England and Wales Family Court Decisions (other Judges)

IN THE FAMILY COURT SITTING IN LEEDS
IN THE MATTER OF THE CHILDREN ACT 1989
AND IN THE MATTER OF THE ADOPTION AND CHILDREN ACT 2002
AND IN THE MATTER OF C ( A CHILD )

		8th October 2015

1. I have recently completed care proceedings concerning a young girl, C, who is four years old. C had been living with foster carers under an interim care order since November 2014. C was represented by her solicitor, Miss Coneron on the instructions of the Children's Guardian, Lianna Rojas.
2. The mother of C is M, who was represented by her barrister, Miss Wordsworth
3. C's father is F. He has parental responsibility for C by virtue of being named as her father on her birth certificate. He was represented by his barrister Mr Taylor who takes instructions from the Official Solicitor
4. The Local Authority has been represented by Miss Shield
5. I have not named the Local Authority and will not name any of the social workers or the other professionals involved in the case. This is because although I will be critical of the Local Authority's conduct it will not serve any useful purpose for me to attribute the omissions and failings which I will identify to specific individuals. Social workers and their legal advisers work under huge pressure, much of it imposed by the requirements of the court.
6. The applications before the court were applications by the LA for a care order and a placement order in relation to C
7. In addition, F, through the Official Solicitor, invited the court to make declarations that there have been breaches of his ECHR rights both before and during the proceedings
8. At the final hearing which commenced on 24^th August 2015 I heard oral evidence from M only. M's very experienced barrister was not instructed to cross examine any of the witnesses. M's reasoning for adopting this approach was set out in her very helpful final statement.
9. I then heard submissions from the advocates in relation to all the applications. At the conclusion of the hearing I made a care order and placement order and gave my reasons for doing so in an ex tempore judgment. It was important that the parties were informed of my decision within the timescale allocated to the case.
10. I agreed that I would hand down a separate judgment later, dealing with the Human Rights aspects of the case. I was unable to give a date for handing down judgment. That was because this aspect of the judgment has required further preparation time and I was about to embark upon other contested public law cases which required resolution.

THE BACKGROUND

11. The background facts that led to these proceedings are to a large extent agreed. The evidence is that in 2010 M struggled to care for C's older half siblings following the breakdown of her relationship with their father. Their father now has the benefit of a residence order.
12. C was born in May 2011 and in June 2011 she was made the subject of a child protection plan. Support was provided to M and her partner D. In August 2012 a psychological report by Dr Berry identified grave concerns about M's capacity to function as a sole parent. A psychological assessment of M's partner identified that he could not make up for M's parenting deficiencies sufficiently to ensure good enough parenting for C.
13. In January 2014 an assessment identified delay in C's speech and language development. There were ongoing problems in the relationship between M and her partner resulting in M having to stay overnight in a shelter for the homeless.
14. Throughout 2014 C's Health Visitor and nursery staff raised concerns about ongoing neglect and C's developmental delay. In July 2014 C missed appointments relating to her development and her asthma. In August 2014 C was the subject of a s.47 assessment because of cumulative concerns about neglect. In September a further s.47 investigation commenced when C suffered bruising and a mark to her eye. Various explanations were provided for the injuries. M consented to C being placed with foster carers pursuant to s 20 CA 1989. F, who had regular contact with C, was not consulted. He was not asked if he could provide suitable accommodation. He was not asked if he could suggest someone who might be able to do so.

