England and Wales Family Court Decisions (other Judges)

IN THE FAMILY COURT AT EAST LONDON

		11 Westferry Circus, London E14 4HD
		23/06/2015

HER HONOUR JUDGE CAROL ATKINSON:

1. On 9^th June 2015 I refused the parents' in this case permission to oppose the adoption of their child, MJC. As it was late in the day I had no time to deliver a fully reasoned judgment but I considered that the parents, who are acting in person, deserved to know my decision. Accordingly I gave my decision and brief reasons. Aware that they wish to challenge the decision I undertook to prepare the written reasons as soon as I was able. Although I have also refused their application for permission to appeal, in order to speed up the process I have put together a bundle of documents for them should they chose to pursue their appeal. My fully reasoned judgment follows.
2. MJC is a baby girl who was born on 11^th February 2014. She is just 16 months old.
3. MJC's mother is RW (the mother). Her father is MC (the father). On 24^TH October 2014, after a lengthy hearing, I made a care order in respect of MJC, and after dispensing with the parents' consent, I made a placement order. The central issue in the case was the level of risk posed to the mother and MJC by the father (who is subject to a s.41 Mental Health Act hospital order) and whether that risk could be managed. Nothing will replace the reading of my judgment in order to gain a full understanding of why it is I made orders anticipating that MJC would be adopted and why I thought that "nothing else would do".
4. Immediately after the judgment the mother and father abducted MJC. There is an issue as to whether the grandmother did anything to stop them. I made a collection order. It was not until 5 days later that MJC was found. I understand that she was with her parents in a flat which smelt strongly of cannabis. I have read that MJC was "subdued". The parents pleaded guilty before Magistrates to a charge of child abduction and they were given community penalties making them subject to the supervision of the Probation service.
5. After MJC had been recovered, the parents appealed the care and placement order on the ground that the decision was "wrong". Permission was sought to adduce new evidence regarding the father's mental health apparently not available during the course of the hearing before me. Permission to appeal and leave to adduce new evidence was given by Gloster LJ on 17^th December 2014. The matter came before the full court on 24^th February and by their Judgment, handed down on 17^th March 2015, the Court of Appeal dismissed the parents' appeal (see Re C(a child) [2015] EWCA Civ 221).
6. After she was recovered, MJC was placed with a foster carer. Initially she was very distressed. This was the first time that she had been placed away from her family. During the proceedings before me I had refused to make an interim care order, considering that the management of risk at that stage was possible. MJC remained with her mother at the home of the grandmother on the strict understanding that the mother would be responsible for the care of MJC and contact between MJC and her father would be strictly supervised and not take place outside of those supervised settings. I made findings at the conclusion of the care proceedings that in breach of that condition the father had had unsupervised contact to MJC, facilitated by the mother, and that the grandmother was aware of this. I also found that the grandmother had actually taken on the greater part of the care of MJC and that she was in the thrall of the mother and father and was powerless to prevent these meetings and did not alert the authorities.
7. The local authority was very concerned at the risk of further abduction and so it began an immediate search for prospective adopters for MJC with a view to her only having to make one further move, and soon.
8. MJC was placed with her prospective adopters on 14^th November 2014. I am sorry to have to repeat this because I know that it will cause the parents distress but having settled into that placement she is now developing a loving relationship with her adoptive parents. She is well cared for and described as a confident and happy little girl.
9. On 14^th April 2015 the prospective adopters issued their application for an adoption order in respect of MJC. Standard directions were given and the case listed before me. The parents were directed to indicate if they intended to apply for permission to oppose the adoption order by 19^th May 2015. Whilst they issued no formal application they filed a joint statement dated 11^th May indicating that they opposed the adoption order. The grandmother also filed a statement of evidence. I shall return to these statements in due course.
10. Those statements were put before HHJ Purkiss in my absence. Noting his willingness to disclose medical records she made directions that the father should file and serve, amongst other things:

a. any report since 24^th October 2014 prepared by a member of his treating mental health team and in connection with his attempt to be discharged from his "37/41" section;

b. a report/ letter from his treating psychiatrist on his current psychiatric condition.

11. Father has faithfully complied with this direction and the following documents have been supplied by his treating Consultant Forensic Psychiatrist, Dr Cadinouche:

a. A psychiatric report by Dr Cadinouche, the father's "Responsible Clinician and Clinical Supervisor" dated 2^nd June 2015;

b. A report from Mr Banza Mulumba, Forensic Community Psychiatric Nurse dated 2^nd June 2015;

c. A report from Mr Tony West, the father's Social Supervisor dated 1^st June; and

d. The minutes of the CPA meeting dated 14^th May 2015.

