sitting in LINCOLN
360 High Street Lincoln LN5 7PS |
||
B e f o r e :
(Sitting as a High Court Judge)
____________________
BC | (Applicant) | |
And | ||
EF | (Respondent) | |
(In the matter of M and N) |
____________________
The Respondent father appeared in person.
MS COMPTON (for MR SLATER and MS MITCHELL) appeared on behalf of the Guardian/children
____________________
Crown Copyright ©
JUDGE ROGERS:
(1) The submission that the judge reached the wrong conclusion by adopting the wrong test was without foundation. In all cases where the outcome of the application was dependent upon the judge's resolution of divergent expert opinion, the judge's assessment of the expert evidence was likely to be crucial to the outcome. The judge could not be criticised for making his assessment of and findings on the expert evidence before considering other relevant factors. The judge's function was to consider all relevant factors and to give each its due weight. The order in which such relevant factors were considered was a matter for the judge to decide. The judgment at first instance was manifestly conscientious and comprehensive. The applications were decided according to a consideration of the welfare of the children, and the judge's approach was above criticism.
(2) Where parents were in dispute about the immunisation of a child against infectious disease, neither parent had the right to make the decision alone and immunisation should be carried out only where a court decided that this was in the best interests of the child.
(3) There was no general proposition of law that a court would not order non-essential invasive medical treatment in the face of strong opposition from the child's primary carer."
"14. Before expressing my conclusions on this central question I must set out the legal framework." He refers to Section 8, the specific issue, and with parental responsibility, as I have myself. He goes on at paragraph 16: "The apparent freedom of each [parent] to act alone is not, however, unfettered. As the President [Dame Elizabeth Butler-Sloss] said in the case of Re J: 'There is, in my view, a small group of important decisions made on behalf of a child which, in the absence of agreement of those with parental responsibility, ought not to be carried out or arranged by one parent carer although she has parental responsibility ... Such a decision ought not to be made without the specific approval of the court." He then goes on to describe other decisions.
"Of course where the obligation falls on the court to decide such an issue the court must apply the child's welfare as its paramount consideration (see section 1(1)) and also have regard to the section 1(3) checklist.
19. I turn now to the authorities which Miss Gumbel has cited. The case of Re Z [1996] 1 FLR 191 concerned a conflict between a mother's desire to further publicise the life of herself and her child in the face of injunction in wardship restraining the media from publishing information which would lead to the child's identification. The mother's application for permission to participate in the making of a television programme was refused by the judge and her appeal dismissed by this court. In the course of his judgment Sir Thomas Bingham MR analysed the function of the court in the following passage [at 217B]: 'I understood the mother's counsel to advance two reasons why discretion could only be properly exercised to the effect contended for. The first was that the court should never override the decision of a devoted and responsible parent such as this mother was found to be. I would for my part accept without reservation that the decision of a devoted and responsible parent should be treated with respect. It should certainly not be disregarded or lightly set aside. But the role of the court is to exercise an independent and objective judgment. If that judgment is in accord with that of the devoted and responsible parent, well and good. If it is not, then it is the duty of the court, after giving due weight to the view of the devoted and responsible parent, to give effect to its own judgment. That is what it is there for. Its judgment may of course be wrong. So may that of the parent. But once the jurisdiction of the court is invoked its clear duty is to reach and express the best judgment it can'."
"Although that analysis was formulated in a wardship case, it equally defines the function of the court deciding an application for a specific issue order advanced by one and resisted by another, each holding parental responsibility in relation to the child."
In my judgment that is a complete answer to the submission, notwithstanding the attractive presentation of it, which advances the fundamentally flawed argument that the mother's status in this case should in some way be elevated and her view be given greater weight than the interest of the child once objectively identified.
"From the decision of this court in Re J Miss Gumbel sought to extract the proposition that the court will not order non-essential invasive medical treatment in the face of rooted opposition from the child's primary carer." Again, not dissimilar from the arguments in this case. The learned Lord Justice continues: "I unhesitatingly reject that submission. The judgments in the case of Re J expressly emphasise that the case turned on its particular facts and that no general guidance was to be drawn from it. In any event I reject Miss Gumbel's repeated categorisation of the course of immunisation as non-essential invasive treatment. It is more correctly categorised as preventative health care."