HISTORY OF THE PROCEEDINGS

15. The LA applied for an interim care order by way of paper application on 17.11.14. Initial written directions were given on issue. The case was allocated to a District Judge.
16. The first hearing was before a different District Judge. An interim care order was made. Some preliminary directions were given. Permission was given for DNA testing to establish if F is the father of C. On 03.12.14 there was a further case management hearing before the allocated District Judge. An application for a psychological assessment of M and her partner was refused. F was directed to apply for party status by 12.12.14. Case management directions were given leading to an Issues Resolution Hearing (IRH) on 23.4.15 and a final hearing on 13.5.15 with a time estimate of 5 days
17. It is unclear exactly when F became aware of the result the DNA test which is dated 3.12.14. A negative assessment of F as a carer for C was shared with him at some point. In March 2015 the Local Authority solicitor wrote to F noting that although DNA testing had confirmed that he is C's father he had not made an application to become a party to proceedings. He was advised to seek advice from a solicitor. The Local Authority did not make the link between parental responsibility and party status. In April 2015 F consulted a solicitor. It appears that the solicitor immediately identified that F's capacity to conduct proceedings required investigation and resolution.
18. At a hearing before the allocated District Judge on 15.4.15 F applied for an assessment of his capacity to conduct the proceedings. This was granted. Dr Shenoy, Consultant psychiatrist, certified that F does not have capacity on 15.4.15. In a report dated 16.4.15 he stated that F would not be able to comprehend, understand and participate meaningfully in the proceedings due to his level of intellectual functioning. He noted the following

• F attended a special school as a child which he left at 16

• He has never been in paid employment

• He is unable to read

• He suffers from a mild learning disability and memory deficits

19. At the IRH on 23.4.15 the Official Solicitor applied for an independent social work assessment of F. The final hearing was vacated and relisted to be heard by a Circuit Judge
20. To complete the picture it is important that I mention again that F has and always has parental responsibility for C, having been named as her father on her birth certificate. This fact was known to the LA in its widest sense but was clearly not known to some of the professionals dealing with the case.
21. It was or should also have been apparent to the local authority from its own involvement with F that F has a learning difficulty

OVERVIEW OF THE CURRENT APPLICATION

22. The Official Solicitor invites the court to find and declare that there have been breaches of F's ECHR rights both before and during these proceedings.
23. The Official Solicitor asks me to find that the Local Authority has acted in a way which is incompatible with F's Article 6 right to a fair hearing within a reasonable time and his Article 8 right to respect for his family life. The Official Solicitor submits that, in particular, the Local authority failed

a) to consult F at the time that C was voluntarily accommodated

b) to identify F as a father with parental responsibility in the Form C110A and therefore as a respondent to its application

c) to recognise and correct its own error, proceeding instead on the basis that both F's parental responsibility and his party status were determinable by the outcome of DNA paternity testing.

24. The local authority concedes that there have been breaches of F's Convention rights. It concedes that it has acted in a way which was incompatible with F's Article 6 right to a fair hearing within a reasonable time. It also concedes that it has acted in a way which was incompatible with F's Article 8 right to respect for his family life. Counsel for the Local Authority has provided me with a draft of a proposed declaration which contains details of the breaches that are conceded. In addition, Counsel for the Local Authority has helpfully listed the consequences of the breaches that are conceded
25. In relation to the breaches alleged by F, it is conceded that:

a) there was a failure by the Local authority, at the time C was voluntarily accommodated, to consult F

b) there was a failure by the Local Authority to identify F as a father with parental responsibility in the Form C110A, and therefore as a Respondent to the proceedings

c) there was a failure by the Local Authority to recognise and correct its own errors, as set out in paragraphs a) and b) above

THE POSITION OF THE OFFICIAL SOLICITOR

26. The Official Solicitor has informed the Court that he is not prepared to allow these breaches of F's Convention rights to pass unnoticed. I was told that he seeks findings because:

a) it is in the wider public interest that public authorities' mistakes are the subject of findings when those mistakes amount to unlawful acts;

b) any future professional or public authority considering C, or any future child for whom F has parental responsibility, should know that F's apparent failure to be properly involved in the proceedings throughout was not of his making;

c) F lacks capacity to conduct these proceedings; the best way to protect his position on his behalf is to seek findings;

d) the breaches are stark and serious

27. Given the extent of the concessions on the part of the Local Authority I do not consider it necessary for me to embark upon a detailed forensic dissection of every aspect of the breaches. I only propose to highlight them and the consequences for F, to the extent that it is necessary to ensure that this local authority improves it's procedures to prevent similar breaches in the future.
28. I should mention that all parties are in agreement that the relevant Law is as very helpfully set out by Mr Taylor in his very focussed and incisive skeleton argument. I am therefore able to rely heavily upon Mr Taylor's skeleton argument for the description of the Law that follows.

