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England and Wales Court of Appeal (Criminal Division) Decisions


You are here: BAILII >> Databases >> England and Wales Court of Appeal (Criminal Division) Decisions >> Bennis, R. v [2025] EWCA Crim 538 (10 April 2025)
URL: http://www.bailii.org/ew/cases/EWCA/Crim/2025/538.html
Cite as: [2025] EWCA Crim 538

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Neutral Citation Number: [2025] EWCA Crim 538
Case No 2024/00439/A3

IN THE COURT OF APPEAL
CRIMINAL DIVISION
ON APPEAL FROM THE CENTRAL CRIMINAL COURT
(HIS HONOUR JUDGE LICKLEY KC)
[T20227287]

Royal Courts of Justice
The Strand
London
WC2A 2LL
Ay 10 April 2025

B e f o r e :

THE LADY CARR OF WALTON-ON-THE-HILL
LADY CHIEF JUSTICE OF ENGLAND AND WALES
MR JUSTICE GOOSE
and
MR JUSTICE CHOUDHURY

____________________

R E X
- v -
HANNA BENNIS

____________________

Computer Aided Transcript of Epiq Europe Ltd,
Lower Ground, 46 Chancery Lane, London WC2A 1JE
Tel No: 020 7404 1400; Email: rcj@epiqglobal.co.uk
(Official Shorthand Writers to the Court)

____________________

Mr J Dein KC and Miss K A Rowan appeared on behalf of the Applicant
____________________

HTML VERSION OF APPROVED JUDGMENT
____________________

Crown Copyright ©

    This judgment was handed down ex tempore on Thursday 10 April 2025 in Court 4.

    The Lady Carr of Walton-on-the-Hill, CJ :

    Introduction

  1. This is a renewed application for leave to appeal against sentence following refusal by the single judge.
  2. On 16 January 2023, in the Central Criminal Court, the applicant pleaded guilty to manslaughter by reason of diminished responsibility of her mother, Aziza Bennis, on 15 August 2022. The applicant was aged 21 at the time of the offence, and the deceased 58.
  3. On 18 January 2024, the applicant was sentenced by His Honour Judge Nigel Lickley KC to an extended determinate sentence, pursuant to section 279 of the Sentencing Act 2020, comprising a custodial term of nine years and an extended licence period of five.
  4. The offence was committed against a complex background, including a significant history of a physically and emotionally abusive relationship between mother and daughter. In addition, the applicant at the time had undiagnosed mental disorders of complex post-traumatic stress disorder ("CPTSD") and alcohol use disorder. There was also evidence of drug misuse.
  5. We express at the outset our gratitude for the submissions, both written and oral, from Mr Dein KC and Miss Rowan, both of whom appeared on behalf of the applicant below at trial, and who have appeared in front of us today pro bono. We are also grateful for the written submissions on behalf of the prosecution.
  6. The Facts in Summary

