England and Wales Family Court Decisions (High Court Judges)

IN THE FAMILY COURT
SITTING AT THE ROYAL COURTS OF JUSTICE

		Royal Courts of Justice Strand, London, WC2A 2LL
		19/10/2015

Mrs Justice Theis DBE:

Introduction

1. This is a re-hearing to consider certain findings I made on 6 January 2015. Those findings were in a judgment I gave at the end of a contested fact finding hearing in three related care cases, known as the D, E and F case. The proceedings concern six children, whose ages range between 3 to 15 years. The previous hearing considered the factual basis upon which the Local Authority (LA) alleged the threshold criteria had been established in each of the cases.
2. The findings I made are set out in a schedule of findings dated 6 January 2015, which are set out by way of an annex to this judgment.
3. One of the central issues in the case were allegations of sexual exploitation made by a 16 year old girl, Z, which implicated the three mothers in these proceedings. As part of the police investigation Z was the subject of a number of preliminary meetings with the police and social workers, ABE interviews and section 9 statements. Z did not give oral evidence in the family hearing. I considered a Re W application in early November and concluded that she should not give oral evidence, due to the harm such a course was likely to cause her. The reasons for the decision are set out in the judgment dated 7 November 2014. That ruling was not appealed.
4. In the January judgment I did not consider all the findings sought by the LA, based in whole or part on Z's evidence reached the required standard. Some did for the reasons I set out. The findings I did find established are:

In relation to AK

1. That she was more involved with Z than she revealed (466). She was in regular contact with Z (481)

2. That she was involved in the arrangements for Z being sold for sex, knowing that she was under 16 (484)

3. That she was at least complicit in causing or permitting the exposure of Z to inappropriate and abusive sexual activity, knowing that she was under 16 (482, 497)

4. That she kept Z in her home against her (Z's) will (485)

In relation to JE and the E household

1. That her knowledge of Z was significantly more than she revealed and this was due to more direct contact she had with Z than she said (480). She was in regular contact with Z (481).

3. She was probably at the least complicit to some extent in what was happening to Z in terms of her being sold for sex. The precise extent of her involvement/complicity is difficult to say but the Court is only able to make positive findings that she knew Z was being sold for sex and that she knew Z was under 16 years old and she took no action in relation to this (482 and 497).

In relation to JC

1. That her relationship and knowledge of Z was far more than she has said (480) and that she was in regular contact with Z (481).

2. She was probably at the least complicit to some extent in what was happening to Z in terms of her being sold for sex. The precise extent of her involvement/complicity is difficult to say but the Court is only able to make positive findings that she knew Z was being sold for sex and that she knew Z was under 16 years old and she took no action in relation to this (477 - 480, 482 and 497).

In relation to LF

1. That he knew of the sexual exploitation of Z by individuals, although not specifically of her being exploited by JE (493).

5. Following the conclusion of the fact finding hearing in January the parallel criminal proceedings started on 12 January. Two of the mothers in the care proceedings, AK and JE, were defendants in those proceedings, together with 5 male defendants facing charges of sexual exploitation concerning Z. Z gave oral evidence in those proceedings over a period of 9 days. In addition, prior to giving oral evidence she was able to view her ABE interviews and read her section 9 statements. That memory refreshing procedure was video recorded. The criminal proceedings concluded on 6 March 2015 when the criminal trial judge, HHJ O'Mahony, acceded to the application at the end of the prosecution case that there was insufficient evidence for the case to continue on the basis of the inherent unreliability of Z's evidence. He gave a detailed ruling which is available to this court.
6. That determination resulted in applications being made by the following parties for a re-hearing regarding the findings made against them that related to Z's evidence:

(i) The mother in the D case AK (AK -findings 1, 2, 3 and 4).

(ii) The mother in the E case JE (JE - findings 1 and 3).

(iii) The father in the E case JS (JS - findings 1 and 2).

(iv) The mother in the F case JC (JC - findings 1 and 2).

(v) The father in the F case LF (LF - finding 1).

7. On 29 April 2015, for the reasons set out in the judgment on the same date, I granted the applications for a re-hearing in relation to findings (i), (ii), (iv) and (v) above. I refused the application made by JS in (iii) above.
8. There were pending appeals against some of my findings by AK and JS in January. The Court of Appeal was aware of the re-hearing applications. Subsequently AK withdrew her appeal and it was dismissed on 9 July 2015. Following my refusal of the application by JS to re-open any findings about him he pursued his appeal. The application by JS for permission to appeal findings made against him was refused on paper by McFarlane LJ on 13 July 2015; it has not been renewed.
9. This re-hearing started on 14 September, the evidence concluded on 29 September. I have had the benefit of comprehensive written submissions from all the parties, including a detailed schedule of third party evidence relevant to the allegations made by Z. In addition I heard oral submissions on 2 October 2015. Both the written and oral submissions were, as one would expect from the expertise of advocates in the case, of the highest standard.
10. The parents in these proceedings have been the subject of intense forensic scrutiny by both the family and the criminal courts over many months. Whilst this has been unavoidable, it is to their credit that each of them has shown enormous commitment to these proceedings. They have each been largely reliable in attending court and giving instructions to their legal teams. It should not be forgotten that these proceedings have been conducted in a language that is not the parents' first language. They and the court have had the considerable benefit of having continuity of interpreters, who have each been of the highest standard and have been willing to assist in what ever way they can to ensure the proceedings have run smoothly.
11. In his written submissions Mr Storey Q.C. placed emphasis on the difficulties members of a Roma community face. This court is acutely aware of those difficulties and is very conscious of the background of the families in this case and has sought to ensure that all steps that can be taken have been, to ensure these proceedings have been conducted in a way that enable the parents to properly and effectively participate.

Criticisms regarding the police investigation

12. In the January judgment I made a number of criticisms of the police investigation (see in particular paras 432 – 435). In his ruling in March HHJ O'Mahony agreed with those concerns and expressed his own concerns about the investigation in trenchant terms. I hope that any review of the police investigation will take on board what has been said in both sets of proceedings about the investigation. Like HHJ O'Mahony I appreciate that this investigation was a difficult and challenging process for all those involved dealing with a young, vulnerable person as Z.
13. This hearing has done little to improve the position regarding the investigation. Whilst this court recognises the enormous sensitivities involved in this type of investigation, it is clear that some of the decision decisions taken have seriously undermined the evidence. For example, the decision made not to challenge Z in relation to possible inconsistencies, the methods used to put her at ease and gain her trust seriously risked being seen by her as encouragement, with the consequence of undermining the quality of her evidence. When looked at in the context of her low IQ and the information regarding her tendency to confabulate (which information was only available after all the interviews and discussions with her had concluded) made the task for this court challenging when evaluating the reliability of the evidence to support any of the findings sought in January. The events since January, has undoubtedly made that task significantly more challenging.

