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You are here: BAILII >> Databases >> England and Wales Family Court Decisions (other Judges) >> North Somerset Council v SB, DM, Guardian [2015] EWFC B23 (24 February 2015)
URL: http://www.bailii.org/ew/cases/EWFC/OJ/2015/B23.html
Cite as: [2015] EWFC B23
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This judgment was delivered in private. The judge has given leave for this version of the judgment to be published on condition that (irrespective of what is contained in the judgment) in any published version of the judgment the anonymity of the children and members of their family must be strictly preserved. All persons, including representatives of the media, must ensure that this condition is strictly complied with. Failure to do so will be a contempt of court.
IN THE BRISTOL FAMILY COURT No. BS14C00704
Bristol Civil and Family Justice Centre
Redcliff Street
Bristol
24th February 2015
Before
HIS HONOUR JUDGE WILDBLOOD QC
__________
NORTH SOMERSET COUNCIL
(Applicant)
-v-
SB, DM, and BL, by his guardian
(Respondents)
__________
JUDGMENT
__________
Transcribed from an audio recording by
J L Harpham Limited
Official Court Reporters and Transcribers
55 Queen Street
Sheffield S1 2DX
NORTH SOMERSET COUNCIL -v- SB, DM, GUARDIAN
24th February 2015
JUDGMENT
JUDGE WILDBLOOD QC:
1. Introduction - By way of preliminary remarks I wish to observe that this has been a somewhat unusual hearing. It concerns one child, a four year old boy. When the case started the guardian, mother and father were all contending that a care order, not a placement order, should be made. The parents contended that the boy should be in long term foster care with regular contact but accepted that there was no prospect of the boy being returned to the care of either of them in the near future. Although this is a case of profound importance to this family, there are no points of general practice that are raised within it. It is an example of a sad set of family proceedings relating to a single child whose parents cannot care for him and where the quality of contact has been limited.
2. The guardian had recommended that a care order should be made on the basis that the local authority would keep an open mind to whether the boy could be rehabilitated to the mother over the next three to six months. The local authority sought care and placement orders and indeed still does. The guardian changed her position on the day that the hearing started, having filed a report containing her recommendation of a care order the working day before. She moved to recommend that a placement order should be made also.
3. The mother, despite every encouragement, and offer of any special measures that she might reasonably request, declined to give evidence and left the Court on the second day of the hearing. I had spoken to her on the first day of the hearing and explained, I hope in a kind way, that if she did not give evidence it made her case very difficult for her solicitor to argue. In particular, on the facts of the case, because she would leave unanswered (a) whether she is still drinking; (b) whether she is likely to wish to resume her relationship with the father; (c) whether she will accept help with her emotional and depressive difficulties and also with her social isolation, not having done so to date, and (d) how she would co-operate with a long term fostering arrangement.
4. I specifically advised her, I hope again in kindly terms, that if she did not give some sort of evidence on these points I could only make assumptions against her in relation to them. Her refusal to give evidence, despite adjournments for this to be discussed including the adjournment overnight, is very difficult to understand, save on the basis that she knows that if she did give evidence it would reveal matters that were profoundly adverse to the case that she would wish to pursue.
5. The mother's position also very materially undermines the father's case as his solicitor herself recognises. The father accepts that he cannot offer BL a home. There are no other family members with whom BL has a continuing relationship.
6. The parties - North Somerset Council applies for care and placement orders in relation to this four year old boy, that I shall call BL in this judgment. BL's mother is aged 21 and is referred to as SB in this judgment or simply as "the mother". His father is aged 34 and is referred to as DM or "the father". I refer to them by initials because I wish to avoid them being identified when the case is reported on the Bailii website. I am ordering a transcript at the end of the judgment because I regard it as essential, that the future carers of BL should know what has happened. Further, BL may himself seek information about his past in later years and this judgment may well be made available to him then if he does seek that information.
