England and Wales Family Court Decisions (other Judges)

IN THE FAMILY COURT AT RHYL
IN THE MATTER OF THE CHILDREN ACT 1989
AND THE HUMAN RIGHTS ACT 1998
AND IN THE MATTER OF E, G & A (CHILDREN)

		5th December 2014

JUDGMENT

5^th December 2014

HIS HONOUR JUDGE GARETH JONES:

1. I have a number of applications before me which concern three children, all of whom are half-siblings; E born on 11^th September 2008, who is six years-old; G born on 5^th April 2011, who is three years old; and A born on 22^nd June 2014, who is five months-old.
2. The parties to these applications and the legal representation is as follows:

(i) the mother, SC, who I shall identify as 'the mother' during the course of this judgment is represented by Mr Abberton;

(ii) the Local Authority is represented by Miss Beattie;

(iii) A's father, who I shall identify as 'the father' in this judgment, is represented by Mr Jamieson. The father was granted parental responsibility for A by District Judge Jones-Evans on 26^th June 2014, and he therefore shares parental responsibility for him;

(iv) G's father (LK) is unrepresented because of legal aid difficulties. He has not attended this hearing, but he is aware of the proposed outcomes;

(v) the children are represented by their solicitor, Miss Owens, and by the Guardian, Mrs Smith;

(vi) E's father (PW) has played no part in these proceedings, nor to any significant degree, in E's life hitherto.

The summary of the applications and the general position of the parties

3. The Local Authority has issued an application for a Care Order with regard to A. The Local Authority, and A's father, supported by the Guardian, asked me to grant under section 10(1)(b) Children Act 1989:

(i) a Child Arrangements Order which will provide for residence in favour of the father;

(ii) contact provision which would be made for the mother and for the siblings;

(iii) a Specific Issues Order which would permit a change of A's surname from C to C-H in A's case. That is agreed by the mother and the father and endorsed by the Guardian, whatever be the outcome with regard to placement and contact arrangements. Since this change correctly reflects A's identity, and is accordance with A's welfare and is uncontroversial, I propose to grant that application at this stage.

4. The mother opposes the proposed Child Arrangement's Order, and she asks for a Child Arrangements Order in her favour, with regard to A, possibly with a Supervision Order attached.
5. The Guardian and the Local Authority ask me to make a Family Assistance Order in favour of the Local Authority for a period of twelve months with regard to A. That is an uncontroversial application.
6. So far as E and G are concerned, the mother has applied for discharge of the Care Orders, which have been made in E's case on 23^rd September 2010, and in G's case, on 17^th December 2013, and the mother has buttressed that application by a claim for injunctive and declaratory relief under the Human Rights Act 1998.
7. So far as that application is concerned (the mother's application for a discharge of the Care Order) as I understand it she would be prepared to accept a Supervision Order in the case of E and G, but her case is put on the basis that E and G should be returned to her care.
8. The Local Authority's proposals for E and G are that they should be placed together with Mr and Mrs H, who are a paternal aunt and uncle of G (Mrs H is LK's sister but is no blood relation to E), and the Local Authority's proposal is supported by LK, and by the Guardian in this case. The Local Authority propose that if the application for discharge of Care Orders is dismissed, the contact provision for the mother will be reduced from its current level. This would effectively provide for E and G's continued placement with Mr and Mrs H, for the revised contact arrangements put forward by the Local Authority, and dismissal of the mother's application for discharge of the Care Orders.
9. The hearing began on Monday of this week (1^st December 2014) and it has continued until today, Friday 5^th December 2014. In addition to the relevant documentary evidence, I have received written closing submissions by all of the parties in this case, and I have heard in addition the oral evidence of the following witnesses:

(i) the key social worker, Yvonne Carter;

(ii) another social worker, Debbie Hobson;

(iii) the mother's neighbours, LC and AVS;

(iv) the mother;

(v) an Independent Social Worker, Miss Bev Fenton;

(vi) WPC Harden;

(vii) A's father; and

(viii) the Children's Guardian.

The general background

10. The mother has in total six children:

(i) the oldest child is now twelve and lives with his father under a Residence Order, the mother told me in C [name to town given];

(ii) the next child is ten years-old and that child has been adopted;

(iii) the next child is eight years-old and is placed with the paternal grandmother under a Care Order;

(iv) the next child is E. She is the subject of a Care Order made in 2010;

(v) G is the subject of a Care Order made in December 2013; and

(vi) A.

11. E and G lived with their mother until early February 2014. I should indicate that prior to these current proceedings, the mother had applied for a discharge of the Care Order in respect of E, without success.
12. It follows from this summary that there are threshold findings which formed the basis of these earlier Orders made by the Court (see B12, B22, B28 and B32). At the IRH, in A's case on 14^th November 2014, (see B84) on the basis of these earlier historic findings I found the threshold of significant harm to be established under section 31(2) Children Act 1989, on the basis of a 'likelihood', that is to say a 'real possibility' of harm in the case of A, and these findings could be supplemented by others during the course of this hearing.
13. I was previously involved in G's case in December 2013, which involved a consideration of the Care Order in E's case.
14. On any view, the mother has a poor parenting history, at least in this sense - she has not (as yet) parented one of her children continuously into adulthood. She has a long involvement with Social Services, her own childhood history was an unhappy one, which has left its imprint upon her. That history is summarised and is referred to in many documents, by way of example only in the Parenting Assessment completed for the December 2013 proceedings, at paragraphs 21.1 to 21.28.
15. Having regard to the information provided therein about the maternal grandmother, it is perhaps a surprise that the mother, for the first time at the outset of this hearing, asked that the maternal grandmother be allowed to sit in this courtroom to provide her (the mother) with support. There were objections from several parties to this application, which was refused by me.
16. Historically the mother has formed numerous relationships with partners, seldom have these been wholly satisfactory and supportive. The basic care of the children has often been provided, but sustaining such care to an acceptable level has been difficult for the mother.
17. In December 2013, the Court endorsed a Plan for continued rehabilitation involving G and E, and the mother, and that Plan was buttressed by a Contract of Expectations, and reinforced by the Guardian's recommendation at that time. The Guardian was, at that time, extremely guarded in this recommendation. I should indicate that the Guardian has even greater experience of the mother than do I.
18. The reason for the Guardian's caution was:
19. Firstly, because the mother had from September or October 2013, announced that she was pregnant and expecting A, having formed a relationship with A's father through an online dating agency. When the Guardian spoke to the mother in November 2013, the mother was preoccupied with this relationship with A's father (see paragraph 5.3 of the Guardian's report, November 2013):

"… rather than considering the implications for E and G of a further child within the family".

20. Furthermore, according to the Guardian, E could be a difficult child to manage:

"… demanding, manipulative and challenging of her mother's authority".



At paragraph 9.4 the Guardian continues, when the mother:

"… parents well E responds positively when she senses that her mother is distracted, or at a low ebb. She responds by making more demands".

21. In the Guardian's view at that time the mother could parent, and "raise her game" when required, but she struggled to maintain this consistency and made the same repeated mistakes in her personal relationships. The mother struggled with the care of two children (see paragraph 9.7) and:

"… is very unlikely to be able to manage with three".

22. The children, E and G, had always lived with their mother. The Guardian's view at that time was that permanent removal of those children would be disruptive and distressing, but a high level of ongoing monitoring and support would be required (see paragraph 9.10). The Guardian identified the mother's progress at that time (see paragraph 9.11), but reiterated that the mother was emotionally vulnerable. A robust Contract of Expectations was critical, and a regular six-weekly review process was necessary (see paragraph 10.2).
23. The mother had been, according to the Guardian, less than open in revealing her latest pregnancy, which:

"… throws uncertainty upon the sustainability of the Local Authority's Plan".

24. The Guardian's conclusion in that report in November 2013 was:

"As a result, whilst I have serious doubts about her ability to meet the needs of three children in her care, on balance I support the Plan to leave G and E in the mother's care."

