England and Wales Family Court Decisions (other Judges)

 

Date 9/3/2015.

 

IN THE MILTON KEYNES COUNTY COURT.

 

Before:

 

HER HONOUR JUDGE BROWN

 

Re L and C (Children) (Application for permission to oppose an Adoption Order)

 

 

The Applicant Mother in person.

The Applicant Father in person.

Ms. Bowes for the Local Authority.

Mr. Browne for the Child

(By her Children’s Guardian Ms. Sylvia Baker)

 

 

Judgment handed down on 9^th. March 2015.

 

 

 

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Approved Judgment

 

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This judgment was delivered in private.  The judge has given leave for this version of the judgment to be published on condition that (irrespective of what is contained in the judgment) in any published version of the judgment the anonymity of the children and members of their family must be strictly preserved.  All persons, including representatives of the media, must ensure that this condition is strictly complied with.  Failure to do so will be a contempt of court.

 

 

 

Her Honour Judge Brown sitting at Milton Keynes.

 

Mother had sought permission to oppose the adoption order in respect of both of her children.  Father of the youngest child attended.  He had not attended previously and had not filed a statement setting out a change in circumstances.  He wished however to apply for permission to oppose the adoption order.  I took the view that I would hear both parents and if I considered there to be merit in either application I would adjourn for further information.  I wanted no further delay for either child.  Father was given time to write a statement which he duly completed.

I heard evidence from Mother, Father, the social worker Ms. Lopez and the Children’s Guardian Mrs. Baker.  At the end of the hearing I informed the parties that the applications on behalf of both parents for permission to oppose the adoption were refused.  These are the reasons for my decision.

 

This matter concerns two children namely L born on [ ]  and her brother C born on  [ ].  Their mother is S who I shall refer to as Mother.  The father of C is M who I shall refer to as Father.  The father of L has played no part in the proceedings and has had no involvement in L’s life.

 

The matter is listed for Mother’s application for permission to oppose the adoption order.  Mother has filed a one page statement setting out her reasons for her application and why she argues there have been sufficient changes for leave to be given.

 

Father attended.  He has not attended previous directions hearing within this application and has filed no evidence.  He told me that he wished to seek permission to oppose the adoption order.  I gave father time to write a statement at court which I have before me.

 

Therefore both birth parents seek permission to oppose the adoption order.

 

The history.

 

On 15^th. April 2011 L was taken to hospital by mother and father after father noticed that L was not using her arm.  Subsequent medical investigations revealed a fractured arm and a further six fractures to L’s limbs.  The fractures were; two to the right forearm, one of the right leg and four of the left leg.  The fractures were of different ages.  The fractures were caused either through a direct blow or a gripping and twisting mechanism. 

 

A fact finding hearing took place before HH Judge McIntyre.  I have read the judgment dated 7^th. November 2011.  C was born on 20.12.2011 following the fact finding and immediately following his birth an Emergency Protection Order was made and he was removed into foster care in the same placement at L.  A further hearing on 17 – 21^st. September 2012 ruled out mother and father as carers for the children.  Further assessments of family members were undertaken which for various reasons were unsuccessful.  Placement Orders were made on 6^th. September 2013.  L and C were placed with their prospective adopters on early 2014 and on 5^th. November 2014 the prospective adopters made applications to adopt L and C.

 HH Judge McIntyre writes in relation to the evidence of the paediatric radiologist and the consultant paediatrician,

“The effect of their evidence taken together is that both would have expected anyone caring of L in the days following that when all but the metaphyseal fractures were sustained to have noticed a change in her behaviour even though, had they not been present at the scene they may not have attributed that change to an injury.”

 

 HH Judge McIntyre found that mother was the perpetrator of the injuries and that Father had failed to protect L.

 

HH Judge McIntyre handed down a written judgment at the welfare stage dated 21^st. September 2012.  He had the benefit of a psychological report from Dr. Blumenthal dated 6^th. June 2012.   I have read that report in full and with great care. 

