England and Wales Family Court Decisions (other Judges)

IN THE FAMILY COURT
SITTING AT MANCHESTER

IN THE MATTER OF THE CHILDREN ACT 1989
AND IN THE MATTER OF THE ADOPTION AND CHILDREN ACT 2002
AND IN THE MATTER OF: W (CHILDREN)

		Civil Justice Centre 1 Bridge Street West Manchester M60 9DJ
		24th October 2014

JUDGE NEWTON:

I INTRODUCTION

1. I am concerned with:

A, born on 24^th March 2010, so she is now 4½ years; and

B, born on 25^th January 2013 and now aged 20 months.

2. The parents are D and E. I hope they will forgive me if, during an already over-long judgment, I refer to them by way of shorthand as 'the mother' and 'the father'.
3. The parents are black Africans from Zimbabwe. They are both well-educated and speak excellent English. I have sought to make appropriate allowance for the fact that they enjoy a cultural, religious, and ethical background that is very different from my own.
4. This is Local Authority A's application for care orders in relation to A and B, issued as long ago as 5^th March 2013. Originally, those proceedings also encompassed the children's older sibling, C, born on 19^th February 1999, now aged 15 years. As their plan is that A and B be placed for adoption, the Local Authority has also issued a placement order application.
5. The Local Authority's key social worker was F and is now G. The children's CAFCASS guardian is Z.
6. Sadly, these proceedings have had a chequered history. They were originally allocated to Her Honour Judge Penna. Following a lengthy contested hearing on 20^th March 2014, Her Honour Judge Penna made care orders in relation to all three children and placement orders in relation to A and B. The order in relation to C has not been challenged and C remains placed with foster carers.
7. The parents successfully appealed against the decision of Her Honour Judge Penna and the matter came before the Court of Appeal on 27^th August 2015 Lord Justice Ryder giving the leading judgment.
8. The case was remitted for rehearing and was allocated to me. I conducted an issues resolution hearing on 24^th September 2015. At that stage, I raised the potential problems as to the father's immigration status at the conclusion of his sentence. I am grateful to his legal representative, Mr H, and indeed the Home Office, for attempting to clarify his position so expeditiously.
9. I heard oral evidence and submissions over four days commencing on 14^th October. At the conclusion of the hearing on Friday afternoon, there was insufficient time for me to consider my decisions and today is the first occasion when it was convenient for myself and all the parties and advocates to deliver this judgment.
10. The father is currently serving a sentence of imprisonment. I made production orders to ensure his attendance. He told me that there was difficulty with transport on Tuesday and that he decided not to attend on Wednesday and Thursday. It was rightly accepted by Mr J on his behalf that I must proceed in his absence. He did attend on Friday to enable me to hear his evidence. His reluctance to attend appears to have been linked to his desire not to be brought overnight to Prison A from Prison B. It is then doubly unfortunate that production orders sent to Prison B to ensure his attendance today have not been acted upon and he is therefore not present this afternoon. I will, of course, order a full transcript of this judgment in any event and a copy will be sent to him.
11. I have read all five lever arch files of documentation. I have only skim-read bundle F containing medical notes, although I have looked at the good quality photographs of C's injuries. The bundle includes transcripts of all of the oral evidence heard by Her Honour Judge Penna. For the avoidance of any doubt, although I have read those transcripts, I make it clear that I have relied upon the oral evidence of the witnesses as they gave evidence before me and not before Her Honour Judge Penna. It was however agreed that it was unnecessary for 2 witnesses from the Probation service to be re-called to give oral evidence because I could safely rely upon the transcript of their evidence in February 2014 and I have done so.
12. I heard oral evidence from:

a. F;

b. K, consultant psychologist;

c. L who runs an organisation called Organisation B;

d. the mother;

e. the guardian;

f. the father's immigration solicitor, Mr H; and ultimately

g. the father.

Where witnesses have not been called to give oral evidence, I have taken their written evidence as read.

