England and Wales Family Court Decisions (other Judges)

IN THE FAMILY COURT
SITTING AT MANCHESTER


IN THE MATTER OF THE CHILDREN ACT 1989
AND THE ADOPTION AND CHILDREN ACT 2002
AND IN THE MATTER OF: H (CHILDREN)

		Civil Justice Centre 1 Bridge Street West Manchester M60 9DJ
		29th July 2015

JUDGMENT

HER HONOUR JUDGE NEWTON:

1. I am concerned with:

A, born on 18^th January 2011, and now 4; and

B, born on 14^th April 2013, who is now 2.

2. The mother of the children is C. The father of A is D and the father of B is E. Neither father has chosen to play any part in these proceedings and both have had very limited roles in the lives of their respective children
3. This is an application by Wigan Metropolitan Borough Council for care orders issued on 16^th February 2015. As their plan is that the children be placed for adoption, there are linked applications for placement orders issued on 10^th June 2015.
4. The local authority's key social worker is F and the children's guardian is G.
5. These proceedings were allocated to the Justices but at the issues resolution hearing it became apparent that they would be unable to list the case for a final hearing before the expiry of the 26 weeks. I agreed that the case be added to my list and it comes before me today for a final hearing with witnesses in attendance. I have read the two bundles of documents with care. However, the mother, with the assistance of her solicitors and counsel, has bravely accepted that she is not in a position to care for A and B. She does not consent to, but does not seek to oppose, the making of the orders sought by the local authority. The guardian supports wholeheartedly the local authority's applications.
6. At the conclusion of submissions, I indicated to the parties the orders which I intended to make today. Given the mother's obvious distress, I have not invited anyone to await the delivery of this judgment which will be transcribed and served upon the parties.
7. I am satisfied, applying the appropriate burden and standard of proof that the threshold criteria at section 31 of the Children Act are established. I make the draft findings sought by the local authority which are not opposed and which are found at A7 of the bundle.
8. In summary, since the birth of A, and subsequently B, there have been repeated issues of domestic abuse; consistent reports of the mother's misuse of alcohol and illicit substances; her association with a schedule one offender; an assault upon a police officer; unexplained injuries to the children; and various problems associated with the mother's poor mental health, which have led to several hospital admissions. Tragically, the mother has attempted suicide on two occasions.
9. Matters came to a head in September 2014 when the mother agreed to the children being accommodated pursuant to section 20 of the Children Act.
10. Upon the issue of these proceedings, the mother expressed her willingness, indeed enthusiasm, to work towards the children's return to her care. Sadly, she has not been able to commit herself to the assessments and the contact arrangements which were offered. The underlying reasons for her difficulties became clear as I read Dr Daley's report dated 25^th April 2015. There is a helpful summary at E19, which I accept in its entirety as if read into this judgment. I will not distress the mother further by setting it out. It is clear that the mother has the misfortune to suffer from an emotionally unstable personality disorder. Dr Daley recommends dialectical behaviour therapy alongside some cognitive behavioural therapy to assist her in dealing with her emotional needs during therapy. The mother has a new treating psychiatrist, H, and has an appointment with him next week. It remains to be seen whether he agrees with Dr Daley's proposed treatment plan but, on any version, therapy will be lengthy and demanding and the prognosis is guarded at best.
11. That uncertain future for the mother must be seen in the context of children accommodated since September 2014, now ten months ago, a very substantial proportion of each of their respective lives. They are currently settling with a second set of foster carers who are not in a position to care for them in the longer term and so a move will be necessary whatever I decide.
12. It is abundantly clear that both children urgently require a safe, secure, stable and permanent placement, somewhere they can put down roots and build the attachments that will be so necessary to their future.
13. What are the realistic options? Although I did not hear evidence, the mother addressed me movingly herself and I have recorded exactly what she told me. She emphasised how much she loved both children and regretted doing what she had done. She should have gone for help, she says, years ago. She says she wants them both to know how much she loves them and she wants to get better, so that in the long run she can care for them. She said that in the past she had lost hope and wishes that she had never taken the overdoses. She says that she knows that working through therapy will be difficult but she is committed to doing it. She wants to stay away from bad relationships, from self-harming, and is concentrating on thinking positively. She is now already feeling better and stronger. She says she wants both children to be happy and to know that their mummy is going to be okay and will get better. She is keen to engage in indirect contact with the children and hopes to participate in life story work and ideally to meet the prospective adopters.
14. In my judgement, the mother is being realistic in accepting that she is not in a position to care for the children now or in the immediate future. Sadly, they cannot afford to wait for the mother's commendable efforts to seek the help that she needs. Unfortunately, there are no prospective placements within the mother's extended family. Long-term foster care is really not a realistic option for children of this age.
15. So I must balance the positive and negative aspects of the Local Authority plans for adoption. I am all too conscious that adoption is no panacea. Adopters face all the vicissitudes of life faced by ordinary parents with the added complication that the children they are bringing up are not their birth children. Of course, adoption would sever the relationship between A and B and their mother who loves them very much. I do not envisage that the Local authority is likely to find it difficult to identify prospective adopters and I hope that they can be placed within the relatively near future. Current research suggests that in those circumstances the risks of disruption of the placement are extremely low. In my judgment, adoption offers the best prospect of a permanent, loving, enduring family for these children.
16. Doing the best that I can to weigh all of the evidence, accepting the firm consensus of professional evidence, and bearing in mind that the applications are not opposed, I am satisfied, firstly, that applying the welfare checklist at section 1(3) of the Children Act, the making of care orders with a plan for adoption, accords with the welfare interests of the children.
17. Turning to the application for placement orders, I have firmly in mind the assistance of the Supreme Court in Re B (A Child) [2013] UKSC 33, followed by the decisions of the Court of Appeal, particularly in Re B-S (Children) [2013] EWCA Civ 1146. I accept that placement for adoption is, "a very extreme thing", and, "a last resort to be approved only when nothing else will do". I am also aware that the granting of a care order, let alone endorsing the plan for adoption, represents a drastic curtailment for the rights of these children and their mother under Article 8 of the European Convention on Human Rights and Fundamental Freedoms. Such interference can only be justified by pressing concerns for the children's welfare and any orders I make must be a lawful, necessary and proportionate response to the children's sad predicament.
18. Nevertheless, applying the welfare checklist at section 1(4) of the Adoption and Children Act 2002, and conscious that I must consider the welfare of A and B throughout their lives, I am satisfied that it accords with their welfare to be made the subject of a placement order. Indeed, the position really is so clear, bearing in mind the guidance set out in Re P (Placement Orders: Parental Consent) [2008] EWCA Civ 535, that I must dispense with the consent of the mother, in so far as she is withholding it, to the making of placement orders.