THE OVERARCHING LEGAL FRAMEWORK

29. Article 6(1) of ECHR reads as follows:

1. In the determination of his civil rights and obligations or of any criminal charge against him, everyone is entitled to a fair and public hearing within a reasonable time by an independent and impartial tribunal established by law. Judgment shall be pronounced publicly but the press and public may be excluded from all or part of the trial in the interest of morals, public order or national security in a democratic society, where the interests of juveniles or the protection of the private life of the parties so require, or the extent strictly necessary in the opinion of the court in special circumstances where publicity would prejudice the interests of justice.

30. Article 8 of the ECHR reads:

1. Everyone has the right to respect for his private and family life, his home and his correspondence.

2. There shall be no interference by a public authority with the exercise of this right except such as is in accordance with the law and is necessary in a democratic society in the interests of national security, public safety or the economic well-being of the country, for the prevention of disorder or crime, for the protection of health or morals, or for the protection of the rights and freedoms of others.

31. By section 6(1) of the Human Rights Act 1998 it is unlawful for a public authority to act in a way which is incompatible with a Convention right. The definition of public authority includes a court.
32. Section 7(1) of the Human Rights Act 1998 states:

(1) A person who claims that a public authority has acted (or proposes to act) in a way which is made unlawful by section 6(1) may –

(a) bring proceedings against the authority under this Act in the appropriate court or tribunal, or

(b) rely on the Convention right or rights concerned in any legal proceedings, but only if he is (or would be) a victim of the unlawful act.

33. The Official Solicitor has not brought free standing proceedings against the Local Authority and does not seek any damages on behalf of F. The parties are agreed that this Court is able to deal with Human Rights points which are raised within care proceedings and before their conclusion without the need for separate proceedings. The parties and the Court were on notice of the intention of the Official Solicitor to raise the issue of the breach as long ago as May 2015. He now seeks findings. He does not seek a declaration of incompatibility.
34. I turn then to the first question to be considered 'Did the Local Authority breach F's ECHR rights as a result of the circumstances in which C was voluntarily accommodated?'

THE LAW IN RELATION TO S.20 ACCOMMODATION

35. Section 20 of the Children Act 1989 reads as follows:

(1) Every local authority shall provide accommodation for any child in need within their area who appears to them to require accommodation as a result of—

(a) there being no person who has parental responsibility for him;

(b) his being lost or having been abandoned; or

(c) the person who has been caring for him being prevented (whether or not permanently, and for whatever reason) from providing him with suitable accommodation or care.

(2) Where a local authority provide accommodation under subsection (1) for a child who is ordinarily resident in the area of another local authority , that other local authority may take over the provision of accommodation for the child within

(a) three months of being notified in writing that the child is being provided with accommodation; or

(b) such other longer period as may be prescribed.

(3) Every local authority shall provide accommodation for any child in need within their area who has reached the age of sixteen and whose welfare the authority consider is likely to be seriously prejudiced if they do not provide him with accommodation.

(4) A local authority may provide accommodation for any child within their area (even though a person who has parental responsibility for him is able to provide him with accommodation) if they consider that to do so would safeguard or promote the child's welfare

(5) A local authority may provide accommodation for any person who has reached the age of sixteen but is under twenty-one in any community home which takes children who have reached the age of sixteen if they consider that to do so would safeguard or promote his welfare.

6) Before providing accommodation under this section, a local authority shall, so far as is reasonably practicable and consistent with the child's welfare—

(a) ascertain the child's wishes and feelings regarding the provision of accommodation; and

(b) give due consideration (having regard to his age and understanding) to such wishes and feelings of the child as they have been able to ascertain.

