England and Wales Family Court Decisions (other Judges)

In the FAMILY COURT at
NEWCASTLE UPON TYNE

		The Quayside Newcastle upon Tyne NE1 3LA
		19th March 2015

1. His Honour Judge Simon Wood : The court is concerned with the welfare of C, a girl born on 6^th October 2014, so now four months old. She is the only child of the union of M and F3, a couple who say that she was conceived as a result of a casual relationship; a relationship that is no longer subsisting. She is M's third child and F3's sixth child.
2. Sunderland City Council seeks a care order in respect of C, with a plan of permanence outside the family, by adoption, and accordingly it seeks a placement order to pursue that plan. The plan is supported by C's children's guardian, but opposed by F3, who seeks to care for C as her sole carer.
3. M's position is not formally known. In circumstances I will explain, she has disengaged entirely from the process of working with the local authority or participating in the litigation, albeit she has faithfully and appropriately attended every contact offered to her with C. Consistent with her position, she has never attended any hearing at court, including this final hearing and, on 9^th March, which was the first day of the hearing, I discharged her counsel from any further attendance.
4. The background is significant and I will detail some of it, albeit that concerning M is set out in full in the judgment of this court, given on 15^th September 2014; that judgment was published shortly thereafter on BAILII, under the name Re B (Children)[2014] EWFC B155 (15.9.14), which should be considered by anyone wishing to understand the background in greater detail than I will offer here.
5. The background concerning C's father did not feature in the September judgment, albeit F3 was the person mentioned in that judgment, in the context of part of the history, where he is referred to by the letter X; he, in those proceedings, consistently being referred to by M's family as a "family friend". F was born in 1957 and M in 1991; he is 57 and she is 23. The relevant part of M's background begins with the subject matter of the September judgment, namely very serious injuries suffered by her younger daughter, B, then aged fourteen months, in February 2014.
6. They included serious skull fractures and other sinister bruising and it was the decision of the court, following a full investigation, that those injuries had been caused whilst B was in the overall care of her mother, but no adequate explanation had been provided for them. They were injuries that would have caused B significant pain and distress and it would have been obvious to any reasonable carer present when they were inflicted, or someone subsequently involved in her care, that she had been seriously hurt. Furthermore, these were injuries inflicted by an adult and they were non-accidental injuries; that the perpetrator of the injuries was either M or some other adult who she knew had caused the injuries, but chose to protect. Furthermore, she failed to seek prompt medical attention for B and thereby failed to protect her.
7. There were other findings that were serious. The exposure of both B and her older sister, A, then aged three, to domestic abuse, as well as M's failure to provide them with a safe and secure home, in a number of material respects. The court ultimately made care orders and placement orders in respect of both; (parenthetically I mention that it is the local authority plan to place C with B, who has sadly had to be separated from A, something that was anticipated although it had hoped to be avoided, in September). The plan is to place, as I say, C with B in the event that orders are made.
8. By the time of the final hearing which took place in August and September, M was pregnant with C. She had a difficult pregnancy and the final hearing was punctuated by her not being well enough to proceed and it ultimately extended into September. An issue in the September hearing was the identity of the father of the unborn baby. The local authority had received information that suggested that F3 was the father; M denied it absolutely in emphatic terms in her witness statement. She said she had not had a relationship with him, who both she and her mother insisted was a family friend. She said that the father was a man called Y; also referred to in the September judgment, though as F3 in that document. Coincidentally, he is the former partner of one of F3's daughters. He had a significant head injury about seven years ago and so he lives with F3, who is his registered carer, he being in receipt of Carer's Allowance.
9. Y declined all attempts by the local authority to engage in the process of pre-birth assessment, which was required by virtue of the findings that had been made in respect of B. Despite having maintained throughout that Y was the unborn baby's father, on C being born M, for the first time, said there was a possibility that F3 was her father; something he confirmed in asking the court for paternity testing to be carried out as soon as possible.
10. At the case management hearing on 14^th November, I made orders for paternity testing of F3 and Y and whilst the latter did not engage, the testing confirmed C's paternity as being F3. In advance of that, F3 had indicated his wish to be assessed as a carer and to have contact and contingent directions were put in place to ensure that that happened. Each parent had also named family members as potential kinship carers for C. The local authority, so far as I can tell, in fact cast the net somewhat wider, but ultimately no one wanted to be assessed, or, in one particular case, the local authority declined to assess because there was active local authority involvement with that family at the time.
11. Before turning then to F3 who is central to this hearing, I should complete the picture regarding M. In the amended threshold, M's dishonesty about the paternity of C; even if she had thought that Y was the father, she had nevertheless been dishonest about her relationship with F3. A running theme in the previous proceedings, the use of controlled drugs, continued and was a recurrent theme in relation to C. Subsequent to C's birth, M has continued to decline to give an honest account of what happened to B. She had also ceased to engage with the agencies in those proceedings that she stressed to the court she would continue to work with, such as Wearside Women in Need, in relation to obtaining suitable advice about domestic abuse and the charity, Turning Point, in relation to drug use.
12. M responded to the threshold denying that there was any finding there that excluded her as being a carer but, that aside, has not engaged at all. There are, it seems to the court, two consequences. First, the threshold findings, supported as they are by evidence that has not been challenged, are beyond argument. They are irrefutable. As I say, despite the contention that was made in the threshold response and by counsel on her behalf at the case management hearing that she could safely care for C, the findings are quite simply so serious that it is difficult to see how she could realistically challenge the local authority case that she cannot meet C's needs safely, because C was likely to suffer harm attributable to the care likely to be given to her by M, not being what it would be reasonable to expect the parents to give.
13. Secondly, on that basis, there being no evidence that she has in any sense moved on since September, indeed if anything it is the reverse, the ongoing risk that she poses is directly relevant to the care plan, because wherever C is placed, regard has to be had to the risk that M might pose to her. Specifically placed in the care of F3, the role that M might play in C's life and F3's perception of the F3 can safely meet her needs.
14. The concerns raised by the local authority of F3 are in part relating to that issue, but in part related to wholly different issues. The local authority initially asked me to find that F3 advised M after B's injury not to take her to hospital. The local authority has amended that to the more limited finding that at the very least he contributed to material delay in getting treatment for B, as I will explain. It also asks me to conclude that he continues to minimise the seriousness of B's injuries and the court's findings about them. Further, that he is unable or unwilling to acknowledge the risk posed either by M or by Y, who lives in his house. Further, that he has a history of offending, including dishonesty which has a bearing on his ability to provide safe care. Further, he is ill equipped for the challenges, physical and emotional, to care for C, by reason of his age and experience and the concerns around the care for his own grandchildren. He is also said to have cooperated poorly with professionals, denied the relationship with M and failed to attend a parenting assessment that the local authority attempted to carry out in respect of him.
15. With the exception of his criminal record, the relevance of which he denies, as well as acknowledgment of the volatile relationship that he had with his daughter, PA2, which, with his lack of parental responsibility, prevented him from safeguarding her son, he denies every allegation. He does accept not completing the parenting assessment sessions, but in fact attributes blame to the social worker for not rearranging them and suggests that all the information she needed was given, in any event.
16. So before considering the evidence I need to provide some brief context. As I have said, F3 has five other children. His partner, LM, sadly died of cancer three years ago. His children range in age from 26 to 34 and I think I need to mention three of them; PA1, who is 32, is the mother of PGD, PGS1 and two other children who do not feature in the story. Their father, from whom their mother is separated is Y, in respect of whom F3 is his carer. PA1 is presently subject to an active case of neglect from a neighbouring local authority; her daughter, PGD, lives and has for most of her life lived with theF3 and, before she died, her grandmother and she is fourteen and a half. Her very good presentation is a central part of F3's case that he is a suitable carer for C. PGS1 who is thirteen, has at times lived with his grandfather, F3. PA1's younger children live with their mother and now so does PGS1.
17. F3's next daughter is PA2, who is 30. She has a son, PGS2, who is now aged twelve and another child who I need not mention. There has been considerable local authority involvement with both of those children, but the focus is on PGS2 here, because, like PGS1, for a time, he lived with his grandfather.
18. F3's youngest daughter is PA3, she is 28, although she does not feature directly in this story, she too has had local authority involvement with her children.
19. As I have mentioned, three of these grandchildren have lived with F3; PGD still does. An assessment of his ability to meet her needs was commenced in November 2014 and closed as recently as 20^th February, with the conclusion that there are no known safeguarding risks. PGS2 was removed from F3's care in April 2014 and with his mother's agreement placed in foster care, where I understand him to remain. PGS1 was the subject of an initial assessment in May 2014 and likewise is no longer living with F3.
20. Thus, the current situation is that F3 lives with Y and with PGD. He told the key social worker in the parenting assessment that his main source of support would be his mother, JK, believed to be about 80 and his middle child, PA1. His case is that, whilst not wanting to hide his past, he can nevertheless meet C's needs. He says he now has an understanding of the concerns around M, having seen the judgment. Whilst he cannot conceive of M having hurt B, he accepts that if she has protected whoever did, there is thus a need for her to be supervised in her contact. He says that so far as he is concerned he does not understand what risk Y poses, but if such risk is made out, he would ask him to leave. He points to the fact that he has cared for PGD for most of her life and that she has come to no harm. Indeed, he asserts, but the local authority dispute, that he was effectively her primary carer, rather than his late wife. He says he has not offended since 2009 and has no anti-social traits. His offending he would characterise as minor dishonesty, scrap and coal, and he said it is not offending that puts a child at risk. He said that neither his age nor his health should be a bar to him caring. He denies being an inexperienced carer of a young child, but nevertheless would welcome support and help and he complains that the course that the local authority sent him on was, in fact, for older children, so it was not suitable. That was not his fault. He denies not cooperating with the local authority. None of the issues, he says, wit PGS2 and PGS1 would justify him being denied the chance to care for C. The issues regarding PGS2, he in particular attributes to their mother, PA2.
21. Accordingly, that is the nature and scope of the enquiry. The threshold is denied so findings will be required and they will be made following consideration of the evidence and on the application of the burden of the standard of proof; that is to say the local authority brings this case, it must therefore prove it. It must prove it to the stringent standard of the balance of probabilities, as explained by the House of Lords in the leading case of Re H and R (Child Sexual Abuse: Standard of Proof) [1996] 1 FLR 80 and subsequently clarified in the case of Re B (Children) [2008] UKHL 35.
