England and Wales County Court (Family)

Neutral Citation Number: [2010] EWCC 45 (Fam)

 

In the County Court

 

 

Before:

HHJ X

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Between:

 

	Local Authority X	Applicant
	And
	A Mother	Respondent

 

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Hearing dates: 09 July 2010

 

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Judgement

 

Part 1 (reasons)

 

1                 In this case I propose to state my conclusions in advance of giving my Judgment and my reasons therefore.  My conclusions are as follows, firstly, that the application for a Placement Order in respect of T should be refused, secondly, that Care Orders are appropriate for both B and T, thirdly, that a Care Order can be granted now in relation to B, although there are matters relating to contact between her and T that require resolution; and, fourthly, that the care plan in relation to T is inchoate and requires further consideration in relation to contact such that the Care Order should not be granted at this stage.

 

2                 The proceedings were commenced in December 2008 in respect of J.S., who is (age given), A.S., who is (age given), B.S., who is (age given), and T.S., who is (age given). C.M. is the father of J and A. Mother says that he is the father of B as well. He disputed that but declined to undergo testing.  Mother maintains that he is, nevertheless, the father. The father of T is R.T. Mr. T has been a father figure to all the children since the relationship between them began nine years ago, and I shall refer to them as “mother” and “father” or as “the parents” throughout this Judgment.

 

3                 The proceedings follow a long history of social services’ involvement since 1994. J, A and B have been on the child protection register since 2005 under the category of neglect and B has been registered since birth. The historical concerns related to drug misuse by the parents, chaotic and unhygienic home conditions, failure to attend to the children’s health appointments and ensure that they received appropriate medical attention, poor engagement with professionals and their non-attendance at school. Home life was chaotic. J and A were effectively beyond parental control. The local authority intervened and  made its application for a Care Order on 16^th December 2008 which is the relevant date for the purposes of the Children Act 1989.   Threshold was agreed on 24^th August 2009.  On 11^th November 2009 District Judge R made a Supervision Order in respect of J. That order would expire on 15^th November (year given) which is J’s (age given) birthday. The local authority now seeks a Supervision Order in respect of A. The parents consent to that. They are supported by the Guardian. A is living at home. Having regard to that, his age and his need for support in relation to training and education and employment, I agree that it is necessary for the local authority to intervene in his life to provide that support in accordance with its care plan. It is an entirely justifiable and proportionate response and one that he himself agrees with and accepts. I, therefore, make a Supervision Order for 12 months in respect of A.

 

4                 In relation to B and T the local authority seek Care Orders which, subject to acceptable care plans, would not be opposed. B and T have been in the same foster placement since January (year given) and there has been regular and consistent contact between them and the wider family three times a week, although it is right that of late the attendance of their brothers at contact has been inconsistent.  The issue in this case is over the respective care plans for the girls. The local authority propose long term fostering in relation to B with contact with her parents and siblings reducing to six occasions each year, subject to review. In relation to T the plan is for adoption. The local authority has issued and there is also before the court an application dated 9^th December 2009 for a Placement  Order. The plan is to end direct contact between T and her parents and brothers and to preserve letterbox contact only after an adoptive placement is found. The care plan says the local authority is open to considering direct contact between B and T and in her evidence Miss D, the social worker, saw direct contact as potentially destabilising any prospective placement, and she supported indirect contact twice a year but she said more if possible. The local authority was not, however, ruling out direct contact. If, alternatively, T was to be placed in long term foster care then the proposal was that there should be contact six times each year as in B’s case. The care plan for B is that she should remain in foster care with her current carers with whom she has formed a strong attachment since January (year given). The parents do not oppose that and the Guardian supports it.  The principal issue relates to T. The parents, the Guardian and T’s brothers oppose the care plan for placement outside the family in an adoptive placement. They say that, like B, T should remain in long term foster care. There are also unresolved issues in relation to the level of contact there should be between B and her birth family and, in the event that T is to remain in long term foster care, between her and the family as well.

 

5                  This case was listed for hearing initially in December of last year. It was felt that there was then a gap in the evidence before the court. Permission was granted for expert evidence to be obtained from a psychologist, Mr. B,  and from an independent social worker, Miss A.  The court heard evidence from them, from Miss D and from the Guardian, Mrs. M. 

