England and Wales Family Court Decisions (other Judges)

		The Law Courts Quayside Newcastle upon Tyne NE1 3LA
		3rd October 2014

JUDGMENT

THE JUDGE:

Introduction

1. These proceedings concern two little girls: A, now 6 years of age; and B, aged 2. This is the second judgment I have given in care proceedings, which were issued on 11^th April 2014. On 24^th June 2014, I gave judgment at the conclusion of a contested interim care hearing, when I made interim care orders in respect of the girls and approved the care plan of their removal from their care of their mother and placement in foster care in the interim. The children have been placed together in foster care since. The judgment I gave on 24^th June 2014 has been transcribed and is in the case papers at B50A.
2. These proceedings have been case managed by me throughout. The judgment I gave on 24^th June 2014 sets out the chronology of the hearings which took place before me on 24^th April, 8^th May and 4^th June 2014 and the circumstances in which, at each of those hearings, I was satisfied that the children should remain in the care of their mother, in circumstances in which the children had always been cared for her, or by her and F together. The judgment also records my findings in relation to events which led to the contested interim care hearing and my conclusion at that hearing that the safety of the children required their immediate removal from their mother and their placement in foster care. This judgment must be read in the light of that judgment.
3. This judgment is given at the conclusion of a contested final hearing. The Local Authority seeks final care orders in respect of A and B with care plans of their placement together for adoption with indirect contact with their birth family, with a contingency plan of placement of the girls together in long term foster care with limited continuing direct contact with their parents. The Local Authority has issued placement applications for determination at the conclusion of this hearing if care orders are made and the Local Authority's care plan of adoption approved.
4. The Local Authority's plans are opposed by M and F, who both argue that the children should be returned to M's care. F does not put himself forward as a carer for the children but seeks contact with them. The children's guardian, Barbara Hewitt, supports the Local Authority's plans for A and B and the making of final care and placement orders.
5. The Local Authority, M and the children's guardian have had the advantage of representation by counsel who also appeared at the interim hearing on 24^th June 2014: Miss Darby for the Local Authority; Miss Gibson for M; and Miss Callaghan for the children's guardian. F has been represented at this hearing by counsel Mr McDermott, in place of his solicitor who represented him at the interim hearing.
6. During the course of this hearing, I heard evidence from two social workers: Deirdre Ryan, the social worker who prepared a parenting assessment which considered both placement of the children with the parents together and with M alone; and Joanne Dean, the currently allocated social worker for the children. I heard evidence from M and F. Finally, I heard evidence from the children's guardian.
7. In the light of an issue raised by the children's guardian earlier in the proceedings about the cognitive functioning of the parents, I approved a cognitive assessment of them both as necessary, mindful of the need to ensure that all assessment work in respect of the parents was undertaken with proper consideration of their functioning. Dr Stephanie Hill, consultant in forensic and clinical psychology, assessed M and F. Her report in respect of F is dated 4^th June 2014 (at E35). She summarises her conclusions at E43 as follows:

'[F] functions within the low average range of ability. His vocabulary, knowledge and use of words are more limited than his underlying comprehension and awareness and he may at times struggle to articulate himself, particularly within stressful or emotive situations such as court. However, his cognitive abilities are not so limited as to present significant challenges for him or professionals working with him and simple techniques and general awareness of his functioning should be sufficient to overcome any difficulties.'

8. In respect of M, Dr Hill's report dated 17^th June 2014 is at E45. She summarises her conclusions in respect of M at E51 as follows:

'[M] does not evidence any significant intellectual or cognitive limitations of note. She can at times appear overly bored and dismissive or else impulsive in her reactions to situations which will probably have greater effect than matters related to IQ.'

