to progress steps to arrange that. BB's mother was not invited to LAC reviews as she should have been, and so another valuable opportunity to explore these issues was lost.

10.               However the fact that BB's mother was not putting herself forward as a carer, ought not to have led the authority to assume she did not desire any contact. At the very least she had expressed her interest in letterbox contact at the time when a child a family assessment was completed on 2.2.15. BB also had other important family relationships with members of her paternal family including aunts, grandparents, and even full sibling brothers, but the local authority took no proactive steps to support or nurture her contact with these members of her family. The day after BB was first placed in foster care she requested to see her aunt J, yet the first record of this happening did not occur until 11 months later in October 2015. Social workers expressed the intention to set up contact between BB and her bothers J, C, and CN at a LAC review on 10.12.14, but those intentions did not translate into any actions, notwithstanding that BB's express requests to see them were documented on 12 and 14 August 2014.

11.               Even after issuing their care application the local authority took no steps to remedy this contact issue until the Guardian issued an application on 14.4.16 for contact orders to be made under s34(2) Children Act. By this stage BB was expressing her worry that her paternal grandfather might die before she ever got to see him again, since he was then ill and in hospital, adding that she had only got to see her maternal grandmother and to kiss her once before she had died in January 2016, and now she would never see her again.

12.               Indeed it was only as a result of BB being able to attend her grandmother's funeral that mother and daughter had the opportunity to see one another again. Having done so, each was evidently able to take more voluble steps to ensure that their contact was restored. To her credit Mrs W has been consistent in attending all the sessions of contact with BB which have been arranged within the care proceedings every three weeks since then. I accept that it was ultimately as a result of the Guardian's representations that appropriate contact arrangements were put in place, and this amply demonstrates the disadvantage that BB has suffered by the authority's failure to commence proceedings sooner.

13.               In February 2015 a referral was made by the Local authority to SL counselling service since it was recognised that BB needed help to understand her difficult family history, but little was done to progress that referral. At the first hearing of the care proceedings on 18.3.2016, it was again the robust submissions from the Guardian which resulted in the Court directing that TBC must file and serve a letter by 4pm on 1.4.16 specifying whether or not it was prepared to fund bereavement services for BB. This was in the light of the local authority's excuse that its local service known as 'Cruise' had a six month waiting list. Following the Court's intervention, I am pleased to note that counselling services for BB were more swiftly sourced and obtained.

14.               Both the President Sir James Mumby in Re A [2015] EWFC 11, and Keehan J in Northamptonshire CC v AS & Ors [2015] EWHC 199 (Fam) have expressed their criticism of local authorities' misuse of s20 in the strongest terms. As the local authority's legal department ought surely to have been aware, these decisions draw attention to the fact that by using s20 for other than temporary periods of care, the local authority effectively deprives the child of the benefit of having an independent guardian to represent and safeguard her interests. It curtails the court's ability to control the planning for the child, and it prevents unnecessary and avoidable delay in securing permanent placement for the child at the earliest possible time.

15.               Even today at the final hearing, it has not been possible to achieve the level of finality which BB may have hoped for within the care planning for her. BB has been clear in her wishes to be reunited with her mother and brothers, but until the second day of this final hearing the care plan did not even articulate any steps which the local authority might take towards achieving that aim as a parallel plan. On 31.3.2016 it appears that a s47 investigation was instigated as a result of certain historic allegations of mistreatment which BB shared in relation to her stepfather. The Police have investigated this and determined that no further action is warranted. Nearly 3 months later the local authority have yet to complete their own s47 investigation into the matter. They point to difficulties in making an appointment with Mr W who works full time. As a result of negotiations at court I am pleased to note that a first interview with Mr W has now been arranged for 4 July 2016. At the Court's behest the local authority has now agreed to conclude the s47 investigation within 2 weeks, and to record that they will do this in their care plan.