 

 

6                 There is very little, if any, issue about the facts of the case. The issue is over the outcome and whether, upon evaluation of all of the circumstances of the case, T’s welfare is consistent with an adoptive placement or a foster placement. In assessing that and in considering my independent judgment in relation to B, their welfare is of course the paramount consideration. The court must also consider the criteria specified in section 1(3) of the Children Act 1989, the welfare checklist and, in the case of T and in relation to the application for the Placement Order, the criteria in section 1(4) of the Adoption and Children Act 2002. 

 

7                 In terms of their ascertainable wishes and feelings, T is too young to have formed a view about the circumstances and her future. Observations of her by the social worker are of a bright, engaging, a more settled child who will seek comfort from her family members. The Guardian said that sometimes she ignores her wider family during contact, sometimes she does not. She displays little emotion at the end of contact and there are no reports of disturbing behaviour upon return to foster care. The evidence reveals a child whose feelings are one of ease in her current circumstances. B has regularly said that she wants to go home. However, when her circumstances are explored it is clear to those involved with her that this is a superficial expression only and that her true feelings are that she wants to stay where she is and remain integrated into her current foster family where she has formed strong attachments and is settled. That is the Guardian’s assessment of her wishes and no one challenges that.

 

8                 In terms of their physical, emotional and educational needs, because of her disrupted infancy, T has needs in addition to the conventional needs of any young child for safe and secure nurturing. She is still young and Mr. B and Mrs. A agree that there are both known and unknown problems associated with her attachment difficulties which she has experienced as a result of early disruption.  Mr. B says specifically, “T needs a stable and trusting relationship with a significant other but as yet has not been able to completely fill that role”.  I pause to mention that the evidence is that she has started to fulfil that role but has not succeeded to the extent that B may have.  He says, “T requires a permanent placement where she can receive consistent care in a secure environment free from violence and drug misuse provided by intelligent, sensitive, empathic carers who can prioritise T’s needs above their own.  Such carers will need to understand the extent of T’s specific difficulties and their causation and not expect early rewards from their parenting practice. They will need to understand that, although T’s social and emotional behaviour has improved during her time in care, she remains an insecurely attached child and a move to a new placement may cause her to regress. T’s carers will need to be patient and understanding and be willing to support her through any insecurity she may experience as a result of her move now and in the future”, and he said, in conclusion of his own view, that it was as follows: “My own view is that T would benefit most with experienced carers who have already raised a family and the age group between T and the older children is large enough for the older children to act as appropriate role models.” In evidence he amplified this by saying that such were T’s needs that carers should receive training and support both before and after placement and he felt that the demands placed on them and presented by T’s needs required some altruism on the part of carers, whether adoptive carers or foster carers, to address these particular needs.

 

9                 In addition, in my view, the evidence reveals clearly and uncontroversially that T knows her family, has a  relationship with her brothers, with her parents and with B. She has an identity that she needs to understand and preserve, and she cannot, in my judgment, simply be plucked and taken away from it. That is a need that itself must be addressed by one means or another. The Guardian says that it must be addressed by direct contact. The local authority say that letterbox contact and indirect contact, according to Mr. B, would suffice. Mr. B’s view was that indirect contact can sustain a close relationship and as close a relationship as other forms of contact may. He appears to question in fact whether there is an advantage to T in continuing a relationship with her wider family.

10              Contrary to what was first thought in the early planning in relation to both girls, there is now a consensus between all of the experts that such are their needs and their competing needs and because of their ages as well and developmental difference, they have to be addressed in separate placements.  B’s behaviour also suggested an insecure avoidant attachment to her mother. She has displayed no significant emotional or behavioural disorder but still has difficulties with self doubt and self worth. All are being addressed in her current placement and her needs are for the continuation of that development. As in T’s case, the questions of future inter-sibling contact between them and of her contact with the wider family need to be addressed carefully.

