England and Wales County Court (Family)

IN THE LINCOLN COUNTY COURT

		Lincoln County Court, 360 High Street, Lincoln, LN5 7PS.
		25th March 2014.

JUDGE SWINDELLS:

1. This is a very sad case involving the welfare of M, who was born on [a date in] 2013. His mother is JD, who is herself a young woman, having been born on [a date in] 1994. His father is CB, who was born on [a date in] 1991. The father has not played a part in these proceedings. I say it is a sad case because JD, as a young girl, came before this court and was herself the subject of a care order. So this court has a detailed knowledge of the difficulties that JD has faced already in her very young life. What is truly positive in this case is that it is clear from the wealth of material that, notwithstanding her hugely difficult background, she herself has made progress in her individual life.
2. I, therefore, want to set out at the forefront of this judgment that this is a young mother who has shown her love and commitment for M. She was a committed participant in a mother and baby foster placement where she showed gentle loving care for M. Notwithstanding all her difficult care history, she was committed and cooperated with the local authority during the mother and baby placement and I am fully satisfied that she did all that she possibly could within her personal resources to place herself in a position to be able to care for M.
3. The sadness is that the court has before it a report by the Consultant Forensic Psychologist, Dr David Briggs, which is a pessimistic report as to the mother's abilities to be able to care safely for M. There was a detailed assessment by the Independent Social Worker, Nick Wale, which also reached a negative conclusion but in the course of the assessment, a number of positives were highlighted in aspects of this young mother's care of M.
4. So it is against this somewhat daunting background that the court has to consider and

carry out the welfare evaluation and the placement option evaluation in this case.

5. As the local authority's plan is for a care order and a placement order it is necessary for

the court to consider the first principles which a court must always have in mind at every stage of the process. The starting point is Article 8 of the European Convention, the right to respect for private and family life; the key principle of which is that 'the aim should be to reunite the family when the circumstances enable that, and effort should be devoted towards that end. Cutting off contact and the relationship between a child and their family is only justified by the overriding necessity of the interests of the child'. The Supreme Court in the matter of Re B (A Child, Care Proceedings) [2013] UKSC 33 emphasised that orders contemplating non-consensual adoption are a very extreme thing, a last resort, only to be made where nothing else will do and to be made only in exceptional circumstances and where motivated by the overriding requirements pertaining to the child's welfare.

6. My paramount consideration has to be the welfare of M. In determining where his best interests lie I have to have regard to the welfare checklist in Section 1(3) Children Act 1989 and, in particular in this case, Section 1(4) Adoption and Children Act 2002. This is a case where there are positives in terms of the mother's parenting and there is evidence that she has built a strong attachment with M. The court always has to weigh very carefully in the balance the incalculable benefit to a child in being cared for by a member of the family and, in this case, particularly his mother. She urges upon me to give her an opportunity to care for M in the future in the home of her aunt, who lives away from the difficulties which her extended family have presented her with over the years including in her efforts to care for M. There are positives in the mother's favour but the court cannot ignore the assessment by Dr Briggs, which I have to say was stark reading, and also the assessments of Mr Wale. The court has also weighed very carefully in the balance the final evidence of the allocated social worker and the thorough analysis by the Children's Guardian, who supports the making of care and placement orders.
7. M is not of an age or understanding where his wishes or feelings could be a determinative factor but I am sure that if he had a voice he would say that he would wish to stay with his mother and the court takes that into account. But M's particular needs require a permanent and settled home which provides him with a safe and secure environment which meets all of his needs and which will provide a solid foundation for him to be able to meet his full potential. This is a welfare need that is 'here and now' and cannot wait. There will of course be lifelong losses resulting from him ceasing to be a member of his original family and becoming an adoptive child if ultimately an adoption order is made, and those include the impact upon his sense of identity and esteem. On the other hand a plan of permanency by way of adoption brings the advantage of a lifelong committed and enduring relationship with prospective adoptive family members. The court has to take account of the potential for harm were M return to either parent's care, and the risk would be that he would suffer significant harm in terms of neglect. This is something that the court cannot ignore but must be weighed very, very carefully in the balance.
8. Looking at the wishes of the mother, I fully understand, given her commitment to M, her heartfelt wish to be able to care for him in the future because there is no doubt that she loves him very dearly. Given the risks, however, the court has to say that the value of the relationship which his parents can bring to him is something that can be sustained through the proposed contact and the important lifestory work. The mother, prioritising M's interests, has dedicated herself to providing the relevant material for his life story book.
9. Sadly the court has to conclude that there are deficiencies in the mother's parenting ability and it is not really possible that changes can be effected in her ability within the welfare timescales of this little baby. I have, therefore, with regret to conclude that the welfare balance strikes down in favour of making the care order and the placement order.
10. Turning to the placement option evaluation, neither a residence order to the mother, even if supported by a supervision order, or a placement with her under the auspices of a care order with the local authority sharing parental responsibility, would, in my judgment, provide M with a safe placement which provides those benefits I have identified that he requires in his environment for him to grow and develop as an individual. The court has, however, carefully to consider the differences between long-term fostering and adoption. Fostering is a less interventionist option in that it falls short of severing the legal ties with the birth family and is more likely to provide a vehicle for maintaining contact with the natural family. A placement order, however, would ultimately make M a permanent part of the adoptive family to which he would belong throughout his life. Adoption would be likely to feel very different to M from fostering; the commitment of the adoptive family being of a different nature to that of local authority foster carers. Also it would free M from the statutory intrusion which a care order entails.
11. Accordingly, with a sense of deep sadness, carrying out the holistic evaluation of the benefits and detriments of each of the options I can only conclude that a care order and a placement order would be in M's interests in providing him with that sense of permanency, which I am satisfied is his overriding welfare need and, therefore, justifies intervention in the family.
12. I have to go on to consider the issue of dispensing with consent. Section 52(1)(b) of the 2002 Act provides that the consent of the parent with capacity can only be dispensed with if the welfare of the child requires this, and 'require' has that strong Strasbourg meaning of 'necessity'. This is a stringent test but for all the sad reasons that I have already outlined I am satisfied that that test is met in this case and that the welfare of M does require dispensation of his parents' consent.
13. I cannot but feel personally a sense of tragedy having been involved with JD for so many years. She has made brave decisions today but she could not, for understandable reasons, bring herself to consent to either of the orders. As a result of the hearing today there are some improved prospects in terms of the direct contact that she will have –sadly for only a limited period – with M. It is hoped that the sessions of contact that she has, which are so precious to this young mother, can be extended to four hours, and I endorse those carefully thought out proposals for contact. I very much hope that this can be achieved for this young mother.
14. I make the care order and the placement order. Additionally, I will make an order for the transcript of the judgment at public expense.
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