Strand, London, WC2A 2LL |
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B e f o r e :
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A Local Authority |
Applicant |
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J and- D and- E (a child acting through her guardian, Jan Lech) |
1st Respondent 2nd Respondent 3rd Respondent |
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Nkumbe Ekaney QC and Alison Easton (instructed by Motley & Hope Solicitors) for the 1st Respondent
The 2nd Respondent did not attend the hearing
George Lafazanides (Solicitor) of Fahri Jacob Solicitors for the 3rd Respondent
Hearing dates: 5th to 30th October 2020
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Crown Copyright ©
Covid-19 Protocol: This judgment will be handed down by the judge remotely by circulation to the parties' representatives by email and release to Bailii. The date and time for hand-down will be deemed to be 2:00pm on 19 November 2020. A copy of the judgment in final form as handed down will be automatically sent to counsel shortly afterwards
This judgment was delivered in private. The judge has given leave for this version of the judgment to be published on condition that (irrespective of what is contained in the judgment) in any published version of the judgment the anonymity of the children and members of their family must be strictly preserved. All persons, including representatives of the media, must ensure that this condition is strictly complied with. Failure to do so will be a contempt of court.
The Hon Mrs Justice Judd :
Background
The local authority case
The law
"36.In determining the issues at this fact finding hearing I apply the following principles. First, the burden of proof lies with the local authority. It is the local authority that brings these proceedings and identifies the findings they invite the court to make. Therefore the burden of proving the allegations rests with them.
"If a legal rule requires the facts to be proved (a 'fact in issue') a judge must decide whether or not it happened. There is no room for a finding that it might have happened. The law operates a binary system in which the only values are 0 and 1."
"It is an elementary proposition that findings of fact must be based on evidence, including inferences that can properly be drawn from the evidence and not on suspicion or speculation."
"Evidence cannot be evaluated and assessed in separate compartments. A judge in these difficult cases must have regard to the relevance of each piece of evidence to other evidence and to exercise an overview of the totality of the evidence in order to come to the conclusion whether the case put forward by the local authority has been made out to the appropriate standard of proof."
"There has to be factored into every case which concerns a disputed aetiology giving rise to significant harm a consideration as to whether the cause is unknown. That affects neither the burden nor the standard of proof. It is simply a factor to be taken into account in deciding whether the causation advanced by the one shouldering the burden of proof is established on the balance of probabilities."
The court must resist the temptation identified by the Court of Appeal in R v Henderson and Others [2010] EWCA Crim 1219 to believe that it is always possible to identify the cause of injury to the child.
" To these matters, I would only add that in cases where repeated accounts are given of events surrounding injury and death, the court must think carefully about the significance or otherwise of any reported discrepancies. They may arise for a number of reasons. One possibility is of course that they are lies designed to hide culpability. Another is that they are lies told for other reasons. Further possibilities include faulty recollection or confusion at times of stress or when the importance of accuracy is not fully appreciated, or there may be inaccuracy or mistake in the record-keeping or recollection of the person hearing and relaying the account. The possible effects of delay and repeated questioning upon memory should also be considered, as should the effect on one person of hearing accounts given by others. As memory fades, a desire to iron out wrinkles may not be unnatural – a process that might inelegantly be described as "story-creep" may occur without any necessary inference of bad faith". These words echo the words of Leggatt J in Gestmin SGPS v Credit Suisse (UK) Ltd [2013] EWHC 3560 as to the fallibility of human recollection, and the limitations of human memory.
"100. One highly important aspect of the Lucas decision, and indeed the approach to lies generally in the criminal jurisdiction, needs to be borne fully in mind by family judges. It is this: in the criminal jurisdiction the "lie" is never taken, of itself, as direct proof of guilt. As is plain from the passage quoted from Lord Lane's judgment in Lucas, where the relevant conditions are satisfied the lie is "capable of amounting to a corroboration". In recent times the point has been most clearly made in the Court of Appeal Criminal Division in the case of R v Middleton [2001] Crim.L.R. 251. In my view there should be no distinction between the approach taken by the criminal court on the issue of lies to that adopted in the family court. Judges should therefore take care to ensure that they do not rely upon a conclusion that an individual has lied on a material issue as direct proof of guilt".
The hearing
The evidence of Dr. Ward
The mother
The other witnesses
Discussion
E's use of a wheelchair
Autistic spectrum disorder
Obstructive sleep apnoea/snoring
Speech and Language therapy
Tuberous sclerosis
Seizures and epilepsy
Eating, drinking and the ketogenic diet
The overall presentation
Next steps