7. In her initial report the guardian had said this, "As I cannot support the proposal of BL remaining in long term foster care I have given thought to whether further consideration is given to a very time limited piece of work with the mother for three to six months. This would be determine if, with her accessing specific services, further testing and structured feedback about her parenting she would be able to adequately parent BL. This work would be undertaken with BL remaining in foster care and with the local authority having been granted a full care order. If at the end of the time period the necessary progress had not been made by SB then an application for a placement order by the local authority would be made. This proposal would not significantly create any delay for BL. There would be no change in circumstances, BL would remain in his current foster placement. The local authority could continue with a matching process in preparation for adoption".
8. Given the change to the guardian's position I asked her to file a further report which she kindly did having typed it overnight. In the position statement that she filed as a result she said this in paragraph 9, "In summary following the guardian's discussions with the local authority on the 23rd February 2015 she is satisfied that the local authority were actively providing support, structured feedback and offering to help the mother (SB) overcome the difficulties any parents may encounter in accessing such support. The guardian is satisfied that structured feedback has been provided to SB and is now aware of just how much support SB was provided with to enable her to access support services and therefore does not feel that any further assessment is necessary as her perceived gaps in the evidence have now been addressed by the local authority. Whilst the guardian does have some concerns about SB's telephone consultation with Positive Steps, this is not the primary reason for actively supporting a placement order being made at this stage. The guardian believes that the most optimal outcome for BL is for care and placement orders to be made and therefore supports the local authority's position".
9. I have already described therefore the parents’ positions in outline. The mother accepts that BL cannot return to her care and has proposed, before leaving Court, that a placement order should not be made but that BL should be in long term foster care under a care order with her having contact once a week.
10. In his final statement dated the 16th February 2015, the father opposed both care and placement applications but by the start of the hearing his position became the same as the mother's; a care order but not a placement order should be made and contact should take place once a week. By its care plan written by the social worker, the local authority proposes that BL should move from his current foster placement and that once he is there all contact should cease save for biennial letter box contact with both of his parents.
11. The proceedings - These proceedings started by an application for an emergency protection order on the 31st July 2014. The 26 week period prescribed by Section 32(1)(a)(ii) of the Children Act 1989 ended on the 29th January 2015 and had to be extended because of the change in the care plan that arose at the end of December 2014. It had been the care plan that the child BL would be rehabilitated to the parents. The change occurred in circumstances that I will describe to the current care plan. The case now comes before the Court in week 30 of the proceedings.
12. Local Authority involvement - The local authority had become involved with the family in 2012 due to the level of the parents’ alcohol intake and the neglect of BL. By 2014 the local authority formed the opinion that matters were deteriorating further and this is described at page C14 of the Court bundle. The description is of the parents drinking more heavily, BL being more neglected and the mother being increasingly depressed and expressing suicidal thoughts. Examples of that can be found at page C104 and C59 of the bundle.
13. The reports were also of the father drinking very heavily indeed. BL has lived with the same foster carers since he was removed from his parents care on the 31st July 2014 under an emergency protection order. He has been the subject of an interim care order since the 6th August 2014.
14. On the 29th July 2014 BL had first been removed from his parents care under the powers conferred on the police by Section 46 of the Children Act 1989 and was placed with his maternal grandmother. However, the maternal grandmother then returned him to the care of parents, contrary to an agreement that had been made with the local authority and that is why the proceedings were started and court directed separation between the child and the parents occurred.
15. Contact - Contact between mother and BL has been recently at the rate of three times a week for one-and-a-half hours. The father has had no contact with BL since the 2nd of January. The Social Worker describes the mother as having been often passive and inattentive to BL during much of the contact since the local authority abandoned its plans to rehabilitate him to both parents at the end of December, although there was a period where there was modest improvement in the mother's engagement in contact. I have read the contact notes and can see the difficulties that were presented, although I have to say that the contact notes are not the most helpfully prepared documents that I have seen in cases of this nature.