12. The Annex A report was filed on 1^st April 2015. I have a brief statement from MJC's social worker setting out the dates upon which she was placed and the fact that she is settled in placement.
13. As is the practice at this court, the case was listed for directions on the basis that final orders might be made, or alternatively, if parents attend seeking permission to oppose the adoption, in the event that their evidence is complete, the issue of permission might be resolved. It is the issue of permission to oppose that I have resolved.
14. I have considered whether I would have been assisted by a Guardian in this application and have concluded that given MJC's age and the information that I already have about her placement, a Guardian would not add anything. I have sufficient information before me to proceed.

The legal framework

15. The provisions governing the making of an adoption order are contained in s.47 Adoption and Children Act 2002. In this case the provisions under s.47(4) apply. MJC has been placed for adoption by an adoption agency and pursuant to a placement order. I can only make an adoption order under this provision if no parent opposes the making of the order.
16. The parents most definitely do oppose the making of the order. Pursuant to s. 47(5) a parent may not oppose the making of an order without the court's permission. I cannot give permission to oppose the making of the adoption order unless there has been a change in circumstances since the placement order was made (s.47(7)).
17. I have reconsidered the key authorities on these provisions and reminded myself of the guidance given in each of those cases: they are Re P (Adoption: Leave Provisions) [2007] 2FLR; Re B-S (Adoption: Application of s.47(5)) [2013] 2FLR 1035;Re H (Adoption Order: Application for Permission to Oppose) [2014] 1FLR 1266. I will summarise the principles.
18. The grant of leave is a two stage process. The first question is whether there has been a change of circumstances. The change does not have to be significant but it must be relevant or material to the question of whether leave should be granted. It must be of a nature and degree sufficient to reopen consideration of the issue.
19. If the answer to this first question is no then that is an end to the matter and permission will be refused.
20. If the answer is yes then I must go on to the second stage and ask whether leave should be given? I need to consider all the circumstances and in doing so have regard to two inter-related questions: one, the parent's ultimate prospect of success in resisting the making of an adoption order if given leave to oppose; the other, the impact on the child if the parent is, or is not, given leave to oppose, always remembering, of course, that at this stage the child's welfare is paramount throughout his life [Re B-S supra].
21. Turning first to the parents' prospect of success. This means their prospects of success in opposing the adoption order and not the prospect of ultimately having the child restored to their care. Are they more than just fanciful? Do they have solidity?
22. At the same time as considering whether the parents have solid grounds for seeking leave, I must consider very carefully indeed whether the child's welfare "throughout her life" really does necessitate the refusal of leave. I must keep in mind at all times that adoption is the "last resort" and only permissible if "nothing else will do" and that the child's interests include being brought up by the parents or wider family unless the overriding requirements of the child's welfare make that not possible. In short I must carry out a proper welfare analysis. I remind myself that the mere fact that the child has been placed with prospective adopters and would suffer short term disruption if moved cannot be determinative.
23. Finally I remind myself that in approaching these issues I must not set the bar too high because – "… parents should not be discouraged either from bettering themselves or from seeking to prevent the adoption of their child by the imposition of a test which is unachievable." per Wall LJ in Re P.

The background

24. The factual background to the case can be found in my judgment at paragraphs 5-22.
25. The base line for the measurement of change is of course the findings that I made in October 2014 and the reasons that I gave then for considering that MJC's welfare required that I dispense with the consent of these parents and make a placement order. Those reasons were set out in the October judgment but were also summarised by Lady Justice King in the appeal (Re C supra) at paragraphs 16-26.
26. Essentially I accepted the medical evidence of Dr Castle regarding the father's diagnoses. I found that so far as the paranoid schizophrenia was concerned the father remained psychosis free only because he was compliant with his medication and subject to strict regulation and supervision. I also found that when the father takes his medication and is psychosis free, there was still a risk of violent and aggressive behaviour as a result of his enduring dissocial personality disorder. I was satisfied that this together with the father's lack of insight into his medical condition and the need to take medication created a risk of significant harm to MJC. I concluded that the mother and grandmother also lacked any insight into the risks. This wholesale lack of insight (demonstrated during the proceedings by the breach of the conditions under which MJC remained at home) meant that the risks could not be managed. I was satisfied that there was no prospect of any change in that position within a timescale that met MJC's needs for permanence. So it was that I was driven to the conclusion that the only outcome which met MJC's welfare needs was a care and placement order.
27. That decision was upheld by the court of appeal and significantly after admitting further evidence from the father's mental health team.