ORDERS

19. The orders I make are as follows:

a. I approve the local authority's care plan and I make care orders;

b. I dispense with the consent of the mother and I make placement orders;

c. I direct a transcript of this judgment at the joint expense of all the parties;

d. I give leave to disclose the transcript to any prospective adopters;

e. I direct an assessment of the costs of the legally assisted parties;

f. I reserve any further applications in relation to the children to myself unless geographically that is inconvenient for prospective adopters.

20. If A or B should ever in later life read this imperfect judgment, I hope they will appreciate that their mother loved them very much indeed and was desperate to resume their care. The decisions she has taken today are painful but realistic and they are decisions that she made with the welfare of her children at the forefront of her mind. She is still only 25 years of age. It is not her fault that her own appalling upbringing and consequent psychological problems have left her ill-equipped to cope with the challenges of parenting.

POSTSCRIPT

21. The chronology of events prior to September 2014 makes depressing reading. Both children were significantly harmed and that harm was not mitigated by appropriate local authority intervention. The local authority could and should have intervened to remove these children from their mother's care very much earlier. That said, I understand the challenges which hard pressed Local Authority social workers face and it is very easy to be wise with the benefit of hindsight.
22. However, even when the children were belatedly accommodated on 18^th September 2014 and despite legal gateway meetings on 29th September 2014 and 13^th November 2014, proceedings were not issued. On 26^th November 2014, the mother attempted suicide and was then admitted to hospital. She was not discharged until 15^th December 2014. The assessment which should have been commenced, even concluded, long prior to the children's accommodation was not finalised until 20^th January 2015. It is astonishing to record that care proceedings were still not issued until 16^th February 2015.
23. That period of over five months' delay, exacerbated by the Local Authority's failures prior to September 2014, has in my judgment been profoundly damaging to the children. Orders, including care and placement orders, could and would have been made much sooner had the local authority issued these proceedings at an earlier stage. The pre-proceedings protocol is not an excuse for drift and delay. Social work interventions undertaken in the pre-proceedings stage must be focused and timely.
24. I fully understand why everyone with an ounce of humanity would be sympathetic to the mother's predicament. However, there has been far too much attention paid to the mother's state of health, and insufficient attention to the impact of delay upon the welfare interests of such young children.
25. On this occasion, I do not propose to take the matter any further, other than to direct that my judgment is brought to the attention of the relevant Director of Children Services. She might profitably also consider the recent strictures of the Court of Appeal in Re N [2015] EWCA Civ 1112

[Judgment ends]