25. A significant piece of evidence relating to the mother was provided by Professor Jane Ireland, who completed a Psychological Assessment of the mother on 5^th April 2010 (see E1). This was not the first such report provided by Professor Ireland; there had been others in 2003 and in 2005. I will return to this aspect later, because in this report there is a recommendation with regard to therapeutic assistance for the mother.
26. However, in her statement (see C40) Miss Amanda Morris, a social worker with the therapeutic service, confirmed that she was asked to complete nine individual sessions with the mother, starting from 6^th December 2013. It is indicated that six out of the nine sessions were attended (see C41), which included the following elements:

(i) attachment theory;

(ii) motivational interviewing; and

(iii) basic cognitive behavioural therapy.

27. The sessions ended on 14^th February 2014, to allow the mother to approach the Community Mental Health Service. Miss Morris saw the mother on 9^th July 2014, and concluded that some progress had been made, but this was at an initial/preliminary phase (see C44).
28. Counselling intervention had been offered to the mother in the past. I refer here to Laurel Morgan's evidence (see E67), referring to the period from January to May 2013, where it is recorded that seven out of twelve sessions were attended. The case was then closed due to non-engagement, and the same thing happened again in August 2013.
29. At C19-20 in E and G's bundle there is a chronology of the mother's involvement with the key social worker, Miss Yvonne Carter, during December 2013 and January 2014. In retrospect the key social worker, in her oral evidence to me, identified some 'straws in the wind', that is to say indicators that matters were not progressing satisfactorily after December 2013, and prior to February 2014.
30. Firstly, there was friction between the mother and LK, and between the mother and A's father, and often this affected the mother's mood and behaviour. The friction between the mother and LK appears to be focused around the issue of G's contact, and LK's behaviour towards G, or his care of G during contact.
31. The difficulty with regard to A's father appeared to centre around the mother's desire for a permanent relationship, and the father's decision to end that relationship. At page P43-46 of A's Pre-birth Assessment this background is summarised in some detail. It is alleged that the mother would bombard the father with telephone and text messages, sixty-four calls and thirty texts per day. Further it is said that she (the mother) threatened to leave on one occasion for S [name of country given]. Much of this conduct was admitted by the mother in the witness box, and I will return to that later.
32. This preoccupation with ex-partners or lovers was a distraction for the mother, and again this was accepted by her in the course of her evidence.
33. Secondly, the mother was complaining of tiredness and was unable to attend to the children properly in the mornings, and get them ready for school (in E's case) punctually. The mother told me that the reason for this was her low iron during pregnancy, and her extreme anxiety and worrying over certain issues.
34. Thirdly, there was clutter in the house which had not been tidied up.
35. Fourthly, the mother's ability to control and manage the children's behaviour (G and E) was not evident, perhaps more so in the case of E who was the more demanding child.
36. Fifthly, the mother herself complained of ill-health. Indeed, it is recorded that she had visited the local hospital on 3^rd February 2014 (see C20).
37. The key social worker called for an unannounced visit at the mother's home on 4^th February 2014; this would have been at approximately 4:30 p.m. During the hour or so which followed, the key social worker described to me in evidence a scene which descended into pandemonium, with the mother losing her self-control, ranting and swearing, with the children exhibiting unruly and disruptive behaviour.
38. This account is disputed by the mother, who has sought to defend her conduct, and I will deal with those events later.
39. However, it was this episode which led to E and G's removal from the mother's care on 5^th February 2014.
40. I should indicate that a Legal Planning Meeting took place on 31^st January 2014, which was attended by the Local Authority's solicitor, Miss Heidi Roberts. That was convened because of alleged non-compliance with the Contract of Expectations by the mother, and the mother was to be invited to attend a formal "warning" meeting, on 14^th February 2014. Indeed this had been a possibility from an earlier stage, as early as 13^th January 2014, if the entry at C19 is accurate.
41. However, the events of 4^th February 2014, intervened (see B36 and B37). That Legal Planning Meeting, therefore, on 14^th February 2014, did not take place.
42. On 5^th February 2014, the mother was asked to attend at Social Services' Offices. Prior to her attending, the key social worker had a discussion with her senior managers (Miss Morrelle and Miss Moss) about the events of 4^th February 2014. The key social worker told me in her oral evidence that no decision on removal was taken prior to the mother's attendance on 5^th February 2014. The key social worker was authorised to form her professional judgment about the mother's presentation and response, and if she (the key social worker) concluded that there was a situation of emergency which warranted a protective response, then removal of the children could proceed.
43. At C41-42 there are notes of this discussion with the mother. I was told by the key social worker in her oral evidence:

(i) that the mother was in an emotional state;

(ii) that she displayed no understanding of the Local Authority's concerns; and

(iii) that her mood was similar to the night before, 4^th February 2014.

44. Accordingly the mother was told that E and G would be removed, and they were collected from school and placed with Local Authority foster carers.
45. On 19^th February 2014, the mother's solicitors wrote to the Local Authority (see B39):

"Our client's position is that she seeks the return of E and G home as soon as possible".

46. There was a Looked After Children Review on 3^rd March 2014. This LAC Review was minuted (see C51). The mother was present at that LAC Review. The fact of the removal is noted in the minutes, but the Independent Reviewing Officer of the Local Authority is minuted as indicating that the long-term Plan for the children was "on hold".
47. Miss Heidi Roberts had indicated in correspondence dated 28^th February 2014, that the mother could meet the social worker and the practice leader following that review (see C49 and B45). The Local Authority's solicitor telephoned the mother's solicitor on the afternoon of 28^th February 2014, suggesting she accompany the mother for that meeting on 3^rd March 2014, but was told that the mother's solicitor was unavailable (see C55).
48. I was told in evidence by the key social worker that the mother herself had attended the meeting with the key social worker, after the LAC Review on 3^rd March 2014. The intention of the meeting, according to the correspondence (see C49), was to allow the mother to share her wishes and feelings. The key social worker could not recall in evidence what the mother had said. The mother, in her oral evidence, could not recall what she had said either.
49. Miss Beattie, on behalf of the Local Authority, in her re-examination of the key social worker on the second day of her evidence, sought to introduce an email sent from the key social worker to the Local Authority's legal department subsequently, which contained information about the views expressed. The mother's counsel objected to the provision of this evidence at such a late stage, and in contravention of CPR Part 8.5(3), where a defendant has to file the written evidence relied upon with the defendant's Acknowledgment of Service.
50. A Court can allow supplemental written evidence under CPR 8.6(1)(b) by permission, but this application was not made on Notice, and in advance of a hearing, and with an explanation of why the document had not been disclosed sooner, and in the usual way under Part 8, with the Acknowledgment of Service. I refused permission to adduce the document concerned. No minutes of 3^rd March 2014 meeting are produced.
51. A professionals meeting took place on 5^th March 2014, and the mother's solicitors were invited to make representations in writing for that meeting (see B45). The key social worker told me in evidence that at this professionals meeting on 5^th March 2014, she and two members of the management team, Adele Pearson and Rhian Morrelle, attended together with an unidentified legal advisor. At C16, paragraph 23, it was confirmed that the decision was taken at this meeting on 5^th March 2014, that:

"The Local Authority had reached the decision for the girls not to return to their mother's care due to the ongoing and considerable risks to the girls' emotional welfare".

52. There are no minutes of this meeting, and I have no idea what factors were considered.
53. On 6^th March 2014, the key social worker, and the practice leader, told the mother of the decision taken.
54. Between 5^th February 2014 and 5^th March 2014, the key social worker told me that the removal decision sanctioned on 5^th February 2014, was not necessarily a permanent decision. She reviewed/assessed the mother's behaviour during this month. The mother came into the office regularly, she was spoken to on the telephone, and contact observations were maintained. G and E were making good progress with their foster carers, the mother was acknowledging her own shortcomings, and the key social worker's oral evidence was:

"The mother couldn't cope with the girls' behaviour, and she could see the changes in them in foster care".

