IN THE MATTER OF THE CHILDREN ACT 1989 AND THE ADOPTION AND CHILDREN ACT 2002
AND IN THE MATTER OF
B e f o r e :
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A Local Authority |
Applicant |
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- and - |
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X (a mother) (1) & (a father) (2) B (a child, through her Children's Guardian) (3) |
Respondents |
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Crown Copyright ©
Background
a. C has presented with bruising on 13 October 2014 and 17 November 2014. Both episodes of bruising are non-accidental in nature and have been caused using recklessly excessive force.
b. The perpetrator of the injuries detailed at (1) was Y who has stated that the injury on 13 October was caused by him "tapping" C on the face using three or four fingers. Y accepts that the force used was excessive and inappropriate and caused bruising to C who was 7 and a half months old at the time.
c. A non-perpetrator parent failed to protect C from further significant harm following the first episode of bruising in October 2014.
d. C was found to have nappy rash so severe that he was bleeding and blistered. The parents failed to treat this properly and therefore did not meet his basic needs.
e. On 17 November 2014, there was an incident of domestic violence between X and Y. X received bruising to her face and being struck on her back. These were inflicted by Y. The incident took place in front of C.
f. Y has little, if any, previous experience of parenting a child.
The Issues and the Position of the Parties
Threshold
a. X is unable to protect B from harm due to her history of parenting her older children, her failure to protect C and her failure to accept the risks posed by Y to C.
b. Y poses a risk of physical harm to B due to the findings made against him of non-accidental injury to C caused in October and November 2014.
c. Neither parent has sought any further support to deal with managing the behaviours that caused C to be injured in their care.
The legal context
My decision
B is likely to suffer significant harm, such harm being attributable to the care likely to be given to her care order was not made not being what it would be reasonable to expect a parent to give. The court specifically finds that: