B e f o r e :
Sitting at the Royal Courts of Justice
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A LONDON BOROUGH |
Applicant |
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The Children (by their Guardian) |
All Respondents |
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____________________ Re N (Children: Welfare Decision) |
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Malcolm MacDonald (instructed by Lawrence & Co) for the Mother
Dorian Day (instructed by Hecht Montgomery) for the Father
Martha Cover (instructed by Hanne & Co) for the Children
Hearing dates: 12, 14-15, 19-23 September 2016 Judgment date: 23 September 2016
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HTML VERSION OF JUDGMENT
Crown Copyright ©
Mr Justice Peter Jackson:
Summary
(1) I accept the strong and united evidence of the professional witnesses: Ms H (social worker), Dr Bailly (child psychiatrist) and Ms Lain (Children's Guardian), which is to the following effect.
(2) In 2013, the children needed to be removed from their parents, who were not looking after them properly.
(3) They now need a family that will meet their needs throughout their childhoods and make them feel that they belong.
(4) The foster family is meeting the children's needs in every way. The girls see their foster parents and siblings as their parents, their brothers and their sisters.
(5) It would, as Dr Bailly put it, be an emotional catastrophe for the children if they were moved. They have put down roots. If they were uprooted, they would need exceptionally good parenting from someone else to give them any chance of recovering.
(6) In fact, no other arrangement has any chance of doing this.
(7) The parents have natural feelings of affection for the children, but they could not meet even their most basic physical and emotional needs. This would be true whether the parents were together or apart and whether or not they had family support.
(8) No member of the wider family in Hungary is in a position to look after the children.
(9) It would not be right for the children to be sent to Hungary to be placed in foster care, and the parents do not suggest it. It would be likely to cause them harm, with lifelong consequences.
(10) The argument for the children to stay where they are for the rest of their childhoods is overwhelming.
(11) Face-to-face contact with the parents has not been good for the children for a long time and it should not continue after a farewell visit.
(12) There are three legal ways in which the children could stay with the foster carers: a care order, a special guardianship order (SGO), or an adoption order. Adoption can only be allowed if there is no other way of meeting a child's needs. That is the position here. The advantages of an adoption order for the children are far stronger than the disadvantages. The children's welfare requires adoption. I will therefore dispense with the requirement for parental consent and make a placement order allowing Janetta and Ella to be adopted in due course.
(13) The foster carers have brought the children up to know about their background, and that will continue. The plan is for reports to be sent to the parents and for the parents to be able to write and receive replies. The local authority will act as a post-box. Once the children are adopted, the adopters will decide what is sent and received. Until then, I direct that reports should be sent to the parents each March and September. These can include photographs of the girls if the prospective adopters agree. The parents can send messages to the children in April and October. I hope that this arrangement will be regular, but even if the parents do not communicate I would expect the adopters to send them a report once a year as a minimum.
(14) These proceedings have taken far, far too long. They were slow to start and have now been going on for two years nine months. The delay has caused problems for the children and their carers, for the parents and the wider family, and for the professionals. What has happened in this case is not typical of good practice in our family justice system. Nowadays, decisions for such young children are normally taken within six months. This case could have taken a little longer because of the international aspect, but it should certainly have been completed within a year. The Children's Guardian rightly said that the children have been let down by the judicial system. The Adoption and Children Act 2002 ('the ACA ') states at s.1(3) that the court must at all times bear in mind that, in general, any delay in coming to a decision is likely to prejudice the child's welfare. This case is a sorry reminder of the importance of that general principle.
(15) At the same time, I wish to emphasise that the delay has not changed the outcome. There is no earlier moment at which the children could have been safely returned to their parents or wider family, and no point at which it would have been in their interests to have gone into foster care in Hungary.
(16) I express this court's appreciation for the great assistance given by the Hungarian authorities through the Ministry of Human Resources, the Central Authority and the local Guardianship Office. Although our legal systems are different, this has not prevented the professionals who have been working on the case for so long from doing so in a spirit of mutual understanding and respect, and always with the aim of finding the right solution for these children.