9. Dr Hill was not required for cross-examination. I have had regard to her assessments in full as well as the summary conclusions I have recorded in this judgment in my overall consideration of the evidence in the case.
10. Before I turn to the evidence, I set out the basis upon which I have considered it. It is for the Local Authority to prove its case as to threshold and welfare. In this case, it is accepted that the section 31 threshold criteria are satisfied. Concessions have been made by both parents in response to the findings sought against them. There have been relatively few factual issues between the parties during the course of this hearing. It is not, of course, necessary to resolve all factual disputes, only those which will inform the planning for the children. It is for the party making an allegation to prove it. I determine all factual issues on the simple balance of probabilities.
11. I have now heard evidence from M and F on two separate occasions. In assessing their evidence, I am mindful that people can present in very different ways in such a stressful situation and have not based my conclusions on their presentation alone. Findings of fact must be based on evidence, including inferences that can reasonably be drawn from the evidence, and not on suspicion or speculation. As I have considered the evidence, I have made my assessment of that I can rely on and the evidence I have concluded I cannot. I have considered the evidence which may implicate a person in relation to any finding against the evidence which points in another direction. I have considered the evidence about specific events in the context of the evidence as a whole.
12. My judgment dated 24^th June 2014 set out the findings I made at the interim hearing about the events which precipitated that application. I found then that the evidence of both parents could not be relied upon. I found that they had each lied in aspects of their evidence. Insofar as I find a person has lied, I have taken account of the fact that lies may be told for many different reasons. I have cautioned myself that a lie about one aspect of the case renders other evidence from that person unreliable or untrue. I have, in essence, given myself a Lucas direction.

Relevant Chronology

13. M is aged 35; F is now 30. M has two older daughters, X aged 19 and Y aged 18 years. Lincoln Children's Services, the Local Authority responsible for the area in which the family were then living, was involved periodically from 1995, with referrals raising concerns about the children's wellbeing in M's care. In addition to these issues, the status of M's father (MGF) as a sexual offender was an additional concern. The Local Authority chronology records that MGF has served custodial sentences for two sexual offences against a child and an offence of rape.
14. A was born on 1^st April 2008. Her father is named by M as W. The limited information provided by M about him is such that it has not been possible to trace him. He is not named on A's birth certificate and has not otherwise acquired parental responsibility for him. He has not featured in A's life.
15. In her oral evidence, M said that her father's conviction for rape arose from an incident when A was a baby. M said her father had sexual intercourse with a woman following a night out, at a time when she and the woman were sleeping in the sitting room at the home that MGF shared with his wife after a night out. M said that MGF took the opportunity to have sex with the woman whilst his wife was asleep upstairs. M's account is that because she was in the room at the time, she is aware that her father did not rape the woman.
16. In her oral evidence, M disputed the account she is recorded as giving to Deirdre Ryan during the course of the parenting assessment, that her children were also asleep in the room. In her oral evidence, M confirmed that the children in question were her daughters, X and Y. M denied that the children had slept in the room and said that they were sleeping upstairs. I prefer the evidence of Deirdre Ryan in relation to this. I find that M told the social worker that the children were sleeping in the same room, whether in fact they were or not.
17. M has always disputed her father's conviction for rape arising from this event. She has always said that she does not believe that he poses a risk of sexual harm. She maintained this position in her evidence, although she did say that she would not allow her children to come into contact with him because of the risk that others perceive him to pose. MGF served a prison sentence in relation to this offence but was released from custody some months ago. He continues to live with his wife in the Lincoln area.
18. The relationship between M and F commenced in about 2009. Lincolnshire County Council undertook an initial assessment in May 2011 and a core assessment in August 2011 following referrals raising issues about A's safety and welfare. The core assessment recommended support from a Team around the Child.
19. A further referral to Social Care followed, including allegations of domestic abuse between M and F. They both now accept that their relationship was very violent when they were in Lincoln and that A was exposed to it. The Local Authority's involvement continued with a further initial assessment and a Child in Need meeting, leading to further Team around the Child status.
20. On 9^th April 2012, B was born. Over the following year, the Local Authority's involvement continued with increasing concern in the following areas: the care of the children, with evidence of significant neglect of their basic care; domestic violence between M and F; poor home conditions; and a failure to adhere to agreements which were in place with the family with a view to ensuring the children's safety and well-being.
21. In March 2013, the Local Authority decided that a section 47 enquiry was required as a result of the safeguarding concerns in relation to the children. A strategy meeting held on 18^th April 2013 recommended an initial child protection conference. This was arranged for 8^th May 2013. A core assessment was completed by Lincolnshire Social Care on 27^th April 2013. It identified wide-ranging issues regarding the children's wellbeing. It recorded domestic abuse in the parents' relationship with repeated separations and reconciliations. F was having contact with the children, despite bail conditions to the contrary. A had made allegations of physical abuse against F. The children's basic care needs were not considered to be met. Home conditions were very poor home and assessed as being unsafe for the children. There was neglect of A's health needs and her school attendance was poor. The relationship between M and the children was considered to lack emotional warmth and she was recorded as making derogatory comments about them. M's engagement with professionals was described as superficial, in attending meetings and courses but not taking on board the advice provided. There was, in addition, a risk of sexual harm from MGF in the light of M's approach to his conviction and her ongoing contact with him.
22. M, F and the children moved to the North East days before the initial child protection conference was due to take place in Lincoln. Following a referral from Lincoln Children's Services on 30^th April 2014, an initial assessment was undertaken locally, which led to a core assessment and an initial child protection conference, at which the children were made subject to child protection plans under the category of physical harm. There was an agreement that contact between the children and F should be supervised.
23. The chronology records ongoing concerns from professionals in the North East which substantially mirrored those from Lincolnshire Children's Services. In the early months of 2014, home conditions were reported to be extremely poor, reflected in the children's presentation with A presenting in a very dirty and smelly condition at school. The proceedings were issued on 11^th April 2014.