 

11              I turn to the likely effect of any change of circumstances upon the girls. T’s circumstances will change in any event. Last summer the foster carers made a commitment to long term care of B alone. They were approved accordingly. This was because B had integrated well within the family and formed stronger attachments than had T. It might conceivably have been the other way round. Were the girls returned home they would be exposed to repetition of the shortcomings of the past and to a recurrence of harm, both of which I will return to again shortly. Subject to proper matching, T is capable of making attachments, more so with females now than she was in the past. As Mr. B observed, the extent of any disruption and, therefore, the effect of any change of circumstance to her from the inevitable move will depend in part on the ability of the future carers to meet her emotional and psychological needs and on any transitional and support arrangements that are actually put in place. The making of a Placement Order and an eventual adoptive placement would sever all links between T and her family and the effect of that would be that her contact with her parents and brothers would effectively end save for conventional letterbox contact. Her contact with B would reduce dramatically. 

 

12              In terms of their age, sex, background and any relevant characteristics, T is a young child but nevertheless of an age and from a background where she is aware of her family and her position in it. She is said to be attractive, outgoing, engaging little girl who has shown considerable capacity to adapt whilst in her foster placement and ability to make herself successful in nursery and a popular member of her class. B is older; she is approaching adolescence. Consequently, she has a greater experience of her own family and in her case of having fulfilled a role as a surrogate parent towards T, a role which B herself now probably unwittingly wishes to be relieved of.

 

13              The next consideration is any harm which the children have suffered or are at risk of suffering.  The harm here was caused to these children arising from the issues which were agreed as part of the threshold in this case. It is important to recognise that the extent of the neglect of all of the children was very significant.  The home conditions and the children’s personal hygiene were extremely poor. Their education suffered because of poor or non-attendance at school.  Their day to day life was chaotic and they were deprived of the benefits of proper boundaries, proper stimulation and supervision at home. Their health was jeopardised by the failure to obtain proper treatment and to attend appointments. These failings endured for several years and they created marked levels of anxiety and unhappiness in the two children by January (year given). The effects upon B have been reduced to the residual levels of self doubt and self worth that I have referred to. In relation to T, Mr. B has concluded that she is a young child who demonstrates in her indifferent emotional behaviour towards her parents and sister that she has an insecure avoidant attachment to her mother. This is supported by T’s ability to form indiscriminate associations with strangers which is symptomatic of the kind of attachment difficulty and makes her vulnerable. She has that vulnerability still. However, he found that, despite her earlier experiences,  there were few indicators of learning difficulties, no evidence of executive functioning difficulties, nor any marked delay in reaching her developmental milestones. In fact, he said he had not seen such a normal overall profile from a young child who had suffered as she had in infancy. The evidence shows that since she has been placed in foster care, the physical shortcomings have been addressed. Both children have done well at school. Their health needs now are attended to. However, the residual problems associated with the attachment disorder remain and to different extents in B’s and T’s cases they overlay the other historical problems.

 

14              I turn to the capability of the parents in meeting the children’s needs. The parents remain unable to address all of these needs. Both were assessed by Dr. A and in his report he concluded, in relation to mother, she has a markedly heightened vulnerability to psychological problems.  She suffers from depression and general anxiety. This has  a considerable impact upon her day to day functioning and she is likely to require long treatment and will also need support from the community addiction unit to address past illicit drug use and reduce the risk of reverting to use of crack cocaine and/or amphetamine. His prognosis was very poor and he felt that during bouts of depression mother’s ability to care would be significantly reduced, that is to say she would be unlikely to be able to care, particularly if she continues to use large doses of methadone and supplement it with other substances. Father has a continuing amphetamine dependency. There is no indication that he was suffering from any mental illness such as depression or any anxiety disorder but his craving and the after-effects upon it upon his physiology, his marked tiredness and his lack of concentration means that, in Dr. A’s words, “During these periods his parenting ability will be severely compromised”. To their credit both parents recognised the reality in the course of the assessment by the independent social worker and at the commencement of the hearing, although I did not understand them to consent to orders, they accepted, as what Mr. T, counsel on their behalf described as “the reality of the situation” that the children should not be returned to them. Mrs. A said both adults are fully aware of the extent of the problem. What they lack is the knowledge, skills and ability to bring about change. The task of sustaining a family of six people, particularly with the age span, had proved to be overwhelming and, as Mrs. M observed in one of her reports, although there had been improvements in home conditions from time to time, these were not sustained. The evidence shows very clearly that, even apart from the challenges and the demands presented by J and A, a combination of these psychological problems, their continuing vulnerability, their continuing and persistent drug use and the lack of knowledge, lack of ability and lack of support, the sad reality is that the parents cannot provide even for the ordinary needs of B and T nor, therefore, for the special needs that their attachment difficulties create. 