The earlier judgments
This hearing
Ms H, the children's social worker since July 2013
Dr Bailly, consultant child psychiatrist, instructed after the appeal proceedings
Dr Kovacs, specialist at the Baja Guardianship Office, involved since December 2015
The Mother
The Father
The Children's Guardian
I have also read an expert report on Hungarian law written in July 2016 by Dr Oliver Bohanek, attorney at the Budapest Bar.
I have had the benefit of detailed written opening and closing submissions from counsel.
The background in more detail
"6. The parents are in their 20s. The father (28) is of Hungarian Roma descent, the mother (24) of mixed Hungarian and Roma descent. The father has two older children, a girl now aged seven (now eight) and a boy now aged five, half-siblings of the children with whom we are concerned. Those children were placed in foster care and adopted in Hungary with the approval of the Hungarian authorities. They now live in Italy. The father says that he lived with the children's mother until the older child was aged three. The mother then left him, taking the children. For some time he had contact and saw that the children were not being well cared for by their mother. She then put them in a home. Despite this, he moved to England in 2011 and saw nothing more of those children, nor did he play any part in the adoption process, which took place about six months after Janetta and Ella were removed. These parents met and began their relationship in 2010. In July 2011, when the mother was pregnant with the older of the two children in this case, whom I shall call Janetta, they travelled to this country. Janetta was born here in January 2012. The family had some contact with the local authority in April and May 2012, because of their accommodation problems, and both the local authority and the Hungarian embassy offered to support their return to Hungary, but in fact they stayed here.
7. Their second child, whom I shall call Ella, was born here in May 2013. The mother had had no ante-natal care. The baby was born in the room in which the family were living without any medical assistance. The London Ambulance Service arrived after the baby was born but before the placenta was delivered. They called the police, as the father was reported to be resisting the mother and baby receiving medical attention or being taken to hospital. The family were living in circumstances of extreme squalor, with no food, clothing or bedding seen for either child.
8. Janetta was removed from her parents that same day. Ella was discharged from hospital into foster care when she was eight days old. They were initially placed separately but since 28 May 2013 they have both been living with the same foster carers. The foster carers have four other children: two teenage birth children of their own and two other unrelated adopted children of primary school age who do not have contact with their birth family. The local authority originally applied for an emergency protection order, but this was not pursued because the parents agreed to the children being accommodated by the local authority under section 20 of the Children Act 1989 while an assessment was carried out. This arrangement was formally approved by the magistrates hearing the emergency protection order application. The local authority originally arranged for the children to have contact with their parents three times a week; this was reduced to twice a week because the parents often failed to attend or left early – they attended about half the contact that was available; and in February 2014, it was reduced to once a week.
9. Care proceedings were not issued until January 2014 and the first interim care order was made in February. Before beginning the proceedings, the local authority had commissioned assessments of the children's maternal grandmother and great-grandmother in Hungary from Children and Families Across Borders (CFAB). The maternal grandmother was unable to offer a home but the great-grandmother had suitable accommodation and was willing to offer the mother and children a home, provided that the father played no part in their lives. At that stage the father did not want his own mother to be assessed as a possible carer. The local authority had also been in touch with the Hungarian Central Authority ("HCA"), which had, in January 2014, suggested that the solution was for the Hungarian authorities to bring the children back to Hungary, as they were Hungarian citizens and their relatives could keep in contact with them there. Also, if they were to be adopted, "only the Hungarian authorities have the right to adopt Hungarian citizen minors". That has been the consistent position of the HCA throughout.
10. At the first hearing in the High Court, the mother, then pregnant with the couple's third child, indicated her intention to return to Hungary to have the baby and also to apply for the transfer of the proceedings under article 15. This she duly did and gave birth to a baby boy in March 2014 (she later accepted that her return was in order to avoid care proceedings here in respect of him). I shall refer to this child as Z. At a hearing on 18 March 2014, Holman J declared that the girls were habitually resident here and that is not now in dispute. He adjourned the article 15 application so that there could be "some clearer understanding of what arrangements might exist for the transfer of the children themselves to live, whether long term or even during the course of the proceedings, under suitable arrangements in Hungary" ([2014] EWHC 999 (Fam), para 12).