New Material

14. The new material relied upon to re-open the findings can be summarised as follows:

(1) Z's oral evidence in the criminal trial (together with the recorded memory refreshing sessions beforehand when she viewed the ABE interviews) which resulted in the conclusion by the trial judge not to allow the case to go before the jury on the basis of the second ground in Galbraith, due to what he considered were the 'extreme flaws in the reliability and credibility of Z's evidence'. Z gave oral evidence over 9 days following careful consideration having been given to appropriate safeguards and the use of an intermediary. HHJ O'Mahony's conclusion was founded on a number of grounds, which included

(i) A number of men being wrongly put in the frame in allegations of rape and trafficking, 2 of whom were defendants in the criminal proceedings. HHJ O'Mahony stated when giving his ruling 'it is clear from the cross examination based on sound and undisputed disclosure that by mistake, confusion or sheer lies, Z has implicated eight men of serious crime and then in evidence withdrawn the allegations or robustly rejected them as being wholly wrong'. The detailed analysis in the ruling in the criminal proceedings includes some evidence that was available at the family hearing, although the further inconsistencies, retractions and reasons for retractions in Z's oral evidence in the criminal proceedings is clearly new.

(ii) The lack of corroborative evidence to support the two weeks Z had said she spent in hospital. That position was largely known at the family hearing although in the memory refreshing stage Z stated that the hospital stay was not true.

(iii) The different accounts Z had given of her return from Town C to Town A, 3 of which were known to the family court, but a further account was given in oral evidence.

(iv) The differing accounts of times she was taken to Town C, she gave a different account in her ABE interview (known about at the time of the family hearing) and in her oral evidence (both in her examination in chief (30 – 40 times) and her cross examination ('I made a mistake')). The accounts in the oral evidence are new.

(v) The events when Z was in City A. The documents disclosed Z had been seen by the police, told them her parents were selling her for sex and then Z denied to the police having said that (this was all known in the family proceedings). In her oral evidence she rejected any of the events disclosed in the City A documents had occurred and that all was well throughout her time in City A. In a lunch break during cross examination she was seen on the phone to her mother writing notes which she tried to tear up when the police tried to take them from her. She refused to answer any more questions about City A. When her mother gave oral evidence about the phone call she said Z had told her on the phone that she, Z, had lied about it in evidence before the jury. The account in Z's oral evidence, and her mother's evidence about the phone call are new.

(vi) Inconsistent accounts by Z as to whether she had taken drugs voluntarily or not, when the prosecution case was she was forced to take drugs. In her 13 February interview (which was known to the family court) she said she was addicted to drugs. In her oral evidence she said she did not know or remember if she brought drugs or was addicted to drugs. There is reference to a facebook conversation concerning drugs and a video of Z expertly rolling a joint. The oral evidence, facebook conversation and video are new.

(vii) Inconsistent accounts concerning sex with JDI, which were described by HHJ O'Mahony as 'remarkable'; alleging that in the 6 March interview, denying it in the 24 October interview (both of which were known in the family proceedings) and in her examination in chief and cross examination stating that he had raped her. The content of her oral evidence is new.

(viii) False complaint by Z against her father, she admitted this in her oral evidence. This was not before the family court although her mother gave evidence in the family proceedings that she thought Z had done this as the father had stopped her going out to a nightclub.

(2) Further details emerged in the criminal proceedings about the evidence gathering of DC Verier (KV) that puts into question the neutrality of the investigation, which this court had already been critical of. It emerged during the criminal trial that KV had been instructed to pre-prepare a statement in section 9 form and turn up at the address with it and present it to Z. This was not disclosed in her evidence during the hearing before me, although it was raised as an issue in cross examination.

(3) The evidence available in the criminal proceedings (notably the evidence of DC Brightman (DCB) in the voir dire) regarding the circumstances surrounding the ABE interview of CC such that HHJ O'Mahony excluded it under section 78 PACE as having been obtained in circumstances which he considered as oppressive, bearing in mind the vulnerability of the witness. The full detail about the background circumstances of this ABE interview is new, although most of the information was available at the earlier hearing.

15. The courts overriding objective is to deal with cases justly having regard to the welfare issues involved. The factual and welfare issues in this case could not be more serious or complex. The threshold findings relied upon by the LA are the only basis upon which they are justified, by law, in seeking to interfere with the Article 8 rights of each of the adults and children.
16. Although the LA submits that the family court was aware of and alive to the significant emotional, psychological and intellectual difficulties of Z and the inconsistencies in her evidence at the time of the family hearing it acknowledged in April the procedural bind the court is in.

This Hearing

17. At this hearing I have considered the agreed bundle of documents, which consists of the majority of the material that was before this court previously, together with the transcripts of the relevant evidence in the previous proceedings before me and transcripts and further documents from the criminal proceedings. I have viewed the passages of the memory refreshing exercise I was asked to. I have heard the oral evidence of Kayleigh Jones, Claire Ledger, DC Verier, DI Cooper, DC Brightman, SS, CC, AK, JE, LF and JC.
18. Z left the UK on 12 June 2015 to join her mother in Slovakia with the consent of the LA in whose care she was, and the approval of the court seized of proceedings that concerned her. This court determined on a renewed Re W application on 22 July 2015 that Z should not be required to give oral evidence, on the basis that on the information available to the court it would be contrary to her welfare to do so. Directions were made for any further information that became available concerning Z. No further relevant information was made available to the court and there was no renewal of any Re W application.
19. The LA took steps to make contact with ZM (Z's mother) to enquire whether she would be prepared to give evidence by video link. The indications were that she would, but in the event no party sought to cross examine her in this hearing. She had given evidence in the previous family proceedings and the criminal proceedings.
20. All parties have provided written submissions and have had the opportunity to make oral submissions as well.