 

15              In terms of the range of powers, the court could make no order, it could make a Supervision Order, a Care Order, a Placement Order. Those are the only practical options available to the court in relation to either child. 

 

16              In relation to T and the Placement order application I have to consider section 1(4) of the Adoption of Children Act 2002.  Where the criteria are the same then the same conclusions apply. They differ in two respects. Firstly, I have to consider the likely effect on T throughout her life of having ceased to be a member of the original family and become an adopted person. In this respect she would move from her current position of knowing and understanding who she is and who other members of her family are to a position in which all legal ties would be severed save for some measure  of indirect contact with the wider family, and different arrangements for  B.  It is likely, in my judgment and that of Mrs. M certainly, to generate feelings of isolation and rejection initially and/or in the longer term. The second consideration is the relationship that T has with relatives, and this includes the likelihood of any such relatives continuing and the value to T of them so doing, the ability of the relatives to provide a secure environment and the wishes and feelings of the relatives. The relatives here are not, as might generally be under consideration in relation to this criterion, wider family members. They are her mother and father, her brothers and her half sibling sister. She knows all of them. She has lived with her sister throughout her life. She has had contact three times per week and continuing. She knows her mother and father as mother and father and her brother as brothers. They have all, parents in particular, been committed to contact throughout and opposed to adoption. These are, in my judgment, significant relationships and constitute her heritage, and whatever the perception of the family may be and whatever their level of social desirability may or may not be, they are her family with whom she has a real identifiable relationship. It would be, in my judgment, a substantial and intrusive step to sever those relationships legally, which would be the effect of making a Placement Order.

 

17              I turn now then to the outcome. The court must approach this on the basis that there are to be separate placements. The fact of the matter is that the foster carers have committed to long term care for one child only and Mr. B said, “I think it would be wholly unrealistic for one set of carers to be given the responsibility of trying to provide the type of secure, permanent, nurturing environment that both children require and I feel if this was the chosen option neither child would have the optimal care that they require”. He is supported by Mrs. A and by the Guardian and I agree that that is the inevitable outcome of not only the situation but his assessment and view of it.

 

18              In my judgment, the case for a Placement Order is not established in relation to T for these reasons. Firstly, Mr. B’s emphasis and the foundation for his position, which is adopted by the local authority and by Mrs. A, is on permanence. Permanence, he said, should be paramount. His analysis supports the view taken last year by the local authority that permanence was more likely to be achieved through an adoptive placement and the reason advanced for that is that, because T is a child with particular difficulties, she needs carers with long term commitment.  Adoptive parents tend to provide that and are willing, as it were, to go the extra mile. That is echoed by Miss D who, in acknowledging that the profile of T’s needs probably better fits a long term foster carer, that does not, she said, mean it cannot be found within adopters. The issue is one of permanence and adoption is more likely to provide it because there is less prospect of breakdown. Mrs. A’s position had changed.  Initially, her view was that both children should be left in long term foster care. Following Mr. B’s report she accepted his view and favoured an adoptive placement. She made the qualification, however, that in relation to T’s specific case, she saw this as a very small window of opportunity and one which realistically would probably not be achieved. What she said was that the window offered permanency and an opportunity for T to know that she is significant. B knows she is. T does not. She may never know it but she should be given the chance. She said she saw this as a life outside the care system with contact with B and a life that T could enjoy whilst keeping the connection with the family and not in fact closing down the birth family.

 

19              In my assessment of their evidence – and I have read it all again in its entirety – the experts were speaking of permanence in two senses. Firstly, as Mrs. A described it, a life outside the care system and, secondly, as Mr. B actually defined it, the opportunity to develop individually in a normalised setting, free from all prior life evens. He also said if B and T were seeing the parents, it would be difficult to develop freely and that they need to develop new links and a new sense of belonging. It would be difficult to do that if they were required to live a previous existence. Permanence in that sense is taken to mean a new life, distinct, separate and apart from the old life, a clean break, a new start. That is what made it, in Mr. B’s view, preferable to long term fostering even if a stable and secure fostering placement could also be found and with contact preserved. The second sense in which the word was used was in relation to durability. The proposition is that the adopters invest more in the child and make a lifelong commitment which is likely to result in a resolution of problems as and when they arise and not in the child being abandoned or the foster carers giving up. Having carefully considered all of that evidence, which I regard as a crucial, pivotal part of the case, I find I cannot accept that the case for permanence is made out on either basis.  In the context of the inadequacies she has had to endure, the argument that T would be better off with all ties to this family severed and her being afforded a new life in a more appealing setting is readily beguiling but it is not, in my judgment, a proper test. The analysis does not address the discrete and pertinent issue of the effect upon T of severing all legal ties with and to a substantial extent all contact, with a family who, with whatever shortcomings, are the only family that she actually knows and with whom she had had regular contact throughout.  There may be many aspects of that family life that are unattractive. It does not alter the fact that this is a family with which she identifies; it is her heritage. Mr. B’s evidence was that she knows the family. The strength of the emotional relationship with mother was as strong as it was with the foster carer. This reality has to be factored in to what is a balancing exercise necessary to identify where it is that T’s welfare lies. No clear explanation is offered to support the proposition that a new life and complete departure from the old is better for her and that that is where her welfare lies.

 

20              In relation to the second sense and durability Mr. B, Mrs. A and Miss D acknowledge that it is probable in this case that the profile of the carers needed for T would more readily be found amongst experienced long term foster carers. The hallmark for the carers here is people who understand attachment difficulties, T’s inclination towards males, carers who are prepared to be let down and feel unrewarded, parents who are aware of the likelihood of regression and who would be able to cope with it.  The assertion that a prospective adopter’s commitment is likely to meet these discrete identifiable needs or more likely to meet them than a foster carer is not explained and made out to me sufficiently on this evidence. Mrs. M brings to this a wealth of experience on the ground over many years and I prefer the points that she makes that paid professionals, which is in effect what long term foster carers are, are also committed. Indeed, there is an argument to say that they are at least equally committed having chosen the long term foster caring route for whatever reason. Indeed, they are also more likely, because of training and experience, to be able to fulfil these needs. Becoming a long term foster carer involves a decision and, therefore, a commitment. Furthermore, a foster placement would be buttressed by support. In this instance so too would an adoptive placement for a period of three years by this authority, but inevitably that would be dependent upon the extent to which the adoptive parents themselves were willing and prepared to engage in it. The degree of involvement, the availability of review and of control would necessarily not be the same. Mr. B emphasised that the prime importance here lies in fact with the match, by which I took him to mean that matching T to the right people was the first and prime significant factor, more significant, therefore, than the issue of the structure of the regime. T has particular needs and getting that match right is imperative. If that is done not only is it more likely to be achieved amongst prospective foster carers, as everyone acknowledges, but getting it right enhances the prospect of durability, it diminishes the point relied upon in respect of commitment and implications for T.  The second reason is this that, in considering the effects upon T of ceasing to be a member of her family, Mr. B questioned the degree of attachment within the family. He based that, as he himself acknowledged, on one observation and a number of psychometric tests.  The tests in fact suggest a strong relationship in terms of responses but was contradicted, he felt, by that single period of observation when he saw what he felt was an indifferent interaction and an ambivalence in the relationship between the sisters. Mrs. M’s assessment of it  follows her much more extensive relationship with this family and T. Her assessment is different. She acknowledges that the sisters are not particularly close, but I suspect within what she said is a question of whether that is surprising to any extent or unusual. In this particular context T is seen, understandably in the context of the history, as something of an irritant younger child by B, but they know who they are, they have lived together.  The variable reactions within the wider family are acknowledged too but, again, they know each other and Mrs. M has overheard T not necessarily covertly but privately saying to her mother, “I love you, Mum”. Mum is “Mum”, foster carer is “Nan”.