55. No documentary assessment of the mother during this period, 5^th February 2014 to 5^th March 2014, was produced. I was told by the key social worker:

(i) that there was no change in the mother's emotional state during this time; and

(ii) that her contact with the girls were deteriorating.

56. Initially it was unclear to me what, if any documentary information, was collected about the mother during this period, 5^th February 2014 to 5^th March 2014, and what if any part this played in the decision taken on 5^th March 2014, permanently terminating the rehabilitation.
57. On the second day of her evidence, the key social worker produced a number of documents (see F27-F41), confirming a number of factors taken into account by her in her 'assessment' of the mother during this period:

(i) A's school attendance and lateness;

(ii) the mother's emotional wellbeing;

(iii) her confrontational stance;

(iv) the possibility of a sexual relationship which might distract the mother; and

(v) possible inadequate supervision of G.

58. In the absence of a discrete documentary assessment, it is impossible to say how any of these factors weighed in the balance (nor in the absence of any record of the meeting on 5^th March 2014), is it clear how, and to what extent any of these factors influenced the decision taken at that meeting. There are, after all, possibly two relevant decisions. There is the first decision to temporarily remove on 4^th/5^th February 2014, and there is a subsequent decision to terminate the rehabilitation, and make the removal a permanent one.
59. The situation is a complicated one, because during this entire period the mother was pregnant, and the birth of A was awaited. This pregnancy, and the relationship with A's father had emerged, (as I have said) during the proceedings involving G and E, up to 17^th December 2013. However, the events of 4^th February 2014, obviously played a part in the Local Authority's response to A's birth in June 2014. In essence it could be argued that since the mother had not adequately demonstrated her ability to care for two young children, she could not possibly manage a third child. Furthermore, A's birth father offered the prospect of safe, alternative care, and the prospect of parental care.
60. There was a Pre-birth Child Protection Case Conference involving A, on 8^th April 2014. A Pre-birth Assessment by Miss Hobson favoured placement with A's father. She also produced an Initial Assessment. I have read very carefully Miss Hobson's Pre-birth Assessment:

(i) it was suggested that she was unduly influenced by E and G's removal;

(ii) that she had misunderstood the significance of Professor Ireland's recommendation with regard to the mother's therapy and the importance thereof in the Local Authority's Planning, as recently as December 2013; and

(iii) that she had incorrectly evaluated the historic information about the mother, which had been accumulated by the Local Authority.

61. The Pre-birth Assessment weighed the mother's capabilities, and the father's capabilities, and ultimately favoured the father. Having read that assessment, that was not, in my view, an unreasonable conclusion.
62. On 14^th May 2014, three months after the removal of G and E, the mother issued her application under the Human Rights Act 1998, and there is a claim form/particulars of claim at B1-17. The Local Authority acknowledge service on 30^th May 2014, and there was an Initial Directions Hearing on 6^th June 2014, and there are Orders at pages B64 and B66.
63. On A's birth the Local Authority issued its application for an Interim Care Order. An Interim Care Order was granted by District Judge Jones-Evans on 26^th June 2014, and upon A's discharge from hospital, A was placed with his father, and the father has lived with his sister, her husband, and their young daughter.
64. The mother's contact with A initially was for five times per week. This was reduced to three times per week at the end of August 2014.
65. On 3^rd July 2014, the mother applied for discharge of the Care Orders, with regard to E and G. I refused an application to instruct a further Expert Psychologist, Dr Polly Turner at the end of August 2014, and the applications that I have identified already were timetabled for this Final Hearing this week. There was a IRH on 14^th November 2014.
66. An Independent Social Worker (Miss Fenton) was instructed and she undertook an assessment of the mother. LK was assessed by the Local Authority, although he had been considered in earlier proceedings involving G. LK has another child, K, who is six years-old, and contact is maintained between LK and K
67. G's aunt and uncle, Mr and Mrs H, were also assessed by the Local Authority (see D13-D55). This was a favourable assessment of them:

(i) they have two young children of their own;

(ii) they have support from other family members;

(iii) they live in a three-bedroomed semi-detached property locally.

68. Mr and Mrs H have been approved as the Local Authority's foster carers, and at half-term on 24^th October 2014, E and G moved to live with them. The children continue to attend the same school but will move shortly, I was told by the Guardian. There has been provision for interim contact between E, G and their mother on three occasions per week. There is also frequent contact between LK and G, two or three times per week, which is arranged between LK and his sister, Mrs H.
69. A's father intends shortly to move from his sister's home in this locality, out of area. He will live with his girlfriend (a cardiology nurse) who has a five year-old son. A's father is employed on a self-employed basis, and will make arrangements for A's childcare. He will continue to work in the North Wales area, and will use his sister's home as a base, and rely upon familial support networks. He may in the future, I was told, move even further away from this area.
70. It is obvious from Miss Hobson's assessment of the father that he by no means escaped unhappy childhood episodes. His mother's partner was physically abusive towards him, and ultimately was convicted of an extremely serious criminal offence (see P35-P36).
71. Despite these difficult episodes in his childhood, the father managed reasonably well at school, gaining eight GCSE. He joined the Army when he was sixteen years of age, and he served until he was twenty-four. He left the Army in 2005, and thereafter he obtained employment and has been regularly in employment since that time. A is the father's first child, and in the last five months or so, he has managed A's care perfectly satisfactorily, and there is no real indicator to the contrary.
72. The father's circumstances currently are not at all unusual, after all what is proposed in A's case is a private law outcome between his parents. The key social worker obviously needs to assess the father's new accommodation, and meet his partner. It is accepted that the father's partner has no previous convictions, and she has managed to care for her own son without any reported difficulty.

The applications under the Human Rights Act 1998, and relevant legal provisions

73. The claim issued by the mother asserted that there was no basis for E and G's removal. The Local Authority had circumvented the procedure set out in the Contract of Expectations, and the applicant sought the return of G and E, and a reversal of the alternative/contingency plan for the children's permanent removal from the mother's care. It was asserted that:

(i) there was no emergency situation on 4^th February 2014;

(ii) removal was a disproportionate response, not justified by proportionality and contrary to Article 8(1) and 8(2) of schedule 1 of Human Rights Act 1998, and the mother's family life had been breached, and the children had been wrongly separated from their parent;

(iii) there were serious procedural shortcomings, including a failure to alert/warn the mother of concerns, and a failure to allow her to respond reasonably to any concerns, and a failure properly to consider her response.

74. Section 8(1) Human Rights Act 1998 permits the Court to grant such relief and remedy as the Court "considers just and appropriate", and this includes injunctive and declaratory relief.
75. As I have said, under Part 8 of the Civil Procedure Rules 1998, written evidence is usually relied upon, but the Court retains the discretion to resolve factual disputes on the basis of oral testimony. Such was the dispute over the events of 4^th February 2014, and accordingly, pursuant to CPR 8.6(2), I resolved that oral testimony would be required about that issue during this hearing.
76. The Local Authority in essence, has always maintained that it was confronted by a situation on 4^th February 2014, which required the response of removal on 5^th February 2014.
77. Since Re W [2005] 2 FLR 1022 the Court of Appeal has recommended that challenges under the Human Rights Act 1998, to the removal of children who are subject to Care Orders, should proceed at the earliest opportunity, and prior to removal, and not as a reaction to removal (see the judgment of Thorpe LJ, at paragraphs 11 to 15, and 25 in that case).
78. Of course many of these observations pre-date the current difficulties, which are sometimes encountered with regard to the provision of legal aid.
79. In Re G [2003] 2 FLR 42 Munby J (as he then was) set out the procedural safeguards for parents confronted with the removal of a child, following the making of Care Orders. This includes:

(i) the involvement of parents in the decision making process (see paragraph 36 of the judgment);

(ii) prior notification of concern and a provision of an opportunity to respond prior to any such decision being taken (see paragraph 43 of the judgment); and

(iii) the provision of written information and notice, and the affording of an opportunity to participate in meetings (see paragraph 45 of the judgment).