 

Dr. Blumenthal described Mother’s personality difficulties as follows;

 

Dr. Blumenthal did not diagnose Mother with having borderline personality disorder.  In his report he wrote,

“Whilst the issues presented by [ ] mother may not be at a level associated with a disorder and may well ameliorate further as she gets “older” there are certainly indications from [ ] mother’s history and her presentation of problematic personality traits.  During adolescence and until very recently she showed signs of antisocial and emotionally unstable personality traits.  The evidence for this includes evidence for impulse behaviour and emotional instability, most notably in relation to L.  Emotionally unstable personality traits are associated with a poor self image, chronic feelings of emptiness and labile and intense interpersonal relationships.  [ ] mother has shown signs of emotional instability, impulsiveness and persistent personality problems.  There is also evidence of self harm and suicide attempts.  Drug taking and drinking from a young age probably had the purpose of managing her emotional instability.  She has displayed significant mood instability.  According to the Judgment which [ ] mother accepts, she caused significant injuries to L on a number of occasions and has no memory of these.”

 

Mother told Dr. Blumenthal that she accepts the judgment of the court but has no recollection of the events which caused the injuries.  He set out two options.  Either mother was not being truthful or if she really had no recollection then the injuries must have occurred within a highly dissociated state possibly relating to alcohol consumption or intense or overwhelming anger.  Dr. Blumenthal writes,

“I believe that overall the risks are higher because it indicates that there are times when [ ] Mother is not fully in control of her actions.”

 

Dr. Blumenthal makes the point that non acceptance of the findings “bears no relationship with the risk of actual repetition of the abuse.”  However he notes,

“denial does have other important implications.  It is not possible to obtain a true picture of the situational factors which led to the perpetration of the injuries.  Consequently one is led to having to speculate as to the practical and psychological context in which the injuries to L occurred.  The risk is therefore partly unquantifiable because there remain many uncertainties about contextual factors.  However, in this case it is reasonable to speculate as I have done above that the injuries took place in a highly emotionally aroused state, possibly relating to alcohol consumption.”

 

In respect of therapy Dr. Blumenthal writes,

“It is important to state at the outset that therapeutic work should not be the mainstay of risk management.  Treatment within care proceedings is always problematic, because it encourages an individual to respond in a socially desirable way and may not be something the individual chooses to do themselves.  In this case there is some limited evidence that [ ] mother may be motivated to engage in treatment.  However, considering the depth and persistence of her psychological difficulties as outlined above, a therapeutic intervention is likely to be a considerable undertaking and besides, the outcome of this is uncertain.  As she indicated, when she engaged in psychological therapy some years ago she became angry and it is likely that psychological therapy that touches upon the underlying difficulties in her personality are likely to at least temporarily exacerbate mental conflict.

Therapeutic work would certainly not be within the timescales of the children.  Ultimately the question of whether it would enable [ ] Mother to care for her children on a respite basis or in unsupervised contact can only really be tested by management rather than therapy.”

“[ ] Mother does appear to be motivated to engage in therapeutic work.  A major question currently is that of funding for therapy.  [ ] Mother has complex personality problems which require highly specialised help.  It is very difficult in the current climate to obtain funding for such treatment.”

 

In respect of father Dr. Blumenthal writes,

“There was evidence from [ ] father’s presentation that there may be cognitive difficulties associated with learning disabilities.  However, due to funding restrictions I have not undertaken a formal assessment of [ ] father’s IQ functioning and will undertake this if this is deemed necessary by the court.  However, I would advise that at the current time this may be felt to be unnecessary, if there is a serious consideration that the children return to [ ] father’s care, then I would strongly advise that a formal assessment of his cognitive functioning be undertaken.  This may also be considered necessary in informing decisions about contact with his child.

Whilst there is unlikely to be evidence for problematic personality traits at the level associated with personality disorder, there are certainly indications of problematic personality traits and psychological difficulties in [ ] father.  His account of himself and his situation was somewhat incoherent at times and his narrative was circumlocutory.  He presented a picture of very significant vulnerability and fragility.  He has very poor self esteem and conveys uncertainty about himself.  He described a highly problematic early life and does not seem to have a firm foundation in adulthood.  I believe that this would significantly impact upon his capacity to parent children in his care.”

 

In his welfare judgment, HH Judge McIntyre wrote the following,

“[ ] mother told me that she accepted the findings but had no recollection of how she inflicted the injuries.  She accepted Dr. Blumenthal’s report and the work that he says needs to be done before she will be able to look after a child safely.  She accepted that until such time as that work was completed she would remain a risk to any child in her care.  She would make sure that nothing similar happened again.  I am satisfied that [ ] mother was genuine when giving evidence.  She accepted that the success of any therapy was not guaranteed that she did not know what the trigger for her violent behaviour was and so she did not know how to guard against it.”