The Law

21. The parties have been able to agree the law and any direction I should give myself when considering Z's evidence, in particular that the court has not had the advantage of her giving oral evidence. Save for what I set out below it remains as I set out at paras 28 – 52 and para 427 of the January judgment. I have the principles set out there very much in mind and do not propose to add to this judgment by setting them out again.
22. In addition regarding threshold the court's attention is drawn to Re A [2015] EWFC 11 (paragraphs 8-16 and 62, 63 and 76). In this case Sir James Munby P gives a timely reminder of the need for a LA to ensure that facts in issue are supported by proper evidence and that a link is established between the facts in issue and why the LA asserts that significant harm has been suffered or is at risk of being suffered by any child subject to proceedings. The court is also referred to Re J (a child) [2015] EWCA Civ 222 paragraph 45 per McFarlane LJ where he states (approving the President's observations in Re A (ibid)) "There was a need for the judge to make clear and sufficiently reasoned findings of fact with respect to any disputed issues. There was then a responsibility upon the judge to identify whether, and if so how, any of the facts found either alone or in combination with each other, established that J was likely to suffer significant harm in the care of either or both parents. Finally it was necessary for the threshold findings to identify (at least in broad terms) the category of significant harm that the judge concluded was likely to be suffered by J."

The Background

23. I do not propose to set out the background to this matter again. It is comprehensively dealt with in the January judgment at paragraphs 54 to 422 and I refer to that judgment for the detailed background.
24. I have set out above the events since January that have led to this hearing.

The Evidence

Z's evidence

25. The evidence from Z has been put under renewed scrutiny in this hearing.
26. It is right that the main reason why the re-hearing was sought was the collapse of the criminal trial and the reasons that underpinned that. Obviously this court is not bound by any conclusions reached by HHJ O'Mahony in his ruling, but the evidential position that brought about that conclusion is clearly very relevant.
27. The first matter is that prior to her first ABE interview on 6 March 2014 Z had made serious allegations against a number of individuals, including two people who were defendants in the criminal proceedings. In the meetings Z had with DC Verier (KV) and Kayleigh Jones (KJ) on 13 and 20 February Z implicated a number of people as causing sexual harm to her. In the first meeting JDI, MC, and A. In the second S, T, RK and RF. In her the memory refreshing exercise and her oral evidence in the criminal proceedings she withdrew her allegations against a number of men including A, S, RF, T and U.
28. Two of these men, RK and A, she had described in her oral evidence as having been very kind to her; RK was a former boyfriend. She went further in her oral evidence in that she denied she had ever said to KV in her meeting on 13 February anything unpleasant about A.
29. It is submitted that the importance of this is that it is now known that prior to the first ABE interview Z had already told untruths about a number of men regarding serious sexual offences. As Mr Storey submits, this was also at a time when those who were speaking to Z were ignorant of the information that subsequently became available about Z's low IQ and suggestibility.
30. It is submitted that this behaviour by Z supports the suggestion that Z has the capacity to make up allegations against people for little or no reason. Two of the people she had made up allegations about, RK and A, she subsequently described as having been very kind to her. In other instances, when she has given a reason it has been a slender one (such as the allegation of assault against her father when she stated she wanted him to be in prison, to then subsequently state she had made the allegation as he had refused to allow her to attend a disco). This behaviour, it is submitted, supports the evidence given by Z's mother, ZM, in the previous family proceedings that Z was someone who would 'make up stories, someone who made up allegations of sexual abuse against people'. ZM said something similar in her oral evidence in the criminal proceedings.
31. Feeding into this is the further inconsistent oral evidence given by Z about a number of other matters. For example, the times she was allegedly taken to Town C. In her ABE interview it was twice, in examination in chief in the criminal court it was 30 – 40 times and in cross examination she said it was a mistake. The rest are set out in HHJ O'Mahony's ruling.
32. Another feature of Z's evidence is the additional information regarding what occurred in City A. It is suggested to have been missed by all the parties in the family proceedings that buried within the papers was a separate reference by Z to her family selling her for sex. This arises from a question put in the criminal proceedings by Mr Saxby Q.C. (leading counsel for RB). At the time of the first family hearing it was thought this had only been said by her once (to PC Swift, which she subsequently denied). It now appears that the records show this was possibly done on two separate occasions, to two separate people. The second occasion was two days prior to the time with PC Swift to someone called N (although the records available do not specifically record her saying to this person she was sold for sex but that question was put in the criminal case without objection being raised). It is pointed out that this now lends more support to such behaviour by her own family, further supported by her reaction recorded in her meeting with KV on 26 March 2014 when asked if her parents had ever received money for her she 'looked extremely sad and refused to provide an answer or make eye contact'. This additional information resulted in both KV and KJ agreeing with Mr Storey in cross examination in this hearing that if they had known about these reports from City A they would have considered removing Z from her parents care, both for her own protection and so she was in a neutral environment.

ZM

33. She gave oral evidence in the criminal proceedings as she did in the previous family proceedings, but was not required at this hearing. The court has the benefit of transcripts of her evidence from both sets of proceedings.
34. In relation to her evidence given in both sets of proceedings it is submitted on behalf of AK that it is of note that despite the evidence of the close relationship between Z and her mother Z made no mention to her of any the allegations she makes against AK. She gave evidence of Z taking money from her, that she had wrongly reported her father for physical abuse and when asked about the time when Z alleged she was sexually assaulted in Slovakia she agreed Z was someone who would invent such an allegation.

CC

35. In the criminal trial her ABE interview was excluded, following a voir dire where DC Brightman gave oral evidence. The basis of that was due to the number of times she was seen prior to any ABE interview, the circumstances of those occasions (for example, for an extended period immediately after her mother had been arrested) and the risk of the combination of pressure and leading questions and the lack of safeguards afforded by the ABE guidelines.
36. CC gave oral evidence at this hearing; she didn't in the previous family hearing. She had the opportunity to view her four ABE interviews prior to giving oral evidence, the practical arrangements for that having been agreed between the parties. It is recorded that whilst she was watching the 20 June interview she commented that the Roma community were upset with her because she was telling the truth. In oral evidence she said JDI's mother came to her sister's house, as she didn't want her son to go to prison and wanted CC to withdraw her statement. CC said she wasn't there at the time. She also commented whilst watching that interview that she (meaning Z) sold herself.
37. In her oral evidence she denied being sold for sex by anyone and the allegations made about her behaviour by Z. She denied FF (JDI) was selling anyone for sex, in her words 'Z was doing it for pleasure'. She did accept that once FF had tried to sell her for sex and she refused (this confirmed what she said in her interview on 20.6.14). She had not seen Z having sex with men with her own eyes 'but I knew she went'. She said Z went to see men for money to have sex, she went on her own.
38. There is some force in the criticisms made about pressure being put on CC by the police, in particular putting forward matters as fact rather than allegations (such as DCB saying that lots of people had been arrested and were in prison for selling people for sex) and the number of occasions she was seen without proper compliance with the ABE guidelines. Against that is the fact that she had the opportunity to view all her ABE interviews prior to giving oral evidence and apart from placing an emphasis on Z going for sex with men on her own and that she was doing it for pleasure, she did not resile from what she said in her ABE interviews and confirmed they were true. This included (i) in her interview on 30.5.14 describing being taken by FF and others to visit a man in London who gave her money to talk to her; (ii) when asked about Z at the start of the 20 June interview she said 'I don't know how, how we have met up. I have already forgotten that. I know about something it is that she was sold and erm FF was selling her. She was doing it with err joy because she wanted to do it for her family for her mama. She has said that to me by herself.' In that interview she gives detailed descriptions of Z being driven by FF to locations in Town B and Town A to have sex, which he arranged and she came out with money. She refers to Z saying she was doing this so her family could eat.