 

21              Mr. B accepts that there are limitations arising out of the short time that he has actually observed the family interactions. I do not accept that these relationships can or should be lightly disregarded. Even if there is an ambivalence between a (x) year old and a (y) year old girl, in the wake of their experiences and in this context at this stage of life, the value to them of a lifelong sibling relationship and the issue of the deprivation of it now are quite another matter. 

 

22              The third reason is that Mr. B suggests that what residual needs there are can properly be addressed by indirect contact between B and T. He gave a personal example of how in his experience a sustainable relationship and a meaningful relationship can be preserved by indirect contact.  I am not sure that the experience we can all bring to this of long distance and highly meaningful and loving relationships, for example between grandparents and grandchildren, can be replicated in the case of young siblings, who have always been together, being separated permanently. The needs are not the same. The context is not the same. The effect on T has to be considered in the position of having been taken from one situation and placed in a new family, anxious to integrate her and, in all probability, anxious to enforce that integration by reinforcing the severance. Letterbox contact with the wider family is likely in practice to offer no meaningful continuing link with her birth family. Indirect contact with B would at best amount to a very substantial interference with the half sibling relationship between them. I am not persuaded, in short, that there is a proper analysis here consisting of an appreciation of the needs arising out of this proposed severance on the one hand and the way in which this suggested regime of letterbox and other indirect, possibly occasional indirect, contact can address it. 

 

23              The fourth reason is that there is, in my view, a lacuna in this evidence. On the one hand, Mr. B recognises T’s vulnerability in losing a family. He identifies potential risks to her as follows. Severing ties could be emotionally damaging and create a risk that she does not make secondary attachments. It could create a resistance to authority. It could cause problems at school and with peer relationships. It may generate feelings of isolation and rejection as she perceives herself as the only excluded member of the family but, on the other hand, there is no explanation offered as to how these risks in reality are going to be addressed, nor is there any analysis of why these risks would be justified risks to take, save to the extent that he says it would offer permanence. The risk is that it is all too easy, in my judgment, to say that T will have a better life with another family and to disregard this consideration in pursuit of it. It is the effect upon T that matters of having all ties severed, however socially desirable or preferable an alternative family might appear to be and, whilst I have evidence before me of what could go wrong by the severance, there is neither evidence of how it is to be addressed, nor is there evidence which, in my judgment, is a sufficient basis for the court saying that, whilst it acknowledges those risks it can put them to one side because such are the benefits of going in a different direction they do not redress a balance.

 

24              The fifth reason is that there is little to choose and little in and between the respective arguments about breakdown of the placement should things go wrong. If either regime broke down the consequences would, in everybody’s word, be devastating. On the one hand a breakdown of an adoption placement could leave T adrift and deprived of any family at all. The breakdown of a long term foster care placement could expose her to being retained within the care system and moved between successive placements. In my judgment, the point is that the match and getting that right in the first place is the priority. The question is not where the greater harm lies in the event of breakdown, it is which regime is consistent with the paramouncy of her welfare, and I do not find that the awful consequences of a breakdown in a foster placement is itself an argument in favour of an adoptive placement;  I see no force at all in that.

 

25              The sixth point is that there are a number of practical implications of the court making a Placement Order which are either unresolved or are now demonstrably unsatisfactory. The plan is that she should be placed and adopters identified over a period of six months. It has to be acknowledged, on the basis of the evidence before the court, that there is a very pessimistic assessment of the likelihood of that happening anyway. We start from day one with what Mrs. A said were very slim prospect, what Miss D herself described as a very difficult proposition and which the Guardian, I think, regarded as more or less impossible.  That is something which in practical terms has to be factored in to T’s immediate needs and her life over that period. There are further practical considerations in relation to prospective adopters in terms of their being trained before as well as after placement. If it fails a review will be undertaken by the Adoption Panel at six months. If it is clear that it is unlikely to succeed then at a point probably around five months in to the process there will be a simultaneous reference to the Permanency Panel. Mrs. A’s view is that there should be concurrent planning in both those respects now, probably because of her pessimism over finding an adoptive placement anyway. But factoring in the training and the general practicalities, all of this could easily take a year and it could easily exceed that, and the current plan does leave at large issues about how T’s needs are to be addressed should that happen. It is a distinct possibility. There is a need for a mechanism and procedure for addressing a level of delay which, if it materialised, would be regarded by everyone with great concern. A child and her care would be outside the court system unless and until adoptive parents made an application to discharge the placement order. She would be exposed to complex issues as well over the management of her own feelings throughout this, about selection and rejection and isolation. So there are immediate and longer term implications for her arising out of the inherent difficulties that there are going to be in seeking out an adoptive placement and the time it will save.