In relation to father HH Judge McIntyre wrote,

“[ ] Father said that he accepted that the injury inflicted by father on 15^th. April had been inflicted by her “because the judge has found that’s what happened.”  He was asked by Mr Browne whether he “believed” it had and his answer was to the effect that he could not believe it because he had not seen it.  He told me that if he thought [ ] mother was a danger to his children he would leave her.  I have found that [ ] mother is a danger to her children and yet he is still with her and intends to remain with her as she does with him.”

 

The Law.

 

Turning to the law in relation to this application I must have regard to section 47 Adoption and Children Act 2002.

L and C have been placed for adoption pursuant to section 47 Adoption and Children Act 2002 namely that they have been placed pursuant to a Placement Order.  (Section 47(4)(b)(ii).

Section 47 (5) A parent or guardian may not oppose the making of an adoption order under the second condition without the court’s leave.

 

Section 47(7) The court cannot give leave under subsection (3) or (5) unless satisfied that there has been a change in circumstances since the consent of the parent or guardian was given or, as the case may be, the placement order was made.

 

I have of course had regard to Re B [2013] UKSC 33.  Throughout my deliberations I have born in mind that adoption is an extreme order and a last resort.  In compliance with Article 8 of the ECHR and UNCRC a court should only make such an order if it is necessary in the sense that “nothing else will do.”

I have also considered the entirety of Re BS.   I remind myself of what an order for adoption means for this child.  In particular I remind myself of paragraph 22 of Re BS namely,

“The language in Re B is striking.  Different words and phrases are used but the message is clear.  Orders contemplating non consensual adoption – care orders with a plan for adoption, placement orders and adoption orders – are a “very extreme thing, a last resort”, only to be made where “nothing else will do.” Where no other course [is] possible in [the child’s] interest”, they are “the most extreme option”, a last resort when all else fails” to be made “only in exceptional circumstances and where motivated by overriding requirements pertaining to the child’s welfare, in short where nothing else will do.”

 

I have of course had regard to Re R [2014] EWCA Civ 1625 per Sir James Munby.

“I wish to emphasise with as much force as possible that Re B-S was not intended to change and has not changed the law.  Where adoption is in the child’s best interests, local authorities must not shy away from seeking nor the courts from making care orders with a plan for adoption, placement orders and adoption orders.  The fact is that there are occasions when nothing but adoption will do and it is essential in such cases that a child’s welfare should not be compromised by keeping them within their family at all costs.”

 

I have reminded myself of the case of Re AW [2013] EWHC 2967   which assists me in distinguishing between applications for permission to apply to revoke a placement order and an application for leave to oppose an adoption order.  Per Pauffley J,

“Ms Fottrell also contended that an application for leave to revoke the placement order and an application for leave to oppose the adoption are analogous. In order to succeed in relation to the former, and at a time before the child had been placed for adoption, a parent would have to demonstrate there had been a change of circumstances since the order was made. The court would then go on to consider whether or not to exercise its discretion and also whether the application has a real prospect of success (Re F (a Child) EWCA Civ 439).

In relation to the latter, an application for leave to oppose the adoption, a parent would have to satisfy the court there has been a change of circumstances which is relevant or material to the question of whether or not leave should be granted. The change in circumstances must be of an nature and degree sufficient on the facts of the particular case to open the door to the exercise of judicial discretion; and the paramount consideration must be the welfare of the child throughout her life ( Re P (Adoption: Leave Provision) [2007] 2FLR 1069 ). “

I therefore consider the test required for the permission to oppose an application for adoption

The Application for leave involves a two stage process (see re B-S para 72 and 51 approving Re P).  This is a matter of judicial evaluation not mere discretion.

“In our judgment, analysis of the statutory language in ss 1 and 47 of the 2002 Act leads to the conclusion that an application for leave to defend adoption proceedings under s 47(5) of the 2002 Act involves a two-stage process. First of all, the court has to be satisfied, on the facts of the case, that there has been a change in circumstances within s 47(7). If there has been no change in circumstances, that is the end of the matter, and the application fails. If, however, there has been a change in circumstances within s 47(7) then the door to the exercise of a judicial discretionevaluation to permit the parents to defend the adoption proceedings is opened, and the decision whether or not to grant leave is governed by s 1 of the 2002 Act. In other words, ‘the paramount consideration of the court must be the child's welfare throughout his life’.”

