England and Wales Family Court Decisions (other Judges)

IN THE FAMILY COURT

		30th April 2014

HIS HONOUR JUDGE RUMBELOW QC:

1. Before the court are a number of applications made by Mrs. G, the mother of a girl known as C, who is now aged 15 having been born on 5th August 1998. On 6th November 2009 District Judge Venables, as she then was, made a care order in respect of C following a four day hearing. A copy of her judgment is on file and all the parties have it. The care plan was for long-term foster care and C has been with her foster carers since 2009.
2. Taking the applications chronologically the first was made on 14th October 2013 on form C100. It sought a revocation of the care order, an interim contact order and a residence order. It made allegations of local authority and police corruption. On the same date Mrs. G issued a C1A form setting out allegations of harm and domestic violence which Mrs. G says she and/or C have suffered at the hands of the local authority, but essentially seeking the return of her child. Those matters were listed for a 30-minute directions hearing at 9.30am on 29th November 2013.
3. The day before that directions hearing Mrs.G made a further application, seeking an order that C attend the directions hearing on 29th November 2013 as a witness, and complaining about the changes of guardian since the 2009 care order was made.
4. The hearing on 29th November 2013 was not very productive since Mrs. G arrived late at court, as did the guardian who was bringing his report with him. Nevertheless, there was a hearing in excess of an hour during which time Mrs. G, who acts in person, addressed the court. I then adjourned the application to 16th April 2014. I directed an addendum guardian's report because Mrs. G had failed to respond to the guardian's offers of appointments, and his letters and telephone messages had not been returned. I made orders against Mrs. G with a penal notice attached, directing her not to post and to remove from the internet or other social media any details which she had posted concerning C and which could lead to C's identification or location. I also directed her not to seek to contact C other than in accordance with the existing contact order under which there was supervised contact four times a year, that frequency having been C's then wishes.
5. On 29th November 2013 I refused the application that C should be brought to court to give evidence, having regard to what I had heard in submissions from the local authority and the guardian that C was happy with her foster carers and did not wish to make any change to her placement. Apart from these submissions the court was in possession of a long letter from C, faxed to the court by the deputy head of C's school on 29th November 2013, in which C said that she wished to stay with her foster carers. It was originally unclear whether that letter had been sent for disclosure to all parties or simply to me personally. Accordingly I did not rely on its contents in refusing the application that C should give evidence. However, the existence and some indication of the terms of the letter became apparent during the hearing when disclosure of the letter was canvassed with the guardian. I concluded that to compel C to attend to give evidence would place her in an invidious, embarrassing, distressing and damaging position.
6. Although I refused Mrs. G's application that C should attend, that refusal was unfortunately not included in the order of 29th November 2013 issued by the court.
7. By the adjournment date of 16th April 2014 the local authority social worker KW had filed a statement dated 20th December 2013 in which she reported C's views as being as expressed in the letter of 29th November 2013, namely that C did not wish to have any contact with her mother. In a further statement of 22nd April 2014, made in relation to applications by the local authority, to which I will return, the social worker disclosed the full letter. I therefore now regard the letter as a document in these proceedings.
8. On 16^th April 2014, Mrs. G renewed her application that C should attend the hearing, on the ground that my refusal on 29^th November 2013 had not been included in the order of that date. I again refused the application on the same grounds, which were now supported by C's own letter and by the up to date reports of her wishes and feelings as conveyed to the court by the local authority, the guardian and C's solicitor, Ms King. C had told each of them that she did not wish to leave her placement or to see her mother or to attend the hearing. Mrs. G sought leave to appeal my refusal to require C's attendance. I refused leave to appeal. I assume that Mrs. G has made or will be making an application for leave from the Court of Appeal.
9. I return to Mrs. G's applications. On 14th February 2014 she issued an ex parte application for an emergency protection order. The application is supported by a 15-page submission and a separate statement. Principally the application alleged that the local authority had neglected C, that the findings of District Judge Venables had been overtaken by Mrs. G's acquittal on a charge of neglect, that she was the victim of racial discrimination and that the local authority had fabricated evidence against her. In so far as the application of 14th February 2014 seeks that C return to her mother's care, I will regard it as a further application to discharge the care order and/or to make a residence order.
10. On 20th February 2014 Mrs. G wrote to the court indicating that she was appealing part of my order of 29th November 2013. I have no knowledge as to the point on which she was seeking leave to appeal unless perhaps it was my refusal of her application that C should have been brought to court.
11. I will summarise the grounds of Mrs. G's submissions to revoke the care order, combining her submissions made on 29th November 2013 and the 16th April 2014:

(A) C should have been ordered to attend the hearing.