II THE ESSENTIAL BACKGROUND

13. The mother was born on 15^th November 1980 and so is now nearly 34 years of age. The father was born on 9^th May 1970 and is now 43 years. The parents are from Bulawayo. They had a brief relationship in Zimbabwe leading to C's birth. The father did not initially acknowledge C as his son and he appears to have played no role in his early life. When C was 2, the mother went to South Africa to seek work leaving C to be cared for by his maternal grandmother. She returned briefly to Zimbabwe in 2003 before leaving again for the United Kingdom. She sought asylum, has been granted indefinite leave to remain in the UK, and now holds a British passport. She is currently studying for a degree in biomedical sciences.
14. It appears that the father came to the UK in 2008 and subsequently made a claim for asylum. That was initially refused, but was granted following an appeal to an immigration tribunal. He had leave to remain in the UK until 29^th September 2014 and had hitherto worked as a chef.
15. The parents met in Manchester and resumed their relationship in about 2010 and A was born. They made arrangements for C to join the family in the UK and he arrived, in around December 2010 (although different dates are given in different documents). This was the first occasion that he had met his father. He had not seen his mother for perhaps seven years. He spoke no English and had no understanding of British culture. Unsurprisingly, C experienced some challenges in adjusting to life in Manchester with parents who were virtual strangers to him.
16. On 22^nd January 2011, the parents were married. B was born in January 2013. A matter of weeks later, C was severely assaulted by his parents.
17. During the hearing in the Court of Appeal, Lord Justice Ryder formulated a set of findings based upon the evidence which he understood Her Honour Judge Penna to have accepted. At the IRH and during this hearing, all parties agreed that those findings were an accurate baseline for establishing the threshold criteria at Section 31 of the Children Act. It subsequently appeared from the oral evidence of both parents that they do not entirely accept Lord Justice Ryder's formulation but, wisely, their advocates have not sought to go behind it. Accordingly, the threshold criteria in this case in relation to A and B is established on the following factual basis:

(a) C was seriously injured by a repeated and at least one sustained attack by both parents, instigated by his mother and perpetrated primarily but not exclusively by his father.

(b) A was inappropriately physically chastised by her mother by being slapped or touched on her cheeks.

(c) A was emotionally harmed by witnessing the harm caused to C and/or by being aware of it, and/or by her apprehension that she would suffer the same violence.

(d) The mother and father have minimised their responsibility for and the extent of their violence to C, i.e. there is no full acceptance of it by them.

(e) The mother and father have demonstrated no sufficient insight into what happened, i.e. why it happened, so as to reassure professionals it would not happen again.

(f) The mother and father have entrenched attitudes to punishment that will be difficult to overcome.

(g) There is a risk of serious physical and emotional harm to A and B arising out of the parents' dishonesty, lack of acceptance, lack of insight, and entrenched attitudes such that in the absence of an alternative strategy in the parents which is protective of the children as they grow up into teenagers presents a risk of significant harm to the children.

18. The parents were both prosecuted for their behaviour towards C and in December 2013, the case came before His Honour Judge Knopf for trial. The parents pleaded guilty to an assault on C and, in the father's case, to an offence of cruelty.
19. On 16^th December 2013, the father was sentenced to two years and ten months imprisonment. His earliest release date is May 2015. The mother was sentenced to a term of imprisonment for 20 months, suspended for two years, and is subject to supervision from the Probation Service for a period of 18 months. Unfortunately, the mother has now been charged with offences of fraud. Her trial in the Magistrates' court has, last week, been adjourned to enable her to attend this hearing.
20. As a result of the parents' assault upon C, all three children were accommodated with foster carers where, sadly, such a long time later, they remain. They are doing well. Their mother's contact to them now takes place only once every two months. The father is unable to attend because he is incarcerated.

THE LEGAL FRAMEWORK

21. The burden lies on the Local Authority to prove the allegations which it makes. The appropriate standard of proof is the civil standard of the simple balance of probabilities. I have reminded myself of Re B (Children) [2008] UKHL 35 and particularly the speech of Baroness Hale.
22. As I have set out, it is conceded by the parents that the threshold criteria at Section 31 of the Children Act are met in relation to A and B and the factual baseline for that concession is agreed.
23. So the central issue I have to decide in relation to A and B's future is whether I should approve the Local Authority's care plan for them to be placed for adoption or whether there is any realistic route by which they might safely be placed in the care of their mother and, upon his release from prison, their father. In determining that issue, I bear firmly in mind that A and B's welfare is my paramount consideration. I have reminded myself of the provisions of the welfare checklist at Section 1(3) of the Children Act 1989 and also what is known as the no delay principle set out at Section 1(2). Obviously, if there is any prospect of children being safely cared for by their parents, that is the alternative which I would favour.
24. If I were to approve the Local Authority's care plan for the children, I would then be obliged to consider whether it would accord with their welfare throughout their lives to be made the subject of placement orders. In that exercise, I am guided by the welfare checklist at Section 1(4) of the Adoption and Children Act 2002, Section 1(4)(c) the likely effect upon them of having ceased to be a member of their family, and Section 1(4)(e) the harm they are at risk of suffering appear particularly significant.
25. If I conclude that a placement order accords with A and B's welfare individually and collectively, I will then have to decide whether their welfare requires me to dispense with consent of their parents to the making of such orders. In addressing that issue, I have reminded myself of the guidance set out in Re P (Placement Orders: Parental Consent) [2008] EWCA Civ 535.
26. I must be satisfied that any orders I make are a lawful, necessary, proportionate and reasonable response to the children's sad predicament. The granting of a care order, let alone endorsing a plan for adoption, would represent a drastic curtailment of the rights of these parents and of A and B under Article 8 of the European Convention on Human Rights and Fundamental Freedoms. Such an interference can only be justified by pressing concerns for the children's welfare.
27. All of this is now trite law. However, in construing both the Convention and also domestic law, I now have the assistance of the Supreme Court in Re B (A Child) [2013] UKSC 33, followed by the decisions of the Court of Appeal, particularly in Re B-S [2013] EWCA Civ 1146, but also Re P (A Child) [2013] EWCA Civ 963 and Re G (A Child) [2013] EWCA Civ 965. All of those cases firmly re-emphasise that a placement for adoption is "a very extreme thing" and "a last resort" to be approved only when "nothing else will do." Both domestic and Convention law do require a high degree of justification before an adoption can be endorsed as "necessary," the term in the convention, or "required" by the Adoption and Children Act.