16. The threshold criteria for the purposes of Section 31 of the Children Act 1989 are fulfilled in the terms that I will now give, based on the document at A54 which has been the focus of discussion and agreement between the parties. The following are the agreed matters that constitute fulfilment of those statutory provisions in this case. (A) SB and DM have histories of excessive alcohol use including whilst BL has been in their care. The police and ambulance service have attended at the family home as a result of the parents’ intoxication. (B) SB experiences unstable mental health and has expressed suicidal ideation. (C) BL has been exposed to his parents’ volatile relationship which has involved verbal arguments between SB and DM and periods of separation and reunification. (D) SB and DM have on occasions behaved in a manner that was volatile towards professionals. (E) BL's health needs were not consistently met whilst in his parents care and he missed a number of medical appointments. (F) SB and DM have not maintained their engagement with alcohol or mental health services to address their difficulties. (G) The family home was not kept in a satisfactory condition on a consistent or maintained basis. (H) SB and DM have failed to engage openly and honestly with professionals.
17. The child- All that said BL is a much loved child by his parents. He has been a great source of pride to them and remains such. He is fortunate in that he has been very well cared for by his current foster carers. The guardian describes BL as a complex and challenging child and says that from the description of the foster carers he has some of the behavioural traits that may be associated with either autistic spectrum disorder, exposure to trauma or attachment difficulties. She gives examples of his repetitive behaviours, over vigilant and having difficulties coping with change.
18. The position of the parents now is that they separated in early January 2015, having resumed co-habitation in early December 2014 after a period in which they had lived separately, but was still in a relationship together. There have been occasions in the past where their relationship has been extremely strained and then there have been resumptions of it. The father is apparently living with friends. It has become apparent that he has continued to drink throughout the proceedings and, I regret to say, has obviously misled those professionally involved in them by representing that he was not drinking. Although the father's position is as I have set out, he has always recognised that there are profound hurdles in the way - he has always recognised that there would be profound hurdles in the way of any suggestion that he might care for BL. The evidence is that he is a chronic alcoholic and there are no realistic prospects of that changing, despite the help that he has had from addiction recovery agency which is referred to ARA.
19. I wish to pay a compliment, however, to the father because he has engaged in this hearing extremely well. I am very conscious of the difficulty of the position in which he finds himself and I wish to express my gratitude to him for the way that he has handled the difficulties of this hearing. It must be extremely painful for him and I acknowledge that pain.
20. The local authority alleges that the mother in addition to her other difficulties has failed to protect BL from the manifestations of the father's drinking when the family were still together. The mother, accepts, that she has been a binge drinker in the past, but says that she has ceased drinking and that save for a Shandy on Christmas Day has not drunk at all since then. There is no expert evidence as to whether her body reveals recent and greater alcohol consumption and her absence from the witness box makes this area one that is not assisted by any evidential provision by her. The local authority was proposing to return BL to both his parents following a positive parenting assessment in November 2014. However, it abandoned that proposal when it discovered that the father had resumed his drinking in December and the local authority alleges the mother withheld information about that resumption.
21. On the 30th December the local authority had received a referral from ARA that the mother had revealed that the father had consumed three litres of cider on one occasion and that she had consumed the shandy on Christmas Day. The local authority says that when challenged by the social worker the mother initially denied the report that been made by the ARA worker. It then carried out a further parenting assessment of the mother as a potential social carer and the summary of its position can be taken from the care plan where the social worker says this, "This further assessment is identified with the mother's own alcohol and mental health issues, failing to accept responsibility for BL's experiences; inability to engage - to recognise the concerns of the local authority and dependency upon others, means that she would not be able to meet BL's needs if he were to be placed in her sole care. Thus the further parenting assessment that was adverse to the mother and recommended that BL should not be returned to her care. Given the father's circumstances and his resumption of alcohol intake it was upon the mother that the focus was directed.
22. The local authority also contends that the mother is of very vulnerable mental and emotional health. In June 2014, she informed BL's nursery staff and also, on another occasion paramedics, that she felt suicidal. The ambulance service attended at the family home in June 2014 after the mother contacted them, expressing suicidal thoughts. On the 29th of July 2014 when the police exercised their powers under Section 46 of the 1989 Act the mother had contacted them making further threats of suicide. When the police attended on that occasion they found the mother to be intoxicated to the point that neither she nor the father was capable of caring for BL.