16.               As to BB's contact with her mother it is now proposed that the 1.5hrs which BB currently spends with her mother every three weeks, may now be increased to 3 hours every three weeks, with some other special activities and outings being organised during her summer school holidays to include her half siblings whom she will be getting to know. This will be part of the planning towards an active consideration of her rehabilitation with her mother. The family home is also limited in size at present, and is another issue which I hope the local authority will help with resolving as part of a rehabilitation plan.

17.               I saw BB myself on the first day of this hearing at her request, and she is a delightful young girl. She is clearly interested in the plans for her life, and she is both engaging and polite in searching for answers. Her eyes welled with tears when she told me that her social worker had told her she would not be going home to live with her mother. She is mature enough to understand that checks needs to be made to ensure that she will be safe living with her stepfather and her mother, and also that they need to have enough room to accommodate her, but the relief and hope on her face when she learned that the local authority will now commit to actively working towards this end, was very clear. Understandably she yearns to be part of her family again in a 'normal' way, just as her school friends are. Nevertheless I am satisfied that her return home must be considered on a carefully staged basis to ensure that the past will not repeat itself, and that her return home will have every chance of being a permanent one. In the circumstances I am satisfied that a care order at this stage is a necessary and proportionate response to her needs, and I accordingly make a care order in relation to BB, and approve the final care plan dated 28 June 2016.

18.               The Law relating the HRA claim: Whilst Section 6 of the 1998 Human Rights Act (HRA) makes it ' unlawful for a public authority to act in a way which is incompatible with a convention right' the local authority accepts that it has breached BB's Article 6 rights to a fair trial, and her Article 8 rights to respect for her private and family life. Section 7(1)(b) of the HRA is the jurisdictional means provided whereby BB is able to bring her claim against the authority within the current care proceedings, as a victim of the authority's unlawful acts. Section 8 of the HRA provides discretion to this court upon finding that any unlawful acts have been committed, to ' grant such relief or remedy within its powers as it considers just and appropriate'. The section also empowers this court to award damages, taking account of all the circumstances of the case, including under subsection (3): " Any other relief or remedy granted, or order made, in relation to the act in question (by that or any other court) and , (b) the consequences of any decision (of that or any other court) in respect of that act.' Under s8(3) no damages award is to be made unless the Court is also ' satisfied that the award is necessary to afford just satisfaction to the person in whose favour the order is made'.

19.               In this case I am satisfied that a declaration alone will not provide just satisfaction, and that an award of damages to BB is necessary to afford her this. My order will include a declaration of those accepted infringements of BB's rights under Articles 6 and 8 of the European Convention on Human Rights and fundamental freedoms. Specifically these are that Thurrock Borough Council:

i)                    Did not issue any application under s31 of the Children Act 1989 until December 2015 thereby depriving BB of a timely hearing to determine her long term future care from November 2014 until December 2015;

ii)                  Did not establish contact between BB and her mother between November 2014 and February 2016;

iii)                Did not establish contact between BB and any or all of her siblings between November 2014 and May 2016;

iv)                Did not establish contact between BB and members of her paternal family between November 2014 and October 2015 in the case of her aunt, and between November 2014 and April 2016 in the case of her paternal grandfather;

v)                  Did not arrange for therapy for BB between November 2014 and March 2016.

20.               In considering the level of damages which it is appropriate to award, I have considered the table of previously decided cases which was helpfully set out in by Her Honour Judge Lazarus in the case of Medway Council v M & T (by her children's guardian) [2015] EWFC B164 which is reproduced and updated in the Guardian's skeleton argument to include the later cases of Worcestershire CC v mother and B (a child) [2016] EWFC B10 and Kent CC v M & K [2016] EWFC 28. Bearing in mind the length of time (13 months) for which the local authority was in breach in this case, and taking into account that BB' s original placement in care under s20 was made with her mother's informed consent, I approve the agreed level of damages at £7,500 as appropriate and consistent with those authorities.