22. To that end, I have heard from the key social worker, Emma Cullen; she was A and B's social worker so is very familiar with the background; I heard from Sarah Doyle, the author of the screening assessment of F3, in relation to him being a carer to PGS2, in February 2014; next I heard from Amy Robson, the author of an initial assessment regarding PGS1, carried out in May 2014; I heard from F3 himself; finally I heard from C's children's guardian, Laura Grundy, who was also the children's guardian for A and B.
23. The evidential basis for the threshold findings sought against F3 was laid out in the witness statements of Emma Cullen and in her parenting assessment of F3. These are comprehensive documents and I am not going to repeat them here, but concentrate on the areas that are in dispute. The first issue arises from a conversation that F3 had with Emma Cullen on 18^th September, just days after the judgment had been given regarding B. As I have said, F3 had played no part in that hearing. The conversation is evidenced in an email that Ms Cullen sent that same day to the legal department of the local authority and in it she relates the meeting she had had with F3 that morning, where he had begged her to allow the children to return home, having advised M that she should appeal the decision.
24. There were some other remarks, such as advice that she should leave the country to keep the baby. Of particular interest to the events that had just taken place, was his report that PA1, his daughter, and he had told M on the Friday to take B to hospital. However, they had said that she should say that A had done it, or that B had hit her head off a cot. He is reported as saying that he would tell anyone from now on not to contact the local authority or health professionals as he had no faith in the system.
25. There was a reference reported of him having been at the family home on the Friday; that A had a doll that she tried to hit off B, such that he had to intervene twice. So he speculated that A may in fact have injured B.
26. One of the things that had attracted the attention of the social worker at that stage was the presence, on this account, of F3 being at the family home on the Friday; it being the case that B was actually taken to hospital on the Saturday, there being no clarity around when the injury occurred, but it was certainly within the realms of possibility, if not probability, that it had occurred on the Friday night, certainly on M's account.
27. Ms Cullen told me that she had met F3 previously in dealings over PGS2, and she said she found him to be very volatile. She thought that the email fairly reflected the conversation she had had. Asked if the reference to the Friday was a mistake for the Saturday, she said her recollection was that it was the Friday. The significance of the Friday was noteworthy to her for the reason I have given.
28. The other contentious part of the record related to the advice not to take B to hospital. She had in fact recorded in the parenting assessment the exact opposite. She said it was her recollection that he had said not to take her to hospital, but pressed about she confessed that she could not repeat the conversation with certainty. This is obviously a straight forward conflict between Ms Cullen and F3; the only evidence in support is the near contemporaneous note in the email, which would appear to support F3's position that he had advised her to take her to hospital, hence the local authority modifying the finding that it seeks, when it came to the close of evidence.
29. The minimisation of B's injuries is spoken of by both Ms Cullen and the guardian. At different times, F3 has referred to "the accident"; something that in fact featured in his own evidence to me. Ms Cullen agreed that F3 did not get the judgment from the court until December 2014 and accepted the proposition that he may have found it hard to conclude that M had deliberately hurt B. However, she was concerned that, during the course of several discussions, his account had changed; he believed strongly that F2, B's father, was to blame, certainly up to 18^th September when he visited her. Ms Cullen said he had stood by his decision to advise her to go to hospital, but had also said that he would advise anyone not to go, because of the questions likely to be asked and the likely reaction of Children's Services.
30. The parenting assessment, as I have said, recorded the fact that he said he would go to hospital as he would have to, to keep the local authority off his back. She formed the impression he was saying what she wanted to hear, rather than what he meant. It was in this later conversation, on 9^th January, that he referred to "accidents happen". He went on to suggest that M's brother, MU, or possibly a former partner, maybe called K, may have been to blame for B's injuries. K was a name hitherto unknown to the local authority; described by F3 as "a waste of space". There was concern that, despite an exhaustive enquiry, further information was still coming to light that had not been previously volunteered. The tone of the discussion, she felt, suggested that F3 did not regard M as being a risk; indeed, he insisted she was a good mother and cared for her children well. The concerns that she raised around M's alcohol and drug misuse, her abusive partners, who exposed the children to domestic abuse, quite apart from other instances of poor parenting, were all dismissed by him.
31. Acknowledging that he had not had the judgment until December, and the positives that he had identified by M, had been noted in the case, she said that he continued to say it was difficult to think she had deliberately harmed B. Ms Cullen was unimpressed by the fact that it was being suggested that three or four weeks to digest the judgment, the period of time between him receiving it and the parenting assessment, was a sufficient explanation for coming to terms with its findings. But he had said that he did not feel that M needed to be supervised; she said if she was saying something different now, she felt it was lip service and noted that there was a history of non-compliance with written agreements which was not a vote of confidence in measures that might be used to regulate contact with M, were there to be a private law order.
32. It is convenient to go to the issues arising from caring for PGS2 and PGS1 in 2013 and 2014. They are said to tie, amongst other things, into the effectiveness of agreements. Both children came to live with F3 because of the concerns that existed in the care of their mothers. PGS2, PA2's child, was living in unsafe and squalid home conditions, yet criticisms of his care continued after PGS2 moved to his grandfather. There were reports of him appearing dirty and unkempt, with inadequate clothing; failure to supervise him; permitting unsupervised contact with his mother and failing to cooperate with professionals.
33. On his behalf, it was put to Ms Cullen, that PA2 is a frequently volatile and aggressive individual, who would turn up, assert her parental responsibility and effectively do as she pleased, putting matters beyond F3's control; he lacking parental responsibility. Ms Cullen said had that been the case, he could have contacted the police, or Children's Services and sought advice, or even orders. She obviously could not say whether the neglectful things noted when PGS2 was ostensibly in F3's care were in fact due to PA2's disruption of the placement, to the extent that, unknown to the local authority, PGS2 was in fact living with his mother, not with F3.
34. Questions about this were in fact more a matter for Sarah Doyle, who carried out the screening assessment. It became clear that they too had a difficult relationship. He did not want to engage, in fact he put in an official complaint. She said that despite what happened to PGS2, and she described in detail the squalor in which PGS2 had been living, when she carried out her assessment of F3, he complained that PGS2 should in fact be returned to his mother. He disputed her concerns; she ultimately concluded that PGS2 should not be in F3's care; she noted that when he was in F3's care, PGS2 was involved in anti-social behaviour, found in the community late at night – he was then aged ten – and was apparently caught up in a police incident within the house. She accepted the PGS2 had issues; she accepted the description of his as "an emotional and troubled little boy" and that this was attributable to his neglectful and abusive upbringing by PA2. But she said that, in fact, PA2 had worked well with her and she would not accept F3's characterisation of her as intimidating or hostile, albeit accepted that there was volatility between PA2 and F3.
35. She agreed that PGS2 was not difficult all the time; she recognised that there had been difficulties setting boundaries; the fairly loose restrictions that the local authority had put in place, in terms of regulating boundaries had been designed to reduce issues. They were principally directed at keeping PGS2 from his mother's home and ensuring that his mother, who had issues with both drink and drugs, was in a suitable state whenever she was to have contact with him. She was unaware of what was effectively described as a "contact free for all". She said she was simply never told and had she been, it would have been addressed.
36. She accepted that when she saw PGS2 in the house he was clean and tidy. She obviously could not say if the occasions when he had been observed to be dirty and smelly were when he had been illicitly with his mother. But she reported that the school complained of a lack of parental support; that his homework was never done; books were not returned. What troubled her was F3's refusal to engage or to go to core group meetings. When it was put to her, she said that a comparison with PGD was not appropriate, because she is an older child, who has a much higher level of independence.
37. Likewise, PGS1 is a child with difficulties; the initial assessment recommended referral to Child and Adolescent Mental Health Services as well as a special educational needs assessment and a full parenting assessment. None of that happened. Ms Cullen said that F3 did impose boundaries that PA1 had not. She was uncertain whether the assessment, had it proceeded, would have identified more support. She referred to language that F3 was reported to have used about PGS1, some of which was in his presence, and to which I will come, which she thought had been emotionally abusive.
38. Amy Robson was in fact the key witness here. Her initial assessment was based on a single visit, as is usual under that procedure. She was alarmed to hear F3 say in PGS1's presence that if he did not behave, he would be put into care; the context being that by then PGS2 was in fact in care. As she put it, so it was not an empty threat. In PGS1's absence she heard him described by F3 as a "waste of space", as a "little shit" and as "wicked". She thought his style was authoritarian; it was put to her, as it was in relation to PGS2, that effectively F3 had inherited a pre-existing problem. Whilst not denying that, she said that she had not gained the impression that F3 had offered to help PA1 until she had reached "breaking point". She agreed that PGS1 needed boundaries; F3's assessment was right about that. But she said he also had emotional needs and his language and his threats were concerning. The holistic needs were not being met; it was still early days and the method of managing him appeared to be the threat of care.
39. Likewise asked to compare the situation with PGD, she said the impression she had gained was that F3's late wife had raised PGD. She said that PGD seemed to be resilient, maintaining herself in school and had very different needs.
40. Y is another issue. He is PGD's father. As I say, he suffered a serious head injury seven years ago and, relatively recently, within 18 months or so, moved from PA1's home to F3's. F3 is his registered carer and is in receipt of Carer's Allowance, by virtue of the fact that Y is assessed as requiring personal independence payment at the enhanced, that is to say the highest, rate. The local authority thinks he poses a risk; he has a very extensive criminal record, having been arrested 88 times since 1991 and acquired in the region of 132 convictions for assault, drugs, weapons, driving offences. As well as having history of alcohol and substance misuse, he has been the subject of thirteen child concern notifications since 2003. F3 says he is harmless. He has only offended once since 2007, but nevertheless if it is proved to him that Y is a risk, he will ask him to leave the family home.
41. The one conviction that does post date 2007, says the local authority, is nevertheless relevant. On the evening of 6^th February 2014, the police sighted a van driving in the Hendon area of Sunderland. It was being driven by Y; PA1 was the front seat passenger and all the children were in the van, albeit the van had no seats, so they were not secured, not wearing seat belts. Y was spoken to, he smelt strongly of alcohol, he failed a roadside breath test. On his arrest and search he was found to be in possession of cannabis bush. He was later charged with traffic offences and issued with a warning for cannabis and it appeared that there was no real concern for safety with regards to his own children driving around, unlicensed, uninsured, taking drugs and under the influence of alcohol. The local authority says that there is no recognition by F3 of the risk that would flow from that conviction; the impact that Y potentially could have on C, or indeed PGD, who loves her father and would be very upset were he, for example, to be asked to leave.
42. The local authority also point out that F3 has put no arrangements in place for him to leave; he is not an ordinary lodger. So whether he really would ask him to go, as he says, the response of the local authority is:

"We would have hoped he had made some preparation, rather than wait for the last minute."

43. Challenged about the risk that all of this posed, Ms Cullen pointed to the convictions and the recent one in particular. She acknowledged that the local authority could carry out a risk assessment of him, but had no confidence that F3 would adhere to its recommendations, or that Y would engage. Thus far he has absolutely refused to engage with anything the local authority has attempted to do with him. It is to be recalled that right up until the time of birth, on M's report at least, he was thought to be C's father and he never engaged in any of that either. So the question of F3's role as his carer is unclear, were Y to be asked to leave. It is not known where he would go or who would take over his care.
44. The local authority acknowledges that F3's last offending was in 2009 and that all offences of dishonesty, albeit the last conviction was specifically in respect of Trading Standards offences, that resulted in a 40 week suspended sentence and a successful Proceeds of Crime application in the sum of £59,195. F3 says that was all paid. A close examination of the record shows that on 24^th February 2010 he was ordered to serve twelve months in default of that having been paid. That is at odds with his evidence and it was not explored. That is what the record says.
45. In terms of F3 being equipped for the challenge of caring for a child, Ms Cullen said that his age was not in itself a bar; she said his diabetes did not appear to always be well controlled. She was concerned that with a child such as C, who is not yet mobile, whilst PGD for example had established routines which the local authority attribute to her grandmother's care, none of this was ever established for PGS1 or PGS2. The social worker said that she had observed him initially struggling with nappy changing, something that resolved, but nevertheless throughout the period of contact, he had deferred to M and the local authority feared he would do the same if C was in his care.
46. He was offered a chance to undergo a parenting course, but having been referred he did not complete it. It was put to Ms Cullen that he had actually been sent to the wrong course, which was one designed for older children. She said that she had not known that, but had she been told she would have re-referred him and she complained that he had not told her.