(B) Mrs. G is not and never has been mentally ill. Dr. Mahendra, the consultant psychiatrist who gave evidence to District Judge Venables, which evidence District Judge Venables accepted, was wrong in his diagnosis. Mrs. G has never neglected or ill treated , for example making her run naked down the street. C has never complained of being ill treated. Mrs. G's acquittal on the charge of neglect proved that District Judge Venables' conclusions were wrong and the jury also said that she, Mrs. G, was not mentally ill.

(C) She has been prosecuted by the local authority and locked in a cell by the police, who beat her up. Mrs. G will lay charges against the police and seek compensation. All that was racial harassment, and the local authority has made racially offensive statements. Mrs. G had taken this issue to the European Court which had declared racial harassment to be within its sphere of competence.

(D) The notes relating to contact between herself and C show that they had a brilliant relationship and C wanted to be with her mother.

(E) Social worker, KW was not in attendance at court on 16th April 2014 nor was the guardian. The guardian was not to be trusted. There had been three guardians since 2009 and this contravened Mrs. G's article 6 rights. The submissions made by the local authority and by C's solicitor, Ms King, as to what C had told them and the guardian were hearsay, and should be ignored. The social worker had only signed the first page of her statement and the local authority could have removed that first page and attached it to a different statement. There was no evidence that the guardian and Ms King had gone to see C at her school, as was reported to the court.

(F) The local authority had neglected C physically. Mrs. G had requested photographs of C from the period 2012 to 2013 to show C's condition, but the local authority have not provided these. Further, the local authority has placed C with foster carers who are not sympathetic to her racial and cultural heritage, and who disrespected those needs. The local authority had been found by Ofsted to be a poor provider of care to children in its care.

(G) C was Mrs. G's property. Mrs G had not consented to the local authority taking her property, and she wanted her property returned to her.

(H) Mrs. G said she had been attending at C's school but had not attempted to speak to C, who was pleased to see her. In other documentation Mrs. G refers to having been to a school ballet production which involved C and they had spoken.

(I) As to the allegation that she had published material revealing details of C the whereabouts of the foster carers, the local authority had done the same thing, and what was sauce for the goose was sauce for the gander.

12. The cases for the local authority and the guardian are simple and straightforward. C had consistently said that she is settled and happy with her foster parents, and does not wish to move, or to go to live with her mother. It is agreed that C is an intelligent and articulate girl. Whereas at one time C had been saying that she wanted limited contact with her mother she was now saying that she did not even want telephone contact. She is embarrassed by her mother's attendances at her school. She wants these proceedings to be at an end. C's wishes and feelings had been fully expressed to the local authority, to the guardian and to C's solicitor.
13. The local authority said that it would issue an application for a section 34(4) order, and committal proceedings for breaches of court orders against publication of details of C's placement, and for repeated contact with C otherwise than in accordance with the order of the court, which was for limited and supervised contact.
14. Ms King, C's solicitor, said that she had offered C the options of coming to court to give evidence, or possibly coming to see the judge privately. C had rejected both options. Ms King, like the local authority, said that there should be a section 34(4) application by the local authority, failing which she would make one on behalf of C. She would also make an application to commit Mrs. G for continued breach of the court orders. Ms King said that there should also be a section 91(14) order.
15. I made clear to the parties on 16th April 2014 that any section 34(4) or committal applications would have to be made and heard separately on a date which I identified as 7th May 2014. Those applications have now been made. In an order of 18th April 2014 I directed that I would consider any section 91(14) application today, following this judgment. I will return to that at the end of this judgment.
16. In the hope that it will assist Mrs G, I will briefly address the issues raised by her at paragraph 11 above, using the equivalently lettered subparagraphs.

(A) C has not been required by the court to give evidence for the reasons set out at paragraphs 5 and 6 above. In short, it would be contrary to her welfare, and superfluous having regard to the unanimity of reports from the local authority, the guardian and C's solicitor as to her wishes and feelings. A copy of Chs letter will be appended to this judgment.

(B) Mrs. G's acquittal on the charge of neglect in no way invalidates District Judge Venables' decision to make the court care in order 2009. The evidence from the criminal trial is not before this court and District Judge Venables would have been concerned with a different standard of proof. I cannot see, in the absence of any specific evidence, how Mrs. G's acquittal means that the jury accepted or stated that she did not have a mental illness. In any event, Dr. Mahendra had not said at the care hearing that Mrs. G did have a formal mental illness. He said that she was a paranoid personality type.

(C) The local authority was not responsible for the criminal prosecution for neglect. That was a decision made between the police and the Crown Prosecution Service. I cannot comment on Mrs. G's allegations against the police.

(D) It is accepted that at one time C and her mother enjoyed their contacts together. However, it is clear from C that Mrs. G's subsequent behaviour has completely soured their relationship.