21.               Costs: The arguments of each party were succinctly made. The Local authority initially challenged the likelihood that any statutory charge would be debited against BB's damages in respect her legal aid fees. However in the light of the Legal Aid Agency's email of 27 ^th June, that point was not pursued. On behalf of the child I was also referred to paragraphs 5.6 and 5.7 of the Statutory Charge Manual which make it clear that " If an individual has been issued with more than one legal aid certificate in the same proceedings, either simultaneously or subsequently, costs under the additional certificates count towards the statutory charge. It is the costs incurred in the provision of the services, not under the certificate, which s25(1) of the Legal Aid, Sentencing and Punishment of Offenders Act 2012, and s10(7) of the Access to Justice Act 1999 refers to." I accordingly accept the likelihood that in the absence of any costs order being made for payment of all of BB's legal aid costs, her damages award will be substantially if not wholly subsumed by the legal aid statutory charge.

22.               On behalf of TBC I was referred to Mrs Justice Theis' recent decision in the case of Kent County Council v M & K (by her children's guardian) [2016] EWFC 28 as the most recent and authoritative example of the Court's approach in a similar case. There the Court was concerned with a local authority's failure to issue proceedings in a timely manner, or to properly assess a child, or to implement a care plan, or to secure a settled long term placement for her, for over three years. Damages of £17,500 were awarded in that case, at the end of a contested hearing. The greater part of the judgment concerns the merits of the claim, and the costs arguments are confined to three paragraphs on the final page. These show that the Court was asked to be 'mindful of the impact of the statutory charge' on behalf of the child, and that the local authority reminded the Court of the general position in family cases since the Supreme Court decision in Re S (A child) [2015] UKSC 20 (paras 15-29) that costs are not usually awarded in family cases. It was argued, and the Court accepted, that the Local Authority had not taken an 'unreasonable' stance in the care proceedings, and that since a discreet order for costs of the HRA application could be made, it would be wrong to award costs of the care proceedings merely as a device to avoid the full impact of the statutory charge. Recognising the financial pressures on the local authority, and the unusual nature of a cost order in care proceedings, Theis J determined that the right order was to award the child's costs of the HRA proceedings including the costs of one additional hearing, but not the remaining costs of the care proceedings.

23.               In this case TBC further argues with reference to re S (supra) that its conduct of the care proceedings cannot be considered reprehensible or unreasonable, and that where (as in Re S) the only criticism that can be made is that the authority might have taken earlier action to protect the child, the case remains well within the general principle that no order for costs of the care proceedings should be made.

24.               On behalf of the child reliance is placed on the wording of section 8(3) of the HRA itself. Namely that the Court having concluded that damages are necessary to afford BB 'just satisfaction', no just satisfaction can in fact be achieved without an ancillary order for her legal aid costs of both related proceedings being made. It does not appear that this particular argument was considered in the Kent case.

25.               Mr Reid on behalf of the Guardian ventured to suggest that the damages claim might alternatively have to be increased to reflect the costs element, but since this was not included as a head of damages in the written case or in negotiations, I did not consider it was an approach open for consideration in this case. Nevertheless it is foreseeable that in future cases it might be argued that the ' necessity' of awarding damages as a means of providing ' just satisfaction' to a victim who is legally aided, may well be called into question in circumstances where financial satisfaction will in fact be illusory by reason of the statutory charge.

26.               Mr Reid also argued that a distinction between the costs of the care proceedings and the costs of the HRA proceedings cannot reasonably be made. He referred to a passage in the Judgment of the President Mr Justice Munby in a case entitled In the matter of L (a child) between A local Authority and MS [2003] EWHC 665 (Fam). At paragraph 31 of that judgement the President stated " Human rights arguments based on the convention can, and should, be dealt with within the context of the pending care proceedings. They can, and should, be dealt with by the court which is dealing with the care proceedings. Where there are care proceedings on foot there is, in my judgment, no need for any separate, let alone free-standing, application. Section 7(1)(b) enables every court- including the FPC- to give effect to the parties' Convention rights." Mr Reid (who is a solicitor experienced in handling legal aid cases on behalf of children) also made it clear that disentangling the costs of the two separate issues would also be near impossible. He cited as an example the work undertaken in respect of the factual enquiries related to BB's contact with her family, which ran as a strand through the warp and weft of both proceedings.