III MY ASSESSMENT OF THE WITNESSES

28. I found F an intelligent and analytical social worker who had clearly given very anxious and careful thought as to the Local Authority's application. He was hampered by the fact that the Local Authority's original social work assessment was prepared by M as the children's then key social worker, but she then became seriously ill and left the Authority. As the new key social worker, he was directed by Her Honour Judge Penna to update the Local Authority's assessment in the light of all the evidence then available and given a comparatively brief period to accomplish that task. He did not think it necessary, nor was he instructed, to re-interview the parents as to the events surrounding the assault upon C. He did properly identify a lacuna in the original assessment in that M had not, herself, observed contact between the parents and the children and he did so. It would, in my judgment, have been preferable if he had had the opportunity to spend more time with the parents if only because his inability to do so has given rise to a sense of injustice on their part. However, given his analysis and conclusions, I do not think, in reality, his re-interviewing either parent would have added a great deal. I am satisfied that his evidence was honest, reflective of his genuinely held views, and that he undertook an objective appraisal of the welfare interests of the children.
29. K is well known to the court as a sensible and conscientious psychologist. However, her written evidence and her contribution to the expert meeting was based on her assessment of these parents as:

"...straightforward and open in their engagement with the assessment. Their accounts are basically truthful."

Her confidence in the parents was somewhat undermined in cross-examination before Her Honour Judge Penna, largely based upon the findings of His Honour Judge Knopf, and has been further undermined by the evidence that she has been provided with as the case has unfolded. I am afraid that I am driven to reject K's fundamental premise as to the parents' honesty and straightforwardness and the value of her evidence is thereby diminished.

30. Similarly, I have no doubt whatsoever that L was doing her honest best to assist the court. However, the valuable service which her organisation Organisation B provides is essentially that of supporting African parents to improve their parenting skills, including providing appropriate educative materials and promoting a very child focused approach. But L is not, and does not pretend to be, a qualified social worker or a professional possessed of expertise in risk assessment. I entirely accept her evidence as far as it goes as to the parents' involvement with her. However, I am unable to place secure reliance upon her advice as to the key issues as to the future placement of A and B. I am not at all sure that the parties were really very clear as to what they were asking L to do and they have not properly investigated her qualifications before inviting her to assist the court.
31. Mother is clearly an intelligent and articulate woman. She was quietly spoken but could be quite combative when challenged. I have no doubt that these proceedings have caused her immense distress and bewilderment. Nor do I doubt her love for A and B. But I am afraid I did not find her a reliable witness. Even when faced with evidence of, frankly, outright lying, she "wriggled" unconvincingly.
32. The father was very calm and I had a sense of him being somewhat resigned to his sentence of imprisonment, the prospect of deportation, and the prospect of his children being adopted. He was, I thought, capable of a degree of belligerence. He appears to have come a little further than the mother in developing a genuine understanding of where their parenting of C went so dreadfully wrong, but he still has a long way to go.
33. Mr H's evidence was given at very short notice. It was not challenged. I accept it and I am grateful to him for his attendance.
34. Z is a very experienced guardian who has now been involved with this case for a depressingly protracted period. Her evidence was child focused and very clear indeed. I am satisfied that she has carefully considered and analysed all of the evidence in the light of her own personal involvement with the children and parents, is doing her best to assist the court and that I can safely accept her advice.