"I would have hoped that he would have approached me instead of raising it later."

47. Likewise, he at no time approached her for one to one contact sessions with C. The contact worker had reported that he continued to have sessions together with M. She said that were C to be in his care he would need social work assistance, certainly initially, but she very much doubted whether he would engage and that fed into the final allegation about cooperation.
48. Despite being a live issue raised by F2, as I recall, in the previous proceedings, M and F3 denied being in an intimate relationship. He had only attended two out of the seven parenting sessions; his mother was ill for part of the time and he was unwell for some of the time and the social worker said he was resistant about talking about alternative dates. He said that he needed to visit a friend, for example, when offering a reason for not being available on one occasion. She felt that he had engaged to the point where the assessment became negative, since when, as whenever else he is challenged, the relationship broke down. It was followed by avoidance of discussion, not answering the telephone and telling the supervisor at contact that he wanted the local authority off his back.
49. In concentrating on the threshold, I do not ignore the positive evidence that I heard. F3 plainly dotes on C; he has been totally committed to contact; he has never missed, so far as I can tell, even when simultaneously he is offering excuses for missing assessment sessions; he demonstrates love and affection at contact; he very quickly got the hang of nappy changing; his interactions are quite appropriate; it is believed that his home is now suitable for a baby, although it was not when Amy Robson saw it. But the local authority says this is simply not enough. Well, that is for the court to decide and that really is the relevant local authority evidence.
50. F3 gave evidence at length. I had a good opportunity to observe him during the local authority case. He was a lively, active and demonstrative participant; indeed, at times I had to ask him to restrain himself from his far from sotto voce commenting on the evidence he did not agree with from the local authority. I am going to set out his position here and then analyse the issues and comment specifically on his evidence before making findings.
51. The local authority stress that the threshold findings are directly relevant to and are pleaded to be relevant to welfare issues that the court is going to have to determine. F3 had made two statements in addition to his threshold response. The first related to his involvement with B in February 2014. He said it began with a call to him on the Saturday at about 10, from M, and she had asked him to take B to hospital. He was there within 30 minutes and there found M, MGM and MU. He noticed marks behind B's ears and a soft spot on her head. She did not seem to be distressed; he later told me she was running around. No explanation was offered for the injury. M wanted to take B to hospital; he rang his daughter, PA1, for advice. She told him that, absent an explanation, the professionals would be very worried and likely to take B into care. They then left for the hospital sometime between 12 and one, he having arrived at 10.30. Having seen the judgment, he accepted that B had been hurt purposefully. He did not think that that was by M, but accepted she must have known by whom.
52. His further statement was by way of response to the local authority case. Anxious not to convey himself as whiter than white, or as any kind of angel, as he put it, he maintained that C would not be at risk of significant harm in his care. He accepted that C's involvement with M would need to be supervised and restricted. He would also accept the local authority requirement of supervision, or any other requirements, indeed, that they would impose.
53. Of Y, he did not know what risk he would present, but, if demonstrated, he would ask him to leave. He said that PGD was the best evidence that a child in his care would not come to harm. She is doing well; she is well cared for, there are no professional concerns. His offending is in the past and is not relevant to the care of C; he is not too old, he is fit and well. He is an experienced carer; he is a grandparent and a parent, having jointly brought up PGD with his wife. He had demonstrated that he could meet practical needs in contact; he maintained he had asked for contact separate from M; the parenting course he had gone on was the wrong one. He accepted that he had been unavailable for some of the parenting assessments due to his mother being in hospital, but he said it was the social worker's fault for not making contact to formulate alternative arrangements. That was because she had all the information that she needed from the sessions that she had had, so it was unnecessary. He challenged each of the assessments regarding PGS2 and PGS1. None of the matters advanced by the local authority justified its plan.
54. He developed some of these issues in his evidence in chief. He said that on 8^th February B was running around and fine. He had been there for two or three hours and had had a cup of coffee. He had spoken to PA1 and noted her advice about the hospital:

"You have to advise them what's happened, even though I don't trust them."

55. Citing the long delayed, initially mis-diagnosed cancer that his late wife had. He remains convinced that F2 had done it, because he said he had seen him the day before, I take that to be the Friday, "flying off his head on drugs". He told me that his relationship with M had come from her being his cleaner. He said that PGS2's problems were all due to his mother:

"A problem kid, bullied all the time, he had a dodgy hand and he was tortured, he was very quiet, very sheepish, he had seen too much violence with PA2 and the men she had lived with."

56. Of PGS2's placement breakdown, he said that:

"Although there was a written agreement, PA2 could see the bairn as much as she wanted as long as it was away from her home."

57. He said:

"In fact she took him home and he stopped there and then he went burgling."

58. He said:

"I got sick of it."

59. He said of PA2:

"She's dodgy, she has mental health problems; she's a big lass and she used to fight me and she's not terrified of anyone. I had a lot of difficulty keeping her in place. She had been to solicitors and told me I had no rights. The local authority had no right to take the children off her, she wanted them back, that's what's happened."

60. When PGS2 was with him:

"He was immaculate, wanted for nothing, and was happy. A lovely kid, he's had too much crap through his life. PA2's house was regularly smashed up; there was parties every night, she was on cocaine, she stole her mother's rings and pawned them."

61. Eventually he gave her money to get a new house and she left it with £15,000 worth of damage behind.
62. PGS1, a lovely lad, had difficulties in school but was brilliant with him. PA1 could not cope, he was throwing desks at teachers. He said:

"When I went in he behaved like a lapdog and left with me he had been brilliant."

63. He said he did warn him about being in care to frighten him, it was not to be nasty. He said:

"They're not angels, they're from (inaudible). It's like Belfast, it's rough, they walk around in gangs. I did say he was a little shit, but he's a good shit and he's behaved himself."

64. He said of PGD, his wife had worked from 3am to 2pm and had worked all her life and so:

"I used to bring her up, not my wife. I would get her up, took her to school, she's not been one bit of bother. Y is no risk, he does need to be assessed and were he then there's a house he could have and I could go and see him, or get somebody to look after him."

65. Asked to describe his problems:

"He buys stupid things, he forgets things, but he can have a conversation, he's no bother and has a heart of gold. He can care for himself, the only problem is that he has no sense of smell so he has to be told to have a bath."

66. He said that his home was owned by PGD, she also owns three other houses. He could meet C's needs, he had tried to cooperate with the local authority, but he described the process as "a joke".

"I'm trying to work with her, I can work with anybody else, I would engage with the health visitor, with social work assistance but not Emma Cullen or Sarah Doyle."