80. It has also been decided that even during the currency of Care Proceedings, a Court can intervene to prevent the removal of a child (see R v Kingston upon Hull City Council [2014] 1 FLR 1024).
81. In G v NCC [2009] 1 FLR 774, McFarlane J (as he then was) reaffirmed that removal of a child post Care Order had to be a proportionate response to the level of concern, and the issues in the case (see paragraph 26 of the judgment). The decision had to be procedurally fair, and should involve a parent in the decision making process. The test for the removal of a child, pursuant to an EPO, "did not apply word for word", however, "the spirit and legal force of the principles behind them certainly do" (see paragraph 28 of the judgment).
82. Where the Local Authority concluded that removal was the appropriate response, he indicated at paragraph 30 (page 783):

"It is not the function of this Court to lay down strictures as to the sort of assessment work that should be put in place before a radical change of Care Plan such as this, but it does seem that some sort of formal assessment, whether it is called a Core Assessment, or otherwise, which draws together all of the evidence in a considered way, rather than simply at LAC meetings, or other professional gatherings, and gives the parent a chance to contribute to that process, and then take stock of all of that material in the way that a Core Assessment would do, is the level of intervention and planning that should be brought to bear before a change of Care Plan, as Draconian as this, takes place".

83. On 23^rd May 2014, (that of course post-dates the decision in this case) Baker J gave explicit guidance in the case of Re DE [2015] 1 FLR 1001. He says at paragraphs 34 and 35:

"34. To my mind, where a Care Order has been granted on the basis of a Care Plan providing that the child should remain at home, a Local Authority considering changing the plan and removing the child permanently from the family is obliged in law to follow the same approach. It must have regard to the fact that permanent placement outside the family is to be preferred only as a last resort where nothing else will do. Before making its decision, it must rigorously analyse all the realistic options, considering the arguments for and against each option. This is an essential process, not only as a matter of good practice, but also because the Local Authority will inevitably have to demonstrate its analysis in any Court Proceedings that follow the change of Care Plan, either on an application for the discharge of the Care Order or an application for Placement Order under the Adoption and Children Act 2002. This process of rigorous analysis of all realistic options should be an essential feature of all long-term planning for children. And, as indicated by Munby J in Re G, the local authority must fully involve the parents in its decision-making process.

35. While this process is being carried out, the child should remain at home under the Care Order, unless his safety and welfare requires that he be removed immediately. This is the appropriate test when deciding whether the child should be removed under an Interim Care Order, pending determination of an application under section 31 of the Children Act 1989 … The same test should also apply when a Local Authority's decision to remove a child placed at home under a Care Order has led to an application by the parents to discharge the Order and the court has to decide whether the child should be removed pending determination of the discharge application. As set out above, under section 33(4) Children Act 1989, the Local Authority may not exercise its powers under a Care Order to determine how a parent may exercise his or her parental responsibility for the child unless satisfied it is necessary to do so to safeguard or promote the child's welfare. For a Local Authority to remove a child in circumstances where its welfare did not require it would be manifestly unlawful and an unjustifiable interference with the family's Article 8 rights."

84. At paragraph 49(1) to 49(6), explicit procedural guidance is given for future practice. This explicit guidance was not available on 4^th February 2014, nor 5^th March 2014, but for the future, this Local Authority and others will be required, as indeed will the Court itself so far as allocation and 'gate keeping' is concerned, to follow the explicit guidance which has been provided.
85. The principles derived from the earlier pre-February/March 2014 cases are fully applicable. The Local Authority maintains in this case that G and E's safety and welfare required removal, and I will consider that later.

The submissions of the parties

86. I do not propose to repeat each argument raised by each party, which is relevant to all of the issues which have been considered in this case. In some instances during this judgment I have adopted the reasoning advanced, or the points raised in some of those submissions. I shall summarise briefly the main aspects which have been raised.
87. On the mother's behalf it is contended:

(i) that removal of E and G was the result of an unfair process adopted by the Local Authority, and was unjustified in the circumstances;

(ii) the Local Authority have attached undue significance to an outdated psychological assessment of the mother, which should be revisited either by the Local Authority or by the Court;

(iii) the mother as E and G's primary carer historically, should have the children returned to her care, or significantly more contact with them than is proposed by the Local Authority;

(iv) in A's case the mother should, at the very least, have significantly more contact, or perhaps shared care whilst he father brings A over to North Wales;

(v) in the absence of an appropriately fair procedure, this has prejudiced the mother's case with regard to return of E and G, and declaratory relief and/or guidance to Local Authorities is required.

88. With regard to the issue of prejudice there is the obvious prejudice of removal itself, but there is no suggestion that any issue which the mother might have raised in March 2014, has not been raised during the course of this hearing.
89. So far as the Local Authority is concerned:

(i) the Local Authority reaffirms that on a welfare basis its Care Plans and conclusions with regard to the three children should be endorsed by the Court;

(ii) the events of 4^th and 5^th February 2014 constituted an emergency;

(iii) it is accepted by the Local Authority that the decision making process adopted up to 5^th March 2014, and after 5^th February 2014, was flawed, and that is recorded in a Court Order on 18^th June 2014. However, the instruction of an Independent Social Worker, Miss Fenton, was accepted by the Local Authority on this basis, so that the merits of the mother's case could be considered afresh. The Local Authority maintains that this has now been done by Miss Fenton, and there is no prejudice to the mother, because the recommendation of the Independent Social Worker validates the Local Authority's own decision.

90. So far as Miss Owens (on behalf of the Guardian) is concerned, she reiterates the position of the Guardian succinctly, and I need not repeat that with regard to the outcomes recommended by her, because I will deal with them specifically later.
91. Mr Jamieson, on behalf of the father, reiterates his client's case for Private Law Orders with regard to A.

The events of 4^th and 5^th February 2014

92. I have referred already to the Guardian's report of November 2013. The mother was given a chance by the Guardian, and by the Court at that time, when the Local Authority's Final Care Plan for G was endorsed. The Guardian, as I have said already, had a number of misgivings, and I have made reference to the competing factors identified by her.
93. Professor Ireland, in her 2010 report, makes this evaluation at paragraph 6.13 to 6.15:

"I would not again at this point, as I have done so in my previous reports (2003 and 2005) that Miss C is still very young to assess personality that reaches the level of disorder. Indeed as noted in my 2005 assessment (paragraph 6.13) I indicated how you do not tend to make diagnosis in individuals under the age of 25. Miss C does not yet meet this age cut off, and thus the enduring nature of any noted personality difficulties cannot be reliably determined. It is also important for me to state here that I do feel there is a developing positive change with regard to Miss C's insight, and reported willingness to change. Whether this will lead to the reduction of what are presenting currently as maladaptive personality traits I could not say, as it is dependent on the progress made from this point forward. If the positive change continues and is followed up by psychological interventions, which is committed to, and sustained, positive structure and support in Miss C's lifestyle, then the clinical picture may be more positive across time.

It is also important not to 'label' what are appearing as potential personality problems as a disorder, without qualification regarding age influences and context. I do feel, nonetheless that identifying Miss C's instability as highly likely to be influenced by personality does have merits, and that it highlights why this instability is appearing as persistent".

94. Paragraph 6.20 was in these terms:

"In summary I feel that Miss C should be engaged in personality intervention with a qualified Clinical or Forensic Psychologist, or registered and qualified professional, such as a Cognitive Behavioural Therapist. The identified clinician should have experience in working with clients with such difficulties. I would envisage up to twelve months of intervention, with the length of this likely to increase if Miss C fails to engage. Such intervention can be identified via local NHS services. I would expect engagement in this work and progress to begin to be made before long-term decisions concerning the placement of E can be made by the Court, should it be felt that rehabilitation is viable".