IV MY FINDINGS

The assault upon C

35. This is the inevitable starting point as it led directly to the Local Authority's involvement.
36. The parents faced an indictment charging child cruelty and assault contrary to Section 47 of the Offences Against the Person Act on 26^th February 2013 when C was 14 years of age. Following denials in interview and in defence case statements, on the day of trial both parents pleaded guilty to assault and the father to cruelty. However, they did so on a factual basis which did not reflect the prosecution case. His Honour Judge Knopf, who is a highly experienced family and also criminal judge, held what is known as a 'Newton hearing' to determine the factual basis upon which to sentence. Over some three days, he watched C's "achieving best evidence" interview and C was cross-examined. He heard oral evidence from Dr. Jilani, the consultant paediatrician who had initially examined C, and from each of the parents. I remind myself that, of course, His Honour Judge Knopf was bound by the criminal standard of proof; that is he had to be "sure" of the facts relied upon by the prosecution. On the basis of all of the evidence which I have heard and read, His Honour Judge Knopf's findings are unassailable and I accept them for the purpose of my welfare assessment in these proceedings.
37. Reading from J3, the approved note of His Honour Judge Knopf's judgment, I make the following findings:

(i) C was angry and upset when he gave his ABE interview on 28^th February, the day following the assault. He accepted in evidence that he had exaggerated some aspects of his account. However, his oral evidence was reliable and honest.

(ii) Both parents had lied comprehensively in their police interviews.

(iii) On 26^th February, C had lied about how he had come by a pair of trainers.

(iv) C was compelled by his parents to remove his clothing down to his boxer shorts and he was pinned to the carpeted floor.

(v) His mother began to hit him with a belt or cable. He tried to escape and pushed her. That incensed the father, who then hit him repeatedly with a scart lead from the television. The majority of C's injuries were caused by his father, but to use His Honour Judge Knopf's phrase, "They both laid into him." Both parents were incandescent with range, out of control, beating a 14-year-old boy who was helpless at their feet.

(vi) C was screaming; a towel was placed in his mouth to stifle his cries.

(vii) The father's account, supported by the mother, that he had inflicted a limited number of blows, that is three blows, was untrue. Both parents had lied in their evidence to the court attempting to minimise what they had done to C.

(viii) C managed to escape to the bathroom when, I think, B began to cry. He squeezed out of the bathroom window on a cold February night, dressed only in his boxer shorts. He was so frightened he had wet himself. He was found by neighbours who called the police. Contrary to the parents' evidence, C's injuries were not caused by him squeezing through that window.

38. This was not the first occasion when C was beaten by his father with a belt for misdemeanours. His Honour Judge Knopf, applying the criminal standard, was unable to say how often C had been beaten previously. On the balance of probabilities and notwithstanding the parents' denials, I am entirely satisfied that the father at least, has assaulted C on numerous previous occasions, the father using a belt or scart lead in accordance with C's consistent account, to medical professionals, the police, and social workers.
39. I turn to the unchallenged medical evidence, I which is carefully summarised in the report of Dr Mecrow, consultant paediatrician, at D63. I find that when medically examined, C had 46 lesions or bruises to his skin. Of those, at least 14 were consistent with him having been hit by a looped object such as a belt, chord, or wire. Perhaps six of the lesions or bruises had an innocent accidental explanation. The appearances of the remaining lesions point convincingly to C having been beaten and injured during more than one incident. As Dr Mecrow noted at the professionals' meeting on 11^th July 2013, there were at least two score blows sufficient to break the skin or to cause bruising and the likelihood is that there were many more blows which did not make contact or leave bruising. He commented

"In terms of the number of injuries sustained, Dr Mecrow has provided over 450 reports in the last six years in this type of case. This would be in the top 1 to 2 percent of cases with as many injuries of this kind."