67. With the exception of the evidence of the guardian, that was what I heard. Although she had quite a bit to say about F3's proposals, I think it is appropriate to make an assessment of him as a finding now. I have already summarised the law on the finding of facts and I have in the forefront of my mind that it is for the local authority to prove its case and no burden rests on F3 to prove anything. That said, I have to have regard to all of the evidence and that includes his. His evidence is, of course, very important, because whilst the local authority has assessed him, it is ultimately the court's assessment of him that is key to the outcome.
68. F3 was very keen to portray himself, if I may say so without offence, as a likeable rogue; a man with a less than perfect past, living in a rough tough old world, and whilst he did not ask or expect the court to approve of all of his decisions and actions, nevertheless he said that it could properly conclude that his actions, his instincts and heart were all in the right place, such that it could have confidence that C's needs would be met and that she would be safe from harm.
69. Can I say at the outset that he is plainly as proud as any father could be, perhaps even more so, because C's arrival was so unexpected to him, he believing he was not capable of fathering another child. I do not for one moment doubt the sincerity of his love for C and his belief that he can keep her safe and indeed his intention to do so. None of that is in issue. What is, however, is his ability to do so against a background of diverse concerns which the local authority says, in many instances, if proved, would be a counter-indication. Put together, they overwhelmingly point against his capability of putting into practice consistently that which he says he will.
70. Central to much of this, is the issue of honesty and openness and his ability and/or willingness to work with professionals, whose concerns are very real. So I cannot avoid tackling this head on. Although not quite the beginning of the story, B's injury is as good as any place to start, because it is that above all that brought C to the attention of the local authority. I accept that F3 was not a party to that litigation. Further, although his name featured as a possible father of the unborn baby, M denied it. The local authority did not know much about F3; indeed, I was driven to describe him in paragraph 66 of that judgment as "a rather shadowy figure".
71. So far as I can tell, he was never approached for an account then, despite it being known that he had taken B to hospital. So I make allowance for the fact that the earliest contemporaneous account that we have from his, of his involvement, is when he went to the local authority, after the judgment was given and spoke of his views in forthright terms.
72. I also take into account the fact that I found that I was told many lies about the circumstances leading to B's admission to hospital; about a wide range of things in the hearing in August and September. I am prepared to accept, because of her vagueness, that the social worker may have got it wrong when she noted that F3 was present on the Friday, although I do agree with her that if he was there on the Friday, that is very concerning indeed. But assessing that in his favour he was not there on the Friday, the evidence about the Saturday is concerning on two levels.
73. First, for the first time he places MU, M's brother, in the house that morning. That is directly at odds with M and MGM's evidence that he was in Newcastle and met them at the hospital. MU did not give evidence. He has a very serious criminal record. M and MGM talked in dark terms of what might happen to F2 if MU found out that he had been allowed to have contact the previous day. I formed the impression that M and MGM were frightened of MU, although each of them denied that.
74. F3 in this case, describes MU as "a nut job" who took legal highs. He said that he had not believed that of him until MU had threatened him at his own home. And he said of him:

"He is an alcoholic and will attack anybody."

75. That was all very concerning. I accept it is not F3's fault if M and others lied about MU being there on the Saturday, but knowing that he had been there, he was still ready to blame F2 for B's injuries, as late as his evidence in chief, despite having read the judgment in which he would have learnt that the family had said that MU was in Newcastle all the time. One might have thought that that would put him on notice of another very possible perpetrator of B's injuries.
76. The history of B's injury becomes the more, not less, confused and despite what F3 has described as "a nut job" being in the house, as I say he remained ready to blame others who had had contact, particularly F2, with B in the community.
77. The second thing, his evidence about the events of the Saturday morning and his own role in it, is itself concerning. Having said he spent two or three hours in the house before going to the hospital, he became, I thought, particularly anxious to compress the time. He repeated, not just in evidence in chief, but in cross examination, that:

"The bairn was eating and running about."

78. He had to retreat from the "running about", when it was pointed out that B could not walk and he grasped at the description offered to him of her pulling herself up and cruising around a table. In seeking to minimise the injury and emphasise normality, he described B as a child that, developmentally, she was not. But even more troubling is the fact of the delay. If he got the call at 10 and got there at 10.30, and we know that B arrived at hospital at 12.30, so it was in fact less than two hours. Faced with the agreed evidence that each adult, M, MGM, even MU said B must go to hospital, MU saying:

"There's nowt to fear."

79. He took time to have coffee and consult with one of his daughters, who is not medically qualified, but nevertheless had considerable experience of Children's Services, and one has to ask the question why? He told Mr Gray, for the local authority, it was to ask for medical advice.

"It was the right thing to do. As soon as I spoke to PA1 she said 'as long as she's eating and running about (that expression repeated) and is not in pain', it was okay."