The parents' case

28. I have read the parents' joint statement in support of their application and unusually I have invited them into the witness box to tell me anything else that they considered important. I have also read the statement of the grandmother and heard her give evidence. Finally, I asked the parents if they wanted me to hear from Ms S, the father's life long friend and character witness and supporter of the parents in this application.
29. In their written evidence the parents remind me that MJC was never harmed in the care of their mother and indeed was well cared for. They raise her right to family life and her right to know her family and grow up with them. They are rightly concerned that growing up MJC should not feel rejection or the loss and grief that they clearly feel as a result of her removal. They are concerned at the impact upon her of being an adopted person. In a short list they set out the benefits to MJC of living with her mother and father. These benefits include the fact that they now have their own accommodation, that the father is "going to be fully discharged off of his 37/41 section", that one of them (the father I think) is about to start their own business.
30. Crucially, at the end of the statement is a section entitled "What has changed since the 24^th October 2014 when the judge made the placement order…". That sets out that they have their own accommodation, suitable for 3, fully furnished with baby gates. It states that they have family and friends, that the father "is going for a full discharge from his 37/41 section and his whole mental health team is in agreement", that they do not "take drugs" or tablets for depression. On the last page is the following paragraph "Part of change is accepting what you have done in the past, being open about what you have done and never return to that behaviour again if you cannot do that then you are not ready to change. I have admitted what I have done it is my innocent child who [is] being punished…." And a little later "Fact there will always be a risk it is not up to the state to try and prevent risk that may or may not be there…" The remainder of the statement is a desperate and moving plea that the parents should be re-united with their daughter who they clearly love very much.
31. On the issue of full discharge from his 37/41 section the medical evidence filed on behalf of the father does not support the assertion made in the statements that such application is supported by his mental health team, which the parents now accept.

The medical evidence

32. I am most grateful to the Barking Community Recover Team and especially Dr Cadinouche for the comprehensive reports provided for this application. Dr Cadinouche has been the "Responsible Clinician" for the father since December 2013. She confirms the diagnosis of paranoid schizophrenia and dissocial personality disorder and sets out in detail the risks associated with these diagnoses. She confirms that there has been no violence recorded against the mother and that there appears to have been shifts in father's problem solving skills since his discharge in 2009 but confirms that he still has difficulties with his personality and that the risk of physical violence would increase if he resumed Class A drug taking, became non-compliant with his medication for a prolonged period and experienced psychotic symptoms, or if he was no longer receiving input from the community psychiatric team. She confirms that the father's move into accommodation with the mother in Dec 2014 was managed through increased supervision and monitoring and that he has made the transition well. She has many positive observations on the parents' relationship. However, Dr Cadinouche concludes that although the father has remained stable (as regards psychosis) his insight remains poor and "there have been aspects of his disordered personality that have translated into problematic behaviours." On balance she considered that the father's risk of having a relapse into a psychotic illness and his risk of violence would increase if discharged from his section 37/41 and as a result she was unable to support the most recent application for discharge. This was precisely the position I was told she had adopted in response to the father's application for discharge in the June/July before the final hearing and it was the position she had adopted in the minutes of meeting placed before the court of appeal.
33. The reports from Mr Mulumba and Mr West support this position. In Mr Mulumba's report he sets out that having failed to secure an absolute discharge in June 2014 the father informed his team in November 2014 that he intended to apply again. The minutes of that meeting were before the Court of Appeal (Re C - paragraphs 36-40). An application was lodged on 29^th April 2015. On 14^th May the father met with the team to canvass their views about his absolute discharge. Mr Mulumba records that he told the team that "if his section were to be lifted he would keep his antipsychotic medication in the cupboard and take it whenever he wishes as it helps him to sleep". Mr Mulumba goes on to say "the team acknowledged the progress [the father] has made since discharge, but also highlighted concerns around his limited insight and plan to disengage with the mental health services. The team points out the impact this is likely to have on his mental state and related risks, if he's not monitored in the community."
34. Mr West is the Forensic social worker allocated to the father to replace Mr Pankhurst, the social supervisor blamed by the father for the removal of MJC into care. He makes many positive comments about the father. However he records father's ambivalence towards his medication. Significantly he records that the father's engagement with psychological work aimed specifically at dealing with his personality problems and tendency to aggression has been minimal. In spite of the positives even Mr West was not able to support a discharge.
35. Finally I have the minutes of the meeting at which the father was informed that his mental health team would not support his discharge application. It is recorded in those minutes that Dr Cadinouche explained to the father that despite the fact that his mental state did not reveal any current evidence of psychosis "his overall presentation has fluctuated between at times being pleasant and responsive to advice and engaging in a helpful discussion; but many times his presentation has been consistent with traits of personality disorder (disregard for authority, rules and regulations, displacing responsibility and blame on others rather than accepting responsibility for his own actions, reckless and impulsive behaviour as demonstrated by his act of abducting is child, impulsive affect as demonstrated by his quick switching from being calm to irritable especially when talking about difficult subjects; non compliance with some conditions of his discharge like cannabis use…..………).