40. I accept Dr Mecrow's opinion, which is consistent with the view of Dr. Jilani, that this was a sustained beating and could not have been some momentary loss of control. I accept also that the injuries, as His Honour Judge Knopf found, were consistent with C being undressed, contrary to the parents' account.
41. In summary, I conclude that this was a sustained and vicious joint attack by two adults using a weapon or weapons upon a boy who was so utterly terrified that he took the dangerous risk of climbing out of a small first floor window in his underwear on a cold night to escape. That is reflected in the sentences which His Honour Judge Knopf imposed on the father and more mercifully upon the mother.
42. The impact upon C, already bewildered by his move from all that was familiar in Zimbabwe to utterly strange and unhappy circumstances in the UK, was devastating. His victim impact statement makes harrowing reading. I accept F's evidence that C's self-esteem, his view of the world, his sense of self, his hopes and aspirations for the future have all been seriously harmed by his parents' behaviours and that this legacy of abuse will continue forward into C's adult life.
43. I am also satisfied that C's trauma was exacerbated by his parents' failure to acknowledge what they had done to him, thereby inflicting upon him the necessity of giving evidence in the Crown Court and being cross-examined at length. Mr P very properly reminds me that, during that process, C did accept that he had exaggerated some elements of the assault, but the reality is that the parents' challenge was to the essentials of his account and, as I have already recorded, the judge rejected their evidence and found to the criminal standard that C was essentially telling the truth.
44. I conclude that the parents' own desire for self-preservation, to completely minimise their behaviours, caused yet further harm to this vulnerable child. F, who supported C throughout the criminal trial, told me that the experience was and remains very traumatic for C. He correlates the breakdown of C's foster placement around this time with his giving evidence in the criminal proceedings. It is, I think, to the father's credit that he was prepared to recognise in evidence that it had been wrong to put C through that further ordeal.
45. I note that for a long period, C refused to have any contact with his parents and it is pleasing to note that, more recently, he has begun to visit his mother and I hope that they may be able to rebuild their relationship.

The evidence of the Probation Service

46. Prior to sentence, as is usual, His Honour Judge Knopf ordered reports from the Probation Service and those reports were completed in the mother's case by Q at J9 and, in the father's case, by R at J24.
47. Given the sentence imposed upon the father, I can summarise R's evidence briefly. The report suggests that the father had been able to move forward in his understanding that his behaviours were wholly unacceptable and in terms of accepting responsibility. He was assessed as posing a medium risk of serious harm and a low risk of reoffending, although this would be increased to a high risk should he have unsupervised contact with children.
48. Q records that, in her interview with the mother, she accepted some culpability, but did not accept responsibility. She sought to minimise her actions, maintaining that this is what happens in Zimbabwe, and refusing to acknowledge the violence by referring to it as "chastisement" in order to discipline, with C's behaviour being the trigger for the offence. She notes the mother's lack of insight and empathy into C's predicament. In the context of the mother's expressed desire to resume care of A and B, she opined that:

"Given her lack of acceptance of responsibility for her actions, her minimising and justification and her lack of victim empathy, I conclude this would place her children at a significant risk of harm."

She assessed the mother as posing a medium risk of serious harm and a low risk of reoffending, although this would be increased should she have unsupervised contact with children.

49. When the mother was not sent to immediate custody, the Probation Service, in the person of S, who is the Probation Services' safeguarding lead, were sufficiently concerned about B and A to write to the Local Authority and their letter is found at D200. S highlights what she describes as the "high to very high risk" which, in the professional judgment of the Probation Service, any unsupervised contact between the mother and the children would present. She points out that the Probation Service will be reviewing the mother's case at a MAPPA level as the process of supervision continues, such are their pressing concerns about her. The letter refers to the mother's persistence in excusing her behaviour, highlighting her entrenched attitudes which it is assessed will be difficult to overcome. There is no evidence, S comments, to suggest that the mother had been subject to coercion by her co-defendant but that she was a willing participant.
50. The essence of the work of the Probation Service with individual offenders is to assess and minimise the risk of reoffending, so they are highly qualified in this field and accordingly I attach weight to their assessment of the parents. However, I bear in mind that they have a limited perspective in the sense that, for example, they know nothing about A and B and their particular needs, nor do they seem to have relevant information about the high quality of the relationship between the mother and children.

