FAMILY DIVISION
Strand, London, WC2A 2LL |
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B e f o r e :
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YH |
Applicant |
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KENT COUNTY COUNCIL |
1st Respondent |
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-and- |
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AB |
2nd Respondent |
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-and- |
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BB |
3rd Respondent |
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CB (by her litigation friend, the Official Solicitor) |
4th Respondent |
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Mr M Bailey (instructed by Legal Services) for the 1st Respondent
The 2nd and 3rd Respondents were neither present nor represented
Ms S Roper (instructed by Bindmans) for the 4th Respondent
Hearing dates: 4th May 2021
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Crown Copyright ©
The Hon Mr Justice Keehan:
Introduction
i) whether I should appoint YH to be CB's personal welfare deputy in addition to being her property and affairs deputy; and
ii) whether I should grant YH's application for an order for the costs of these proceedings against the local authority.
Background
The Law
Appointment of a Deputy
"Powers to make decisions and appoint deputies: general
(1) This section applies if a person ("P") lacks capacity in relation to a matter or matters concerning—
(a)P's personal welfare, or
(b)P's property and affairs.
(2) The court may—
(a)by making an order, make the decision or decisions on P's behalf in relation to the matter or matters, or
(b)appoint a person (a "deputy") to make decisions on P's behalf in relation to the matter or matters.
(3) The powers of the court under this section are subject to the provisions of this Act and, in particular, to sections 1 (the principles) and 4 (best interests).
(4) When deciding whether it is in P's best interests to appoint a deputy, the court must have regard (in addition to the matters mentioned in section 4) to the principles that—
(a)a decision by the court is to be preferred to the appointment of a deputy to make a decision, and
(b)the powers conferred on a deputy should be as limited in scope and duration as is reasonably practicable in the circumstances.
(5)The court may make such further orders or give such directions, and confer on a deputy such powers or impose on him such duties, as it thinks necessary or expedient for giving effect to, or otherwise in connection with, an order or appointment made by it under subsection (2).
(6)Without prejudice to section 4, the court may make the order, give the directions or make the appointment on such terms as it considers are in P's best interests, even though no application is before the court for an order, directions or an appointment on those terms."
"56. The vast majority of decisions about incapacitated adults are taken by carers and others without any formal general authority. That was the position prior to the passing of the MCA under the principle of necessity: see Re F (supra) and in particular the speech of Lord Goff of Chieveley. In passing the MCA, Parliament ultimately rejected the Law Commission's proposal of a statutory general authority and opted for the same approach as under the previous law by creating in section 5 a statutory defence to protect all persons who carry out acts in connection with the care or treatment of an incapacitated adult, provided they reasonably believe that it will be in that person's best interests for the act to be done. Crucially, however, all persons who provide such care and treatment are expected to look to the Code. Certain categories of person are required by the statute, under section 42(4), to have regard to the Code (for example, anybody acting in relation to the incapacitated person in a professional capacity). In addition, however, as the Code itself makes clear, the Act applies more generally to everyone who looks after incapacitated persons, including family carers. Although not legally required to have regard to the Code, the Code itself stipulates that they should follow the guidance contained therein insofar as they are aware of it.
57. The Act and Code are therefore constructed on the basis that the vast majority of decisions concerning incapacitated adults are taken informally and collaboratively by individuals or groups of people consulting and working together. It is emphatically not part of the scheme underpinning the Act that there should be one individual who as a matter of course is given a special legal status to make decisions about incapacitated persons. Experience has shown that working together is the best policy to ensure that incapacitated adults such as E receive the highest quality of care. This case is an example of what can go wrong when people do not work together. Where there is disagreement about the appropriate care and treatment, (which cannot be resolved by the methods suggested in Chapter 15) or the issue is a matter of particular gravity or difficulty, the Act and Code provide that the issue should usually be determined by the court. The complexity and/or seriousness of such issues are likely to require a forensic process and formal adjudication by an experienced tribunal.
58. To my mind, section 16(4) is entirely consistent with this scheme. Manifestly, it will usually be the case that decisions about complex and serious issues are taken by a court rather than any individual. In certain cases, as explained in paragraphs 8.38 and 8.39 of the Code, it will be more appropriate to appoint a deputy or deputies to make these decisions. But because it is important that such decisions should wherever possible be taken collaboratively and informally, the appointments must be as limited in scope and duration as is reasonably practicable in the circumstances.