The Threshold Criteria

24. Each of the parents makes concessions in relation to the threshold criteria. I set them out by reference to the response to the threshold findings filed on behalf of M at A54 (as revised following discussions between the advocates at the start of this hearing) and the threshold concessions provided by Mr McDermott on behalf of F dated 29^th September 2014. In the case of M, she makes the following concessions:

(1) It is accepted that at times the children's clothes and bedclothes have been dirty to the point of being unhygienic.

(2) It is accepted that the previous family home had dog and cat excrement present. All pets have now been removed from the family home.

(3) The children have been exposed to domestic violence and arguments between their parents [M] and [F] causing harm to their emotional and behavioural development.

(4) [M] accepts that she has behaved in an abrupt and aggressive manner towards [A] and that this would give the impression to observing professionals of a lack of warmth and disproportionate chastisement of [A]. It is accepted that such behaviour would frighten [A].

(5) It is accepted that [F] would behave in an abrupt and aggressive manner towards [A]. [M] will say that she accepts that [F] would favour [B] above [A]. It is accepted that this would therefore impair the emotional, social and psychological development of [A's] self-confidence, self-esteem and relationships with adults and her peers.

(6) [M] accepts that [A] has informed school and social work staff that she is physically ill treated by [F].

(7) [M] accepts that [A] had poor school attendance and had fallen behind at school.

(8) It is accepted by [M] that the difficulties she has experienced in providing consistent care to the children have been longstanding and, therefore, chronic.

(9) It is accepted that, at times, [M] has not consistently maintained her response to any advice and intervention by Social Services. However, by 16^th May 2014, improvements were acknowledged by the Local Authority and professionals involved.

M's response further records that she accepts the findings which were made by me on 24^th June 2014.

25. F made the following concessions:

(1) It is accepted that there have been longstanding Local Authority concerns over the home conditions and the physical presentation of the children. The second respondent accepts those concerns and that, whilst improvements have been made, that they have not been sustained.

(2) It is accepted that there have been incidents of domestic violence between the first and second respondent. The children have been exposed to witnessing or hearing physical and verbal arguments. The second respondent maintains that since the move to the North East of England in 2013, that any disputes have been verbal only. He accepts that exposure to any form of parental conflict would have caused the children emotional harm.

(3) It is accepted that historically the parents have been inconsistent in their openness and willingness to work with the Local Authority. The court's findings of 24^th June 2014 are accepted in this regard and that the contracts of expectations were breached on more than one occasion.

(4) It is accepted that when the children have been in the joint care of the parents, that [A's] attendance at school has been unacceptably low.

(5) It is accepted that the second respondent has physically chastised [A]. He further accepts that he can present on some occasions as overbearing and that [A] may have been frightened by his presentation.

26. I agree that these concessions satisfy the threshold criteria, leading the court to undertake a welfare evaluation and proportionality analysis of the placement options for the children and the appropriate orders to be made, if any.