SS

39. She did not give oral evidence in the earlier family proceedings or the criminal proceedings, but did at this re-hearing. She was given the opportunity to view her ABE interview prior to giving evidence. Having had the opportunity to do so she prepared a statement setting out her corrections. Those corrections had a common theme which distanced her, AK and JE from Z and emphasised that Z was selling herself rather than by others. As a result of that statement, prepared at court just before she was due to give evidence, she was not required for cross examination, although she confirmed on oath that she had not been approached by anyone to change her evidence. In her statement she says following a recent conviction she has moved away from the Kent area and no longer takes drugs.
40. The main criticism of her ABE interview is that it is apparent that before the interview started a number of people had been discussed with her. Mr Storey relies on the ABE interview that despite being repeatedly asked she states that there is no problem with AK, although accepting that she takes pica. She did not suggest at any stage that either AD or KD were at risk; in her words they were 'safe'. It is said this was not a witness trying to protect AK, as she acknowledged she took pica. She did not suggest during her interview that Z was forced to have sex.
41. Having reviewed the interview again in the light of the recent statement from SS it is not without significance that this is a person who at the relevant time had a close relationship with AK to the extent that she visited her to take drugs together. Whilst she now seeks to place the emphasis on Z selling herself it is of note in her interview she describes Z being taken to different towns with guys and comments '..whoever was her boss or like that, they was using her..' and in her statement acknowledges Z was used by her boyfriend.

Record of meetings with KD

42. She was seen on a number of occasions as set out in my previous judgment. There has been renewed scrutiny at this hearing of the record of the meeting with her on 3 July when it is said she gave details about the inter-relationship between AK, JE and JC.
43. Both Mr Storey and Mr Larizadeh forcefully make the point that a flaw in the investigation is the failure of the police or LA to speak to AD (who would have been able to give valuable evidence about what was going on in the D household). She did not go to the Country A to live with her father until 1 July 2014. They further rely on the failure of KJ to be able to recognise the dangers of leading questions. She visited KD alone, which coupled with her evidence that she believed Z and the fact that the note does not record all the questions asked risked a lack of neutrality or care regarding the questions she may have asked KD.
44. Against that are the details that are in the account given by KD at the meeting on 3 July. The note records what KJ said to KD at the beginning, that she was going to give her a list of first names and if she recognised the name for her to tell who this person was and how she knew them, and if she didn't then just to say she does not know. KD gave a detailed description of Z (girl who dyes her hair black and draws whirls on her face) and said she came round her house and that her mother would take her out, but she didn't know where. She gave an accurate description of SS and her relationship with AK. She was also able to describe JE, her children and that she was called 'I'. She could identify JC, her relationship with JE and was able to say she did not know who her children were. The note records KD as being able to say when she did not know people, and to distinguish between people who she saw in the home and in the town centre.
45. I have carefully re-considered the position again regarding this note. Whilst I have weighed in the balance the criticisms that are made of it, in particular that it is a hearsay account, it is a note that I consider the court can attach some weight to. I have heard KJ give evidence about it. Whilst she was at times somewhat defensive about it, first saying that it did record all the questions asked and then recognising that probably was not the position. In her evidence she said whilst KD was initially reluctant to talk (as described in the note) her demeanour when they did discuss the names was described as calm, happy to talk and open. The note carefully records KD was able to say when she could not give information about people, or only limited information (for example she knew JC, knew she had children but did not know their names) which lends support to the weight to be attached to it. KJ was able to deal with any suggestion that KD may have been confused about the N she was talking about in the context of JE, she agreed there was a possibility it could be JE's daughter but said it did not readily flow from KDs description of N being introduced to JE, who was her mother. It is clear that is a reference to Z being introduced to JE.
46. The written submissions on behalf of AK and the LA analyse the description given by KD of someone called E. The LA submit that it is RB (relying on the description of the tattoo and the general physical description) whereas Mr Storey submits that a number of features point to it being a unrelated friend of AK. He relies on the fact that KD's description does not match other information in the papers about RB, in particular she describes him as being tall and skinny, that he is married and has 2 children and E is a common name. I agree on the face of the information available whilst suspicious is equivocal as to whether KD was describing RB or not.

Police Intelligence reports

47. Much criticism has been made of these reports. They are, as Mr Storey puts it, as the bottom of the evidential food chain to such an extent that they are no more than 'tittle tattle' and should not be used to prop up an already weak case. He makes the obvious points that the reporter is not known, no attempt has been made by the LA to identify them, produce a statement from them and call them to give evidence. As a result, he submits, they barely amount to evidence.
48. Mr Feehan recognises they are hearsay accounts and the court should treat them with caution. However, he relies on the accuracy of many of the details given in them to lend support to other evidence, particularly that of Z, who was very unlikely to have known about the content of them.

Further criticisms of the police investigation

49. In addition to the criticism this court made in the January judgment and HHJ O'Mahony in his 6 March ruling, further matters have emerged to the forefront during this hearing. They can be summarised as follows:

(1) The failure to follow up any further enquiries relating to SA. He is the neighbour who lived next door to AK against whom cross allegations had been made. Z alleged AK sold her own daughter AD to him, which AK and AD deny. AK alleged that it was Z who used to visit him, have sex with him. In his oral evidence in this hearing DI Cooper said this man was interviewed, denied the allegations and it was not taken any further. Very recent disclosure from the CPS confirmed this man was seen by the police in August 2014. He denied having sex with any of the occupants of AKs address and described an isolated occasion when he smoked cannabis and was offered sex for money by a woman who visits AK who he described as being 'in her late twenties, slim build, blond hair and who always wears sexy clothes'.