(7) A local authority may not provide accommodation under this section for any child if any person who—

(a) has parental responsibility for him; and

(b) is willing and able to—

(i) provide accommodation for him; or

(ii) arrange for accommodation to be provided to him, objects

(8) Any person who has parental responsibility for a child may at any time remove the child from accommodation provided by or on behalf of the local authority under this section.

(9) Subsections (7) and (8) do not apply while any person—

(a) in whose favour a residence order is in force with respect to the child;

(b) who is a special guardian of the child; or

(c) who has care of the child by virtue of an order made in the exercise of the High Court's inherent jurisdiction with respect to children, agrees to the child being looked after in accommodation provided by or on behalf of the local authority.

(10) Where there is more than one such person as is mentioned in subsection (9), all of them must agree.

(11) Subsections (7) and (8) do not apply where a child who has reached the age of sixteen agrees to being provided with accommodation under this section.

THE AUTHORITIES

36. Mr. Taylor reminds me of a line of Authorities that highlight the obligations upon local authorities to involve parents in decision making throughout the child protection process. He relies upon Re S; Re W [2002] UKHL 10, [2002 1 FLR 815, which in turn refers to W v United Kingdom (1988) 10 EHRR 29 and also upon Re G (Care Proceedings : Challenge to Local Authority's decision) [2003]

C's ACCOMMODATION UNDER S20

37. When C became an accommodated child on 12 September 2014 it was because M had consented to this. It is an agreed fact that F was not consulted before C went to live with foster carers.
38. It is clear that prior to C going in to care, F was having regular staying contact with C, and that social workers were aware of this because of their longstanding involvement with the family. It is also clear from the evidence that some employees of Children's Services knew, or had known, that F had parental responsibility for C. I do accept the submission on behalf of the Official Solicitor that in this case, where the Local Authority knew of an existing and continuing relationship between the child and an adult who has parental responsibility, the Local Authority should have taken reasonable steps to ascertain whether the other person with parental responsibility, in this case F, objected to the proposal for accommodation.
39. The Official Solicitor accepts that F became aware that C had been taken in to foster care fairly soon after and did not object to it. However, F was not consulted and it seems likely that F was not advised that he had a right to object.
40. Not only was F not consulted and asked if he had any objection, he was not asked if he knew of any relative who might be able to provide a temporary home for C
41. In the event, when F was asked, much later on, if he wanted to put someone else forward as a carer he did not have any suggestions. That is not the point. The Local Authority's action in accommodating C, without ascertaining whether F felt he could provide alternative accommodation for C, was, I find, an unjustified and unnecessary interference with F's Article 8 right to respect for his family life given that the LA knew where he was and could have consulted him without difficulty
42. The Local Authority's breach had serious implications for C and for the progress of the care proceedings to follow. The Official Solicitor makes the submission, which I accept, that if F had been consulted but had not objected then the Local Authority could have been satisfied that it had provided accommodation lawfully pursuant to s.20(7). However, if, on the other hand, F had objected, the LA would have been obliged to issue care proceedings two months before it did so. It is stating the obvious that even a delay of two months can be significant in the life of a young child. That was not the end of the delay.
43. A Local Authority's discussion with a parent about the consequences of giving consent, the range of choices available and the consequences of refusal of consent is likely to provide useful information about the child's circumstances; the existence of paternal family is only one example. In this case such a discussion may have alerted the LA to the nature and extent of F's difficulties. This would have prevented the further delay which I will find occurred at a later stage because of the Local Authority's omissions.
44. It is also likely that if F had been fully involved pre-proceedings there would have been more chance of someone remembering that F has parental responsibility and therefore of naming him as a respondent when care proceedings were issued
45. It is clear from what has happened in this case that early gathering of accurate information about a child's family circumstances is crucial to there being fair and timely child protection procedures. Bearing in mind that important rights and obligations derive from parental responsibility it is incumbent upon any local authority involved with a child to :

Clearly record who does and does not have parental responsibility for that child,

Ensure that any professional working with the family is properly informed on this point, and

Ensure that its own decision making and care planning is informed by that fact

I turn to the next question: Did the Local Authority act in a way which is incompatible with F's Article 6 right to a fair hearing and his Article 8 right to respect for his family life once care proceedings were issued?