 

26              Seventhly and finally, there is a discrete practical issue, in my judgment, about the management of contact between B and T. Contact is a concrete requirement, by which I took Mrs. A to mean set in stone, and achievable by what Mr. B called extremely good indirect contact, which he said was just as valuable, although he did not define it in detail. The need to facilitate it is a particular challenge in these circumstances when T knows so much as she does. It creates what witnesses regarded as an almost inevitable risk of de-stabilisation through attempts to communicate by any means whatever at their disposal in, what, a year or two years’ time.

 

27              I summarise these conclusions in this way. T is a child with a knowledge of her background, her family and heritage. The proposed severance of the links with her family, which are statutory considerations, is a pivotal aspect of this case. There are recognised significant implications for her in doing so. It is at least equally possible and, in my judgment, probable that a suitable match can be made with long term foster carers as with adopters. In that event the links with the family need not be severed. It is likely that T can achieve the integration and attachment she needs within a foster placement. The matching process is key. If the emphasis is placed upon making the right match a long term foster placement is unlikely to be less durable than an adoptive placement. There is a balance to be struck and that which offers her the opportunity to achieve what B has and preserve her links with her own family, protect her from the adverse consequences of not preserving them is more inconsistent with her welfare needs than is the alternative.  These needs are fewer and more narrowly confined than might have been expected having regard to what she has been through. Conversely, the perceived benefits of permanence in the sense of a new life does not, in my judgment, give sufficient regard to T’s needs arising from her history and awareness of her identity. It is sceptical, in my judgment, merely to question whether a continuing relationship with her family has any ongoing advantage for her, particularly when there has been the commitment there has here to contact and particularly when there is not anything in the evidence which suggests any detriment to her arising from that contact. In my view, nothing less than a Care Order would be appropriate and commensurate with the welfare of both children. Supervision Orders would not suffice in the context of this history. There are no other kinship carers. The local authority needs parental responsibility to ensure adequate care, and Care Orders in the cases of T and B would be the least interventionist and proportionate and a justifiable interference with their lives and with the Article 8 rights of both the children and the family.  In my judgment, a Placement Order would be a disproportionate response and an unjustifiable interference with those Article 8 rights. I am unable to approve the care plan currently in relation to T because it is premised largely on a Placement Order being made. It requires further consideration in relation to the sibling contact between B and T and there is a need as well in both instances for further definition and consideration in relation to the contact with the wider family.  The proposal of it being six times a year is, in my judgment, a realistic and justifiable proposal based upon the proposition that it will of course be subject to review.  I would invite further consideration in that respect.

 

28              I say finally that the outcome, like the conclusions, is far from perfect, far from certain, but essentially the basis for my reaching the conclusions I have is that a balance has to be struck for T between cutting her off completely from the family and her heritage, which she knows, and preserving it and, in my judgment, the evidence puts the balance in the direction I have indicated.

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Part 2 (conclusion)

 

1                 So you are all in agreement that the court can now make a Care Order in respect of T on the basis of the current care plan.  I am going to do so and I am not going to re-visit all of the issues addressed in my Judgment last time because I covered everything other than the prospective matters which have now been addressed in the care plan. The care plan currently reflects the terms of the Judgment and for all of the reasons I gave then a Care Order is appropriate in respect of T, it is necessary, it is a proportionate response and it is in pursuit of a legitimate aim, and I approve the care plan in its current form.

 

2                 So the order today will be that a Care Order is made then in respect of T.  J and A of course have been dealt with historically and B I dealt with at the last hearing. 

 

3                 There will be no order as to costs between the parties and I make a direction that the costs of any assisted party be assessed for community legal services funding purposes.