Oral evidence

36. When father gave evidence I asked him what was meant by the paragraph set out above on change and the reference to owning up to what they had done. He said that this was a reference to owning up to what he had done to his former partner and not committing a like offence since. However that led him to start explaining to me again, just as he did in the care proceedings, what had driven him to behave in the way I set out in my Judgment at paragraphs 7-11. He told me that he had awoken in the early hours to find a pan of hot fat on the hob which was clearly there for a purpose (to use against him was the inference). He referred again to the fact that he was acting in self defence because the 6 year old girl had a knife and was trying to stab him. I heard precisely the same explanations from the father at the hearing in October. When he recounts them he does so passionately and animatedly. They are clearly deeply held beliefs.
37. I asked father about his supervision and he confirmed to me that since their move into independent living accommodation together the level of his supervision under his discharge conditions had increased. He had more frequent meetings with his mental health team for instance. When he wrote his statement he was expecting support for an application for his full discharge. He maintained that this is what he had been told to expect and was visibly irritated by the refusal of his psychiatrist to deliver on what he considered was a promise.
38. I asked about his medication and whether it was right that he had told Dr Cadinouche that if discharged he would put the meds in a cupboard and take them only when he needed help to sleep and he agreed that he had said that and that this was the case. He continues in his view that he does not need this medication to control his condition and to remove his risk of relapse. He told me that he did not take his medication during the 5 days that they were in hiding with MJC following her abduction. That was because he did not have any with him. He said that because he was without it he found himself unable to sleep and that he was looking out of the window all the time "being paranoid". Mother confirmed in her evidence that the father used cannabis during this time to help him relax.
39. He told me that he felt that he was being treated unfairly because he had spent 14 years being subject to supervision simply because he had hit his former partner. Towards the end of the hearing when he went back to his seat and when the subject of his illness so central to this case was raised again he told me "I'm not ill. I was on drugs – I was a mess – drugs was my problem – they have sorted me out now"
40. Mother actually gave evidence first. She is an intelligent young woman. She has read my Judgment and the Judgment of the court of appeal. Of significance for me was her continuing refusal to accept that the father posed any risk, even absent his medication. She said to me that the father had not been ill in all of the time that she had known him and that he had remained well even though they were now living together in independent accommodation. She told me that she knew that the doctors thought he would relapse if he stopped taking his meds but she did not think that he would. She cited the fact that he had stopped taking the meds when they were in hiding as set out above and made the point that he had not relapsed. I reminded her that Dr Castle's evidence at the hearing was that this medication has what is called a "long half-life" which meant that the father would not feel the effects of coming off the tablets for some weeks after ceasing to take them; a matter of days was not enough. I asked how frequently father took cannabis and she said once a day, at night.
41. As part of her supervision by the Probation service and at the suggestion of the father's mental health team the mother has completed a course aimed at equipping women to recognise and resist domestic violence. I asked her about that. She told me that it was useful. She had learned to "spot the signs" but it "doesn't apply to my situation" she told me.
42. I invited the maternal grandmother into the witness box. Her written statement makes similar complaints as the parents on the subject of human rights, loss of identity, etc. It also goes on to complain that she should have been given another assessment by me at the hearing last October. On change of circumstances she says this "My circumstances have not changed….".
43. The maternal grandmother is also very irritated at the suggestion that she allowed the abduction of MJC following the hearing in October. She described to me that two men (friends of the father and virtual strangers to MJC) took MJC into the back of a car and she had pushed herself through the window and demanded her return but they were holding her tightly and she could not get her back. I commented that this must have been very frightening for MJC and asked if she had been distressed. The maternal grandmother told me that she was not distressed. She was quiet; she could not move because "they were holding her so tightly". In spite of her own description she was reluctant to acknowledge how distressing this must have been for MJC.
44. Finally, the parents had with them a family friend, Ms S. I think she may have been the person who was their MacKenzie friend in the court of appeal. At their request I allowed her to give evidence as a character witness. She had no statement. She told me that she has known the father since he was 4 years old. She was an intelligent and articulate lady. Before I heard any evidence I explained in simple terms the two stage process and the fact that I would need to consider change of circumstances first. For that reason she focused on the change and told me that in her view the change here was that the couple were now living in independent living accommodation together. She conceded that there had been an increase in the level of the father's supervision as a result of that move.
45. She also made the point that in spite of the move and the stress of the proceedings, the loss of MJC, the abduction, the loss of MJC for a second time and this adoption application, he had not suffered a relapse. I commented that one thing that had not changed was his belief that he was not ill and that he did not need the meds. She had started to say that he did really understand the need to take them when the father interrupted her reply shouting across the court room saying "I only need the medication to sleep. Dr Cadinouche did say she would think about discharging me but she hasn't done it because of these proceedings and the stresses in my life".