PARENTAL RESPONSIBILITY AND PARTY STATUS

46. On 17 November 2015 the Local Authority issued care proceedings. The application was accompanied by a social work chronology which is based upon the social work records that have been disclosed in the proceedings. An entry for 18.8.2011 records that M stated that she had registered the birth of C and that F was named as the father. A recording dated 18.8.2014 indicates that F told an un-named Social Worker that he is named on the birth certificate as father and that M has a copy of the certificate. It appears from the records that there had been some concern about the identity of C's biological father. Nevertheless, the records show that F had been having extensive contact with C in the years prior to issue of proceedings; the Local Authority's own records identified him as the father; and of course, crucially, he was named on the birth certificate.
47. Despite this, within the application for a care order F is described as a 'putative father'. He is not included as a Respondent. On the contrary, at page 3 of the application it is recorded that F does not have parental responsibility. At another point it is recorded that C has contact once each week with her 'putative father', F.
48. It is hard to understand why the application was filled in as it was when the information supplied conflicted so much with what was on the LA chronology which accompanied the form. Clearly there was human error on the part of the person who filled in the application form or the person who supplied the information. I pause to note that members of local authority legal departments are also working under huge pressure, having to move from one urgent task to another.
49. However, the conflicting information was not noticed by others. It was not noticed by the gate-keeping judge and the court legal adviser when the case was allocated and the gate keeping order issued. As the Official Solicitor reminds me, the gate keeping order states that 'The application form and annex documents have been considered by the court'
50. I accept the submission of the Official Solicitor that in terms of Article 8 it was wrong in law (because contrary to the requirements of the Family Procedure Rules 2010 ) for F not to have been named as a Respondent given that it had reasonable grounds for believing that he was named on the birth certificate and had parental responsibility.
51. F would have been a party earlier but for the failure of the Local Authority which was not identified to or by the court. As a result F was without legal advice and representation for a significant part of the case. He was entitled to public funding by virtue of being a Respondent parent and may well have sought it if he had been made a party at a much earlier stage.
52. On 19 November 2014 the Local Authority did personally serve F with notice of the hearing listed on 20 November 2014 and with a letter from the Local Authority. There is no copy of the letter sent by the Local Authority in the bundle so it is unclear what he was told at that stage about his rights in the context of the proceedings or the immediate issue before the court. I am reminded that F is unable, in any event, to read. Fortunately F did attend the hearing
53. The hearing on 20 November before the District Judge was an application for an interim care order and approval of an interim plan for the continued removal of C from her mother's care, she having been voluntarily accommodated on 12 September 2014.
54. The Local Authority's skeleton argument for that hearing is in the bundle. The position of F is nowhere considered by the Local Authority; his views as a father with parental responsibility did not figure in the Local Authority's thinking at that stage.
55. The District Judge made an interim care order on 20 November 2014. Although F was present at the hearing the recitals to the order do not make it clear if he was heard.
56. The case management order which emerged from the hearing records the fact that F attended at court and gives permission for DNA testing of him "to establish paternity". The reason for this is not given but, in light of the fact he was not considered a party at this stage, was presumably on the basis that if biological paternity was established he would be a party. His position in relation to the interim care order was not discovered by the Court; nor does it appear that the Court or any party considered whether the Local Authority's assertion in its application that F did not have parental responsibility was correct.
57. The next hearing was a Case Management Hearing on 3^rd December 2014 before the allocated District Judge. It does not seem that there was any consideration of whether F should be a respondent. The Children's Guardian prepared an analysis for the hearing. It includes the observation that "(F) has always been part of (C)'s life" There is no consideration of whether he has parental responsibility.
58. F did not attend the hearing on 3 December 2014. It seems unlikely that he was provided with a copy of the order of 20 November 2014 or that he had otherwise been notified of the listing. The order made by the District Judge timetabled the case to a final hearing and was explicit about the possibility of a placement order application being listed and the care plan being one of adoption. The order of the District Judge included the following direction;

'If [F] decides to apply for party status, such application must be sent for issue by him by 12.12.14, the child's solicitor agreeing to write and inform him of this decision'.