The assessment of K

51. K's assessment is at D143 and I have read it several times. Unfortunately, it precedes the criminal trial and the findings of His Honour Judge Knopf. I accept without reservation K's assessment that neither parent suffers from any significant psychological deficit. Essentially, she seeks to argue that the assault upon C was specific to his circumstances and would be unlikely to be repeated upon A and B. She suggests that the parents would benefit from support and help and from becoming better socially integrated. In cross-examination before Her Honour Judge Penna and also before me, K resiled somewhat from this approach. She was very concerned by her reading of the agreed findings from the Court of Appeal, and the findings of His Honour Judge Knopf.
52. There are two principal reasons why I am not persuaded that K is correct in her initial analysis of risk to A and B and I will try and deal with them both in some detail. The first is that she found the parents to be essentially honest and, the second, that she was assuming that no actual harm had come to A or B.
53. Dealing with the question of truthfulness, as K said in her report and has repeated in both sets of oral evidence, "Truthfulness is central to the accuracy of my assessment." I do not accept that the account which the parents gave to K was basically honest. For example, the mother "stuck to the story" she had given to the police that it was she and not her husband who had done most of the hitting of C. The father, for example, was unable to answer the question as to whether he had hit C more than usual or more severely than he had intended. I also do not believe that the parents could have "no idea" that physical chastisement on this scale was unlawful in the UK. Without going into every detail, K was obliged to concede that the parents had not given her an honest account of what had happened to C. In my judgment, that of itself substantially undermines K's advice.
54. Secondly, I am satisfied that A has witnessed a number of violent assaults upon C. This was a very small flat. It is inconceivable that she was unaware of what was happening even if, as the parents contend, she was at nursery on the day of the attack on 28^th February. By way of illustration, A's extreme anxiety when C was being examined by DR Jilani and was laid on his tummy, her reluctance to leave his side and her desire to protect him – she is 2 years of age – suggests that she was more than aware of what was happening to her older brother.
55. Perhaps more importantly, I am confident that A had already been subject to some physical punishment by her mother. In reaching that conclusion, I reject the accounts of the parents. I rely upon, firstly, C's account in interview at G253 that A was regularly slapped if she did not eat or did not get to the toilet on time. He says she was also hit with a small stick which he was required to collect. I am not sure that, given his age, I can safely rely upon that further allegation and I do not accept it to the appropriate standard.
56. But I do rely, secondly, upon the mother's account in her interview with the police, which is found at G221. She was being asked about punching and slapping C:

"Q. Have you ever done that, D?

A. No. The only person I've slapped is my daughter, A, because she swears a lot. She'll be saying 'fucking', 'fucking' all the time. The only thing I do to her... [and then the transcriber records 'makes slapping sound'] ...'Stop that. Don't do that,' and that's the end of the story.

Q. And where would you do that on A if she was—

A. On the cheek, that's it."

57. The mother attempted to say that what she had done was merely gentle touching with two fingers to A's cheek on one single occasion when she swore. I am puzzled when the mother recalls that gentle gesture. It seems to me to have been completely unmemorable and I would have no idea why she would recollect it in the context of a question about slapping. The actual sound of the slap on the transcript of the interview is, in my judgment compelling.
58. Thirdly, I note A's presentation in foster care. She exhibits extreme distress if she believes she has done something wrong, hitting herself on her arm, lying down saying she is "ready to be told off now". The guardian in conversation with the foster carers notes A's preoccupation with being punished, not just in the context of her doing something wrong, but in the context of her, for instance, playing with dolls. There is a lot of conversation about punishment.
59. Fourthly, there was an occasion in contact on 13^th August 2013 when A spilt a drink. She was distressed and promptly lay on the floor, saying words to the effect, "Do my bottom, daddy." I am satisfied that she anticipated physical punishment.
60. Finally, these are parents who went to extreme lengths to "chastise" C. They relied on the proposition that such behaviour was justified by the need to improve him although conceding that their behaviour was excessive. I struggle to see if this was, as they tell me, genuinely the framework for their thinking, why that would not extend to A and, in due course, to B.
61. In conclusion, I am satisfied that I cannot rely upon K's assessment of the risk of harm to A and B.

The parents' relationship with A and B

62. I am satisfied from the evidence of each of the parents that, in comparison with C, they do have a different type of relationship to A and, to a degree, to B, although I fear that their relationship with B is now a tenuous one. The parents do not appear to have reflected at any length upon their own responsibility for the circumstances in which C was placed on his arrival in this country. I do, however, accept that C, through no fault of his own, presented some challenging behaviours. I am satisfied that the quality of relationship with A and B can be distinguished. For example, the father is very much more involved in a "hands on" fatherly role than he could ever have been with C who he did not see until he was some 10 or 11 years old.
63. I do accept that these parents love their children. I have been impressed with the descriptions of contact which is found in F's evidence. Contact with their mother is stimulating, safe, and nurturing, a time during which the children's needs are met. A had a good relationship with both of her parents.
64. I also accept that the parents have tried at some level to understand why their behaviour was not acceptable, the father probably having made a little more progress than the mother. I note the analysis of T, the mother's probation officer, at D250 where she commends the mother's engagement with the Probation Service, although she expresses concern that the mother has still not internalised any sense of responsibility for what happened to C. I fear that analysis is correct.