(2) The very recent disclosure of the s9 statements of LS. His existence was not known during the previous family hearing and was only noted as being referred to in the written submissions in the criminal proceedings. He is the former boyfriend of AD who described Z being a regular visitor to AK's home, but makes no reference to Z being there against her will. This disclosure was made on the last day of this hearing; no party sought this witness to attend to give oral evidence.

(3) The failure to interview AD who would have been able to shed light on what was going on. This was raised in the previous hearing. Z had alleged that AK prostituted AD and that she and AD had spent the night in bed with a Pakistani man. It is submitted that this gap in the information available has to be seen in the context of the frequent meetings with AD's much younger sister, KD. This, it is submitted, supports the lack of balance in the investigation.

(4) The failure to challenge Z (for example, in relation to the hospital stay), the deliberate departures from the best practice outlined in the ABE guidelines, the failure to properly record key events (in the drive round and the meetings with potential witnesses where there were incomplete records regarding the questions asked). Most of this was known at the previous hearing but need to re-evaluated in the context where this court has not had the advantage of Z giving oral evidence.

(5) KV's evidence in the criminal proceedings about the pre-prepared s 9 statement she took to the meeting with Z on 7 May. This was not disclosed in the previous hearing before me, although it raised as an issue in cross examination by Mr Larizadeh. In her evidence in this hearing KV said she 'forgot' that was what happened when she previously gave evidence before me. She said she had more time to prepare for her evidence in the criminal proceedings. Although I accept at face value what KV says I do find it very surprising that such an important detail was forgotten when she gave evidence in the previous hearing. It was, as HHJ O'Mahony described, an usual step to take in such an investigation, especially with such a vulnerable witness. It was based on information given two months previously and KV accepted the way it was presented to Z risked limiting her ability to say what she disagreed with.

(6) There was much debate during this hearing about when the police were made aware of the information from Slovakia, which included information about Z's tendency to confabulate. The evidence very recently disclosed now shows DI Cooper received this on 28 October 2014, considered it and circulated a note about it on 30 October 2014 attached to an email that was copied to KV. KV said in evidence at the previous hearing (which is now known to be after receipt of the email from DI Cooper) that she was seeing the information from the Slovakian psychiatrist for the first time. That was clearly not the complete position as in her very recent s 9 statement she states 'I can confirm that looking back through my email records, I received an email on 30/10/2014 titled 'CONCERNS REGARDING 3rd PARTY MATERIAL FROM SLOVAKIA.DOCZ'. This email contained a report 'outlining' the points made about Z by a Psychiatrist in Slovakia including as per DI COOPER's statement on 24/09/15

• She has tendencies to distort reality

• has tendency to confabulation

Looking at DI COOPER's statement and the email he sent to me on the 30/10/!4, I have only now remembered receiving this. I can state that I did read DI COOPER's chronology on Z's 3^rd party records but did not read the translated Psychologist report itself as believed his chronology to contain all necessary points of concern.'

(7) KJ was closely questioned about how the investigation proceeded. Although it was clear all decisions regarding the investigation were being led by the police, it appears that there was no effective contribution by the LA to the strategic decisions being taken (eg the conduct of ABE interviews, non compliance with ABE guidelines, meetings not fully recorded in writing or by video etc). KJ was questioned about leading questions in some of the ABE interviews and it became clear that she, like KV, believed what Z was saying and as a result risked remaining neutral in gathering the relevant information. As with the police, the LA in this type of situation should have early access to specialist legal advice to enable them to fulfil their statutory obligations, particularly in circumstances where there are likely to be care proceedings based on the evidence gathered during the police investigation.

Oral evidence of AK, JE, JC and LF

50. In very large part the evidence of each of these Respondents took the same course as in the previous hearing, which I dealt with at length in the January judgment.
51. In AK's evidence the LA relied on some inconsistencies between the evidence given previously and at this hearing. For example, that AK sought to give a further explanation for her telephone contact with JDI and MC that they were buying and selling things other than furniture. When asked about the information found in her home that suggested she had arranged marriages for herself and AD, she maintained her denial about her involvement in such an arrangement but AK's answers focussed much more on the fact that she had not got the money that the documents clearly intended she should. As she said 'That is how it should have happened but it didn't'. This, together with her unconvincing account of hers and AD's marriages, strongly supports that she had been involved in arranging marriages for herself and AD. When pressed about how KD could give a description of Z if she had only visited her home once, she said KD saw Z on the occasion when AK shouted at Z for making a noise outside her flat, when Z visited their neighbour and when she saw her in the town. She was again pressed about what the LA submits corroborates what Z says, AK denied some of the material in the intelligence reports and what was reported by SS's father. She denied knowing RB prior to their arrest. When pressed about the recording in her custody record, the day after her arrest which stated she had more information to give but was afraid others might hear, she denied any suggestion that related to any gang or person. She denied she said she was afraid, only worried about her children and the further information she had was that Z's family were selling her. When pressed again about why the phone records show Z phoning a number attributed to her she responded 'I don't know'.
52. In her evidence JE denied ever speaking to Z or knowing about either of her daughters (IE and NE) knowing or socialising with Z or Z staying at her home. When pressed about the detail KD is able to give of JE and her children she described an occasion when she met AK at a mutual friends house when they both had their children with them. She denied any knowledge of people who JS may have been in contact with and repeated that they each used each others phones.
53. JC in her oral evidence confirmed what she had said previously about attending AK's home to take drugs, although said it was only 'maximum 4 times' but denied they were good friends. She denied again using the name 'I' and could not give any explanation as to how Z would know who her children are. She was pressed again about the events outside a hotel in Town A on 5 September, she denied her daughter SF was present and said she was with someone called PF. She accepted she was close to IE but denied telling the social worker at a visit on 11 April that IE and Z had tipped off the police about her being a prostitute when in fact they were selling themselves. She said the social workers were asking her to care for IE. She denied IE's account to the social worker that she would be with Z and others in a street in Town A and could not account for how CC could give details about her children. She was pressed again about her explanation for Z's visit to her home on 13.5.13, she said she did not know why she came to her home and could only respond ''I don't know – someone told her I lived there.'
54. Finally, LF's evidence can be taken quite shortly. He was asked by Mr Feehan about the reports in the papers of members of his family having knowledge of Z and Z's visit to their home for a bath. His answers remained the same as in the previous hearing, he knew nothing about JC's drug use, Z or why she came to their home for a bath and he did not ask anyone.