Change of circumstances

46. I think that Ms S articulated the changes that there have been here very well. Firstly, I accept that the couple are living together now as a couple and being supported in that by the father's mental health team. It can be argued that this represents a progression in the father's rehabilitation to good health. It demonstrates, if nothing else, that his mental health team have sanctioned him living with the mother and implies that they consider that this is not a risk to her. Further, there have been no reported incidents between the two of them and no decline into psychosis.
47. Secondly, although the parents have not had the added stress of caring for MJC, the father has been able to withstand the stresses which have come with the events of the last few months including being on the run with their child, losing their child back into care, the stress of securing permission to appeal ("we persuaded one Judge" he told me) only to lose the appeal before the full court, the adoption application and the refusal of the mental health team to support his application for full discharge. Through all of that there has been no evidence of relapse and no evidence of any incidents between him and the mother.
48. Do these things amount to a change of circumstances of "a nature and degree sufficient…. to open the door to the exercise of judicial discretion"? I am sorry to say I do not consider that they do and for the following reasons.
49. I would not wish to undermine the progress that the father has made since his discharge from prison some years ago. I acknowledge and applaud the fact that he has been psychosis free and there have been no incidents of extreme violence. I am pleased for the couple that they have been able to move in together. However, a move into independent living accommodation was on the cards when I heard the case.
50. In October I had been denied the benefit of information direct from Dr Cadinouche and the father's mental health team. I read in the court of appeal judgment that the reason for that is that the father refused to give his consent. I was unaware of that. However, I did have some information from them via Dr Castle, the forensic psychiatrist and expert in the case (paras 90 and 92 of my judgment). I was aware that the mental health team had never ruled this out as a possibility but I was clear that should there be a move into independent living it would be "a significant change" and as a result I expected that it would be "monitored and managed carefully" and indeed it has been. The level of father's supervision has increased. The mental health team have liaised with the parents' probation team, focusing on ensuring that the mother is directed to the necessary support work designed to equip her with the skills necessary to respond to any incidents as between them. The concern that I expressed that a move into independent accommodation with his partner might lead the father to be tempted to reduce his medication and by that means would lead to a relapse has proven to be unfounded. However it was predicated on the basis of a relaxation in his supervision. In fact the level of his supervision has been increased. The mental health team are keeping a closer watch on his medication compliance. The meetings are more frequent and their involvement with the mother greater. So, whilst I accept that this move has been successful so far it has had to be managed with care and the reason for that is the mental health teams' clear view that it comes with risks.
51. Indeed this move into independent accommodation was raised at the hearing before the court of appeal (Re C para 39). It had already happened and that together with the minutes of the meeting on November was disclosed as "new" evidence which undermined my decision. The observation is made there that the move is under the auspices of the section 41 order. However, Lady Justice King observes in the following paragraph that none of this information formed the basis of an application to reappraise the situation – not least because most of it was before me though through a different means.
52. What has not changed is the father's lack of insight into his illness and the risks that flow from that illness. Father continues in his belief that he is no longer ill. He continues in his plan to be fully discharged from supervision and has been frank enough to say that upon discharge he will take the medication when he needs to sleep because he does not need it for any other reason. He continues to breach the terms of his licence by smoking cannabis and although this has not led to a relapse as his physicians have warned the reports suggest that this is likely to be because his medication is a further protective factor for him so far as cannabis is concerned. His focus in evidence before me was his abiding sense of injustice that he was continuing to be punished for being unwell and hitting his partner 14 years ago.
53. Nor has there been the slightest shift in the mother (or grandmother) on this issue. They continue to lack insight into the risks believing, as the father does, that he is not unwell or certainly not to the extent that he would ever pose a threat and that he is being unjustly penalised for something that he did 14 years ago. In her evidence before me the mother even continued in her reluctance to accept the certainty that the injuries caused to the father's former partner's face were caused by the blows that he inflicted – still commenting that she was given to understand, by father, that the victim had a pre-existing fracture of her cheekbone.
54. The evidence of the father's treating mental health team is clear and no different to the evidence that I heard from Dr Castle. He has remained mostly medication compliant to date because of his supervision and monitoring and if released from that supervision he would cease to take his medication. If he ceases taking his medication he is likely to relapse. If he relapses then there is a risk of significant violence. Neither he nor the mother nor the grandmother accepts this to be the case.
55. We should not forget the other aspect of the case – the dissocial personality disorder. There have been no changes in that regard. Dr Cadinouche remarks in her report that the father continues to have difficulty with his personality in that when he is angry he can become verbally aggressive and abusive and can be perceived as threatening. This was the situation that presented in October last. In the period since the order was made the father has continued to blame his mental health team for the removal of MJC from his care and focused his anger on his previous case worker who since the placement order was made has had to be replaced. The evidence before me in October was that in order to address those behaviours the father would need to undergo therapy over a considerable period. There has been no progress in this regard.
56. So it is that it seems to me that whilst there has been a change of circumstances in their lives in that they are now living together and in spite of that and amongst all of the stress of the current situation there has been no relapse into psychosis, at the heart of it the position remains the same. There is no change of a nature and degree sufficient to persuade me that I should re-open consideration of the issues in the case. The father, mother and grandmother all continue to demonstrate a dangerous lack of insight into the risks associated with the father's mental health with the result that MJC would continue to be exposed to risk if placed in their care for precisely the reasons that I set out in my judgment in October.

