IN THE MATTER OF THE CHILDREN ACT 1989
AND IN THE MATTER OF JB
B e f o r e :
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A LOCAL AUTHORITY |
Applicant |
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and JR |
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and JC and JB (through his guardian) and SB and BF VF |
1st Respondent 2nd Respondent 3rd Respondent First Intervener Second Interveners |
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(instructed by) for the
Hearing dates: 11th February 2016, 15th -19th February 2016 , 23rd and 26th February 2016
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Crown Copyright ©
1 There is only one standard of proof in these proceedings, namely the simple balance of probabilities [Re B 2008 UKHL 35]2 The burden of proof is on the party making the allegations, it is not reversible and it is not for the other party to establish that the allegation(s) are not made out
3 The inherent probability or improbability of an event remains a matter to be taken into account when weighing the probabilities and deciding whether, on balance, the event occurred. Common sense not law requires that in deciding this question, regard should be had to whatever extent appropriate to inherent probabilities –per Lord Hoffman in Re B at paragraph 15
4 If a fact is proved, the law operates a binary system in which the only values are 0 and 1. It is therefore open to the court to make the following findings on balance of probabilities:
(a) that the allegation is true(b) that the allegations is falseAs Lord Hoffman observed in Re B "if a legal rule requires the facts to be proved, a judge must decide whether or not it happened. There is not room for a finding that it might have happened; the law operates a binary system in which the only values are nought and one"
5 Findings of fact must be based on evidence and not speculation. As Munby LJ observed in Re A (Fact Finding: Disputed Findings) 2011 1FLR 1817 "it is an elementary position that findings of fact must be based on evidence including inferences that can properly be drawn from the evidence and not suspicion or speculation"
6 If a court concludes that a witness lied about a matter, it does not follow that he has lied about everything. A witness may lie for a number of reasons: R v Lucas [1981] QB 720
7 When carrying out the assessment of the evidence, regard must be had to the observations of Lady Justice Sloss in Re T [2004] 2FLR 838 where she said (paragraph 33) "evidence cannot be evaluated and assessed separately in separate compartments. A judge in these difficult cases must have regard to the relevance of each piece of evidence to the other evidence and to exercise and overview of the totality of the evidence in order to come to the conclusion whether the case put forward (by the local authority) had been made out to the appropriate standard of proof
8 Neither the seriousness of the allegation nor the seriousness of the consequences should make any difference to the standard of proof in determining the facts. In our legal system if a judge finds it more likely than not that something did take place then it is treated as having taken place. If he finds it more likely than not that it did not take place then it is treated as not having taken place. He has to find for one side or the other. He is not allowed to sit on the fence. Sometimes the burden of proof will come to the rescue; the party with the burden of showing that something took place will not have satisfied him that it did. But generally speaking a judge is able to make up his mind where the truth lies without needing to rely on the burden of proof.
9 In Re S-B (children)(non-accidental injury) [2009] UKSC 17 the Supreme Court held that the court should determine the following in order:
(a) Whether any of the injuries were caused non-accidentally(b) If they were whether the court is able to identify the perpetrator on a balance of probabilities. The court should not strain to identify the perpetrator [para 34](c) A finding on balance of probabilities was preferable to no finding at all for many reasons, the main one being that it would promote clarity in identifying future risks to the child and the strategies necessary to protect the child from them, A finding would also enable the professionals to work with the parent and other members of the family. Furthermore there would be long-term benefits for the child in knowing the truth, if it could be ascertained [paras 36-38](d) If the court cannot identify a perpetrator or perpetrators, it is still important to identify the pool of possible perpetrators. Sometimes this will be necessary in order to fulfil the "attributability" criterion. If the harm has been caused by someone outside the home or family, for example at school or in hospital or by a stranger, then it is not attributable to the parental care unless it would have been reasonable to expect a parent to have prevented it. Sometimes it will be desirable for the same reasons as those given above. It will help to identify the risk to the child and the steps needed to protect him. It will help the professionals in working with the family. And it will be of value to the child in the long run [paragraph 40](e) If the evidence is not such as to establish responsibility on the balance of probabilities it should nevertheless be such as to establish whether there is a real possibility that a particular person was involved. When looking at how best to protect the child and provide for his future, the court will have to consider the strength of that possibility as part of the overall circumstances of the case. The test is not whether the person can be excluded as perpetrator.