Developments Since the Proceedings were Issued

27. Before I turn to my welfare evaluation and proportionality analysis, it is necessary to address events since the proceedings were issued. These from the date of issue to 24^th June 2014 are sufficiently addressed in the judgment which I gave at the conclusion of the hearing on 24^th June 2014.
28. I turn to events since that time. M and F have, once again, separated. They both say that the separation took place on 2^nd July 2014, following a contact visit with the children attended by them both during which A behaved in what was described as a sexually inappropriate manner towards F, rubbing his crotch area through his jeans. This is to be seen against the background of an allegation made by F's mother (PGM) in March 2014 of her belief that F could sexually abuse A. I make it clear that this allegation has never been substantiated.
29. The parents both say that they separated on 2^nd July 2014, but it was difficult to discern from either of them during the course of their oral evidence what caused their separation. Although they both said in evidence that they agreed their relationship should end, M suggested that, but for the contact visit on 2^nd July 2014, they may still be together. This was significantly at odds with her final statement in which she described F's behaviour as extremely controlling of her and appeared to recognise the importance of that relationship ending and their separation being sustained.
30. The parents agree that they have had some ongoing contact since their separation. Their account of the level of that contact and circumstances in which it took place were unclear and, at times, inconsistent. F failed to attend the decision-making meeting which was held on 3^rd July 2014. He served a statement dated 19^th August 2014 in which he explained his absence by his presence at M's property at that time waiting for someone, he thought from a gas company, to visit. In response to this statement, M served a statement in which she disputed that F had been at her property and asserted that he was at his own property. He duly served a further statement in the same terms. I was not persuaded that I could rely on their accounts in relation to this. M's evidence at the hearing was that she visited F at his home on 3^rd July 2014 to find out why he failed to attend the meeting. In circumstances in which she describes him as violent and controlling, if she did visit on 3^rd July 2014 (only the day after the separation, as she says) it begs the question why she would do so.
31. M and F agree that they have spent time together on two further occasions. The first was an occasion when M visited F, they both said without prior arrangement, to see her dog (which F has been caring for). The second occasion, about a week apart from the first, was around the time of F's birthday in early August 2014, when both M and F say they spent about an hour and a half or two hours together shopping, during the course of which they purchased a fridge freezer for F for which M made part-payment as a birthday present to him from the children.
32. The fact of these visits was not disclosed to the Local Authority at the time. In evidence, neither parent considered that they needed to tell the Local Authority as the children were not then in their care and they said that they had not specifically been told that they must report any contact they had.
33. M and F also agree that they have had contact by telephone - by text and at least one telephone call. I found the evidence in relation to this both confusing and unclear – both about the extent of the contact and the reasons for it. They agree that M contacted F by telephone last week to let him know that MGF and her stepmother were visiting. M simply said she thought that F would want to know; he said he didn't know why M contacted him about this. I was unable to discern any good reason for the contact on that occasion, despite the explanation proffered by M.
34. M and F agree that she has provided considerable practical, emotional and financial support for him throughout their relationship. They now say that that is no longer necessary. Her actions in relation to the purchase of the freezer are, however, a further example of this at a time when they say that they were separated and apparently keen to demonstrate their separation for the purposes of these proceedings.
35. M has been attending the Freedom Programme since August 2014. She has attended seven out of twelve sessions and is apparently participating well. She has previously been ambivalent about attending. At times she has agreed to attend but she also accepts that in April 2014 she refused to consider attendance at the programme. Having regard to the number of sessions that she has already undertaken and her evidence that she has benefited from the work and understands much more about the abusive nature of the relationship that she had with F, it was very surprising to hear her evidence that, but for the contact visit on 2^nd July 2014, she and F may still be together. She appeared to see no reason why they should not be.
36. M and F both now accept their relationship has involved domestic abuse, particularly in Lincoln. They both deny any serious domestic abuse in the North East. My judgment given on 24^th June 2014 recorded the findings that I made in relation to ongoing domestic abuse, despite their then denials of such behaviour.
37. The relationship between M and F has been characterised by domestic abuse, separation and reconciliation. The relationship has already had a significant and negative impact upon the children and particularly A. I accept that there is no evidence that the relationship has resumed over the last three months. It is clear, however, that M and F have maintained a level of contact since that time, the extent of which I found myself unable to determine.
38. In considering the future of any relationship between them, I am not satisfied that the current separation can be relied upon in the future, in the light of their history of previous separations and reconciliations, the ongoing contact that they have had since their separation and the lack of acceptance, in particular by M in the course of her evidence, of any real necessity for their separation, despite her attendance at and engagement with the Freedom Programme.
39. Contact has been available for both parents since the children were placed in foster care. M has attended the contact available to her reliably and the quality of the contact has generally been good. F did not attend for a number of weeks in July and only started attending contact again after the issues resolution hearing on 1^st August 2014. The children (and A in particular) were aware of the arrangements for contact and were let down by his failure to attend.
40. The children have settled well into foster care. A's statements at the time of her placement in foster care indicated that she welcomed the routines and consistent good quality care provided, such as clean bedding and her basic care needs being met. The children's presentation overall has improved since their accommodation. The foster carer identified an issue with A's hearing which had not been noted by her parents. In the event, it was caused by a significant build-up of wax rather than anything more serious. It, nonetheless, had a significant and adverse impact on A's hearing prior to her placement in foster care.
41. Since their accommodation, A in particular has made repeated statements to the foster carer, to her social worker and to the school regarding her exposure to domestic abuse between M and F, her direct involvement in episodes and her fear and distress about these events. A has also made repeated reference to herself and B being subject to physical abuse and neglect. These are contained in the written recordings from the social worker Joanne Dean of A's comments directly to her and reported from the foster carer. More recently, B has also made similar comments. The Local Authority realistically recognises that B may be copying A in what she has said.
42. These comments from A must be seen in the context of statements that she has made in foster care which are known to be untrue. There is, however, a strong and consistent theme in the statements made by A regarding her home circumstances. Much of what A has alleged about domestic abuse between the parents is not disputed, although they say it related only to events in Lincoln. I am satisfied on the balance of probabilities, and therefore find, that A and B were exposed to domestic abuse in the care of their parents, both whilst the family was living in Lincoln and in the North East of England. A was also subject to physical abuse and the general care of the children was significantly neglected.
43. M accepts that she has had two periods of contact with MGF. The first was a visit that she made to Lincoln in the summer at around the end of July. She says she stayed for around five days, two of which she spent with MGF. Within recent weeks, MGF made a visit to the North East of England and stayed for four or five days. M is steadfast in her support of MGF and adamant that his conviction for rape resulted from a malicious allegation. She does not consider MGF to be a risk. She asks the court to accept that she would not have had contact with him if the children were in her care. I was not persuaded of this on the evidence I heard. She showed no real understanding of the risks he poses and her history of compliance with agreements is poor.