27.               Mr Reid also submitted that the local authority's conduct should be characterised as having been 'reprehensible' because it had been unlawful. Whilst the s20 consent may have been lawfully obtained in this case, the unlawfulness he referred to stems from the local authority acting in a way incompatible with the child's convention rights, which s6 of the HRA expressly describes as being 'unlawful.' Mr Reid distinguished the Kent case which Theis J decided, on the grounds that whilst her judgment refers to the fact that the local authority did not act 'unreasonably,' she did not expressly consider whether or not they could nevertheless be said to have acted 'reprehensibly' by acting unlawfully, since these are clearly stated as possible alternatives in the Supreme Court case of re S (children care proceedings: proper evidence for placement order) 2015 UKSC 20

28.               On behalf of the child Mr Reid also referred the Court to the transcript of a judgment delivered by His Honour Judge Rundell in Worcestershire County Council and mother and child (by the child's guardian) on 29 January 2016 (which is prior to Theis J's decision in the Kent case). In that case an award of £5,000 in damages was made to a child for breaches of his article 6 and 8 rights over a period of three years. Again costs are briefly dealt with at the end of the judgment in three paragraphs. In that case the 'usual rules' in relation to the legal aid statutory charge covering both the Care and HRA proceedings was acknowledged, and since costs were estimated at £6,700 it was also recognised that the entire damages award was likely to be taken in costs. There the judge observed that he was faced with a ' stark choice: either I make the usual order in Children Act cases, no costs, the result of which will be that B receives not a penny and renders the entire exercise pointless (save for the making of declarations which will be of no practical benefit to the child) ,or I order the local authority to pay the costs of the proceedings.' He found the authority to have been seriously at fault in breaching the child's convention rights in a variety of respects, and concluded that he should award the child damages in just satisfaction. Having done so, he went on to observe that ' Another public authority has made regulations which would effectively prevent him from receiving those damages. That cannot be right, and is certainly neither just nor proportionate. The justice of the case demands that B receives his damages and that, therefore, the local authority must pay the entire costs of these proceedings, on the standard basis, to be subject to a detailed assessment if not agreed'

29.               I have to say that I agree with those sentiments without reservation. However having regard to the fact that it is possible in applying the law to reach two differing views, each of which may be correct, I consider it important to consider first principles in reaching my decision. I note that Theis J's decision represents a higher and more binding level of authority than that of a circuit judge, and yet each decision can be seen to be fact specific.

30.               The FPR 28.2 applies part 44 of the civil procedure rules to the determination of costs issues in family proceedings (excepting always the provision in CPR 44.2(2) creating a general rule that the unsuccessful party will pay the costs of the successful party in first instance cases). CPR Rule 44.2 (1) confirms that the Court has a discretion as to whether costs are payable by one party to another, as well as in its determination of the amount and time of payment. Rule 44.2(4) requires the Court to have regard to all the circumstances in deciding what order if any to make about costs, as well as certain specific factors. These include: ' (a) the conduct of all parties (b) whether a party has succeeded on part of its case, even if that party has not been wholly successful; and (c) any admissible settlement offer...' (which is not applicable here). Rule 44.2(5) goes on to describe the conduct of the parties which is to be included as follows: " (a) conduct before, as well as during, the proceedings and in particular the extent to which the parties followed the practice direction- pre action conduct or any relevant pre-action protocol; (b) whether it was reasonable for a party to raise pursue or contest a particular allegation or issue; (c) the manner in which a party has pursued or defended its case or a particular allegation or issue, and (d) whether a claimant who has succeeded in the claim, in whole or in part, exaggerated its claim."