59. Clearly, practicalities will be an important consideration in determining an application for the appointment of a deputy. As the examples in paragraphs 8.38 and 8.39 demonstrate, it is sometimes impracticable to insist on decisions being taken by the court. The instances which stand out are those which involve a series of decisions (for example, about medical procedures) and where the assets of an incapacitated adult are of a magnitude that requires regular management. Common sense suggests that the second of these examples is likely to arise more frequently than the first, and that the appointment of deputies is likely to be more common for property and affairs than for personal welfare. As Her Honour Judge Marshall QC observed in Baker v H [2010] 1WLR 1103 at para. 32
"the terms of section 18 make it clear that the exercise of the very broad decision-making powers by a property and affairs deputy is readily contemplated"
(and see also the note to section 19 of the MCA in the Court of Protection Practice 2010 edition at page 411). Furthermore, as asset management is likely to be required on an indefinite basis, the appointment of deputies is likely to be of a longer duration for property and affairs than for personal welfare.
60. If Hedley J's comments in paras 8 and 9 in the judgment in Re P were intended to indicate that family members should as a matter of course be appointed deputies irrespective of the circumstances, I would respectfully disagree. But I do not read his judgment in that way. The unusual facts of Re P - the extraordinary gifts bestowed on P which enable him to have a career as a performer and earn significant sums of money - mean that many decisions will have to be taken about his personal welfare and property and affairs over and above the normal decision making involved in caring for a person who lacks capacity. Since it would be manifestly impracticable in those circumstances for the Court of Protection to make those decisions, the appointment of deputies was unavoidable and indeed desirable. As I read Hedley J's judgment, this was agreed by all parties and the issue to be determined by the court was the identity of the deputies. The greater part of that judgment is devoted to the terms on which the deputies were to be appointed and, in particular, whether an independent deputy should be appointed in addition to members of the family. As I read Hedley J's judgment, his comments about the importance of the family were directed more to the question of who should be appointed as deputy rather than the question of whether any deputy should be appointed at all.
61. It is axiomatic that the family is the cornerstone of our society and a person who lacks capacity should wherever possible be cared for by members of his natural family, provided that such a course is in his best interests and assuming that they are able and willing to take on what is often an enormous and challenging task. That does not, however, justify the appointment of family members as deputies simply because they are able and willing to serve in that capacity. The words of section 16(4) are clear. They do not permit the court to appoint deputies simply because "it feels confident it can" but only when satisfied that the circumstances and the decisions which will fall to be taken will be more appropriately taken by a deputy or deputies rather than by a court, bearing in mind the principle that decisions by the courts are to be preferred to decisions by deputies. Even then, the appointment must be as limited in scope and duration as is reasonably practicable in the circumstances. It would be a misreading of the structure and policy of the statute, and a misunderstanding of the concept and role of deputies, to think it necessary to appoint family members to that position in order to enable them better to fulfil their role as carers for P.
62. On the facts of this case, the application for the appointment of F and G as personal welfare deputies is, in my judgment, misconceived. The routine decisions concerning E's day-to-day care, including decisions about holidays and respite care can be taken by F as his carer. Decisions about his education should be taken collaboratively by F, G, his teacher, and other relevant professionals. Decisions about possible medical treatment should be taken by his treating clinicians, who will doubtless consult both F and G and others as appropriate. If there is any disagreement about any of these matters, an application can be made to the Court of Protection. Decisions about who should look after E in the event that F is no longer able to do so should equally be considered (when the need arises) in a collaborative way and only referred to the court for endorsement if required or if there is any disagreement. That is an issue for the very long term and it would be wholly inappropriate to appoint a deputy or deputies now to make that decision.
63. I have already acknowledged on a number of occasions the devotion and dedication which F and G have each shown towards E. This court will do whatever it properly can to support their commitment. I sympathise with their feelings that their commitment would be buttressed by being appointed as deputies for E's personal welfare. In my view, however, the law does not permit such an appointment for that purpose, and the circumstances of this case do not warrant such an appointment at this stage.