Discussion and Findings

55. In considering these findings afresh I remind myself of a number of key matters:

(1) That the burden of proof remains on the LA throughout. The parents do not have to prove anything.

(2) It is critical that I keep an open mind when considering the evidence again, which I do.

(3) I have not had the benefit of hearing and observing the oral evidence of Z whose evidence is such an integral part of the LA's case.

(4) In considering the Lucus direction and in the event the court concludes a witness has lied the court may factor in the circumstances of the witness (including social and cultural) in considering why that witness may have told untruths.

(5) Whilst hearsay evidence is admissible the court must be careful to assessing the relevant considerations as to what weight it should be given.

(6) I must be careful when considering the wide canvas of evidence that this court is required to do that the burden of proof not reversed.

56. Mr Storey was careful, in his well crafted submissions, not to make what was in effect a submission of no case to answer (recognising what is set out in cases such as Re Z [2009] 2 FLE 877). What he submits is that Z's evidence is now so undermined and unreliable that it cannot be supported by what is, in effect, hearsay evidence that there has not been adequate or proper opportunity to challenge.
57. Mr Feehan on behalf of the LA recognises the difficulties there is with the reliability of the evidence from Z, but submits that when looked at in the context of the corroboration that is available, albeit from mainly hearsay evidence, demonstrates that some aspects of her account is in fact credible to the extent that it is more likely than not that it occurred. He fully recognises there is no burden on the Respondents, but submits the court is entitled, when considering the wide canvas, to take into account in evaluating the evidence the Respondents evidence too. That must be correct although the court must be alive to ensuring that a weak case is not bolstered by evidence other than that called by the LA with the result that the burden of proof is reversed.
58. This court in the previous hearing analysed and evaluated the evidence then available. On a fresh analysis and evaluation, in the light of the new material outlined above, I have reached the following conclusions in place of the findings set out at paragraph 4 above:

(1) AK, JE and JC had much more contact with and knowledge of Z than each of them has revealed in their evidence in these proceedings.

(2) They were each aware Z was being sold for sex and that she was under 16 years.

(3) LF knew Z was being sold for sex and that she was under 16 years.

59. I have reached those conclusions for the following reasons:

(1) Whilst I acknowledge that within the criminal proceedings Z did not back down in her allegations about AK, no one has suggested that I should revisit my earlier conclusions about the ABE interviews after 6 March. There is no basis to do so.

(2) The findings I made concerning AK's involvement in the arrangements for Z being sold for sex and that she kept Z in her home against her will were founded in large part on the first part of the ABE interview on 6 March. That now has to be looked at in the light of the further retractions and inconsistencies made by Z within the memory refreshing exercise, her oral evidence in the criminal proceedings and the fact hat this court has not had the advantage of hearing her give oral evidence. Whilst I was aware of and took into account the retractions and inconsistencies known about before the previous hearing, they are now of such a scale and extent in relation to allegations of serious sexual abuse that her account of her allegations regarding AK's involvement in her exploitation has been very seriously undermined. The schedule of inconsistencies and lies produced on behalf of JE accurately sets out the position. The withdrawal by Z of the allegations against the two defendants in the criminal proceedings, are clearly very important. As set out in para 253 of the January judgment Z's credibility is a central issue; in the light of the new material her credibility is now even more seriously undermined.

(3) Another factor that has to be considered and re-evaluated are the significant criticisms about the way the investigation was conducted, the numerous breaches of the ABE guidelines, the failure to challenge inconsistencies and the worrying lack of neutrality in the way Z was dealt with and the lack of balance in evidence gathering (for example not speaking to AD). These failures further seriously hinder the reliance the court can place on Z's evidence.

(4) I have had to re-evaluate the consideration of motive for Z to lie in relation to AK. In the light of the fresh information the submission that she lies for the sake of it cannot now be readily ignored. There can be little doubt that Z has had the most difficult background, and has been grossly let down by those adults who have had responsibility for her care. I agree with the analysis by the LA in their closing submissions 'that everything we know about Z, her background and experiences lend support to the fact that she has been sexually exploited. These experiences left her with little chance that she would be able to fortify herself against it'. The involvement of her own family in her difficulties also has to be re-evaluated in the light of the evidence about what occurred in City A. Her wholesale denial of any difficulties in City A in her oral evidence, together with her subsequent admission to her mother that she told untruths in evidence about City A, illustrates the extent of her vulnerability and unreliability. She has made up serious allegations about her father as she was not allowed to go out and about a former boyfriend due to jealousy about his new relationship.

(5) I have carefully considered what the LA submits is the corroborative evidence to support such a finding against AK as to her direct involvement in Z being sold for sex. It consists of hearsay accounts, unattributable intelligence records or inferences to be drawn from such evidence. Whilst this evidence leaves the court very suspicious of AK's role in Z's exploitation, supported by the court's assessment of AK's lack of credibility (which this hearing has not changed), I agree with the submissions made by Mr Storey that none of the witnesses that have been called to give evidence have directly implicated AK. The burden of proof is on the LA which, in my judgment, they have not discharged. Mr Storey also makes the point that the intelligence reports could arguably support AK in that over this period (2012/2013) her accommodation was being watched and monitored by the police, there were two police raids in 2012 yet no direct evidence has been called to support her involvement in prostitution or exploitation.

(6) The conclusion I reached previously regarding the enmeshed nature of the relationships between AK, JE and JC and their contact with Z remains secure for the reasons I set out in the January judgment. It is more likely than not they were each aware Z was being sold for sex, and that she was under 16 years. That conclusion is not fatally undermined by the unreliability of Z's allegations concerning AK. In her interviews Z was able to give details about AK, JE and JC that were consistent with her having had more contact with them than they suggest. For example, she was able to identify AK and JE's addresses, their children and she attended JC's address for a bath all of which supports far more contact between Z and each of these women. Mr Larizadeh places reliance on the inconsistency of Z's descriptions of JE (e.g as being Albanian) but that has to be balanced with other evidence which supports JE's contact with Z. Z's account of her contact with them is supported by evidence from a number of different sources; for example the detail AK was able to give in her interview about what Z had alleged (i.e. injections in her back and gang rape allegations) and the meeting with KD on 3.7.14. Whilst I have carefully considered again the criticisms of this meeting and record, in my judgment it provides a coherent account to support the much closer relationship of these women to each other and Z than they have each accounted for. KD was able to give good descriptions and distinguish when she did not know anyone named. Further support is provided by the telephone records of contact between AK and Z, which AK had no explanation for other than a generalised suggestion that others used her phone. It is of note that this phone contact was during one of Z's missing periods and AK's number was noted to be stored on Z's phone when she was seen at school. The evidence supports Z being closely associated with IE and SS, both of whom were respectively visitors to JC and AK's homes and IE is JE's daughter.