The social work assessments

65. M concluded her assessment in June of 2013. I cannot detect within it any real challenge to the parents' account of matters. She concluded that a psychological assessment of the parents would be helpful and it was also agreed that Organisation B would be instructed to work with the parents.
66. I have already indicated that L, despite her manifest experience in working with African families, is not qualified to advise the court on risk. Her evidence as to parental capacity to change was, at best, anecdotal. Unsurprisingly, she was unaware, for example, of recent research. Again the parents failed to give her an honest account of what had happened to C and she conceded that such failure fundamentally undermines her advice. As she put it, "We are not off first base." I am sure the parents are grateful to Organisation B for its support, but I can only attach limited weight to L's advice to the court. Similarly, U, who has played a very supportive role with the mother but who does not purports to present any sort of objective assessment. I am pleased that the mother has been prepared to participate in that work and has been keen to learn.
67. F's addendum assessment did have the advantage of being concluded following the criminal trial which, as I have recorded, he attended. He reviews in some detail all of the evidence filed at that stage of the case. He rejects any narrative which describes the assaults upon C as constituting physical "chastisement". Neither parent has sought to pursue that explanation before me. Both have made it clear that they accept that their behaviour went way beyond what might have been acceptable.
68. I do not accept the validity of the parents' claim that they did not realise that physical chastisement on this scale was unlawful in the UK for the reasons which F sets out. In any event, I doubt the relevance of that claim given the gravity of this assault. The parents' behaviour was more sinister and abusive than mere physical "chastisement". F asks, and I have asked myself, "What would have made the parents desist if C had not managed to escape?" F weighs in the balance the high quality of the contact that he observed and the good relationships which A, in particular, has with her parents. Nevertheless, he concludes in clear terms that the risks to the children of placement with either of their parents are unacceptable and that given the parents' level of dishonesty, there is really no support that could be given to the parents to mitigate that risk to a level which might be viewed as acceptable. He points to the likely increases in the risks to A and B as they grow into adolescence and present with the kind of challenging behaviour characteristic of many adolescents in the UK.

The parents' current personal circumstances.

69. The parent's position has not improved since F's assessment. The father's leave to remain the UK expired on 29^th September 2014. Following his imprisonment on 6^th June 2014, he has been served with a notice of liability to deportation as a foreign criminal under Section 32(5) of the UK Borders Agency Act 2007. On 22^nd August 2014, he was also served with notice to cease his refugee status and the appropriate documentation has been served on the UN High Commission for Refugees. He has instructed Mr H to challenge the Home Secretary's decisions. I was somewhat dismayed to read the factual basis put forward by his solicitors in correspondence that they kindly produced to the court, the tenor of which is that the father was merely using discipline to restrain C's antisocial behaviour, for example:

"Due to the antisocial behaviour of their eldest son, the whole family is in trouble as the applicant has to face imprisonment and his wife has been struggling to cope with life alone."

The father's evidence is that he had not read that document and his solicitor was acting without instructions. I find that difficult to accept

70. The mother remains subject to a suspended sentence of imprisonment. On 28^th April of this year, she was arrested for offences of fraud. She had successfully presented and cashed a false cheque for the sum of £980 at the Halifax Building Society in Bury and was about to present and cash a second cheque for the same amount at a different branch. In an interview with the police, she claims to have been sent the money for the sale of a car in Zimbabwe by someone called 'Ron'. To an objective reader with some experience of the criminal courts, I am bound to say that her account lacks credibility. In evidence before me, she was unable to even describe the colour of the supposed vehicle consistently. The false cheques were drawn on a UK building society which she concedes has no presence inside Zimbabwe. She has been charged and the case is ready for trial. If she is convicted, then there must be a significant risk of her having to serve some portion of her custodial sentence.
71. The mother also admitted in cross-examination that she is continuing to claim child tax credits, although none of her children have been in her care since February 2013. I found her attempts to explain why she felt this was justified, for example, she bought things for the children for contact visits, wholly unconvincing. If this conduct should come to the attention of the appropriate authorities, she is, I fear, likely to face a second prosecution for fraud. None of this is helpful.

The evidence of the children's Cafcass guardian

72. Z was very clear indeed that, to put it bluntly, these parents are not trustworthy. She said:

"In some cases, you can see someone making progress. You can work with them and help them to move on."

However, she says, these parents just do not tell the truth and genuine progress is impossible. She gave an illustration from this week. She met the mother on Monday and spoke to her for about an hour and a half. At some stage in that conversation, there was a discussion about whether C had been aggressive to his mother, hitting her. The mother accepted that, yes, indeed, C was aggressive to her, something she went on then to deny in her oral evidence. As Z put it, it is very difficult to see why someone should give two separate accounts in quite close proximity without there being any obvious reason for her telling lies on either occasion. Z is very clear that the risks of A and B being placed in the care of their parents cannot be contemplated and that there are no reasonable steps which could be taken to mitigate the risk.