 

I use the term evaluation rather than discretion as that is what the Court of appeal urge me do to at paragraph 72 of their judgment.

 

Therefore the key distinction between the two applications is that the child’s welfare is not the paramount consideration of the Court when considering s24 [See Warwickshire cc v M and L at [21/22] but F’s welfare must inform the court’s evaluation.

 

                                                   

Turning therefore to the “change of circumstances, what must Mother and Father show?

 

 The “change in circumstances” does not need to be significant  Re P at [29/30]  but needs to be of a nature and degree sufficient to open the door to a consideration of whether leave to apply should be given.”

 

I remind myself of paragraph 68 of Re B S namely,

“We share McFarlane LJ’s misgivings about Thorpe LJ’s use of the phrase “exceptionally rare circumstances” as also about his use followed by the President in Re C [2-13] All ER (D) 235 (Apr) , of the word “Stringent” to define or describe the test to be applied on an application under section 47(5).  Both phrases are apt to mislead, with potentially serious adverse consequences.  In the light of Re B they convey quite the wrong message.  Neither in our judgment, any longer has any place in this context.  Their use in relation to section 47(5) should cease.”

 

The test should not be set too high; Terms such as “Exceptionally rare circumstances” per Thorpe LJ re C[1] or “stringent” “are phrases apt to mislead”[2]

The test should not be set too high to prevent parents from bettering themselves [See Re P at [32]]

The test should not be set so as to discourage parents from preventing their child being adopted [See Re P at [32]];

I must bear in mind that when considering the “prospects of success” the question is not whether the child will be returned to the potential applicants care but of revoking the placement order. [NS-H v Kingston at [22]]. 

 

I have had regard to the case of ­Re W (Adoption Order:Leave to oppose); Re H (Adoption Order: Application for permission for leave to oppose) [2013 EWCA Civ 1177.

 

 I remind myself of the dicta of Sir James Munby President of the Family Division.

 

“The judgment must make clear that the judge has the two stage test process in mind.  There are two questions (Re B-s, para [73]): Has there been a change in circukstances?  If the answer to the first question is no, that is the end of the matter.  If the answer is yes, then the second question is should leave to oppose be given?

In addressing the second question, the judge must first consider and evaluate the parent’s ultimate prospect of success if leave is given to oppose.  The key issue here (Re B-S para [59]) is whether the parent’s prospects of success are more than just fanciful, whether they have solidity.  If the answer to that question is no, that will be the end of the matter.  It would not merely be a waste of time and resources to allow a contested application I such circumstances; it would also give false hope to the parents and cause undue anxiety and concern to the prospective adopted parents.  The reader of the judgment must be able to see that the judge has grappled with this issue and must be able to understand at least in essentials what the judge’s view is and why the judge has come to that conclusion.  There mere fact that the judge does not use the word “solid” or “solidity” will not without more mean that an appeal is likely to succeed for example if the judge uses language whatever it may be, which shows that the parent fails to meet the test.  So if a judge, as Parker J did in Re B-S McFarlane J’s words (see B-S para [58]) and describes the prospect of parental success as “entirely improbable” that will suffice as indeed it did in Re B-s itself, always assuming that the judge’s conclusion is adequately explained in the judgment.

In evaluating the parent’s ultimate prospects of success if given leave to oppose the judge has to remember that the child’s welfare is paramount and must consider the child’s welfare throughout his life.  In evaluating what the child’s welfare demands the judge will bear in mind what has happened in the past, the current state of affairs and what will or may happen in the future.  There will be cases perhaps many cases where despite the change in circumstances, the demands of the child’s welfare are such as to lead the judge to the conclusion that the parent’s prospects of success lack solidity….

If the parent is able to demonstrate solid prospects of success, the focus of the second stage narrows very significantly.  The court must ask whether the welfare of the child will be so adversely affected by an opposed in contrast to an unopposed application that leave to oppose should be refused.  This is unlikely to be the situation in ost cases given that the court has ex hypothesi, already concluded that the child’s welfare might ultimately best be served by refusing to make an order for adoption.”