Legal Framework

44. I turn to the legal framework I apply in my welfare and proportionality analysis. I have had full regard to the recent case law relevant to the approach of the court in determining applications for care and placement orders. The judgment of the Supreme Court in Re B (A Child) [2013] UKSC 33 is of central importance in providing guidance as to the correct approach of a court where it is asked to consider a care plan for permanent removal of a child from the birth family. The judgment, given in June 2013, considered in detail the approach to the European Convention on Human Rights, Article 8 proportionality, in a public law children case. The judgments of the Supreme Court judges stress the significance of the decision of the court to remove a child from his or her birth family and for the child to be placed for adoption against the wishes of the birth family. The judgments emphasise that a care order and a plan of adoption is an extreme outcome and a 'last resort', in the words of Lord Neuberger. A care order cannot be made in such circumstances unless the order is proportionate, bearing in mind the requirements of Article 8.
45. Lady Hale described the test for severing a relationship between a parent and child as 'very strict: only in exceptional circumstances and when motivated by overriding requirements pertaining to the child's welfare, in short where nothing else will do'. The test is one of necessity, therefore.
46. The welfare of the child is paramount but, as Lord Neuberger said at paragraph 77, 'the interests of a child self-evidently require his or her relationship with her natural parents to be maintained unless no other course is possible in the child's interests'. He went on to say that the interests of the child 'include being brought up by [the] natural family, ideally the natural parents, or at least one of them'.
47. The Court of Appeal gave judgment in Re G (A child) [2013] EWCA Civ 965 the following month. The judgment of McFarlane LJ stressed the need for a proper, thorough and holistic evaluation of the placement options, giving full weight to the Article 8 rights. Such an approach involves the court balancing the pros and cons of the placement options in any case. He emphasised the need for a substantive consideration of the Article 8 considerations in relation to the issue of permanent separation of a child from the birth family. The court is required to undertake a balancing exercise in which each option is evaluated to the degree of detail necessary to analyse and weigh its own internal positives and negative, comparing each option side by side against the competing option or options.
48. Where the court is considering a plan of adoption, the evaluation must take place in the context of the welfare provisions of section 1 of the Adoption and Children Act 2002, whereby the child's welfare throughout his or her life is the court's paramount consideration. The welfare checklist in section 1(4) of that Act includes, of course, in section 1(4)(c) the likely effect on the child throughout his or her life of having ceased to be a member of the original family and become an adopted person.
49. McFarlane LJ also referred to Re B and the repeated use in the judgments in the Supreme Court judges of phrases such as 'high degree of justification', 'necessary', 'required', 'a very extreme thing', 'a last resort' and 'nothing else will do'. He said that, in the light of this, it is clear that the importance of a child either living with or maintaining a relationship with birth parents and natural family has not been reduced.
50. In Re B-S (Children) [2013] EWCA Civ 1146 the President also again referred to the striking language used by the Supreme Court in Re B as to the degree of necessity before a care plan for adoption is approved. In paragraph 18, by reference to Strasbourg authority, he said that family ties may only be severed in very exceptional circumstances; that everything must be done to preserve personal relations and rebuild the family; and that it is not enough to show that a child could be placed in a more beneficial environment for his upbringing. The President approved the global and holistic approach to the welfare evaluation. He stressed the need for proper evidence from the Local Authority and from the guardian addressing all the realistic options with an analysis of the arguments for and against each option. He further stressed that the assessment of the parents' ability to care for the child must take account of the assistance and support the Local Authority and other professionals should reasonably make available to the family.
51. In Re W (A Child) [2013] EWCA Civ 1227, Ryder LJ set out in paragraph 99 the three questions the court has to answer in any care case:

(i) What is the harm and/or likelihood of harm?

(ii) To what is that harm attributable? and

(iii) What will be best for the child?

52. At paragraph 100, Ryder LJ said that the court has to undertake its evaluation to determine what is best for the child by reference to the three questions:

(i) What is the welfare analysis of each of the placement options that are available?

(ii) What is the welfare evaluation, that is the best option among those available? And

(iii) What orders are proportionate and necessary, if any?

My Analysis and Conclusions

53. I have applied these principles in my assessment of the evidence. My welfare analysis has been undertaken by reference to section 1 of the 2002 Act, taking account of the welfare checklist factors set out in section 1(4).
54. The accepted history and the findings I have made both in my judgment on 24^th June 2014 and in this judgment represent serious shortcomings in the care of these children by M and F over a period of years and despite a high level of professional involvement and support. This is relevant when considering the extent to which further support could provide an effective framework within which the children could be cared for by their mother. Furthermore, M's engagement with professionals has historically been unreliable. She and F have repeatedly failed to comply with contracts of expectations. I was no more persuaded of their reliability in respect of any such contract in the future at this hearing than I was at the interim hearing.
55. A and B are very young children. They have all the usual care needs of children of their ages. They have increased emotional needs as a result of their life experiences to date. A has already been identified as having particular care needs: she receives additional support at school and has been receiving therapeutic support through a referral to Acorns. In my judgment, A requires a particularly good standard of care if she is to achieve her potential.
56. A and B have established relationships with their birth family. A, in particular, has a clear understanding of her place within her family. She has, however, expressed considerable ambivalence about her home arrangements and her relationships with her birth family since her accommodation, on occasions saying she misses her mother but more often indicating her contentment at her placement in foster care.
57. A and B have suffered significant harm in the wide-ranging shortcomings in the care provided to them by both M and F and the consequent neglect of their care needs. The negative impact of the abusive relationship between M and F is evident. There is a risk of further harm in the children's return to such arrangements, should those care arrangements be maintained. There is, in my judgment, also a risk of sexual harm if the children are allowed to return to the care of their mother with the risk of contact with the maternal grandfather.
58. I do not doubt the love that M has for her children and her ability to meet their basic care needs at times. The question is as to her ability to do so consistently and to meet their emotional needs. M seeks the return of the children to her care. This would provide the children with a return to a familiar placement and a placement within the birth family with all the benefits that brings with it in terms of the children's identity. In the light of the conclusions I have reached, however, I can have no confidence that the situation will be any different for the children than it has been previously. In reaching that conclusion, I have considered the full range of supports that have been made available and could be made available. I have considered the prognosis for change and I have concluded that the prospects are poor. M does not understand or accept the changes which are required in her general care and parenting. Her current separation from F cannot, in my judgment, be relied upon. I consider there to be a strong likelihood that the relationship will resume, bringing with it, once again, a significant adverse impact on the children.
59. There is no alternative family placement for consideration. Placements with MGM, PGM and Y were explored. I am satisfied that all appropriate steps have been taken by the Local Authority. MGM was subject to a negative initial assessment. PGM decided not to proceed with assessment and, although Y was proposed at a late stage, the Local Authority undertook initial enquiries. Those enquiries did not support placement with her. The children's guardian considered that further enquiries were required but her own investigations of the prospect of further assessment of Y led her to conclude that Y was not either willing or able to offer a home to the children. No further steps have been taken by Y to pursue assessment. She is not put forward as a realistic care option by M in these proceedings.
60. The only alternative to placement with M is a placement in Local Authority care. The Local Authority's plan is for adoption in the light of the ages of the children and their need for permanence. This was explored by the parties and by me in the course of the Local Authority's evidence having regard to the ages of the children, A's known difficulties and what is recognised as being a strong relationship between A and her younger sister B.