95. A significant number of factors identified by Professor Ireland (see E24, paragraph 6.44) in the case of the mother persist, four years after that report was completed. Some have been addressed, but by no means all of the factors identified by her have been.
96. This recommendation by Professor Ireland was not followed by the Local Authority. And the Guardian, on balance and despite misgivings about the future prospects endorsed G's Care Plan in December 2013.
97. As the trial Judge in December 2013, I accept my responsibility with regard to that decision also, because I permitted the rehabilitation of G and E with the mother to be continued, despite the fact that the mother had not undertaken the CBT identified for her in advance, as recommended by Professor Ireland. The reason for that was that:

(i) the other positives identified in the mother's case tipped the balance in favour of such an outcome (I have referred already to paragraph 9.11 of the Guardian's report in 2013);

(ii) the Local Authority's Parenting Assessment (of 11^th October 2013) identified many of those factors which were also considered by the Guardian. (I refer here also to the conclusions at paragraph 32.2, page E66):

"The Local Authority consider on the balance of probabilities, that the children can be cared for by Miss C, however it is clear that should Miss C's cycle of behaviour impact on the children's needs, then it will take necessary action to protect them, which will require the children to leave the care of their mother. If this is the case the Local Authority contingency plan will be to consider long-term fostering, or a Placement Order".

98. The author of that report, Miss Yvonne Carter, at paragraph 30.4, sets out her views about the mother's cycles of behaviour historically:

"This cycle of behaviour is whereby Miss C, in the first few months of her cycle, desperately tries to find a male friend, and will spend hours on the internet which in turn impacts on her and the children as she becomes tired and irritable, and has less time and patience for the girls.

The middle cycle is when Miss C has found a partner. This stage is great for the children as she behaves like the perfect mother, and the house is spotless, and she is in a great mood with lots of motivation, and the children will attend days out and activities.

The final stage comes and is of concern. The relationship ends, Miss C hits extreme low moods, and the children are left to their own devices as Miss C is tearful and has no motivation. Accidents start to happen, and Miss C disengages and fails to attend appointments".

99. The Care Plan for G in December 2013 incorporated the terms of a Contract of Expectations. As I have said already, there was to be a six-weekly cycle of progress meetings. Statutory and unannounced visits were part of this tight package, and as the Children's Solicitor has identified, the unannounced visits were fairly frequent because of the risks associated with the Plan from the very outset.
102. Under the Contingency Plan section the following appears (see paragraph 5.4, page B32):

"If Miss C breaches the Contract of Expectations set out above, the mother acknowledges that the Local Authority will be at liberty to remove G. If there is an emergency situation the Local Authority may remove G immediately. If the breaches do not amount to an emergency but the Local Authority is of the view that the child is suffering significant harm and may need to be removed, the Local Authority will hold a meeting with the mother and give her a final warning, and the child will be removed within a specified short timescale if the breaches are not remedied immediately".

103. The first issue to be resolved is whether the events witnessed by the key social worker, on 4^th February 2014, amounted to an emergency whereby E and G's safety required removal.
104. As part of the background I bear in mind:

(i) the finely balanced features of the decision taken to proceed with G and E's rehabilitation in December 2013;

(ii) the complicating feature of the mother's pregnancy with A; and

(iii) the 'straws in the wind' mentioned by the key social worker (which I have identified already) during January 2014.

105. The key social worker's notes of the unannounced visit on 4^th February 2014, appears at C20-C21. The meeting with the mother on 5^th February 2014, is recorded at C41.
106. These accounts were repeated in the witness box, and the key social worker was questioned about them. The key social worker emphasised to me that the mother had completely lost control of the situation on 4^th February 2014:

"I had not seen her as angry as this before".

The mother was shouting at the key social worker, and the children were ignoring their mother's attempts to control them:

"All of the individuals, the mother and the children, were at risk of harm".

The mother at one stage was coming downstairs, the children were swinging from a stairgate or the bannisters, pulling their mother, who was pregnant:

"The children could have been hurt accidently, or the mother could have been hurt. I thought they were in imminent danger".

107. The mother did not want to look after the girls anymore, and the presence of the key social worker was (I was told) aggravating the mother and increasing her anger and reaction:

"The mother just wanted out of it".

108. The key social worker maintained that this was not a reference to LK's contact with G, but was a statement directed by the mother at the situation more generally.
111. The key social worker was in a difficult situation. She had no immediate assistance to help her. If the mother's behaviour was as described, she could hardly remove two poorly behaving children without assistance, and without accentuating the mother's likely response. The key social worker therefore, decided to leave:

"… hoping the mother would calm down".

112. After the social worker left, the mother tried to telephone the social worker. The key social worker rang her practice leader for advice. She was advised to ring the mother back to ascertain whether things were calmer, and if not to ring the out-of-hours team to alert them. By this stage it was around 7:00 p.m., the calls being itemised by Vodafone (see F25).
113. The key social worker spoke to the mother, the children had gone to bed, however the mother was still trying to raise issues about G's contact with her father, but things were left until the next day.
114. Prior to the meeting on 5^th February 2014, the key social worker had the preliminary meeting with Miss Morrelle and Miss Moss, to which I have already referred. The key social workers note is at C41. The mother was still emotional during this meeting. She showed little understanding of the Local Authority's concerns, and her mood was the same as the night before. The key social worker summed up her decision thus:

"I wasn't going to take a chance and go through a similar episode to 4^th February 2014".

Hence the decision taken to remove the children, the mother being informed of that at the meeting.

115. The mother's reaction and response was predictable, but she did pack a bag for the girls, who were collected from school.
116. The key social worker said later in her evidence:

"The mother was properly raging on 4^th February. If the girls had pushed and pushed I don't know what she might have done".

117. Another witness, AVS, did not actually witness what went on in the mother's home on 4^th February 2014, whilst the key social worker was present. AVS was called over by the mother subsequently. The key social worker telephoned the mother whilst AVS was present, but this does not assist with the actual events which occurred during the unannounced visit itself.
118. LC, another witness, gave general evidence about the mother's presentation as her neighbour, but while she was aware of a Police attendance at the mother's home on 18^th September 2014, she was not particularly forthcoming about any detail. She was aware that another neighbour (a female) had apparently smashed the mother's front door glass panel with a hammer at some stage, but again I was unclear from LC's evidence as to why this incident had occurred, although the mother dealt with this herself in her own evidence subsequently.
119. The mother's account of the events of 4^th February 2014 is at C66-C68, and the meeting of 5^th February 2014 is at C68-C70. The mother also gave oral evidence about these events.
120. The broad sequence accords with the key social workers evidence, but the degree to which the mother lost control, and the risks presented thereby are denied by the mother. The mother had experienced difficulty with E, and to a lesser extent, with G's behaviour, at Morrisons, even before the key social worker arrived. E had "time-out" at Morrisons because of her poor behaviour. A taxi then brought them all home, and the mother who had gone to much effort to prepare tea, was faced with E's refusal to eat her tea. E was then sent to her room. Doubtless this was frustrating for the mother, and it was at this stage that the key social worker called for her unannounced visit.
121. There came a stage (which was accepted by the mother in her oral evidence) when E and G were jumping around from bed to bed, in an upstairs bedroom. The mother grabbed E in her arms to stop her. The mother came downstairs, but her progress was hampered by G pulling/pushing on the banister, and previously she had been swinging on the stairgate. The mother did swear when describing LK to the social worker, and her voice was raised. The mother was anxious to raise a number of issues about LK, and his contact with G. She said in her oral evidence:

"I don't have a switch on/off. I have to explain things there and then. I had to explain to Yvonne about contact".

122. After the key social worker had left, the mother confirmed to me in her evidence that she had phoned Yvonne Carter on eight/ten occasions, she had phoned A's father a number of times, and she also phoned Miss AS. She said that she:

"… needed someone to talk to. I needed support around the issues to do with LK".