 

Throughout my deliberations I have had regard to section 1 of the Adoption and Children Act 2002.  I have born in mind that whenever a court is considering a decision relating to the adoption of a child the paramount consideration must be the welfare of the child throughout his life. I have taken account of section 1 (3) that any delay in coming to the decision is likely to prejudice the child’s welfare.   I have considered the welfare checklist under section 1(4) and will consider the welfare arguments in respect of F below.

 

The Evidence.

 

Therefore the first issue I must address is whether there has been a change of circumstances of a nature and degree sufficient to open the door to a consideration of whether leave to apply should be given to either Mother or Father.  I have considered whether the cases of either parent have “sufficient solidity” in terms of prospects of success.

 

.Mother in a succinct statement sets out the change of circumstances.  Mother cites the following as a change of circumstances;

 

·         I have had no episodes of BPD

·         I have never been proven to have BPD

·         I have stopped drinking

·         I left a violent relationship

·         I am now working in settled employment

·         I have a great support network, family and friends

·         I am looking into doing a domestic violence course

·         I am not in the same place or frame of mind I was 3 years ago

·         The local authority has always commented on how far I have come, how good my parenting is and that I’ve done all they have asked of me

·         There is no violence in my life and hasn’t been for 20 months.

In respect of these factors there is some force in Mother’s arguments.    As set out above Dr. Blumenthal did not diagnose Mother with borderline personality disorder but with personality difficulties for which she required long term and intensive therapy.

 

There is no evidence that mother is drinking heavily.  Mother told me and I accept her evidence that she is now working in three jobs, two in catering (a café and a catering van) and one as a cleaner.  Mother’s father was in court and I accept that she has far better relationships with her family than before.   Mother told me that she sees her parents on a daily basis.  Mother told me that she has a strong support network of family and friends including her bosses of her two jobs.  Mother told me that she is not in a relationship and there is no evidence that mother is suffering any forms of domestic violence at this time.  I accept that in many ways mother is leading a more settled and positive lifestyle than she was in 2012.

 

However, of key concern is the severity of the injuries to L for which mother was found to be responsible.  Mother told me that she does not accept these findings.  She told me that in the previous proceedings (despite the judgment of HHJ McIntyre) she did not accept that she had perpetrated the injuries but only that she accepted that is what the Judge had found.  With the greatest of respect to mother, that is not what HH Judge McIntyre or Dr. Blumenthal wrote.  Both write as if mother had told them in terms that she accepted that she was responsible although I accept that she told Dr. Blumenthal that she could not remember perpetrating the injuries.  Mother told me that she is not prepared to accept something that did not happen and that there have been miscarriages of justice in the past.  Her stance now is that she did not cause the fractures and she does not know who did.  Mother also believes that the fractures could have been caused through L suffering from a vitamin D deficiency.

 

This stance caused particular concern to the social worker and to the Children’s Guardian Mrs. Baker who told me that she believes this is a “step backwards” in mother’s thinking.  In my judgment, mother must be able to accept that she caused these injuries and engage in work and therapy to assist her in understanding why she injured her child.  In my judgment that is fundamental to any real change in respect of mother on the key issues affecting her ability to be a safe parent.

 

Mother told me that she had undertaken counselling and therapy through the NHS.  She told me that the psychiatrist overseeing her therapy discharged her on the basis that she did not require any further assistance and the only real stress in her life was the care proceedings.   This work was completed before the welfare hearing in September 2012 and this is not a change since the end of the care proceedings and the making of the Placement Orders.  Mother did not produce any evidence of this and this evidence does not sit well with the opinion of Dr. Blumenthal whose report was before the court and accepted by HH Judge McIntyre.  Mother made the valid point that she could not afford to undergo the therapy recommended by Dr. Blumenthal.

 

Mother has not attended a domestic violence course nor has she approached her GP for assistance in finding one.

 

Mother was asked why she had missed her appointment with the Children’s Guardian on 16^th. February 2015 and she said it was because she was unwell.  Mrs. Baker tried to re-arrange the appointments on three further dates unsuccessfully.  Mother told me that she could not attend an appointment due to work commitments.  I was concerned by her answers and her lack of understanding about the importance of meeting with the Children’s Guardian at this stage. 