"Evaluating the "proportionality" of appointing a welfare deputy as potentially less restrictive than informal decision making under s.5 MCA, requires us to discount both the efficacy and desirability of taking decisions collaboratively and informally wherever possible. To disregard the very clear lessons from both research and public enquires, stretching back over thirty years, which emphasise the importance of agencies working together in order most effectively to promote the best interests of the vulnerable, would be irresponsible. Thus, evaluating the proportionality of the two options is misconceived. They are apples and pears. They are essentially different regimes which are triggered by P's individual circumstances."
"Thus, a number of clear principles emerge:
a) The starting point in evaluating any application for appointment of a PWD is by reference to the clear wording of the MCA 2005. Part 1 of the Act identifies a hierarchy of decision making in which the twin obligations both to protect P and promote his or her personal autonomy remain central throughout;
b) Whilst there is no special alchemy that confers adulthood on a child on his or her 18th birthday, it nevertheless marks a transition to an altered legal status, which carries both rights and responsibilities. It is predicated on respect for autonomy. The young person who may lack capacity in key areas of decision making remains every bit as entitled to this respect as his capacitous coeval. These are fundamental rights which infuse the MCA 2005 and are intrinsic to its philosophy. The extension of parental responsibility beyond the age of eighteen, under the aegis of a PWD, may be driven by a natural and indeed healthy parental instinct but it requires vigilantly to be guarded against. The imposition of a legal framework which is overly protective risks inhibiting personal development and may fail properly to nurture individual potential. The data which I have analysed (paragraph 26 above) may, I suspect, reflect the stress and anxiety experienced in consequence of the transition from child to adult services. As a judge of the Family Division and as a judge of the Court of Protection I have seen from both perspectives the acute distress caused by inadequate transition planning. The remedy for this lies in promoting good professional practice. It is not achieved by avoidably eroding the autonomy of the young incapacitous adult;
c) The structure of the Act and, in particular, the factors which fall to be considered pursuant to Section 4 may well mean that the most likely conclusion in the majority of cases will be that it is not in the best interests of P for the Court to appoint a PWD;
d) The above is not in any way to be interpreted as a statutory bias or presumption against appointment. It is the likely consequence of the application of the relevant factors to the individual circumstances of the case. It requires to be emphasised, unambiguously, that this is not a presumption, nor should it even be regarded as the starting point. There is a parallel here with the analysis of Baroness Hale in Re W [2010] UKSC 12. In that case and in a different jurisdiction of law, the Supreme Court was considering the perception that had emerged, in the Family Court, of a presumption against a child giving oral evidence. The reasoning there has analogous application here:
22."However tempting it may be to leave the issue until it has received the expert scrutiny of a multi-disciplinary committee, we are satisfied that we cannot do so. The existing law erects a presumption against a child giving evidence which requires to be rebutted by anyone seeking to put questions to the child. That cannot be reconciled with the approach of the European Court of Human Rights, which always aims to strike a fair balance between competing Convention rights. Article 6 requires that the proceedings overall be fair and this normally entails an opportunity to challenge the evidence presented by the other side. But even in criminal proceedings account must be taken of the article 8 rights of the perceived victim: see SN v Sweden, App no 34209/96, 2 July 2002. Striking that balance in care proceedings may well mean that the child should not be called to give evidence in the great majority of cases, but that is a result and not a presumption or even a starting point."
e) To construct an artificial impediment, in practice, to the appointment of a PWD would be to fail to have proper regard to the 'unvarnished words' of the MCA 2005 (PBA v SBC [2011] EWHC 2580) (Fam). It would compromise a fair balancing of the Article 6 and Article 8 Convention Rights which are undoubtedly engaged;
f) The Code of Practice is not a statute, it is an interpretive aid to the statutory framework, no more and no less. It is guidance which, whilst it will require important consideration, will never be determinative. The power remains in the statutory provision;
g) The prevailing ethos of the MCA is to weigh and balance the many competing factors that will illuminate decision making. It is that same rationale that will be applied to the decision to appoint a PWD;
h) There is only one presumption in the MCA, namely that set out at Section 1 (2) i.e. 'a person must be assumed to have capacity unless it is established that he lacks capacity'. This recognition of the importance of human autonomy is the defining principle of the Act. It casts light in to every corner of this legislation and it illuminates the approach to appointment of PWDs;
i) P's wishes and feelings and those other factors contemplated by Section 4 (6) MCA will, where they can be reasonably ascertained, require to be considered. None is determinative and the weight to be applied will vary from case to case in determining where P's best interests lie (PW V Chelsea and Westminster Hospital NHS Foundation Trust and Others [2018] EWCA Civ 1067);
j) It is a distortion of the framework of Sections 4 and 5 MCA 2005 to regard the appointment of a PWD as in any way a less restrictive option than the collaborative and informal decision taking prescribed by Section 5;
k) The wording of the Code of Practice at 8.38 (see para 20 above) is reflective of likely outcome and should not be regarded as the starting point. This paragraph of the Code, in particular, requires to be revisited."