61. In the course of this hearing, the Local Authority's care plan has been amended and supplemented to provide a significantly more comprehensive and coherent plan for the children, including a contingency of long-term foster care. The evidence of the Local Authority, which is supported by the children's guardian, is that priority must be given to the relationship between the girls and their placement together. In these circumstances, the final Local Authority care plan provides for placement of the girls together for adoption with a search for adopters over a period of six months, then considering a concurrent search for long-term foster placement. If the children are placed for adoption, the plan is for indirect contact with the birth family; in a long-term foster placement, the Local Authority proposes contact with the parents four times a year.
62. The fact that I consider this placement finally does not represent a linear analysis, but rather a reflection that a placement in Local Authority care, particularly a placement for adoption, is a placement of last resort. The advantages of such a placement for the girls are that they will be placed with carers who are matched to meet their individual needs with the prospect of good quality consistent care throughout their childhood and beyond. The disadvantages are obvious: a placement away from the birth family and the impact that has on the children's long-term identity; the risk that a suitable adoptive placement is not found, so that the children are then in long-term Local Authority care; in every case there is also a risk of placement breakdown. That risk is likely to be increased in the light of the children's ages and known needs.
63. I have balanced the competing considerations and reached a clear conclusion on the evidence. I have concluded that the children's need for permanency and security is such that they cannot wait for a further period of time to determine whether their mother M will make and sustain the changes that she now says she understands are required. Although she puts forward a case for the immediate return of the children to her care, I have concluded that their welfare needs cannot be met by a return to their mother's care at this stage; I have further concluded that the children cannot wait to see if she can change. In my judgment, any prospect of a sufficiently positive change is very low and cannot be relied upon. I have, sadly, concluded that the only placement option to meet the children's welfare throughout their lives is their placement away from the birth family: a placement for adoption, if that can be achieved; alternatively, a placement in long-term foster care.
64. I am satisfied that, following their revision, the Local Authority's care plans provide the best outcome for the children and the only realistic placement option to provide for their future security and well-being. I have concluded that care orders and permanent placement away from the birth family are both necessary and proportionate, having full regard to the Article 8 rights engaged, and that nothing else will do. I therefore make care orders in respect of each of the girls and approve the Local Authority's care plan.
65. The Local Authority's placement applications fall for consideration. The applications are supported by a statement of facts and annex B report in each case, together with the children's guardian's report. I have just made care orders with care plans of adoption based on my findings, welfare analysis and proportionality evaluation. The Local Authority seeks placement orders to enable it to progress its plan of adoption and maximise the prospects of a successful outcome in a search for prospective adopters.
66. The welfare of both A and B throughout their life is my paramount consideration as I consider these applications. I have regard, once again, to the extended welfare checklist in section 1(4) of the 2002 Act. Article 8 rights are once again very clearly engaged. In circumstances in which parental consent is not given to the applications, I can only make a placement order in respect of A and B if I dispense with the consent of the parent (or parents) with parental responsibility on the ground that the welfare of the child requires it. In the case of A, her mother has sole parental responsibility for her; in the case of B, M and F share parental responsibility as F is named on her birth certificate.
67. In the course of my substantive judgment in making care orders and approving the Local Authority care plans, I have set out the grounds upon which I have determined the welfare analysis supports such a placement. I adopt that reasoning for the purposes of these applications. I have reached a clear conclusion that adoption is both achievable and appropriate in respect of these girls. The making of placement orders provides the best opportunity for the plan to succeed in order to meet the children's welfare. It is, in my judgment, both necessary and proportionate. Having reached those conclusions, I have further concluded that the consent of M and F to the applications must be dispensed with on the grounds that the welfare of the children requires it. In the case of A, the consent of her mother is dispensed with; in the case of B, the consent of both of her parents. I do so and I make a placement order in each case.
68. In accordance with the President's transparency guidance, a transcript of this judgment will be provided at the shared expense of the parties. I will direct that it should be placed on BAILII in an anonymised form.
[Judgment ends]