31.               Of course it may be said that the Local Authority has succeeded in obtaining the care order which they sought by their application, even though the child has succeeded in the HRA application. It has on the other hand been observed by the Supreme Court in Re S (supra) that there are no natural 'winners' in family litigation, and that the child should be the only winner. In this case whilst BB has succeeded in her HRA claim, she may also be said to have 'succeeded' indirectly in obtaining another remedy for the authority's breaches by the institution of care proceedings and the crafting (with the robust intervention by her Guardian) of a care plan which properly meets her needs.

32.               In considering the conduct of the Local authority, it is not just the conduct of the proceedings after their institution which I am enJined by the rules to have regard to, but the authority's conduct before the proceedings were instituted. It seem to me right in these circumstances that I should have regard to the local authority's failure to have regard to the guidance provided by judicial authority as to the proper use of s20, in the period prior to their issue of proceedings, as I should also take into account their clear failure to safeguard BB's convention rights to a fair trial under article 6 in particular.

33.               In this case it was also entirely reasonable for BB's Guardian to have had to issue not only an application for a declaration under the HRA within the care proceedings, but also an application under s34(2) of the Children Act, as a result of the local authority's delay in addressing the contact issues. Further work in securing the Authority's provision of counselling services for BB, as well as a rehabilitation plan within the local authority's care planning for BB was also made necessary because of the manner in which the local authority conducted itself during the care proceedings. These also seem to me to be matters to which I should have regard in exercising my discretion as to whether to make a costs order in respect of BB's costs of the care proceedings, in the light of CPR 44.2 (5).

34.               Finally I have considered the judgment in Re S in the light of the rarity with which costs orders are generally considered to be appropriate in care proceedings. I bear in mind (as that decision underscores) that Local authorities should not be deterred from putting care cases before the court through the prospect of paying the costs of those who may be exonerated. Equally children (who are almost always legally aided in care proceedings) should not be deterred from seeking just compensation for a local authority's unlawful acts, because no meaningful damages award can ever be expected to result by reason of the statutory charge. I accept (as Lady Hale stated in para 25 of Re S) that in so far as non means-tested and non-merits tested public funding 'masks' the costs issue, an order for costs should as a matter of principle be determined first, irrespective of whether any of the parties is publicly funded. I have considered the application of the CPR for this very reason.

35.               It is clear from the authorities discussed in re S that costs orders in family proceedings should only be made in 'unusual circumstances'. 'Reprehensible behaviour towards the child, or unreasonable conduct of the proceedings' are cited as two alternative types of unusual circumstance which may justify such an order, as summarised in paragraphs 26 and 30 of the judgment. However Lady Hale is also clear that there may be other such circumstances in both private law and public law proceedings. Specifically she states in paragraph 33 that "the object of the exercise is to achieve the best outcome for the child" and observes that where a child is to be brought up in her own family: " there may be cases where real hardship would be caused if the family had to bear its own costs of achieving that outcome. In other words the child's welfare would be put at risk if the family had to bear its own costs."

36.               In this case no costs argument is advanced on behalf of the family, in relation to any hardship they may suffer. Further the local authority argues that no financial hardship (in the context of meeting BB's day to day financial needs) will result to BB since she will be in local authority care in the immediate future. However more direct financial harm will of course result to BB herself if she is effectively deprived of the benefit of the damages which should rightly be hers. In those circumstances (applying by analogy the scenario which Lady Hale considered in paragraph 33 of her judgement,) it seems to me wholly appropriate to consider whether a richer (corporate) parent, (even one who has behaved reasonably in the litigation) should pay the costs of the poorer party, whether that is the subject child, or the 'poorer parent'. The more so because in this case I have not found that Thurrock Borough Council has behaved entirely reasonably in the litigation.

37.               In conclusion I have reached the clear decision in applying both the relevant case law and the applicable rules, that an order should be made for the local authority to pay all of BB's legal aid costs on standard basis in relation to both the care proceedings and related HRA claim comprehensively. Those costs will be subject to a detailed assessment if not agreed.

HHJ Murfitt 29.6.2016.