(7) I have carefully considered why AK, JE and JC would lie about their relationship with each other and Z and am satisfied that it is to seek to distance themselves from Z and their involvement with her in order to undermine Z's reliability.

(8) It is clear it is more likely than not Z was sold for sex, even if the court cannot make a positive finding who sold her. In her interviews Z said she was sold. Whilst there are some references to Z selling herself I reject that. The weight of the evidence clearly points to her being sold by others. CC in her interviews gives a detailed account of what took place, which corroborates the core of what Z describes. Whilst it is right that there were breaches of the ABE guidelines in the interviews with CC (such as not dealing with truth and lies at the start of the interview and a lack of neutrality in some of the questions) she had the opportunity the day before she gave oral evidence to view her ABE interviews again. She did not detract from the detailed descriptions she gave in those interviews of Z being sold for sex, she maintained that evidence despite being pressed about allegations made by Z about her which she denied. This conclusion is further supported by what JC told the social worker on 11 April (when an interpreter was present). JC's denials of this record were not credible. The reference in SS's interview to 'whoever was (Z's) boss or like that..they was using her' further supports Z being sold. It inconceivable bearing in mind my conclusions about the nature of the relationship and contact between AK, JE, JC and Z that they were not aware of Z's age and that she was being sold for sex. It was something Z did not seek to hide and had clearly been reported by others (such as JC, IE and SS).

(9) I can't reach any conclusion as to the extent, if at all, Z's family may have been implicated in some way in her exploitation. There is evidence that points both ways. ZM appropriately reported Z missing and took steps to secure appropriate medical help for her. However there is also evidence of Z saying she was selling herself to help her family, she was picked up by men from the family home and her reaction when asked by social workers whether her family were involved in her abuse.

(10) The further evidence since January 2015 doesn't in reality affect the finding under re-consideration regarding LF. All those in his household and with whom he had contact with knew of the sexual exploitation of Z by individuals. The evidence still supports the conclusion that she was being sold for sex and that LF knew that, although not specifically of Z being exploited by JE. Those around him and in his household knew or suspected that about Z, and it is inconceivable that he was not aware of that too. I reject his oral evidence that he remained ignorant of this.

Threshold

60. I shall now turn to consider threshold in the light of my findings. In considering this aspect I remind myself of the cases in paragraph 22 above and the need to identify whether, and if so how, any of the facts found establish that the child was likely to suffer significant harm (including which category) in the care of either or both parents. I also have in mind the observations in the cases cited that the courts are not in the business of social engineering, I have very much in mind the wise words of Hedley J in Re L (care: Threshold Criteria) [2007] 1 FLE 2050 at paragraph 50 and the need for the facts proved give rise to the risk of significant harm to the child.

D case

61. In this case the threshold has become of increasingly academic interest as KD is no longer in this jurisdiction and there are no immediate plans for her to return. She has lived with her father in the Country A since November 2014. All parties in the D case support an Article 15 transfer and agree the Country A is the appropriate jurisdiction to determine welfare issues relating to KD.
62. In the light of that I question the purpose served in determining the threshold criteria. Subject to hearing any further representations from the parties in the D proceedings a more proportionate response would be to give the LA permission to withdraw these proceedings, give leave to the parties to disclose the papers to any lawyers, the social services equivalent and any relevant court in the Country A.

E case

63. In considering this aspect of the case the court recognises that there is limited evidence of significant harm being suffered by the children in the E family at the time proceedings were commenced. The focus is on the risk of future significant physical and emotional harm. The level of risk is very likely to be further informed by the evidence due to be filed for the welfare hearing.
64. Pending the welfare hearing and the further evidence the findings made against both JE and JS support the fact that there are reasonable grounds to believe the threshold criteria were established on 8 May as follows:

(1) The children are likely to suffer significant emotional and physical harm as a result of the findings made regarding

(a) the use of methamphetamine and the effect that drug has on the ability of either of the parents to provide safe physical or emotional care for the children;

(b) the supply of drugs by JS to JC from the home address and drugs and drug

paraphernalia being kept within the home;

(c) the failure of the parents to protect the children's elder sister IE from a violent relationship with an adult man as a child;

(2) The children are likely to suffer significant emotional harm as a result of their parents' criminal activity and offending, each putting themselves at serious risk of being subject to a criminal investigation and not being available to care for the children. In the six months prior to the proceedings JE was charged with theft of a wallet with her daughter IE. On a separate occasion she pretended to sell herself to men with the intention of robbing them. Each of these offences occurred late at night/in the early hours of the morning. JS is currently on bail fighting deportation by the Home Office for what is understood to be alleged offences committed in Slovakia.

F case

65. Like the E case the threshold criteria is likely to be further informed by the evidence that is due to be filed for the welfare hearing. Neither of the parents in the F case dispute that the threshold is met by the findings made to date. I agree. I direct the parties to submit an agreed document for approval.


 


SCHEDULE OF FINDINGS – FURTHER TO THE JUDGMENT OF MRS JUSTICE THEIS DATED 5^TH JANUARY 2015 Numbers in bold are references to paragraph numbers in the judgment [THE BOLD PARAGRAPHS ARE THE FINDINGS BEING FURTHER CONSIDERED AT THE RE-HEARING]

A: Effect of methamphetamine

Methamphetamine is an illegal drug affecting the users body and mind adversely. The drug Pika is used by the some of the respondents. Pika is a dangerous drug; the effects very long lasting, it increases confidence, aggression and numbs the sense of pain. The effects of the drug would impact on the ability of an individual to be able to safely care for any child in their care (508).

F: In relation to AK

66. That she was more involved with Z than she revealed (466). She was in regular contact with Z (481)
67. That she was involved in the arrangements for Z being sold for sex, knowing that she was under 16 (484)
68. That she was at least complicit in causing or permitting the exposure of Z to inappropriate and abusive sexual activity, knowing that she was under 16 (482, 497)
69. That she kept Z in her home against her (Z's) will (485)
70. That she was a regular drug user including taking methamphetamine and cocaine (507).
71. That she took drugs in her home with others on most nights. The drug paraphernalia was kept in the home and put KD at risk of finding them. The fact that she took these drugs and kept paraphernalia in her home put KD at risk of significant harm (507).
72. That her drug taking affected her ability to care for any child in her care (508).
73. That she has been involved in arranging marriages (544)
74. That she was participating in criminal behaviour that was very likely to put KD at risk of significant harm either from the people who AK was associating with or that she (AK) would be likely to be arrested and be the subject of a criminal investigation (544).