59. It is unclear when the Court, the Local Authority and the child's solicitor became aware of the DNA results which show that F is the biological father. The results are dated 3 December 2014. The child's solicitor wrote to F, setting out what she perceived to be the options for F in the event that the DNA testing did or did not determine that he was the father. Again there is no suggestion that either the Children's Guardian or the child's solicitor had read or acted upon the information in the chronology that F was named on the birth certificate as having parental responsibility.
60. It does not appear that an order was made joining F as a party to the proceedings. The Local Authority commenced an assessment of him. That assessment dated 9 January 2015 was shared with him at some point. However, it was not until 19^th March 2015 that the Local Authority legal section turned its mind to the possible role F might have in the proceedings. The solicitor for the Local Authority sent him a letter. However, I can see from its content that the Local Authority was still focussing on what F might do in the light of the DNA testing. The point about parental responsibility is still missed.
61. Following his receipt of that letter F did see a solicitor. On 2^nd April 2015 his solicitor applied to the court for disclosure of the papers to Dr Shenoy and for an assessment of Fs capacity to conduct proceedings. The District Judge granted the application on paper
62. On 17^th April 2015 the Local Authority issued its application for a placement order. That application names F as C's father and states that he has parental responsibility. It seems likely that the Local Authority belatedly acknowledged that F had parental responsibility because it had looked at the birth certificate in preparation for issuing the placement application.
63. The Issues Resolution hearing took place on 23 April 2015 (week 23). This was the first hearing at which F was a party but by then he had been identified as lacking litigation capacity. The Official Solicitor was invited to act as F's litigation friend. The Official Solicitor has correctly observed that the resulting order makes no mention of the fact that F had not been a respondent throughout and that the preamble to the order could be read as implying that he had been a party all along. The IRH was adjourned until 8^th May 2015. The District Judge declined to vacate the final hearing. At the adjourned IRH the Official Solicitor successfully applied for an independent social work assessment of F and the final hearing was therefore vacated.
64. The case was re-allocated to be dealt with by a Circuit Judge and the final hearing was re-listed before me on 24^th August 2015.

MISTAKES MADE DURING PROCEEDINGS

65. The LA concedes that F should have been made a party to the proceedings automatically as a father with parental responsibility. It points to the fact that it recognised that F was involved in C's life pre proceedings by inviting him to meetings about C and informing him about their concerns. However, it is clear that the Local Authority was in error in not identifying F as having parental responsibility in its application for a care order. This led to a situation whereby the Local Authority applied for an interim care order in the presence of a father with parental responsibility who, although in attendance at court, was not a party to the application and was not treated as one.
66. Similarly the Local Authority allowed the question of biological paternity to determine if F should have party status or otherwise be involved in decision making. Because there had been some doubt cast on paternity pre-proceedings DNA testing was perhaps inevitable. However, F's party status did not depend upon it and should not have been allowed to depend upon it.
67. It does seem surprising that no-one within the Local Authority noticed the omission to mention F's parental responsibility over a period of months. Because of this the local authority did not correct its own error. Mr Taylor, in his submissions, focuses his criticisms on the LA but of course it will be clear to the reader that neither the court nor Cafcass seem to have asked for clarification of parental responsibility, even though their reading of the papers would have, or perhaps should have, highlighted the evidence that F was named as father on the birth certificate.
68. I mentioned earlier that the Local Authority had undertaken an assessment of F as a carer for C, which was negative. The assessment was commenced in October 2014 i.e. pre proceedings, at a time when it was the case of the Local Authority that F did not have parental responsibility.
69. Once F had received the result of the DNA test and instructed a solicitor the issue of capacity was raised. Once it was established that F did not have capacity the Official Solicitor successfully applied for an independent social work assessment in relation to F. I was not involved at that stage but it seems likely that the opinion of the District Judge who approved the instruction was influenced by the fact that a) F did not have capacity and that it was necessary to ensure that any assessment took into account his learning difficulties and b) that the letter of instruction had input from those representing him
70. Following on from that last point, it is likely that F's lack of litigation capacity would have been identified at an earlier stage if he had been represented earlier
71. In addition, and all these points are conceded by the LA, F may have sought additional contact with C if he had been represented
72. Finally, importantly, there has been a delay of three months in the proceedings due to the need to obtain an independent social work assessment report after the hearing