23. Although there had been periods when the mother appears to have achieved a greater emotional equilibrium since July, the local authority questions whether her current state of balance would be sustained given that she has not undergone any therapeutic processes. In the past when her mental health was poor she was withdrawn and uncommunicative leading to the guardian considering that this in association with the drinking patterns of the then united parents rendered the mother's care of BL inadequate or in her language not good enough.
24. There are no family members or other kinship carers who are available to care for BL. The maternal grandmother was assessed but the local authority concluded in these terms that "she would not be a suitable carer for BL due to her own alcohol misuse, inability to work openly and honestly with professionals. Failure to protect BL and dependent relationship with her daughter". The grandmother has not participated in this hearing or indeed in the proceedings.
25. The issues raised in this case are of profound importance to this family. They are of fundamental importance to the future welfare of the little boy. As the President said in the case of Darlington Borough Council -v- MF and others [2015] EWFC 19, "It is for the local authority to prove on a balance of probabilities the facts upon which it seeks to rely. It is for the local authority since it is seeking to have the child adopted to establish that nothing else will do. See in Re B (A child) care proceedings threshold criteria 2013 UKSC 33 and Re. BS 2013 EWCA Civ 1146. As Baroness Hale of Richmond said in Re B paragraph 198, "The test for severing the relationship between parent and child is very strict. Only in exceptional circumstances and when motivated by overriding requirements pertaining to the child's welfare, in short, where nothing else will do".
26. The mother has been encouraged in this case for a long time to accept help in relation to her emotional difficulties. And there has been evidence about an organisation called Positive Steps which would provide her with counselling and therapy. The mother has been encouraged to attend it but has not done so. She has not done anything to address her emotional difficulties. Although she has attended the alcohol recovery agency, there are doubts that could not be tested in evidence due to the mother's absence, as to whether she was truthful with ARA; in particular it appears she was not truthful about the level of the father's drinking.
27. On the 19th February 2015 the mother had a telephone conversation with somebody from Positive Steps in relation to counselling. However, on the evidence that I have now read it appears that the telephone conversation was terminated by the mother. The organisation made further attempts to contact her on the telephone but were unable to do so. As a final measure they sent a letter inviting the mother to engage with them. That letter can only have been sent last Friday and today is Tuesday, therefore it may well be for the mother to not have the opportunity to respond to it, but overall pattern, I am afraid, is of the mother having done nothing to address the very profound emotional difficulties that she faced in July. The consequence of that is that there is every reason to suppose those emotional difficulties will reappear. Nothing that I have seen at this hearing suggests to me there is now a realistic prospect of this mother working to address the difficulties of the task.
28. Options - I turn now to the options. In the light of what I have already said, this case comes before me with both parents recognising that they cannot care for this four year old boy, despite their love for him. The father is drinking; the mother has not done anything to address her long term and underlying emotional difficulties. Although she has attended contact she has often not engaged emotionally with BL during their contact. It may very well be, I suspect, she is so overwhelmed by her own difficulties that she does not feel that she has any surplus emotional energy to direct to BL. It is a very depressing feature.
29. Thus the options are on the one hand, adoption and on the other hand, long term fostering with parents having some contact but there being no realistic prospect in the foreseeable future of BL being rehabilitated to either of his parents.
30. Law - I now wish to remind myself of a number of principles of law. I must apply the relevant statutory and convention provisions. I must do so in accordance with the guidance given by the higher courts. I am reminded of that of course by the case of EH and Greenwich EWCA Civ 344. In relation to the application for a care order it is necessary to consider first whether the threshold criteria in Section 31(2) of the Children Act 1989 are fulfilled. Here they are.
31. Following the fulfilment of the threshold criteria I have to go on to consider the provisions of Article 8 of the European Convention on Human Rights and also the welfare provisions within the domestic statutes. The domestic statutes are the Children Act 1989 and the Adoption of Children Act 2002. The relevant provisions are contained in the first Sections of both of those statutes. In relation to the placement application I must consider, in particular, the terms of Section 52(1)(d) and Section 1 of the Adoption and Children Act 2002.