C: In relation to JE and the E household

1. That her knowledge of Z was significantly more than she revealed and this was due to more direct contact she had with Z than she said (480). She was in regular contact with Z (481).

75. That she was close to AK and remained in regular contact with her since their time working together at a hotel in Town A (473)
76. She was probably at the least complicit to some extent in what was happening to Z in terms of her being sold for sex. The precise extent of her involvement/complicity is difficult to say but the Court is only able to make positive findings that she knew Z was being sold for sex and that she knew Z was under 16 years old and she took no action in relation to this (482 and 497).
77. That she pretended to sell herself to men with the intention of robbing them. On occasions she did this with others including JC (480, 509).
78. That she was taking methamphetamine in the home whilst caring for the children (503(4)).
79. That she knew that JS was abusing drugs (501).
80. That she knew JC was abusing drugs (501).
81. That she permitted or facilitated the supply of drugs to JC by JS from the family home (501, 503).
82. That she failed to protect IE from a violent relationship with an adult PD when she was a child (525).
83. That she was charged together with her daughter IE of theft of the wallet of a man from a kebab shop in Town A on 1^st or 2^nd December 2013.
84. Two electronic devices were seized from an address in Town A on 7^th May 2014, where JE and JS were living with their children. Images of child like people which are indecent as particularised in the schedule of DC Brightman at page 5023 of Bundle P were contained on the drives of those devices. A number of those images were the same across both devices.

D: In relation to JC

85. That her relationship and knowledge of Z was far more than she has said (480) and that she was in regular contact with Z (481).
86. She was probably at the least complicit to some extent in what was happening to Z in terms of her being sold for sex. The precise extent of her involvement/complicity is difficult to say but the Court is only able to make positive findings that she knew Z was being sold for sex and that she knew Z was under 16 years old and she took no action in relation to this (477 - 480, 482 and 497).
87. That she pretended to sell herself to men with the intention of robbing them. On occasions she did this with others including JE (480, 509).
88. That from October 2012 to May 2014 she was addicted to methamphetamine and on occasion took drugs in the family home when she had the care of the children (499, 503(1))
89. That she frequently went out all night in search of drugs, or because she could not sleep due to the effect of drugs, and left the children inadequately supervised (499, 503(1))
90. That she failed to protect her daughter SF in that SF engaged in a relationship with an adult boyfriend MR and was physically assaulted by him in the course of that relationship. Children in the care of JC may be at risk of such harm in light of their mother's inability to take effective steps to protect SF in this way and the Court's concern that she did not display any real understanding of these historical difficulties with SF in her oral evidence. (527)

[Note: the Court has indicated that this risk should be assessed in light of the Local Authority's acknowledgement that the parents did seek assistance from the Police and from the Local Authority when they had concerns about SF, the fact that the parents did accompany SF to the Police Station in order for SF to make a complaint about MR's behaviour and the fact that the social workers involved with the family professed themselves unable to offer any solution to the problems raised with them by the parents.]

91. That she permitted known sex offender, her brother JAC, to use the family home. It is more likely than not that JAC spent time alone with the children (528).
92. That she was convicted of possession of amphetamine on 8.2.2014 and accepted a caution for possession of amphetamine on 10.1.2014.

E: In relation to JS

93. That he was supplying drugs to JC from his home address (503(3)).
94. That he introduced JC to drugs (501).
95. That he has greatly underplayed his drug taking and the circumstances in which he gets drugs. That he abused methamphetamines (501, 503(3)).
96. That he failed to protect IE from a violent relationship with an adult PD when she was a child (525).
97. That JS received a caution for slapping JE and there were arguments between them that resulted in the police being called, the most recent record of which is in October 2012 (538).
98. That he has admitted an offence, namely sexual intercourse with another person younger than fifteen years of age JS, was 19 years old at the time of the offence.
99. That he has convictions for other criminal offending including whilst in Slovakia for theft and in the UK for possession of an offensive weapon on 25^th November 2013.
100. Two electronic devices were seized from an address in Town A on 7^th May 2014, where JE and JS were living with their children. Images of child like people which are indecent as particularised in the schedule of DC Brightman at page 5023 of Bundle P were contained on the drives of those devices. A number of those images were the same across both devices.

F: In relation to LF

101. That he knew of the sexual exploitation of Z by individuals, although not specifically of her being exploited by JE (493).
102. That he knew about JC's drug abuse but failed to protect his children therefrom (502, 503(2))
103. That he was aware of JC pretending to sell herself to men with the intention of robbing them (511)
104. That he failed to protect his daughter SF in that SF engaged in a relationship with an adult boyfriend MR and was physically assaulted by him in the course of that relationship. Children in the care of LF may be at risk of such harm in light of their father's inability to take effective steps to protect SF in this way and the Court's concern that he did not display any real understanding of these historical difficulties with SF in his oral evidence. (527)

[Note: the Court has indicated that this risk should be assessed in light of the Local Authority's acknowledgement that the parents did seek assistance from the Police and from the Local Authority when they had concerns about SF, the fact that the parents did accompany SF to the Police Station in order for SF to make a complaint about MR's behaviour and the fact that the social workers involved with the family professed themselves unable to offer any solution to the problems raised with them by the parents.]

105. That he permitted known sex offender, his brother-in-law JAC, to use the family home. It is more likely than not that JAC spent time alone with the children (528).

The police were called on occasion to reports of arguments between JC and LF including in November 2012 and March 2013. LF has been verbally abusive to JC on both these occasions at least one of which was witnessed by the children. He has grabbed JC's arm during the incident in March 2013 (537). Article 20

Provisional, including protective, measures

106. In urgent cases, the provisions of this Regulation shall not prevent the courts of a Member State from taking such provisional, including protective, measures in respect of persons or assets in that State as may be available under the law of that Member State, even if, under this Regulation, the court of another Member State has jurisdiction as to the substance of the matter.
107. The measures referred to in paragraph 1 shall cease to apply when the court of the Member State having jurisdiction under this Regulation as to the substance of the matter has taken the measures it considers appropriate.