The balancing exercise

73. It is common ground amongst the advocates that there are only two realistic alternatives for A and B, a return to the care of their mother and hopefully, in due course, to their father, or adoption. Two family members were put forward in the early stages of these proceedings before Her Honour Judge Penna: the grandmother, V, and the mother's cousin, W. Neither individual co-operated with a viability assessment and Her Honour Judge Penna sanctioned their termination.
74. What are the needs of A and B? These proceedings have been distressingly protracted. Bar the first three or four weeks, B has spent his entire life in foster care. A has spent a third of her life with foster carers. After such a prolonged period, the children's roots and their attachments lie with their foster carers. Sadly, those carers are not in a position to accept responsibility for A and B in the medium to long term and so a move will be necessary whatever I decide. That process will, of itself, be distressing, confusing, and giving rise to a real sense of loss for these children. I have read the recent unchallenged statement of the current key social worker and I accept it; I am satisfied that both A and B urgently need a safe, secure, stable and permanent placement, a family who will claim them and where they can put down roots and build the attachments that will be so necessary to their future lives.
75. A return of the children to the care of their parents would offer them the advantage of growing up within their family of origin, of continuing and developing a relationship with C and within the whole of their extended family. I bear in mind that parents have been committed to contact, to co-operation with these proceedings, and, as I have indicated, do love their children. Adoption would necessitate a severing of the relationship between children and parents, in A's case, the loss of an existing good relationship and, in B's case, the opportunity of developing such a relationship.
76. Although my focus must be on the welfare of A and B, I cannot ignore the consequences for C. If his siblings are adopted, that can only add to his misplaced sense of guilt and misery that it was his original complaint to the police which has led to the disintegration of his family. It will also increase his sense of isolation; he will miss them.
77. Adoption is no panacea and adopters face all the vicissitudes of life faced by ordinary parents with the added complication that the children they are bringing up are not their birth children A is towards the upper end of the age bracket where adoption research suggests only a minimal risk of breakdown, but the children do have the advantage of being placed together. I am confident that there are sufficient suitable adopters available to the Local Authority for a sibling group of this age. I am less confident that those adopters will be racially and culturally appropriate for two African children. It is particularly tragic to have to record that an entirely suitable match was identified prior to the proceedings before the Court of Appeal, but those adopters have been unable to wait for this legal process to conclude.
78. On the other hand, I accept the evidence of the Local Authority and Z that to return A and B to their parents would expose them to a high and continuing risk of physical and emotional harm. Any strategy to reduce the risk to an acceptable level would have to rely upon the parents being honest and open with professionals. It is perhaps understandable that the parents are resentful of Local Authority social workers and I note they have worked well with K and L, but I am afraid that, fundamentally, I do not believe that I can place confidence in the parents' future honesty and co-operation so as to mitigate the likely risks to A and B. I also accept that those risks will increase as time goes by.
79. The risks of instability and challenge are exacerbated by the prospect of the father being deported and the mother being sentenced to a term of immediate imprisonment. Those are risks which it is impossible for me to quantify at this stage, but risks which I cannot entirely ignore.
80. Doing the best I can to weigh all of the evidence, and reflecting upon my findings as to the disputed facts and as to reliability or otherwise of professional advice, I am satisfied that adoption does clearly accord with the welfare interests of A and B and is genuinely the only way forward to afford them the safety, security, and permanence that they deserve and need. Nothing else will do for them.
81. Indeed, I am satisfied that the position really is so clear that I must dispense with the consent of the parents to the making of placement orders on the basis that the welfare of B and A demands that I do so.

V ORDERS

82. Subject to any further submissions, the orders that I intend to make are as follows.

a. I approve the Local Authority's care plan and I make care orders.

b. I dispense with the consent of the parents and I make placement orders.

c. I direct a transcript of this judgment at the joint expense of all the parties. I give leave to disclose it once transcribed to any prospective adopters and to each of the professionals who have provided assistance, with my gratitude for their doing so. That includes the father's immigration solicitors and a copy can also be disclosed to the Home Office.

d. I direct an assessment of the costs of the legally assisted parties

THE JUDGE: Mr X, I imagine, although you have not asked for it, the Local Authority would like permission to disclose documentation to the Criminal Injuries Compensation Authority.

MR X: Your honour, yes.

THE JUDGE: I will include that. I would just like to conclude by saying that I hope that if, in their future lives, A or B ever had the opportunity of reading this imperfect judgment, they will fully appreciate that their parents loved them very much.

[Judgment ends]