32. Article 8 is, of course, significantly engaged relation to both the care and the placement applications. I remind myself that the Court must take a global, holistic approach to welfare issues, weighing up the various available options before it. I intend to work through the welfare provisions of the relevant Acts, but it is important to avoid a linear analysis of the options that present themselves, because that can lead to the piecemeal elimination of the least interventionist solutions, leaving the most interventionist solution of a placement order as the only remaining available outcome. That was identified in a case called Re G (A child) 2013 EWCA Civ 965, paragraphs 49 to 50. In this case the least interventionist solution is of course a care order without a placement order. Where care and placement applications are made it is better for the Court to conduct a combined welfare analysis of the applications rather than considering the care application first and separately from the placement application, otherwise if the less interventionist care order is made it may lead to a placement order being made without sufficient consideration being given to the welfare checklist under the 2002 Act and also without there being the necessary holistic analysis of the real options before the Court.
33. Article 8 of the European Convention on Human Rights states as follows: (1) Everyone has the right to respect for his private and family life, his home, his correspondence; (2) there should be no interference by a public authority with the exercise of this right except such as is in accordance with the law and is necessary in a democratic society for the protection of the rights and freedoms of others." Here the phrase "for the protection of the rights and freedoms of others" can be read as meaning for the protection of the welfare of the BL.
34. Care orders amount to a very significant invasion of the rights encapsulated in Article 8(1) of the Convention. Placement Orders amount to an even more significant invasion of that right. For such orders to be justified they must satisfy the provisions of Article 8(2) and therefore must be (a) in accordance with the law, here the convention compliant 1989 and 2002 Acts; (b) necessary for the protection of the welfare of the child concerned, that is BL. And (c) proportionate. By Section 1 of the 1989 Act the welfare of BL is the Court's paramount consideration when considering the making of orders under that Act following the satisfaction of the threshold criteria. The welfare checklist is in Section 1(3) of the Act. However, given the more dominant nature of the placement application it is better to conduct the analysis of the case through the eyeglass of the welfare checklist in the 2002 Act. The 2002 Act stresses that the Court must have regard to the welfare of the child throughout his life. Those last words are of particular importance because adoption is a lifelong decision which has lifelong consequences.
35. Further, by reason of Section 52 of the 2002 Act children may not be placed for adoption under placement orders without the consent of the parents unless the welfare of the child requires the consent to be dispensed with. The core statutory provisions in relation to placement orders are therefore Section 52(1) and section 1 of the 2002 Act for the purposes of this judgment.
36. The relevant parts of Section 1 of the 2002 Act are as follows. (1) This section applies whenever a court or adoption agency is coming to a decision relating to the adoption of a child. (2) The paramount consideration of the Court or adoption agency must be the child's welfare throughout his life. (3) The Court or adoption agency must at all times bear in mind that in general any delay in coming to the decision is likely to prejudice the child's welfare. (4) The Court or adoption agency must have regard to the following matters amongst others; (a) the child's ascertainable wishes and feelings regarding the decision considered in the light of the child's age and understanding; (b) the child's particular needs; (c) the likely effect on the child throughout his life of having ceased to be a member of the original family and become an adopted person; (d) the child's age, sex, background and any of the child's characteristics which the Court or agency considers relevant; (e) any harm within the meaning of the Children Act 1989 which the child has suffered or is at risk of suffering; (f) the relationship which the child has with relatives and with any other person in relation to whom the Court or agency considers the relationship to be relevant including (1) the likelihood of any such relationship continuing and the value to the child of its doing so; (2) the ability and willingness of any of the child's relatives or of any such person to provide the child with a secure environment in which the child can develop and otherwise to meet the child's needs; (3) the wishes and feelings of any of the child's relatives of any such person regarding the child.
37. In subsection 1(6) of the Act it continues as follows: ‘The Court or adoption agency must always consider the whole range of powers available to it in the child's case, whether under this Act or the Children Act 1989 and the Court must not make any order under this Act unless it considers that making the order would be better for the child than not doing so.