80. It is impossible to understand the delay in the context of there being agreement among the adults as to the correct course of action. It is, of course, entirely possible to explain it if what was being discussed was what on earth to tell the hospital to ensure that difficult questions were not asked. Whilst I accept that what was said to the hospital, ultimately, that is to say nothing, had exactly the consequence that PA1 rightly anticipated. I am driven to the conclusion that, whatever else was going on, first of all B was not running around and secondly adults were trying to come up with an explanation which was not a truthful one, for B's very serious injuries. In my judgment, that has very serious implications for F3, in terms of prioritising a child and being open and honest.
81. The other issue around this time relates to M. F3 's very clear evidence to me was that he had had a casual relationship for about a month, that post dated the removal of B and A from her care and ended when he made the decision that she was too young for him. He had said the same thing to the social worker at the time of the parenting assessment in December or early January. He knew that she had denied to everyone that she had had a relationship with him, but could not explain why to this day.
82. C was born on 6^th October; if a full term baby, she would have been conceived around New Year, five or six weeks before the children were removed. F3 could not remember if she was full term, but on this point being pressed and I felt there was an increasing realisation of its significance, he said he remembered that C was in fact a premature baby. The more he was pressed, the more vague he became as to when conception took place, to the point that he appeared to accept that it might, in fact, have been pre-removal. In fact, subsequently, I found my note in the August proceedings, that the estimated date of delivery was 17^th October. Accordingly, C was premature by about eleven days. That would point to conception at about the end of the first week in January. That is to say, one month before B and A were removed.
83. I make no judgment, moral or otherwise, about this relationship between M and F3. But one might have expected a relationship of a month's duration, with a very much younger woman, particularly in the context of the events of 8^th February and the (inaudible) to have enabled this father to have identified when the relationship took place, with a reasonable degree of accuracy. To have told me it was definitely after B and A were removed, only to be confronted with the reality that it was subsisting a whole month before, it seems to the court has consequences. It seems it goes beyond F3 being a poor historian. In the context that we know of, in insisting that the relationship was after the children were removed, at a time when he said he felt sorry for M, provides both a justification for it happening and also places distance between the really concerning events surrounding B and A. Indeed, it opens up the prospect of him not just calling round as a friend on the Saturday, but having been a part of their lives in the run up to that date. I am therefore left with the uneasy feeling that I have not been told the truth, the whole truth and nothing but the truth. Instead the impression that I am left with is that answers were being given that supported or did not undermine his case. He is an intelligent and articulate man, well able to communicate his views and I found this evidence particularly troubling.
84. I am left with considerable uncertainty as to the nature of his relationship with M; in material respects, I am concerned that I have been misled and there remains, if anything, even more murk around the events of B's injury than there was in August and September. This is relevant to the issue of how F3 sees M. Does he genuinely recognise risk, or, in belatedly acknowledging it, blaming late sight of the judgment for that realisation? Or is he, as the local authority fear, paying lip service to what it wants to hear? He may be correct that M did not personally injure B. Every effort was made by all advocates and indeed the court to give her the chance to explain what happened. She steadfastly refused and denied that any circumstances existed to make her fearful. But F3's acceptance of the least she has not told the truth, is at best half hearted. Because in the court's mind he simply does not think that she is a risk. He said more than once that he feels sorry for her. Despite saying he was trying to keep away from her, it was he, I am satisfied, who insisted that they have contact together. He said that the court had said, prior to the DNA testing, that if he was found to be the father, he should have contact alone.
85. My record from the hearing of 14^th November was simply that his solicitor said that contact would need to be reviewed, if paternity was confirmed. Ordinarily, though, I accept that separately presenting parents should have separate contact. That has never happened and he complains about it. The local authority response is that he has never asked and that the contact supervisor, Julia, had reported that they wanted to continue having contact together. F3 said the exact opposite. He said he was sick of asking Julia for him to have contact by himself.
86. In considering the genuineness of this claim, I have had to stand back and ask myself how credible it is. The request he makes is perfectly reasonable. As I have said, it would be entirely normal and helpful. Yet, on his own account, he never asked the key social worker, Ms Cullen was never challenged on that basis, and perhaps more significantly he never made any application to the court for contact as he was plainly entitled to do. That was despite the criticism made of him in the parenting assessment that it was M who had done the caring in contact; the fact that a single session for him alone on 9^th January being set up so that his parenting skills could be identified, even following that there was a lack of complaint about this at the subsequent hearing. This all increases the court's concern that F3 is being less than frank about the status of his relationship with M. It is not necessary to find that there is any ongoing intimate relationship and I do not. But far from evidence of distancing, as would be appropriate in this situation, he chooses to defer to her in contact, in circumstances where he knows that she cannot sensibly be considered to be the carer.
87. I think he does feel sorry for her and in my judgment he has been perfectly content to continue the contact arrangement, despite what he says. I do not accept he has been the complainant. Had he been, an application would have been made; it was not even addressed with the key social worker. So it is against the other concerns about F3's role in M's life, it seems to me that he has failed to keep an appropriate distance between M, in the run up to this hearing, and there can be no confidence that he would do so were C to be placed in his care.
88. That is all the more so when one looks at the history of his involvement and dealings with the local authority. They are nowhere better exemplified than with PGS2 and PGS1. I am going to deal with this shortly. Each of their circumstances was so concerning that the local authority carried out assessments. In PGS2's case, not only was he living in abusive squalor, he was living with a mother, PA2, whom F3 describes in the most extreme terms. I am not going to repeat what he said about her. I do not doubt for a moment that PGS2's problems stem from that and that they were significant. It may even be that F3 effected some shortlived improvement, albeit the evidence from the school as to presentation, engagement, work and so on would suggest not consistently. But in seeking to throw all this back at PGS2's mother's door, F3 tries unsuccessfully to deflect from the real problem. He knew that PGS2 was living in squalor; his description of the problems that he had had maintaining PA2's home, the damage and the parties and so on, were florid and are, without further explanation, wholly inconsistent with PGS2 living in a secure, safe home, where his grandson's needs were being met.
89. Having belatedly removed PGS2 it broke down; the fault he says was not his, but a poor, toothless local authority agreement that PA2 rode roughshod over. Knowing how bad the circumstances were, I am afraid that hiding behind the lack of parental responsibility does him no credit. Not only did he not seek legal advice as to what he could do, he did not even tell the social worker, Sarah Doyle, with whom, like Ms Cullen, he fell out spectacularly, because her assessment concluded that PGS2 should not be in his care.
90. That was an assessment, I should note, in February 2014, seven months after a written agreement signed to prevent PGS2 from going to his mother's unsupervised, yet he did not complain that he lacked the necessary authority to prevent it. (inaudible) it was that he said PA2 was out of control with partying and cocaine and with 13 and 14 year olds having sex at the house, yet he was still permitting PGS2 to go there. I reject his description of Sarah Doyle as a troublemaker, who enjoyed it. It is a fact that permitted PGS2 to return to a seriously abusive environment and did nothing to safeguard him and PGS2 is now in care.
91. So far as PGS1 is concerned, whilst the issues are less extreme they are similar. He described PGS1's mother, PA1, by contrast as being "brilliant" but had too much pressure. When asked what the problem was, he said:

"She was not strict, she spoils, she does not impose boundaries but is a good parent because she loves her kids."

92. Reluctantly he admitted that PGS1's problems must be something to do with the way he was brought up and he said that he had threatened him with care, but that was really just to keep him on the straight and narrow.
93. One of the things that was highlighted by F3 in seeking to persuade me that he had looked after PGS1 well, was over money spent.

"I bought him all his clothes, a new X Box and 30 games."

94. He told me he got £150 a week benefit and the rest from "fiddle drops". Pressed, we got no further as to where the money came from, other than to suggest that in fact PGD had bought the X Box and games, but was too busy to play with it, so it was given to PGS1 – an assertion directly at odds with his bald statement shortly before that he had bought PGS1 these things.
95. PGD we are told has a rental income of over £1,000 a month, at the age of 14. He explained that, it will be recalled, by his wife having put their various properties into her name, because she wanted PGD to have the best start in life possible, with ambition to be a dentist, dancer or hairdresser. Just why PGD should be given such an advantage over all of their children and other grandchildren was not explained, but PGD's report in assessment that they were put in her name to avoid being seized as proceeds of crime, is, on analysis, worth looking at. As part of the likeable rogue approach, F3 told me that his criminal history was "all scrap metal and coal", from derelict buildings and not from "people's kips". When explored further, he conceded he had made the payment of £56,000. It was, he said, all a terrible mistake. It was thought he had been dealing in illicit cigarettes and tobacco, whereas in fact it was:

"A few trackies, a few trainers and a few cigarettes".