123. This evidence, and indeed the mother's presentation when giving her evidence, generally confirmed my impression of a desperately needy and overly anxious individual, who seemed to be struggling in regulating her emotions, and in organising her thoughts to provide coherent answers to some of the questions asked of her. Her demeanour and her behaviour in the witness box veered from the tearful, on very many occasions, to the truculent when challenged or when her views did not prevail. She found it difficult to focus on a question and provide a concise answer without being diverted by incidental or extraneous facts or issues, which were only remotely connected to the subject matter of the question actually asked of her.
124. I remind myself that she was facing challenge in a courtroom setting, and I make every possible allowance for that, but I can readily understand the key social worker's evidence that the mother was fixated, and determined to talk about LK's contact, and was stuck in a groove about that, indeed she was stuck in much the same groove during her evidence in the witness box.
125. When it came to identifying and particularising LK's conduct complained of, a number of matters were raised:

(i) LK would give G sweets;

(ii) G would be returned wet after contact; and

(iii) she was allowed out without her gloves and scarf on.

When I enquired what action she wanted the Local Authority to take, she replied she did not want to meet LK at contact handovers, and believed LK should attend a parenting course as she herself had done.

126. These issues over LK's contact seemed to have caused her extreme anxiety. She was awake and worrying about things:

"I like to get things sorted. Contact was a mess, my relationship with A's father was a mess".

127. This extreme anxiety, and the resulting insomnia, resulted in her tiredness, and in her inability to see to the girls in the morning, and to get E to school on time. The mother acknowledged:

"I can go on and on, and that can be perceived as me being anxious and preoccupied".

128. Some of the things which caused the mother such anxiety, on any objective basis did not merit such an extreme reaction by her. She lacks perspective. Parenting can be stressful. Life can be stressful. Human beings have to cope with the unknown vicissitudes of life; that is part of the human condition. If the mother cannot cope with LK's alleged poor behaviour in contact with G, how on earth could she meet the challenge of three young, active children through their minority?
129. The mother then turned her attention to A's father. This relationship was proceeding in the course of 2013, from about August onwards. They had met on the internet. A's pregnancy was unplanned. It was obvious that the mother invested considerable hope that this finally was to be the satisfying, loving and supportive relationship which she has longed for. That was not to be. A's father travelled to C [name of country given] in September 2013, and upon his return he took up with another partner.
130. There was the possibility of a termination of the mother's pregnancy, and then the mother threatened to take the girls and unborn A to S [name of country given]. How seriously this was meant, it is impossible for me to say.
131. She bombarded A's father with telephone calls and texts, and she felt:

"… let down by C".

She says she was facing another pregnancy alone, without support, and with every prospect of losing the child at birth.

132. This background greatly preoccupied the mother during the months of December 2013 and January 2014, as she conceded in her evidence.
133. The mother accepted that she had sent a text to the key social worker, after the key social worker had left on 4^th February 2014, indicating that she was at breaking point and that she wanted "out".
134. I do not accept the mother's explanation that this related exclusively to LK's contact, but nor do I take this expression of view as being a considered decision by her to relinquish her children. It was, however, an indication that she was at the end of her tether.
135. If I turn to the meeting on 5^th February 2014, with the key social worker, the mother accepted that she could not recall the details of that day. She told me that she was informed that the girls were not coming back, the social workers could not allow the children to be put through a similar situation to that which had been witnessed on 4^th February 2014. The message given, apparently, was:

"… they're not coming back this time".

The mother (see C69) maintains this was a permanent decision, and she was distressed by the news.

136. There is a straightforward clash of evidence between the key social worker and the mother, about the events of 4^th and 5^th February 2014.

Some relevant factors with regard to resolving that issue

137. Firstly, the mother faced a number of difficult issues with regard to her credibility generally. The mother's statement of evidence in November 2013, (in the 2013 proceedings) withheld a considerable amount of the detail given by the mother in the witness box, and in other documentation, for example the Pre-birth Assessment, about A's father and the nature of their relationship (see paragraph 3(vi), paragraph 4 and paragraph 5 of mother's statement in November 2013).
138. The mother when confronted with this, said in evidence:

"I don't think that adding that [this is a reference to the details about A's father] would have done me any favours".

She was referring there to the outcome of the December 2013 hearing.

139. That ability to withhold selectively key pieces of information unfavourable to her case, could very easily be replicated.
140. Secondly, the mother disputed WPC Harden's evidence (confirmed in the witness box) about the WPC's entries of her attendance at the mother's home on 18^th September 2014 (see F1-F4). The WPC had no obvious axe to grind. That entry was accurate and truthful, as was the WPC's evidence in the witness box. On a balance of probabilities I prefer the WPC's account to the mother's denial. The mother, therefore, has tried to deny the truth of that evidence, without success.
141. Thirdly, A's father told me in evidence that the mother had lied to him at a very early stage in their relationship. She maintained that she was a professional hairdresser, that she worked part-time at Next, that she owned her own property, and that she had only one child. All of these averments are of course untrue.
142. I remind myself of the guidance given in R v Lucas [1981] QB 70, a witness may of course lie for a variety of reasons. A lie about one aspect does not necessarily mean the witness is lying about another aspect. However, if I am satisfied that a witness has lied, that can be taken into account in my overall assessment of a witness' veracity.
143. Fourthly, there were aspects of the key social workers evidence which were unsatisfactory, and I will deal with those later when I consider the events of 5^th February 2014 to 5^th March 2014. During that period there were material shortcomings in the documentary recordings and other documents. However, the events of 4^th and 5^th February 2014, are reasonably well recorded by the key social worker, and they provide a coherent narrative which is consistent with the mother's overall presentation in the witness box, consistent with the mother's apprehensions and concerns during 2013 and 2014, and consistent with the mother's recorded behaviour during January 2013, and up to 4^th February 2014.
144. Fifthly, the behaviour described by the key social worker on 4^th February 2014 (after she left) is consistent with the mother's persistent and obsessional texting/telephoning habits (which are evident also with A's father) and are more compatible with the key social worker's account of what happened in the mother's home. Why on earth telephone the key social worker eight or ten times, and phone A's father a number of times, if the incident on 4^th February 2014, is trivial and unimportant domestic behaviour?
145. I do not believe that was the case. The mother realised that the incident had escalated out of all proportion because of her temperament, and she simply could not let matters rest. If there was no significance to the incident, these calls would be unnecessary. She, however, realised that things had gone too far.
146. Sixthly, the mother's assertion that a final decision had been taken on 5^th February 2014, is not compatible with the surrounding documentation, more particularly the minutes of the LAC Review on 3^rd March 2014, and the invitation to the subsequent meeting that day, by the Local Authority.
147. Seventhly, there is little merit in the argument that the absence of intervention on 4^th February 2014, itself was an indicator of a non-emergency. The situation on 4^th February 2014, was a difficult one. The key social worker formed a judgment that a tactical retreat might calm the situation down. If the situation had been difficult subsequently, perhaps the involvement of the out-of-hours team might have been required. That is a matter of pure speculation.
148. The next day, following the experience of a few hours earlier, the key social worker did not wish to risk a repeat performance, and perhaps understandably so. The withdrawal from the mother's home by the key social worker on 4^th February 2014, does not undermine the urgent protective imperative on the following day.
149. Having reached that professional judgment (and after all the key social worker witnessed the mother's responses on 4^th and 5^th February 2014) I doubt whether advance notification, or a warning meeting, or any of the procedural steps outlined in the case law referred to by me above, would in fact have done anything other than heighten the risks in the immediate aftermath of 4^th February 2014 episode.
150. On balance I conclude that the welfare of the children, E and G, required immediate removal, and this was the "emergency type" situation of the kind referred to in the final contingency plan for G, and I would not make an injunction under the Human Rights Act 1998, in relation to that original removal.

The events of 5^th February 2014 to 5^th March 2014

151. The Local Authority accepts that E and G's removal became a permanent one, following 5^th March 2014 decision. It is in relation to this period that the key social worker's evidence was most unsatisfactory, hampered as she was by an absence of contemporaneous case note, by adequate preparation of her evidence in the witness box, and by an absence of adequate procedural activity of the kind recommended by the relevant case law.
152. The key social worker maintained that she undertook an assessment of the mother's circumstances during this period. The core material for such an assessment was produced by her in a piecemeal and haphazard manner. When asked if she had spoken, for instance to Amanda Morris, the mother's therapeutic support worker, during this period, she replied:

"I imagine so".