(E) Hearsay evidence is admissible in family proceedings. There was nothing to support Mrs. G's allegations of dishonesty or bad faith in the unanimous reports from the social worker, the guardian or C's solicitor. I accept the accuracy of the reports which each of those has given.

(F) The letter from C is overwhelmingly to the effect that she wishes the care order and her placement to continue. There is no suggestion from C that she has been physically neglected or that her racial or cultural background has been disrespected. I record that Mrs. G is black and she says that C's father was Chinese.

(G) C was lawfully removed from her mother's care, made the subject of a care order and a long-term foster placement. Like all the other issues raised by Mrs. G, the appropriateness of the care order has been repeatedly raised and repeatedly affirmed, in a series of previous judgments of the Courts.

(H) and (I) are matters for the separate applications to be heard on 7th May 2014.

17. I will set out the history of Mrs. G's previous applications since 2009, but they have been so numerous that the court files are not always totally clear. However, the following may be extracted;

(a) During the currency of the care proceedings Mrs. G appears to have appealed the making of an interim care order. That came before my predecessor as designated family judge, His Honour Judge Waine. He dismissed the application and refused leave to appeal. Mrs. G went to the Court of Appeal and came before Ward LJ for leave on 19th January 2010. With respect to the learned Lord Justice I am not sure that he has completely accurately recorded the history. In any event, however, he refused leave and dismissed her appeal on the merits. He also pointed out her appeal on the interim care order was academic, because a full care order had since been made, in November 2009. The order of the Court of Appeal prohibited Mrs. G from any publication of information likely to lead to C's identification.

(b) A month after that hearing before Ward LJ, Mrs. G made an application before Judge Waine to discharge the care order. That application was dismissed in March 2010 and leave to appeal was refused. Mrs. went to the Court of Appeal. Her appeal was refused on 7th October 2010.

(c) Pending that appeal Mrs. G had made another application to revoke the care order, which was heard on 8th October 2010 before Judge Waine, that being only the day after the Court of Appeal had refused leave to appeal Judge Waine's order of March 2010. Judge Waine dismissed the further application and made a section 91(14) order to last for two years until 8th October 2012.

(d) On 31st December 2012 Mrs. G made another application to discharge the care order. On 2nd January 2013 Judge Waine dismissed that application. Judge Waine then retired.

18. Against that background these applications come before me. I have C's welfare as my paramount consideration, and the burden of proving that her welfare requires the revocation of the care order is on Mrs. G.. I must have regard to the welfare check list and to any change in circumstances which have been demonstrated. The predominant factor in C's case must be her wishes and feelings. I have already accepted those as being correctly reported to the court. C's physical, emotional, heritage and educational needs are being well met. She is happy. She does not want the care order revoked. The only material change of circumstance is regrettably the increased strength of feeling which C expresses about any change in her placement and any contact. All of Mrs. Gl's arguments, many of which are irrelevant to an application to revoke, have been considered several times by this court and also by the Court of Appeal. Her arguments have no more merit now than they had previously. Accordingly I dismiss the applications to revoke the care order.
19. In so far as it may not be implicit in the dismissal of the application to revoke the care order, I also dismiss Mrs. G's applications for a residence order. The evidence of Dr. Mahendra in the 2009 care proceedings was that he was concerned about the mother's paranoid personality traits and the risk that they might be transferred to C if she lived with her mother. Dr. Mahendra described a paranoid personality disorder as follows:

"The paranoid personality type is excessively sensitive to setbacks and rebuffs, has a tendency to bear grudges persistently, is suspicious and with a tendency to distort experiences through misconstruction of the words and actions of others, is combative and tenacious in regard to personal rights, has a tendency to experience excessive self importance and is given to suspecting a conspiracy with regard to personal matters as well as in the wider world at large."

20. District Judge Venables accepted that evidence. From what I have seen and heard of Mrs. G in relation to the present applications, Mrs. G fits the characteristics of a paranoid personality. Some professionals have used what is technically an incorrect term when they say that she has a mental illness. Nevertheless, she would present a serious risk of significant harm to C's well-being in emotional and psychological terms if she were returned to the care of her mother.
21. The application for a variation of the existing contact order is one which is best considered in the context of the section 34(4) application and which will be heard in just over a week's time.
22. For the sake of completeness I will record that in the two weeks between the hearing on 16th April 2014 and the delivery of this judgment on 30^th April, Mrs. G made yet another application to revoke the care order, and opposing any section 91(14) order. In a moment I will hear from the parties on whether we can deal with the section 91(14) application today. (That application was adjourned to 7^th May 2014).
23. I direct that a transcript of this judgment be prepared at public expense and distributed to the parties.
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