38. It is of fundamental importance that there is discipline in the approach to welfare issues in care and placement proceedings. The Court is not a court of social engineering. The Court does not decide welfare issues by deciding whether on an individual judge's analysis a child might be considered to be better off in care or adoption. Nor does the Court apply the test of whether a child will receive optimal care with a given parent since there are many parents who would fail that test.
39. The court must not approach a case such as this by asking whether on balance the given child would better off with adopters or with a parent. As I am frequently heard to say, nature, law and commonsense require that it be recognised that the best place for a child to live is with a natural parent unless, exceptionally, proven and proportionate necessity otherwise demands.
40. The details as I have already set out from the Darlington case and the underlying jurisprudence of Re B and Re BS must be applied. For myself I find the following passages from the judgment of Lord Neuberger of particular assistance, where he said, "It seems to me to be inherent in Section 1(1) that a care order should be a last resort because the interests of a child would self-evidently require his relationship with his natural parents to be maintained, unless no other course was possible in his interests. That is reinforced by the requirement in Section 1(3)(g) that the Court must consider all options which carries with it the clear implication that the most extreme option should only be adopted if others would not be in his interests".
41. Although care proceedings are quasi inquisitorial it is for the local authority to justify its application and to substantiate its proposed care measures on evidence. That can be taken from PC & S United Kingdom 2002 2 FLR 631.
42. Given the options that arise in this case I also remind myself of what was said by Lady Justice Black in the case of Re V 2013 EWCA Civ 913: ‘I do not think that fostering and adoption can in fact be equated in terms of what they offer by way of security. I do not intend to embark on a comprehensive comparison of the two arrangements, merely to highlight some of the material differences. What I say should not be taken as a substitute for professional advice to the Court from Social Services and/or the guardian in any case in which this is a significant issue”. With that caveat Black LJ went on to say: “I make the following observations (1) adoption makes the child a permanent part of the adoptive family to which he or she fully belongs. To the child it is likely therefore to feel different from fostering. Adoptions do of course fail but the commitment of the adoptive family is of a different nature to that of a local authority foster carer whose circumstances may change however devoted he or she is and who is free to determine the caring arrangement. (2) Whereas the parents may apply for the discharge of a care order with a view to getting the child back to live with them, once an adoption order is made it is made for all time. (3) Contact in the adoption context is also a different matter from contact in the context of a fostering arrangement. Where a child is in the care of a local authority the starting point is that the authority is obliged to allow the child reasonable contact with his parents by reason of Section 34(1) of the Children Act 1989. The contact position can of course be regulated by alternative orders under Section 34, but the situation still contrasts markedly with that of an adoptive family. There are open adoptions where the child sees his or her natural parents but I think it would be fair to say such arrangements tend not to be seen where the adoptive parents are not in full agreement. Once the adoption order has been made the natural parents normally need leave before they can apply for contact. (4) Routine life is different for he adopted child and that once he or she is adopted the local authority have no further role in his or her life. No local authority medicals; no local authority reviews; no need to consult the social worker over school trips abroad for example”.
43. Analysis - Therefore the competing options of long term fostering and adoption raise very different considerations. An advantage of long term fostering would be of course that this child BL would remain part of his natural family, although living with other people. He would have contact with his natural family and would experience them and his natural origins. That might be of particular advantage to him as he grows into adulthood. The benefit of adoption can be taken from the passage that I have read from the judgment of Black LJ. BL would experience full family integration with an adoptive family who would be entirely committed to him as his parents. Adoptive parents are very carefully selected and there are good prospects of him being able to settle into a secure and loving environment. The solution of adoption would provide him with that security and stability for the rest of his childhood and would carry him forward into adult life. A fostering arrangement would end when he ceased to be a child. That point when a child moves into adulthood and ceases to be a foster child is a point that is easily overlooked but given the requirement that I consider the welfare of BL throughout his life, it is a factor that I do take into account as well.