Costs
"19.3 Where the proceedings concern P's personal welfare the general rule is that there will be no order as to the costs of the proceedings, or of that part of the proceedings that concerns P's personal welfare."
"19.5 –
(1) The court may depart from rules 19.2 to 19.4 if the circumstances so justify, and in deciding whether departure is justified the court will have regard to all the circumstances including:
(a) the conduct of the parties;
(b) whether a party has succeeded on part of that party's case, even if not wholly successful; and
(c) the role of any public body involved in the proceedings.
(2) The conduct of the parties includes –
(a) conduct before, as well as during, the proceedings;
(b) whether it was reasonable for a party to raise, pursue or contest a particular matter;
(c) the manner in which a party has made or responses to an application or a particular issue;
(d) whether a party who has succeeded in that party's application or response to an application, in whole or in part, exaggerated any matter contained in the application or response; and
(e) any failure by a party to comply with a rule, practice direction or court order.
(3) Without prejudice to rules 19.2 to 194 and the foregoing provisions of this rule, the court may permit a party to recover their fixed costs in accordance with the relevant practice direction."
Submissions on Personal Welfare Deputy
"To decide what leisure and social activities CB should do. To make day to day decisions about whether CB should go to the GP and/or what referrals to specialists should be sought via the GP. To ensure that written and properly informed protocols are available to all of CB's carers. To ensure proper records are kept by carers relating to the handover sheet information that have been in use since CB was placed with YH at home, such as liquid and food intake, skin colour, seizure activity, presentation, so that reliable information is provided to treating medical practitioners. To follow up referrals that are made for CB and not pursued by others. To pursue a care programme approach to CB's medical care. To be invited to all MDT or other multi professional meetings, and to have input in advance, of the agenda of any such meetings. To be consulted in advance of any changes to CB's care plan, including any proposed changes to the provider."
Discussion
Submissions on Costs
i) findings of fact made by the court; or
ii) an agreed factual matrix which arguably demonstrated unreasonable conduct on the part of the local authority. Ms Kirby QC, leading counsel for YH, submitted that the application for costs was pursued on the basis of the agreed statement of facts, the agreed chronology and excerpts from witness statements filed by the local authority and/or other disclosed documents.
i) the local authority maintained reliance on the previously filed Schedule of Allegations against AB and YH;
ii) it had not agreed with YH's concerns, expressed from time to time, about the standard and quality of the care provided to CB;
iii) it had ignored these concerns;
iv) it had not taken any action to address the same;
v) it had refuted YH's concerns that CB suffered from a number of conditions which were later established by the medical professionals;
vi) the social workers had on occasions provided the court with incomplete or in accurate information (e.g. the quality of the relationship between CB and a fellow resident at her care home);
vii) the fact that CB had sustained two spiral fractures in her care home in circumstances which were unknown; and
viii) its initial decision in March 2021 not to support CB living with YH upon her discharge from hospital which only changed on the morning of the hearing fixed to determine the issue of residence.
i) the matters relied on by YH in support of her costs application were denied or challenged by the local authority; and/or
ii) the facts relied on by YH could not or did not amount to unreasonable conduct.
Discussion
i) infer unreasonable conduct on the part of the local authority; or
ii) assume the local authority had acted unreasonably.
By way of example only I refer to two of YH's principal submissions. It was submitted that the fact that CB had sustained two fractures in unexplained circumstances was evidence of unreasonable conduct on the part of the local authority. I do not agree. The fact that CB sustained these injuries may (I emphasise may) indicate negligent care on the part of the care home but without more evidence it cannot lead to a conclusion which impugns the actions of conduct of the local authority.
Conclusion