That response was cavalier, careless and unprofessional.

153. I believe that it would have been far more accurate if the Local Authority had asserted that the decision taken on 5^th March 2014 was the product of:

(i) it's evaluation of the severity of the incident on 4^th February 2014;

(ii) it's reappraisal of the importance of embarking upon the CBT therapy recommended by Professor Ireland, before proceeding with any rehabilitation;

(iii) its evaluation of the pressures and the preoccupations of the mother, and its likely impact upon her behaviour;

(iv) the imminent additional burden of a third child; and

(v) a realistic appraisal of how extremely finely balanced the December 2013 decision was, and how soon thereafter the mother's prospects had unravelled.

154. These factors, if drawn together in a brief assessment document, were far more substantial than the flimsy features identified by the key social worker in her oral evidence, selected seemingly at random during the course of her courtroom testimony, from an ad-hoc collection of Local Authority documentation.
155. In the period leading up to the decision taken on 5^th March 2014, I conclude:

(i) there was no formal Documentary Assessment/Core Assessment, or otherwise a drawing together of all the evidence in a considered way, as suggested by McFarlane J, at paragraph 31 of G v NCC. The Local Authority's meetings, and LAC Review, or other professional gatherings that I have referred to were not a substitute for this failure;

(ii) advance notice of such a document with an opportunity to contribute and respond thereto formally, were not provided to the mother, again contrary to McFarlane J's decision at paragraph 31 G v NCC;

(iii) there was no opportunity for the decision makers, thereafter to take stock of the overall material, before reaching a conclusion. Accordingly the guidance given by McFarlane J at paragraph 31 G v NCC above, was not followed, and certainly the guidance given by Baker J in Re ED at paragraphs 34 and 35, and paragraph 49(2), and paragraph 49(4), were not followed either, although I accept that this explicit guidance post-dated the decision taken.

(iv) there was time afforded to the Local Authority to have complied with these steps. The children's immediate welfare had been safeguarded, and the Local Authority had time to consider the next stage properly, and to adopt the necessary procedural stance. In these respects procedurally, the decision taken on 5^th March 2014, was a flawed one. Should that decision now be restrained by any injunction? I could do so if that is "just and appropriate" under section 8(1) Human Rights Act 1998. For the reasons I shall come to in a moment when considering the applications under the Children Act 1989, I believe that if the Local Authority had followed the correct procedural steps outlined, the resulting decision would not have differed in any way from the actual decisions made. The reasons for this conclusion appear in my evaluation of the outcomes in G, E and A's respective cases, under the Children Act 1989, to which I shall turn in a moment.

156. In its future practice, this Local Authority, like others, will need to adjust its procedures, and ensure that the guidance given in the case of Re ED is followed carefully. This is likely to become a more familiar situation encountered in practice. Inevitably from time to time, rehabilitative Final Care Plans will break down and fail, and contingency plans will be required in the interests of children.
157. This Local Authority, like others, will have to become far more alert to the procedural steps which are then required. This message should be disseminated by this Local Authority to its neighbours in this DFJ area.

The conclusion in relation to the Human Rights Act 1998 application

158. In the circumstances, and for the reasons explained, I do not grant an injunction in this case. Damages were not claimed, nor in these circumstances does it afford "just satisfaction", and I make no award.

The welfare evaluation with regard to the children

The legal provisions

159. The threshold finding that I have made at the IRH, supplemented now by my findings relating to 4^th February 2014, under section 31(2) Children Act 1989, are carried over into the checklist evaluation under section 1(3)(e) Children Act 1989, which follows thereafter.
160. In A's case, having found the threshold to be established, I have to consider the Care Plans, having regard to the paramountcy of his welfare, and I have to apply the so called 'welfare checklist' under section 1(3) Children Act 1989.
161. The outcome proposed for A is obviously a proportionate response to the risk. What is proposed is a familial placement with his birth father, under Private Law Orders. So far as contact is concerned, under section 8 Children Act 1989, again welfare under section 1 Children Act 1989 is paramount, and the statutory checklist applies.
162. In A's case any Family Assistance Order granted for a period of twelve months would not be opposed by any party.
163. In relation to G and E, should I discharge the Care Orders, or substitute Supervision Orders, therefor, under section 39 Children Act 1989? The mother's earlier application for discharge was made more than six months ago. The paramountcy of welfare under section 1 Children Act 1989, applies to these applications for discharge, with the mother having to show that the E and G's welfare requires these outcomes.

The mother's capabilities

164. There is a hopeful sign in this case that the mother is able to identify for herself, where she needs to change her life and her behaviour. During the recent sessions with Laurel Morgan, she has identified some aims that she would like to achieve (see E71):

(i) "Not to have any more babies;

(ii) to change to be a better mum to your children by not over-worrying or over-thinking things;

(iii) to have a more of a balance by being more rational, and not escalating things into a crisis, learning that things don't have to perfect, and that you don't need to overcompensate when things go slightly wrong;

(iv) you spoke about wanting a better relationship with males, so that these relationships don't make things worse, and a better relationship with professionals so you don't over-react; and

(v) learning that not everyone is out there to get you, by not over-analysing or reacting unhelpfully".

165. These are very easy features to identify, but I recognise they would be far more difficult for the mother to achieve in practice. She has made a start; the recent reference to the Therapeutic Service on 3^rd September 2014, with a view at least to the provision of some cognitive analytical therapy is progress. The first block of eight sessions started in November 2014 (see E67-E8). There are two further blocks of work which are anticipated.
166. I appreciate and I have noted that the mother's past involvement with counselling and therapeutic services may not have been maintained. On this occasion she must sustain her early commitment. As the Guardian says (see E86) a six month delay for individual psychological work is anticipated, but there is now at least the prospect that Professor Ireland's long-lasting recommendation may finally be implemented.
167. How long it might take the mother to make the changes required is extremely difficult to judge. The need for this work, and its importance, is accepted by the key social worker, by the Independent Social Worker (Miss Fenton) and by the Guardian. It is a universal professional conclusion now in this case. This is not a case of the goal posts being moved, the need for the work was always identified, and the requirement was always important. Professionals as recently as December 2013, and also the Court, failed to accord primacy to this feature, and allowed other considerations to prevail, because at that time the mother was given an opportunity.
168. Experience over the last months has shown that the mother must address her underlying personality traits as a prerequisite for successful parenting. She may not succeed, as Miss Fenton said, the mother's personality may still intrude and hamper her early commitment. As the mother herself said in evidence:

"… therapy will only work if everything is okay in my mind".

169. Accordingly, I do not believe that accurate timescales can be given. Much will depend upon the mother's commitment herself.
170. Miss Fenton's conclusion is that she could not recommend E and G's rehabilitation with their mother, unless the interventions identified by way of Professor Ireland's recommendation, and parenting work, were undertaken. If that was not done:

"… placement breakdown is a real possibility" (see E10 and E14).