 

In terms of caring for her children she would call on the assistance of friends and family to assist her in caring for the children whilst she maintains her employment.  To her credit mother is determined not to go back onto living on benefits.

 

In respect of father, mother told me that they were last in a relationship in August 2013.  She told me that she does not know much about his life now as they do not have any contact.  Mother would be content for father to have contact with both children.  Mother did not give a firm view about father’s ability to care for the children but noted that he had never had sole care of either child.

 

Mother would like to be assessed and for the children to be placed into her care.  Therefore her application is for an adjournment of the adoption application, further assessments, a re-introduction of the children to her and ultimately removal of the children from the adoptive placement.  Mother’s last contact with the children was on 6.1.2014.

 

In his statement father writes that he is opposed to the children being adopted.  He is the father of C only and therefore does not have parental responsibility for L.  However, throughout the hearing he has spoken of the two children together and he would really like both children placed in his care. 

 

He writes,

“I am now in a position to support L and C with any help with family and support.”  Father writes that he is happy to take parenting classes.

He believes that he is in a “better position than I have ever been with all the help I need.  I will do anything what is necessary to protect my children am no long in a relationship with [ ] mother and am in a better position now.”

 

He writes,

“The reason I am fighting for my children is I believe in myself and my family with their support to look after my children – I will do anything to get my kids back to their loving family.”

 

I have to say that father’s statement and evidence was really a statement of love and devotion for the children and a complaint about the lack of assistance and support the local authority has given him.  I hope he will forgive me for saying that at times he was a little hard to understand but his key points were that he did not agree with adoption, that he felt with the right support and help he would be able to care for the children and that the further disruption which would be occasioned by assessment of him would be worth it and in the children’s best interests if the children could be placed in his care and therefore back in their family.  As I have noted he did not distinguish between the two children which is emotionally to his credit but legally unrealistic.

 

Father was asked about the findings in respect of the injuries to L and whether he accepted them.  He told me,

 

“I know it wasn’t me but I don’t know who injured her.” 

 

Father told me that he had been to parenting classes but on closer examination he has in fact attended Oasis which is an agency which assists with drug and alcohol addiction and Healthy Minds for support.  In respect of the latter father told me that within this counselling he can, “talk about anything.”

 

Father told me that through his work with Healthy Minds he has learnt how to express himself in a more acceptable and appropriate manner and that he presents as less aggressive.  He believes he has more confidence.

 

He last saw the children in 2013 and did not attend the farewell contact.  He believes his last contact was 18 months ago.

 

Father saw the way forward as a gradual re-introduction of him to the children.  He accepted this could take “months or a couple of years.”  He was asked what effect that would have on the children and he told me that he believed both children but in particular L would remember him.

 

He would allow contact with the children and mother as directed by social services but he could give no view as to what he as C’s father thought would be appropriate.

 

Father was cross examined about the last contact he had with L in which it was suggested that he had become angry.  However father took the view that L would be happy to see him and told me L is “a daddy’s girl.”

 

I then heard from the social worker Ms. Lopez and I have read her statement12th. February 2015.

 

Ms. Lopez does not consider that mother has made the necessary changes not least because she is now not accepting that she has caused the injuries to L.  She is concerned that mother has not been able to undergo the therapy recommended by Dr. Blumenthal.

 

In respect of the children Ms. Lopez emphasised that the children have been placed for over a year.  She described them as very settled and happy.  L is at school and C is at nursery.  She described L being very traumatised when she was first received into foster care and rocked backwards and forwards.  This behaviour is no longer evident.  Ms. Lopez described the children being very well attached to both adopters.

 

She emphasised how detrimental any further delay would be to these children.  Ms. Lopez could not countenance a re-introduction of these children to their parents over a prolonged period with all the uncertainty that would bring.  In particular she was concerned for L seeing mother after this time and what memories that would trigger.  Ms. Lopez did not believe that C would have a clear recollection of his parents.  She considered the confusion that would ensure to be extremely damaging.

 

I then heard from the Children’s Guardian.  Mrs. Baker told me that she was very concerned about mother’s stance and that in her view mother had taken a step backwards in her lack of recognition of the findings made.  Mrs. Baker is strenuously opposed to any suggestion of the children being separated.  C has always been placed with L and Mrs. Baker considers the sibling relationship to be of very great importance.

 

Analysis and findings.