44. So I turn to the welfare checklist and the 2002 Act. The child's ascertainable wishes and feelings regarding the decision considered in the light of his age and understanding. He is too young to express wishes. His feelings are of a child who is much loved by his parents, I am sure, and who has become accustomed to living with them for the first three-and-a-three quarters years of his life. That is an important feature and one that I do take into account. His needs are now to find a settled and secure home. He has been in foster care for seven months. He experienced the disintegration of his family home and the disharmony and neglect within it. I find that he has a paramount need for security and full integration with his new family home. Fostering would not provide that. Adoption would. I am very anxious indeed that a fostering arrangement would lead to BL having extremely unsettled childhood with his parents inevitably seeking to reinforce their own positions in relation to him and seeking his return as soon as they felt able. That would leave him pulled between his natural family and his foster family. Adoption by contrast would allow him to be a part of his day to day family, whereas fostering would not. Foster carers would be faced with an extremely difficult task in offering him the emotional care that he needs in the circumstances that would arise and this would be bound to affect their ability to give him the family life and childhood that he needs. Therefore comparing fostering with adoption, holistically, there is only one solution that provides him with what he needs. Sadly for the parents that is adoption.
45. I turn to the likely effect on him throughout his life of having ceased to be a member of the original family and become an adopted person. This is no small consideration. Adoption would mean that he loses his place with his natural family with whom he lived during such formative time of his life. Looking at the position throughout his life it has to be anticipated that he may very well wish to explore his own family background due to the natural magnetism that every person feels towards that natural family background. Many people, indeed most of us, want to research where we come from and understand who we are. We therefore research our family background to that end.
46. Therefore adoption, especially for a child of this age, is not a panacea. However, the alternative of long term fostering simply does not offer him what he needs. There would be long term consequences of a fostering arrangement and those long term consequence are of far greater potential detriment to BL than any potential detriment from adoption. I consider, in particular, the position in which he would find himself for instance as an 18 year old when the fostering arrangement ends would be of particular difficulty to him. Therefore the disadvantages of fostering far outweigh any long term disadvantages of adoption. So the balance falls again very strongly in favour of adoption.
47. I turn to his age, sex, background and any of his characteristics that are considered to be relevant. He is a much loved child and any decision I make in this case is going to immense pain to his parents who have already suffered greatly by reason of things that have occurred in the past. BL came into the care system at three-and-three-quarters. It may be a consolation, I hope to the parents to know, that research demonstrates there would be a very good prospect that he can now still be successfully placed with adoptive carers. He is not of such an advanced age as to make this unrealistic, although care will have to be taken to support his adopters. The end of this process is not achieved by the making of an adoption order and I expect that the carers of BL will be offered the fullest support in settling him with them and I am sure the local authority will proffer that support.
48. I turn to the harm which BL has suffered and is at risk of suffering. The past harm is defined in the threshold criteria and the reality now is that both parents accept that they cannot offer him a home. He has spent seven months in interim foster care and will have to suffer the disruption of being moved from that home where he has been so well looked after. That, too, is emotionally harmful to him but is inevitable and he will need help with that. If he returned to either of the parents in the foreseeable future it is highly likely that he would suffer the same emotional disengagement and neglect that he suffered in the past as they plainly recognise because of the positions that they take within these proceedings. However, given the options that now present themselves as to long term fostering or adoption, the main harm that has to be strongly foreseen is that if he is fostered he will never know the stability and unity of a family life of his own.
49. As to his relationship with relatives they cannot care - the parents cannot care for him despite their love for him. There are no extended family members who offer him a home. The mother finds great difficult engaging with DL due to her own emotional needs. Thus despite the love that they feel for him their relationship with him is one in which they cannot offer him what he needs. In those circumstances it is my opinion that there is only one available solution in this case which is consistent with the paramount welfare of this boy, that is adoption. I am therefore driven to dispense with the agreement of both parents to the placement of DL for adoption on the grounds that his welfare so requires. I make a care order and a placement order.
50. Difficult though it may be I do ask the parents to keep the local authority and the Court advised of their current addresses, since notices in relation to any adoption proceedings may have to be sent to their last known addresses.
51. I would like to finish by expressing my gratitude to the advocates and finally my sympathy to the father. I have already expressed my gratitude to him for the way that he has conducted himself during this very painful hearing. I wish him well with his endeavours in seeking to address his difficulties with alcohol.
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