171. The mother's care of three young children could not be recommended by her, without such preliminary work. As I have said already, this conclusion is shared by the Guardian, and by the key social worker, and it is the unanimous conclusion of the social work professionals in this case.
172. Interestingly, both the Guardian and the Independent Social Worker, also pointed to the mother's limited coping/organisational strategies in some contacts observed by each of them. The mother would have known that these contacts were the subjects of professional observation, and should have prepared herself accordingly. Miss Fenton's observations at E16, and in her oral evidence, and the Guardian's oral evidence and her report at E66, show the same inability to manage and cope with the simultaneous demands of three children.
173. I asked Miss Fenton, in these circumstances how could the Court be satisfied that the mother could manage her three children seven days a week, twenty-four hours a day? Miss Fenton replied that she had no such confidence.
174. The mother's counsel explored with the Guardian whether the risk of harm to the children, from the mother's future care, was confined to emotional harm, and the Guardian was unable to confine herself in that way. If the mother was distracted and her supervision waned, there was a risk of accidental physical harm as well. The mother would need to be constantly alert to the needs of three active young children.
175. There was another aspect of legitimate concern for A's father. The incidents described by the mother involving two doormen in September 2014, and the intra-neighbourly dispute, would have created a situation of potential risk for three children, had they been in the mother's home at that time.
176. The mother, in her oral evidence, gave me a fairly graphic account of two distressing episodes for her on Tuesday 16^th and Thursday 18^th September 2014. AB and another friend, AW, were in her home on the Tuesday. AB sexually touched/indecently assaulted the mother. The mother asked him to leave and he refused. He went upstairs to lie on the bed, and was brought down and ejected by AW. On the Thursday AB returned. He was intoxicated. He forced himself into the mother's home, believing that AW was there. The mother, obviously scared, fled upstairs and locked herself in the bathroom and telephoned the Police (this was at approximately 3:00 a.m.). AB then made off when the Police were called.
177. The mother denies telling the Police that AB was an ex-boyfriend, and that she had split up with him the preceding week after a five month relationship, and that he was struggling to accept their separation (see F4-F11).
178. I have already preferred the WPC's account about what the mother said.
179. The mother indicated in writing to the Police Constable that she did not wish to pursue a complaint.
180. In a separate portion of her evidence the mother said that a female neighbour across the way had smashed the glass in her front door with a hammer, and that another neighbour in drink had smashed the door with her heel. It seems to me that the mother desperately needs to avoid situations of this kind for her own sake, and for her children's sake also.
181. The mother is a young and attractive lady, who has enjoyed and encouraged the attention of young men, sometimes to her cost. I am not satisfied that this is a feature of her past, and her disappointment when things go awry in her personal life substantially impact upon her capability to parent in a serious way.
182. A's father confirmed that his sexual relationship with the mother began from their very first initial meeting. He was allowed into the mother's home at a time in August 2013, when the previous proceedings were underway.
183. As things transpired, A's father was probably one of the mother's better decisions, partner wise, but she did not pause or reflect very much. She invested much into the relationship, she hoped it would be a permanent one, but her obsessional texting and phoning was a prelude to the unravelling of that relationship, and her preoccupation with its aftermath derailed her composure and stability during 2013/14.
184. This mother has been involved in proceedings for twelve years as she told me. She has experience of numerous assessments, social work and psychological. She has learnt much of the jargon, the phraseology of professionals involved in this kind of work, but whether she has assimilated fully the underlying messages, I doubt very much.
185. In fairness to the mother, I believe she herself could see the difficulties, for instance with moving A from his father's care, A having settled there virtually since his birth. She became upset in the witness box yesterday when she was calmer in her presentation, and she came close to acknowledging the difficulty of her case for a full transfer of A's care to her, and she suggested, I believe, shared care as an alternative to that.

The conclusion with regard to A's placement and contact

186. Any consideration of the 'welfare checklist' and the paramountcy of A's welfare favours placement of A with his father. The mother has issues already relating to section 1(3)(e) Children Act 1989, which as I have said are carried over from the proven threshold, supplemented by the events post December 2013, to which I have referred already.
187. The Guardian is clear; A's father meets his physical and emotional needs, that is the clear conclusion of the Guardian's report (see E67-E68). A's father is:

"A competent and caring father who has developed practical childcare skills, and who has a natural rapport with his baby son".

He is organised and with good routines, he is fully committed to A's long-term care, he is in employment, and has the support of his wider family and partner, with a young child of her own.

188. He is sincere, I believe, in his commitment to the mother's contact, but that contact has to be compatible with his move out of this area, and he has suggested a telephone link with the mother which would be a valuable resource. C [name of town given] is a perfectly reasonable location for a handover and for contact. A change in A's circumstances by a move to his mother's care would not, I judge, be in his interests. In any event, the mother's capabilities would preclude such an outcome.
189. The father intends to move at the end of January 2015, to be with his partner. He will retain familial and employment links in North Wales, and he has made appropriate childcare plans. He would taper the mother's contact down from thrice a week to monthly contact, and would support the supplemental birthday and Christmas contact, and the discrete inter-sibling contact which is proposed.
190. The Local Authority has indicated its willingness to assist with the tapering arrangements, and the inter-sibling contact in the longer term.
191. The Guardian recommended these arrangements, since A's father will be A's primary carer, and more frequent contact would not be in his interest. A's father was willing to consider overnight contact, providing the mother made progress with her therapy, and distanced herself from the sort of company which caused her problems in September 2014. I believe that was not an unreasonable stance for him to adopt. Progress, therefore, with regard to the mother's future contact with A is very largely in the mother's own hands.
192. Three times per week contact will be difficult for A's father as a matter of practicality, away from this area, and the nature of the mother's relationship with A is very different to that with E and G, for obvious reasons. Having regard, therefore to A's welfare, I make the Orders in respect of him, which I outlined before the commencement of this judgment.

The conclusions with regard to E and G

193. I recognise, as the Guardian has stated, that E and G would probably wish to return to their mother's care. However, I accept, as the Guardian said, that they are settled and happy with Mr and Mrs H.
194. Section 1(3)(e) Children Act 1989 applies unfavourably in relation to the mother, because of my threshold and supplemental findings. The mother cannot meet the emotional needs of both children, and at times she might compromise their physical welfare as explained by the Guardian. The mother's capabilities are hampered in the way I have already identified.
195. Mr and Mrs H have committed themselves to E and G's care, and that is to their credit because E is no blood familial relative. They are experienced parents with their own children, D and T, who have accepted E and G into their home. The H's are approved Local Authority foster carers and they have their own employment and busy lives.
196. The Guardian was concerned by overburdening this placement, with extended contact commitments for the mother, involving travel for the Hs' and for the children. The Guardian favoured much better quality monthly contact in the community, rather than the rushed after school provision. This was also the key social workers evidence.
197. The Hs' find, I was told, the current arrangements to be onerous. I should not place undue strain upon a placement which is so critically important for both of these children, because if these children cannot return to their mother's care, what is the realistic alternative to Mr and Mrs H? One which I suspect the mother would find much less palatable.
198. G's father, it is true because of his familial connection with his sister, will see G more often, but that is a reflection of the inherent nature of the placement as a familial placement with LK's sister.
199. For E, placement with her sibling G is the next best to a parental placement, and both are proportionate outcomes, consistent with the least interventionist approach to family life.
200. In any event, LK's contact with G will change when G goes to school next September.
201. As the Guardian has said, the mother's contact will be kept under frequent review. The quality of the mother's contact, has according to the Guardian, not always been good, as the Guardian observed for herself, because organisationally the mother has been poor. If the mother were to make progress with her therapy and her life generally, the need for supervision/support in contact might well disappear.
202. The Guardian recommended a tapering over the next two months, to a frequency of monthly contact in the case of E and G. Indirect contact in-between would be appropriate, together with the additional contact around Christmas and birthdays, and discrete inter-sibling contact was also recommended.
203. The Guardian accepted that E might require additional supplemental contact with her mother in her own right.
204. The Guardian was firmly of the view that thrice per week contact was excessive, and it placed an unacceptable strain on the placement, which is so critical for E and G. I agree with that assessment. The Guardian presents a favourable picture of the Hs' home life (see E87-E88). This is a:

"… good placement for both of these children, and it will allow them to enjoy stability and security in a family environment where there are clear structures and boundaries, and where they will be provided with a consistent level of physical and emotional care" (see E89).

205. There is no basis for discharging these Care Orders. The mother's circumstances have not changed for the better. I would not make a defined contact in the case of E and G as children in care, but the Plans recommended by the Guardian at present accord with the promotion of reasonable contact for E and G's mother, and also for G;s father.
206. Accordingly, so far as E and G are concerned, I would also make the Orders I outlined before the commencement of this judgment.

End of judgment