Should leave to oppose be given?

57. Having decided that there has been no change in circumstances I would be entitled to end the enquiry there and dismiss the application for permission. However, out of an abundance of caution I have decided to go on to consider what my answer to the second question would be had I progressed to consider it?
58. At the second stage I would have to go on to consider whether I should exercise my discretion to allow the mother and father to oppose the adoption. At this point the child's welfare "throughout her life" is paramount. I have in mind the welfare checklist as set out in s.1(4) of the 2002 Act. MJC is too young to express her wishes and feelings on this matter. I note that she is settled and happy in her placement but I have to assume that if she were able to choose she would choose her birth family.
59. I accept that the effect upon MJC of ceasing to be a member of her natural family is significant. She will lose the chance to be brought up by her birth parents. She will be reliant upon others to gain a proper sense of her true identity. I bear in mind the effect upon MJC of severing not only her relationship with her parents but also with her maternal grandmother – a significant figure in her life. These are all significant matters.
60. However, MJC's primary need is for permanence: a safe, secure and stable home in which she can continue to thrive, receive continuity of care and commitment from a carer to whom she can form a secure attachment and from there develop a sense of her own identity. There is no doubt that she is poised ready to develop all of those things in her current placement. I attach little weight to the disruption that would follow should she have to move from there. However, if returned to her parents, whilst her basic needs would be met and her identity secured as part of her birth family her safety could not be guaranteed because of the risks associated with the father's mental health diagnoses. Those risks, identified as the basis for crossing the threshold and described fully in my judgment and the judgment of the court of appeal, are the same today as they were in October last.
61. Bearing all of that in mind it seems to me that the parents' have no prospect of successfully opposing the making of an adoption order; nothing else will do for this little girl.

Permission to appeal

62. The parents seek permission to appeal my refusal. They were unable to state the basis upon which they sought to challenge my decision other than the fact that they consider I have got it wrong. In the circumstances I have refused that application on the basis that an appeal has no reasonable prospect of success. I have applied the proper legal test and weighed all appropriate matters in the balance.
63. As they appear in person, I will do what I can to assist in the preparation of a Bundle for the court of appeal.