11. Accordingly, the allocated social worker visited Hungary in April 2014. She met the mother and the new baby, who were then living with the maternal great-grandmother. The great-grandmother was adamant that the father would not be allowed near her home, whereas the mother intended to reunite with the father as soon as they could find accommodation in Hungary. The social worker also met with representatives of the HCA and with social care professionals.
12. The mother's application under article 15 came before Sir Peter Singer, sitting as a Deputy Judge of the High Court, on 9 May 2014. At that stage, both the local authority and the children's guardian were supporting a transfer to Hungary, but only once the requisite assessments had been completed there and a clear recommendation made about the appropriate placement for the girls. By a judgment delivered on 12 May 2014, Sir Peter Singer refused the transfer application, but provided that a further application could be considered after the "fact finding" hearing listed for 25 June 2014.
13. The purpose of that hearing was to establish whether the facts were such as to meet the threshold for compulsory state intervention in family life, set out in section 31(2) of the Children Act 1989:
"A court may only make a care order … if it is satisfied -
(a) that the child concerned is suffering, or is likely to suffer, significant harm; and
(b) that the harm, or likelihood of harm, is attributable to -
(i) the care given to the child, or likely to be given to him if the order were not made, not being what it would be reasonable to expect a parent to give to him; or
(ii) the child's being beyond parental control."
Only if that threshold is crossed can the court go on to consider whether making the order that the local authority seek will best promote the welfare of the child, which is the court's paramount consideration (1989 Act, section 1(1)).
14. Neither parent attended the hearing on 25 June 2014, although both were legally represented. The father's whereabouts were unknown but the mother had been in touch with her solicitor by telephone. At that stage she accepted 11 of the findings sought by the local authority. Five of these related to the circumstances in which the family were living and the lack of medical attention when Ella was born. Two related to the risk of harm stemming from domestic abuse in the parents' relationship and the father's aggressive and volatile personality. Two related to the parents' inconsistent and unsatisfactory contact with, and effective abandonment of, the girls: by the time of the hearing, the mother had not seen them since February and the father had not seen them since March 2014. In August 2014, the parents reappeared in England and contact resumed from time to time. The last finding was the parents' lack of insight into the local authority's concerns and failure to co-operate with attempts to assess them. Hogg J made findings accordingly, which all agreed were sufficient to satisfy the threshold in section 31(2).
15. The hearing to decide what orders to make was planned for September 2014. In August, the social worker discovered that the mother, father and the new baby were all living with the paternal grandmother. The social worker's assessment of the paternal grandmother (over the telephone) was negative. There being no viable family placement in Hungary, the local authority's final care plan, supported by the Children's Guardian, was that the girls should be adopted. Their current foster parents were being given active consideration as their adopters (and have since been approved as such). Accordingly the local authority issued a further application for a placement order under section 21 of the Adoption and Children Act 2002. This authorises the authority to place a child for adoption without parental consent (it is a separate question whether parental consent to the actual adoption order should be dispensed with). Under section 21(2), a court may not make a placement order unless:
"(a) the child is subject to a care order,
(b) the court is satisfied that the conditions in section 31(2) of the 1989 Act (conditions for making a care order) are met, or
(c) the child has no parent or guardian."
Thus, unless the child has no parent or guardian, the "threshold conditions" for state intervention must be met, but they can be met either by the prior making of a care order, or by making the requisite findings in the placement order proceedings, which may (but need not) be contemporaneous with the care proceedings.
16. The hearing listed for September could not proceed because interpreters failed to attend. It was relisted for November 2014. The mother's position was that she wanted to look after the children in Hungary; failing that, she wanted them to live with the paternal grandmother in Hungary; failing that, she wanted them to live with the maternal great-grandmother in Hungary; and failing that, for them to be placed in a children's home in Hungary. The father wanted to look after them with the mother in the paternal grandmother's home; if the parents' cohabitation was not acceptable, the children should live with the mother in the maternal great-grandmother's home and he would stay in England; in his oral evidence he said that he would stay and work in England, but spend holidays living with the mother and children at the maternal great-grandmother's home. The HCA now took the view, apparently based on the CFAB and English social worker's assessments, that there was no suitable family member in Hungary; so the children should be placed with a foster parent there, so that they could keep the connection with their parents. The local competent authority would make a decree appointing a guardian and foster parent for them. Two professional colleagues would come to England to escort the children to their foster placement in Hungary. Only the Hungarian authorities had the right to adopt them."