96. He said there was a box of each. He was unable to get documents relating to an insurance claim to show that it was all legitimate money. Accordingly, he was found liable for this sum of money; it would have been a waste of time appealing, it had to be paid and so his wife paid it. The record, as I have said, shows a figure in fact of £59,195. I am afraid I simply did not believe him. Having been found guilty to the criminal standard, and assessed by the Crown Court in a sum of almost £60,000, for a box each of fake trackies and trainers, what he said is literally incredible. And it also provides the most powerful reason for transferring the property into someone against whom the Crown might not seek to trace.
97. That evidence does show that his criminal past is relevant to the care of a small child. Were it to be repeated, he would be denied the chance to care for her, because he would be in prison. It is about as far from scrap metal and coal as it could be, but yet again he minimises and dismisses the concern and does so in the face of clear evidence.
98. I am afraid he does the same in respect of Y. That unfortunate man has plainly had a significant head injury. He is assessed by the Department for Work and Pensions as requiring care which, on analysis, means that he needs 24 hour supervision, with a good deal of personal care; preparing simple meals, prompting to take medication, to bathe, to wash, to dress or undress; he needs help with communication, dealing with written information; engaging with others and managing money. I accept his very bad criminal record is significantly behind him, but the events of February 2014 are about as clear an example of him being a risk to a child as there could be. He was driving when drunk and certainly in possession, at least, of drugs which, presumably, he keeps where he lives. He did so with the children in the van. The children were not secured in the van; it only had one passenger seat which was occupied by their mother. He was uninsured and not licensed.
99. From what I know of Y, it is hard to see that he should be permitted to be behind the wheel of any vehicle, in any circumstances. To do so when drunk, with drugs and with children in the car is about as serious as it gets. It does not appear to F3 to be a problem. No explanation is offered as to how this person who requires so much supervision should have got himself into that position and it does not really seem to show any evidence that the care that is being provided meets that which he needs and payments are being made for. The lack of planning around Y is, frankly, as concerning as the lack of insight when he describes him as being "harmless".
100. So that really leaves the question of his capability to meet the day to day physical and emotional needs of C. PGD is clearly an impressive young teenager, who has demonstrated resilience and resourcefulness; that is apparent throughout the chronology. The social work history in evidence would suggest that she was very much the product of her grandmother, as primary carer. F3 said in his statement that he had been the primary carer, along with his wife, until she had died. But in his evidence he went further and subtly elevated his role and downgraded that of his wife. I found that as surprising as it was suspicious. I do not want to diminish F3's role in her upbringing, but it was not his solely. The events concerning PGS2 and PGS1 post date his wife's death and do not reflect well on him, however much they presented as troubled children.
101. Like the guardian, I was troubled by the constant and frequent references to money; the sources for which remain unclear and evidence that as a parenting style it is a major feature. PGD was noticeably being paid £15 for washing the dishes in December. F3 told me he gave her £5 daily for pocket money and £10 on a Saturday; that is £40 a week. What F3 has to offer was often referred to by reference to cost, "they want for nothing". Even the fridge, I was told, cost £1,000. However, she has got to where she is, PGD, and one is left with the impression that she knows very well where she is best off, and she takes full advantage of it. I am pleased that she has developed so well. There is evidence of F3's ability to meet the needs of a baby; it seems to the court that it is of limited assistance.
102. I accept that as threshold issues, his age and his health are not matters to be the subject of adverse findings, other than in the context of embedded views and the ability to develop insight, which the guardian described as "startlingly lacking". I am sure he can learn to change a nappy competently, as well as many other caring tasks. The concern is whether he has the ability to devote himself to her appropriately and to protect C from all the other concerning things that I have found. One way to make up for any loss is for the authorities to provide help and assistance. He said he would accept it and I frankly doubt it. He does not accept the need. He has only volunteered for courses to keep the local authority happy and then did not take up the issue of being sent to the wrong one, which I accept Ms Cullen did not know about. His history of his ability to work with professionals is poor. The saga over PGS2 particularly so. The agreement was reached (inaudible), yet he never complained that he lacked the powers to override his daughter.
103. Twice recently he has fallen out with social workers and he has challenged their professionalism. He did so in an unpleasant way when they gave their evidence, with sighs, tuts and vocalised complaints and refuses point blank to deal with two of them. His assertion that he will work with others has to be treated with scepticism. He can for short periods, as he did with the school, but as soon as he is challenged, the game changes. He did not, I am satisfied, cooperate with the parenting assessment. I acquit Ms Cullen of blame for not carrying out more sessions. I think she would have liked them; his excuses though were just that. He went to contact without apparent difficulty. He will therefore do as he pleases, what he wants to do, as opposed to what he needs to do and these are worrying traits in a man assessed to need social work support, but who denies that it is required.
104. Thus, having reviewed the evidence, it seems to the court that the finding at paragraph 4 of the threshold, as amended, is made out. So are findings 5 to 8 inclusive. Finding 9 is made out, save that I will remove his age as a finding. He is however inexperienced as a sole parent of a baby and, by reference to the other findings, ill equipped for the physical and emotional challenges. Paragraph 10 is certainly made out.
105. Care proceedings involve two principal questions. The first, are the threshold criteria for making a care order under section 31 of the Children Act 1989 satisfied? Secondly, if so, what order should the court make? Section 31, sub-section 2, provides that:

"A court should only make a care order if it is satisfied that the child concerned is suffering, or is likely to suffer, significant harm, and that the harm, or likelihood of harm, is attributable to the care given to the child, or likely to be given to the child, if the order were not made, not being what it would be reasonable to expect a parent to give a child."

106. In this case, the threshold findings were disputed. In the analysis that I have just carried out, I am satisfied that they are made out and I do conclude that there is a likelihood that C would suffer harm, were she to be placed in F3's care. The rest of this judgment therefore concentrates on the second question as to whether and, if so, what order should the court make.
107. In answering that question, I apply well established legal principles. I bear in mind the rights of F3 and C, under Article 8 of the European Convention for Human Rights to respect for the family and private life. Under section 1 of the Children Act, C's welfare is my paramount consideration; under section 1, sub-section 2, any delay in making decisions concerning her future is likely to prejudice her welfare; and section 1, sub-section 3 provides the checklist factors that have to be taken into account, determining where her welfare lies and what order should be made. In this case, the important things are C's needs, the capacity of F3 to meet those needs and the harm that she is at risk of suffering.
108. There is an application for a placement order, so section one of the Adoption and Children Act 2002 applies and my paramount consideration has to be C's welfare throughout her life. Again, I have to take into account delay and, amongst the checklist factors to be taken into account, important is the effect on her throughout her life of ceasing to be a member of her birth family, and becoming an adopted person, as well as the relationship that she would be denied with other family members, in such circumstances.
109. The court may not make a placement order unless satisfied that the parent has consented to the child being placed for adoption, or that their consent should be dispensed with. In this case, neither parent can be treated as consenting to the making of a placement order, and so the court, if it is to make an order, has to consider its power under section 52 to dispense with the parents' consent, if C's welfare requires that consent be dispensed with.
110. These provisions have been subjected to analysis in a number of important decisions by higher courts, over the last two years. In particular, by the Supreme Court in Re B (A Child)[2013] UKSC33 and by a series of decisions in the Court of Appeal, culminating in Re B-S (Children)[2013] EWCA Civ 1146, Re W [2013] EWCA Civ 1227 and most recently in Re R (A Child) [2014] EWCA Civ 1625. I have had all those decisions firmly in mind throughout this hearing.
111. In Re B, the Supreme Court, having reminded itself of the European jurisprudence, reiterated that the test for severing a relationship between parent and child is very strict, so that in the words of Baroness Hale it should occur:

"Only in exceptional circumstances, and when motivated by overriding requirements pertaining to the child?s welfare. In short, where nothing else will do. In many cases, and particularly where the fear of harm has not yet materialised and may never do so, it is necessary to explore and attempt alternative solutions."