HUMAN RIGHTS BREACHES

73. F clearly has an established family life with C. It is clear from the Local Authority's own chronology that the Local Authority treated him as a father until about September 2014 and he was invited to meetings and was informed about its decisions until that point. F had regular, overnight contact with C who knows him as her father. He was therefore entitled to respect for his family life.
74. It is clear from what I have described that the Local Authority has acted in a way that was incompatible with F's convention right to a fair hearing in the following ways:

i. the LA did not name F as a Respondent to its application when it knew or ought reasonably to have known he had parental responsibility for his daughter

ii. The Local Authority applied for an interim care order at a hearing when F, a parent with parental responsibility, was not heard and was not represented (as was his right) as a party

iii. The local authority failed to recognise its error and proceeded on the basis that the outcome of the DNA paternity testing was the only basis on which F could acquire party status

75. The same omissions and procedural errors give rise to breaches of F's Convention right to respect for his family life. It was clearly wrong in law that F was not named as a respondent to proceedings given the local authority had reason to believe that he had been named as father on the birth certificate. That error remained uncorrected for several hearings. As a result, the court was misled as to F's status. The court therefore did not have all the necessary information when considering whether to make an interim care order. That is of particular concern bearing in mind that by virtue of gaining such an order the Local Authority acquired parental responsibility for F.
76. F was not only denied a fair hearing when the interim care order was applied for, the procedural unfairness meant that the court was not able to consider the issue of contact. The Court has an obligation to consider contact on making an interim care order. This failure to involve F in the decision making process in relation to where his child should live, and whom she should have contact with, was a violation of his Article 8 rights.

CONCLUSION

77. All those involved in this case have learned lessons from what has happened. It is crucial that a local authority should put in place procedures to correctly identify those who have parental responsibility for a child it is concerned with, at the earliest opportunity. It should certainly do so by the time it is contemplating accommodation of the child or issuing care proceedings. This Local Authority will ensure that it has early sight of the birth certificate to identify those with parental responsibility by virtue of registration at birth.
78. It will then record this information about parental responsibility in such a way that it is accessible to professionals working with the child. This will ensure, for example, that accurate information is communicated when one professional takes over from another. The Children's Guardian has taken back to colleagues the message that once care proceedings are issued Cafcass should also ensure that all those with parental responsibility are correctly identified. Clarification should be sought where there is contradictory information within the papers.
79. I wish to make it clear that there is no suggestion of any bad faith on the part of any of the professionals in this case. An early error was not noticed by a variety of professionals who are all working under a great deal of pressure. It is unlikely that this pressure will lessen. Therefore it is crucial that where rights and obligations derive from parental responsibility clear simple procedures are put in place as early as possible to establish who has it.
80. I anticipate that the Local Authority will wish to share this judgment with the other local authorities within this group as part of the work they do to share good practice and to learn from errors. They have my permission to share the judgment for this purpose. Finally, I also wish to make it clear that, fortunately, although there has been delay, the ultimate outcome for C has not been compromised because of the errors in the case.