- In December 2015, the mother told her that she could not look after the children herself. She said that the father was not living with her, that during their relationship he drank and beat her, and that he was unsuitable to care for the children. She proposed her own aunt (who had accompanied her) as a potential carer.
- Dr Kovacs then saw the mother and the aunt together with a view to arranging an assessment.
- However, the mother returned a few days later to withdraw her agreement, saying that the aunt's lifestyle and living conditions were not suitable. She repeated that she was not able to look after the children herself: "Unfortunately, I am not in a position to care for and bring up my daughters, because I live in my grandmother's house… And I care for two children of minor age. It would be simply too much of a burden to care for them financially and in terms of personal engagement." Her only proposal was children should be placed in foster care in Hungary.
- The father was seen on his own in January 2016. He did not offer himself as a carer: "My current conditions are unsuitable for caring for and bringing up my daughters." Instead he suggested an uncle, but he did not provide any address or contact details, so that possibility could not be pursued.
English law
"The court … must have regard to the following matters (among others) –
(a) the child's ascertainable wishes and feelings regarding the decision (considered in the light of the child's age and understanding),
(b) the child's particular needs,
(c) the likely effect on the child (throughout his life) of having ceased to be a member of the original family and become an adopted person,
(d) the child's age, sex, background and any of the child's characteristics which the court … considers relevant,
(e) any harm (within the meaning of the Children Act 1989) which the child has suffered or is at risk of suffering,
(f) the relationship which the child has with relatives, and with any other person in relation to whom the court … considers the relationship to be relevant, including –
(i) the likelihood of any such relationship continuing and the value to the child of its doing so,
(ii) the ability and willingness of any of the child's relatives, or of any such person, to provide the child with a secure environment in which the child can develop, and otherwise to meet the child's needs,
(iii) the wishes and feelings of any of the child's relatives, or of any such person, regarding the child."
Hungarian law
Evidence at the hearing
Ms H, social worker
- The paternal grandmother (PGM) is in her late 40s. She was first suggested as a carer by the father in late 2013, even though he expressed concern about her drinking. Ms H assessed her in 2014 during extensive telephone conversations. The assessment was negative, largely due to the PGM's lack of insight into her son's behaviour and the children's needs.
A fresh assessment was carried out during Ms H's visit in June 2016. Again it was negative, though the PGM engaged with the process to an extent. She had just suffered the death of her partner and was understandably distressed by this. Her home consists of two very small rooms with limited services, and is accepted by the parents as being too small for Janetta and Ella as well as Z and R. The PGM is caring for the younger children at the same time as working full time, starting at 4am. She has an amicable relationship with the mother but is frustrated that she does not do more to help in the home. Ms H considers that the PGM still minimises the risk of violence and she is concerned at the maternal family's description of the PGM's drinking.
At all events, during the course of Ms H's visit, the PGM said that she did not wish to be further considered and withdrew from the assessment process.
- A paternal cousin (G) was suggested in 2014, but he withdrew.
- A great uncle (J) was suggested by the father in January 2016, but, as stated above, no details were given for him.
- The maternal great-grandmother (MGGM) was assessed in June 2016. She is in her late 60s and is concerned about her health. She and the mother have a fluctuating relationship. The MGGM is critical of the mother's abilities and is not offering to care for the children. Her home is larger and in better condition to the homes of the PGM and MGM. When the mother has been living with her, the MGGM has looked after Z and R at various stages, but they have now all returned to the PGM.
- The maternal grandmother (MGM) is aged 52. She was assessed by CFAB in 2014 and said she was not in a position to care for the children. At that stage she had the care of her own teenage son and her older daughter R's older child J (now 3). In 2016, the position has not changed, except that she is now the Guardian of J and R's younger child N, who was born in January 2016. Her home is larger than that of the PGM but it does not have running water. Ms H described her as being understandably preoccupied with her other grandchildren.