112. As Lord Neuberger observed, orders of this sort should be a last resort, when no other course is possible in her interests. That was stressed by the President in the judgment of the Court of Appeal in B-S. He emphasised that the statutory language imposes a stringent test and it has to be demonstrated that the child's welfare requires parental consent to adoption to be dispensed with. He emphasised two essential things that are required before the court should approve a care plan such as I am being asked to.
113. First, there must be proper evidence from both the local authority and the guardian, addressing all the options which are realistically possible, with an analysis of the arguments for and against each. The second thing he identified was the need for an adequately reasoned judgment, citing with approval the observations of McFarlane LJ, in Re G (A Child) [2013] EWCA Civ 965 about the need to make a holistic, global evaluation, rather than approach it in a linear manner.
114. None of this was, in fact, new law. The Court of Appeal was simply emphasising the need for rigorous analysis in comparison of the realistic options for a child's future, having regard to the advantages and disadvantages of each. It is required by the checklist in each of the Acts which requires the court to consider the range of orders available.
115. In this case, there are only two realistic options before the court – rehabilitation of C to F3 on the one hand and adoption on the other. As I have said, no kinship placement has been identified. In theory, long term foster care would be an option but no one has argued for it and no one has suggested it should be regarded as realistic for a child of her age. It was not argued that the local authority evidence, or the guardian's analysis, was deficient in this regard. Realistically, I am afraid the options are stark.
116. The first option is placement with F3, as he proposes. I have paid tribute to his love, devotion, commitment to contact and his belief that he will meet C's needs. He feels he has been unfairly treated by professionals; he has the physical, mental and natural resources to care for the child and he points all along to the success of PGD. On his behalf, Ms Upton said that the risk from M has to be seen in the context of his late viewing of the judgment; that his and Y's criminal pasts are behind them; that he should not be too harshly judged by PGS2 and PGS1's pre-existing problems and all the difficulties that PA2 created for him and he has learned from the divided loyalty, particularly in relation to PA2, that he then experienced.
117. He has cooperated with the local authority, at least sufficiently, and I have confidence that he would do so in the future, and to give C a chance that PGD has also had. Therefore, he asks me to defer a decision, to build on his commitment to contact and work towards being a full time carer, over a period of, say, two months. With monitoring and help there would be no significant risk and there are sufficient positive indicators to point to success.
118. The local authority, having contrasted C's situation with that of PGD, says that the findings that I have now made all apply in the welfare evaluation and not only exclude F3 now, but do so in the future. There is no sufficient basis to consider that delay would bring about a reasonable chance of success and, in accordance with the guidance in Re S (A Child) [2014] EWCC B44 (Fam) it is not necessary for there to be this delay. The guardian continues to endorse the plan and had her own very clear views, having heard the evidence, particularly about M and the findings which she regarded as the overwhelming obstacle to her having an involvement. But in relation to F3, she was concerned at his belief that M is innocent, is troubling, emphasising this is a child who had a fractured skull in her care. She was very concerned about his description of the events of 8^th February and about his want of commitment, in conjunction with his very negative view, to the work with the local authority.
119. She points to the difficulty of the constant monitoring; indeed, her assessment was that it would need to be 24 hours monitoring, noting the history of breach of agreements previously. She said that support and monitoring would be of limited use in the face of lack of acceptance of concerns and she believed that the moment he was challenged F3 would disengage. She was very clear from her own enquiries and the evidence as a whole that in respect of PGD it was her grandmother who had been her primary carer. She said that in her view there was a complete absence of protective factors within the family and, like the local authority, she felt there was no basis made out for a testing out period against this background.
120. Drawing together the local authority elements previously reviewed and that of the guardian, it seems to me that there is a good analysis of the positives and negatives that could be made out as follows.

First, in favour, C would have the opportunity to be cared for by F.

Second, she would be able to maintain direct links with her birth family in general and M in particular.

Third, she would be provided with a positive sense of identity as part of the birth family.

Fourth, F3 has undoubted demonstrated love and affection, as has M.

Fifth, F3 has consistently attended contact.

121. Set against that, there are these negatives.

First, historic and current significant concerns arising from the findings, in previous proceedings and in these proceedings, but also in relation to F3's ability to meet C's physical and emotional needs in a safe environment.

Second, the significant (inaudible) of exposure to further harm in the form of M, who remains as an unassessed risk, in the light of serious findings – findings that F3 accepts in a most minimal and qualified way.

Third, F3's lack of assessment into the previous concerns and ongoing concerns exemplified by the findings.

Fourth, his selective willingness to work with the authorities; a willingness that is then withdrawn when confronted with challenge or decisions with which he disagrees.

122. In reaching each recommendation, the local authority has identified a series of significant concerns, extensive documentary evidence of concerns regarding grandchildren. C, it says, is highly unlikely to have her needs met. The guardian, likewise, identifies the risk and notes that not only would there need to be unsustainable levels of monitoring, because this is a father and mother who do not work openly and honestly with the local authority; it would be not only intrusive, but it would prevent C from experiencing normal family life.
123. So far as option two is concerned, the advantages and disadvantages of making an order placing C for adoption can be summarised as follows.

First, in all probability here emotional and physical needs would be fully met in an adoptive placement.

Second, she will be placed in a carefully and comprehensively assessed placement, with carers with a capacity to look after a child safely.

Third, there is no likelihood that she would suffer significant harm in the care of adopters; she would be safe and secure and not exposed to the degree of risk of harm, such as her half-sister suffered; quite apart from that suffered by F3's own adult children and grandchildren.

Fourth, she would be offered stable and consistent care, with the chance to live a normal life and to develop into a balanced and emotionally secure person.

Fifth, C is not yet six months old. At this young age she will manage the transition from foster care to an adoptive placement without suffering undue emotional harm.

Sixth, she has the opportunity to be placed with her half-sister, B, so to that extent she will continue to enjoy a degree of family life that would be permanent and life long. There may even be a chance of ongoing contact with A.

124. The disadvantages are as follows:

First, it will result in loss of direct relationship with F3 and M, who love her and, in F3's case, who is desperate to look after her.

Second, she loses the potential of relationships with all of her birth family members, save for B. I accept that such relationships are valuable, even when a child cannot live in family care.

Third, she will lose her sense of identity with her birth family, even if her relationship with B continues, the relationship will be with a different adoptive family.

Fourth, whilst the vast majority of adoptions are successful, a number do break down and that results in further harm. The guardian reminds me that, despite the break in family ties, it can be argued that these are essential to secure development because C is young enough to form secure attachments to her adoptive parents, as those that would be formed by a child of her age with a non-adopted child.

125. In my judgment, the evidence in this case fully complies with the requirements identified by the Court of Appeal in B-S; the realistic options for future care have been comprehensively analysed and the advantages and disadvantages carefully considered by the local authority and the guardian and I accept their analyses. Ms Upton's argument that further time should be given cannot, in my judgment, be justified as a necessity against the findings made, both historic and present, in terms of insight, honesty and cooperation. In my judgment, F3 was paying lip service to his willingness to work and I have the gravest concerns that C's welfare would be severely compromised if constant monitoring was withdrawn, such monitoring would be wholly intolerable, both for F3 and C, and would, I am satisfied, inevitably break down.
126. The Supreme Court has reminded us that adoption is the last resort. Wherever possible, children should be brought up by their natural parents. Adoption is not a panacea; it has advantages and disadvantages as have been discussed. But in this case, having conducted the balancing exercise, I unhesitatingly conclude that there is no realistic prospect of C being safely returned to F3's care and that her needs for stability and permanence can only be met in an adoptive placement.
127. Accordingly, I make a care order and, having concluded that C's welfare requires me to dispense with the consent of both M and F3 to placing her for adoption, I make a placement order, authorising the local authority to place C for adoption. These are orders that are proportionate to the risks that have been identified in Article 8 terms and fully meet with the checklist in section one of the Adoption and Children Act that (inaudible).
128. It is, of course, a very sad conclusion, I accept, for F3. But I very much hope that the outcome in the long run will give C the opportunity to develop her full potential in a safe and secure environment and that that will, in due course, be some consolation.
End of judgment

We hereby certify that this judgment has been approved by His Honour Judge Simon Wood.

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