 

At the outset I would like to commend both parents for the way in which they have conducted themselves at this hearing.  I do not underestimate how difficult it must be and both tried to put their cases calmly and politely despite the highly emotional nature of the case.

 

I am in no doubt that mother genuinely loves her children and is desperate for them to be placed in her care.  I am also satisfied that mother is trying very hard to rebuild her life.  She has shown a good work ethic and is leading a less disrupted lifestyle.  There is no evidence that she is in a destructive relationship or that she is abusing alcohol.

 

However the fact remains that she was found to be the perpetrator of very serious injuries to her child, something which she now denies and for which there is therefore no explanation or understanding save for the reasons put forward by Dr. Blumenthal. Mother has not undergone the intensive work that Dr. Blumenthal recommended, although I accept that funding was not available to mother to complete the work.  However mother has not undertaken work that may have been available to her such as a domestic violence course and I accept the concern of Ms. Lopez that mother believes she has addressed this issue simply by not being in a relationship at the present time.  Mother tells me that she completed work prior to the final welfare hearing but it is clear that Dr. Blumenthal took the view that further work was required and HH Judge McIntyre accepted that view, as it would appear did mother in her evidence before the trial Judge.

 

In respect of father I say without hesitation that the submissions he made were from the heart and he feels great distress about both children being adopted.  Whilst it is accepted that his presentation was less aggressive and therefore there may well have been a change in his ability to regulate his emotions and express himself in a more relational and appropriate way, in my judgment he has not addressed the key concerns before the court.  He told me that he did not know who caused the injuries despite the clear judgment of HH Judge McIntyre.  He could give no reasoned view as to the appropriate level of contact between the children and mother if they were to be placed in his care and did not seem to understand the risk management that would be needed in respect of contact given the findings of fact against mother.  He did not understand that his application was in respect of C only and therefore he was effectively applying for the children to be separated.

 

In my judgment there is no evidence that father’s ability to protect is any less compromised than it was in 2012.  Father has never had sole care of any child and never had the care of C who was removed from his care at birth.  I was also struck by father’s lack of insight into the needs of the children in terms of the potential anxiety, confusion and disruption that assessment of either or both parents would cause.  It caused me great concern that father could suggest that a period of re-introduction could last up to two years.  There was no consideration of the impact upon the children and indeed their carers of this uncertainty.

 

For all of the above reasons I do not consider that either parent has satisfied the first stage of the two stage test and made changes that are of the nature and degree sufficient to open the door to a consideration of whether leave to apply should be given.  In my judgment in respect of both parents their prospects of success “lack solidity.”

 

However, even if I am wrong about that, in my judgment the welfare arguments in this case are overwhelming.  L was a child who suffered very serious injury.  When removed into foster care she was a traumatised child.  She had to be moved again to her adoptive placement which fortunately has proved successful.  Further destabilisation and a potential move in my judgment would be utterly devastating for L. 

 

It is clear to me that the best interests of both of these children, separately and together are to remain in this adoptive placement which is proving to be a safe, secure and nurturing home environment.  These children need to remain together and they need a permanent placement.  Given that I do not consider that further assessment of these parents would result in a recommendation that the children could be rehabilitated to the care of either parent for the reasons stated above, the disruption and destabilisation caused through delay and further assessment simply cannot be justified.

 

I have had regard to the section 1(4) welfare checklist as follows;

 

In my judgment the children would wish to remain in their current placement.  L needs the stability of this placement and these adoptive parents are the only carers who C has ever known.  I have already noted that L in particular needs stability and security given the events of the past.  Both need a permanent, safe and secure family life.  The effect on each child of ceasing to be a member of their birth family is that they will remain together and be brought up by carers in a permanent family with whom they are already securely attached.  There are no particular characteristics of these children I need to focus upon save that they are very young and they need stability and permanency now.

L was found to have suffered harm in her mother’s care and therefore C was found to be likely to suffer harm if he remained with his parents.

 

For all of those reasons I am satisfied that the welfare of these children demands that an adoption order should be made in due course without further delay.

 

I refuse each parent’s application for permission to oppose the adoption order.

 

In my judgment adoption is in the best interests of each child for the rest of their lives and in due course I will make the adoption orders.

 

My thanks to the advocates, the child care professionals and most of all to the birth parents who came and told me of their views.