- The maternal aunt R is in her late 20s. She was proposed as a carer after Ms H had returned from Hungary and was assessed shortly before this hearing. R cooperated with this process, but Ms H does not consider her a viable option, given her acceptance that she cannot look after her own two children on her own.
- The mother's aunt (Ms K, 50) briefly offered her support at the end of 2015, but almost immediately the mother withdrew her support for this, as described above.
Dr Lionel Bailly
Dr Rita Kovacs
The mother
The father
The Children's Guardian
Welfare analysis
The child's ascertainable wishes and feelings regarding the decision (considered in the light of the child's age and understanding)
The child's particular needs
Any harm (within the meaning of the Children Act 1989) which the child has suffered or is at risk of suffering
The child's age, sex, background and any of the child's characteristics which the court … considers relevant
The relationship which the child has with relatives, and with any other person in relation to whom the court … considers the relationship to be relevant, including –
The likelihood of any such relationship continuing and the value to the child of its doing so.
The ability and willingness of any of the child's relatives, or of any such person, to provide the child with a secure environment in which the child can develop, and otherwise to meet the child's needs.
The wishes and feelings of any of the child's relatives, or of any such person, regarding the child.
The likely effect on the child (throughout his life) of having ceased to be a member of the original family and become an adopted person
The whole range of the court's powers
SPECIAL GUARDIANSHIP | ADOPTION | |
1. STATUS OF CARER | Special Guardian: If related to child retains existing relative status |
Parent for all purposes: If related to child existing relative status changes |
2. STATUS OF CHILD | A child living with relatives/carers who remains the child of birth parent | The child of the adoptive parent as if born as a child of the marriage and not the child of any other person therefore adoption includes a vesting of 'parenthood' Sec 39(1)&(2)AA 1976/Sec 67 ACA 2002 |
3. DURATION OF ORDER | Ceases automatically on reaching 18 if not revoked by court earlier ?whether also ceases on death The legal relationship created is therefore time limited and not lifelong Sec 91(13)CA 1989 |
Permanent The legal relationship is lifelong Sec 39(1) AA 1976/Sec 67 ACA 2002 |
4. EFFECT ON BIRTH PARENT PR | PR retained by birth parent SG can impose limitations in use (see 6 below) Sec 14C(1)&(2) CA 1989 |
Birth Parent PR extinguished Sec 39(2) AA 1976/Sec 46 ACA 2002 |
5. CARER'S PR | PR vests in special guardian/s Sec 14C(1)&(2) CA 1989 Subject to limitations (see 6 below) |
PR vested in adopter/s S 39(1) AA 1976/49 ACA 2002/S 2 CA 1989 No limitations (but see joint operation* below) |
6. LIMITATION/RESTRICTION OF PR (a) removal from jurisdiction |
(a) up to three months without leave, thereafter only with written consent of all PR holders or leave of court unless court gave general leave on making SG order Sec 14C(3)(b)&14C(4)/14B(2)(b) CA 1989 |
(a) No restriction |
(b) change of name | (b) can not change surname without written consent of all PR holders or order of the court Sec 14C(3)(a)/14B(2)(a) |
(b) No restriction name change may take place at time of making adoption order or thereafter |
(c) consent to adoption | (c) consent required from birth parents and special guardians or court must dispense with consent of birth parents and special guardians Sec 19,20,52 & 144 ACA 2002/14C(2)(b)CA 1989 |
(c) consent required from adopters only or court must dispense with consent of adopters only |
(d) medical treatment | (d) may be difficulties where each special guardian agrees but birth parents do not in the following circumstances: Sterilisation of a child This is the example given in the government guidance to SGO in "Every Child Matters" in Relation to effect of section 14C(2)(a) – no authority is cited Ritual Circumcision See Re J [2000] 1 FLR 571 Suggests that like sterilisation the consent of all PR holders would be required for this procedure |
(d) no restrictions where each adoptive parent agrees (subject to age/Gillick competence of child) on giving consent for medical treatment *However where adoptive parents themselves disagree in these scenarios a court order may be required (see below) |
(d) medical treatment contd | Immunisation See Re C [2003] 2FLR 1095 This added contested immunisations to the small group of important decisions where the consent of both parents was required Life prolonging/Life shortening If the above scenarios require consent of all with PR surely it must then extend to issues of whether treatment should be given or withheld in terminal cases Sec 14C(1)(b) with (2)(a) Ss1 does not effect the operation of any enactment or rule of law which requires the consent of more than one person with PR in a matter effecting the child If consent of all PR holders is required for these type of decisions does this then impose a duty upon SG to consult with birth parents in advance and to bring the matter back to court for determination if birth parents indicate an objection? |
*Sec 2(7) CA 1989 Where more than one person has PR for a child each may act alone and without the other but nothing in this part shall be taken to affect the operation of any enactment which requires the consent of more than one person in a matter affecting the child |
(e) voluntary accommodation |
(e) If SG objects LA cannot accommodate child unless court order If all SGs consent but birth parents object would appear that LA cannot accommodate child unless court order if birth parent willing and able to provide accommodation or arrange for accommodation to be provided |
(e) where adoptive parents agree they can accommodate voluntarily |
(e) voluntary accommodation contd (f) removal from voluntary accommodation (g) consent to marriage under 18 |
This is not the case if there is in force a residence order and the residence order holder consents nor if there is a care and control order pursuant to wardship or inherent jurisdiction and the person in whose favour the order is made consents. (f) Any person may remove from voluntary accommodation at any time This is not the case if residence order holder of carer under wardship/inherent jurisdiction agrees to the voluntary accommodation How is the 'exclusive' nature of the SG's PR intended to operate in these circumstances? It appears that the statute requires the consent of all PR holders therefore if SGs consent to accommodation but parents do not the parents can simply remove the child. Sec 20 (7)(8) &(9) CA 1989 (g) if all SG agree no restriction the Marriage Act 1949 has been amended to enable SGs to give valid consent where SGO in force (unless also care order in force) sec 3(1), (1A)(a)&(b) |
(f) adoptive parents can remove from voluntary accommodation (g) if all agree no restriction |
7. DEATH OF CHILD | Special guardian must notify parents with PR Sec 14C(5) CA 1989 Special guardians may not be able to arrange for burial/cremation in circumstances where parents wish to undertake such a task if the SGO ends on death See by way of analogy R-v-Gwynedd CC ex p B [1991] 2FLR |
No requirements for notification The rights and duties of legal parents do not end on death therefore would be no such conflict |
8. REVOCATION OF ORDER | Specific statutory provision for birth parents to apply for discharge of SGO with leave of the court, leave not to be granted unless there has been a significant change of circumstances Specific statutory provision for court to discharge of its own motion even where no application in any 'family proceedings' Sec 14D CA 1989 |
No statutory provision for revocation in wholly exceptional circumstances court may set aside adoption order, normally limited to where has been a fundamental breach of natural justice. See for example Re K Adoption & Wardship [1997] 2FLR 221 |
9. FUTURE APPLICATIONS BY PARENTS (a) Residence (b) Contact (c) Prohibited Steps (d) Specific Issue |
(a) Leave required (b) no automatic restriction (c) no automatic restriction (d) no automatic restriction Sec 10(4, (7A)&(9) CA 1989 A parent is entitled to apply for any section 8 order except residence where is SGO |
leave required leave required leave required leave required Sec 10(2)(b), (4), (9) |
10. RESPONDENTS TO FUTURE LEGAL PROCEEDINGS RE CHILD |
Birth parents would be respondents in addition to the SGs to any applications in relation to the child for Section 8 orders, EPOs, Care /Supervision Orders, Secure accommodation etc | Only Adopters would be automatic respondents |
11. MAINTENANCE | Does not operate to extinguish any duty on birth parents to maintain the child | Operates to extinguish any duty on birth parents to maintain the child Sec 12(3)(b) AA1976/Sec 46(2)(d)ACA 2002 |
12. INTESTACY | Child placed under SGO will not benefit from the rules relating to intestacy if the SGs die intestate | Adopted Child will have rights of intestate succession |