  7. During the day of 15 August 2022, the applicant and the deceased exchanged abusive text messages. At one stage the applicant said that the deceased should "burn in hell" for what the deceased had done to her. Both were drinking alcohol. Despite her partner's offer to join her, the applicant went to the deceased's home alone with a view to seeking assistance from the deceased for the applicant's childcare arrangements.
  8. At around 3.40 pm an emergency call was made to the police as a result of screaming and swearing being heard coming from the deceased's flat and objects apparently being thrown about the premises. The applicant and her mother had earlier been seen arguing outside the flat.
  9. The police arrived ten minutes later. They could not immediately gain entry. The applicant declined to open the door and was screaming and shouting. A neighbour who knew the applicant tried to reason with her, but the applicant told the police to leave her alone. She was heard to say, "I've killed my mother". The police continued to knock at the door. The applicant could be heard saying, "My own mum tried to kill me".
  10. The police were able to enter the address just after 4 pm. There was blood on the hall wall and in the kitchen. There was a broken glass on the living room floor and a bloodstained knife on a coffee table. The deceased was opposite the front room door, on the floor, covered in blood, and lying in a foetal position. She was alive, but very badly injured, with at least 57 stab wounds and incised wounds to the head, face, arms and right thigh, consistent with having been caused by a knife. Many of the wounds were consistent with defence wounds. The applicant was found near to her mother, slumped on the floor. She appeared to be injured, particularly on the forehead, with a deep cut above her left eye and a puncture wound to her right thigh.
  11. The deceased was pronounced dead at 4.23 pm. The cause of death was stab wounds to the right thigh, which caused damage to the femoral artery and vein, resulting in fatal haemorrhage. The wounds would have required at least a moderate degree of force to inflict. One of the stab wounds to the left shoulder resulted in cleavage through part of the shoulder blade and would have required severe force.
  12. The applicant explained that she had come to see her mother to talk about the applicant's daughter. At the scene and later she told the police that she had stabbed her mother because her mother had attacked her whilst holding a knife and a glass. That version of events was accepted by the prosecution. She said that she was sorry that she had killed her mother and that they had both been drinking.
  13. During a later mental health assessment, the applicant said that she had been defending her father. She did not touch her mother. It was when the mother came to the window, that was when the mother tried to stab the applicant's head. Her mother had been talking "bad" about her father. She did not remember what had happened. The mother had used a knife on her and she had then pushed the knife back on her mother.
  14. In due course the applicant provided a prepared statement in which she stated that she had been acting in self-defence.
  15. The investigation into the incident revealed that, prior to the offending, the applicant had been living a chaotic lifestyle. She had stopped her studies and was in debt. She had not complied with a previous rehabilitation activity requirement and had not kept up her appointments with the Probation Service. She had also relinquished the care of her daughter to her sister. The applicant and her sister had had a very troubled relationship from a young age with the deceased. The deceased was an alcoholic who had been violent towards her children. Social Service files revealed that the deceased had not been able to provide a stable life for either child. Excessive drinking by the deceased was a feature of Social Services' involvement. Reports from independent sources described the deceased as frequently violent, unpredictable and unstable. The applicant's sister described how they were regularly abused, verbally and physically by the deceased. The overall picture was of a toxic relationship with the deceased, where violence was commonplace.
  16. There was also evidence that the applicant was disruptive, aggressive and rebellious against authority. She drank to excess, took drugs and often went missing. Psychiatric evidence, as we have indicated, identified that this behaviour was largely as a result of the abuse by the deceased. The applicant had undiagnosed mental disorders of CPTSD and alcohol use disorder. Psychological evidence also showed symptoms of severe anxiety and severe depression.
  17. The applicant had three convictions for six offences, spanning between 2017 and 2021. In 2017 she was sentenced to a referral order for common assault. The same year she was sentenced to a referral order for possession of a bladed article, sending a threatening communication, common assault and criminal damage. In October 2021, she was sentenced to a 12 month community order for assault of an emergency worker.
  18. The Sentence Below

  19. In comprehensive sentencing remarks, the judge carefully summarised the facts, the contents of the pre-sentence report, and the expert psychiatric and psychological evidence. Both experts agreed that the applicant's ability to exercise self-control was substantially impaired as a result of CPTSD. They disagreed as to whether her ability to make a rational judgment was substantially impaired. They agreed that her ability to understand the nature of her conduct was not substantially impaired.
  20. The judge concluded that the applicant's ability to make a rational judgment was impaired, but only to a limited degree. The main driver of the offending, however, was the substantial impairment of the applicant's ability to exercise self-control. Having considered the competing arguments, the judge assessed the level of the applicant's retained responsibility as medium for the following reasons. Her condition was undiagnosed and she was not in a position to understand how the condition of CPTSD would cause her to act on the day in question. In the moment of killing a number of things aligned: violence from the deceased, the history of abuse and trauma, issues concerning her daughter and the fact that she was unwell. However, her behaviour, said the judge, was not caused solely by her CPTSD; nor did the CPTSD wholly explain it. The consumption of a considerable amount of alcohol had exacerbated the condition. She was angry. She made a very poor choice to go and visit her mother that day. Her previous violence towards a police officer in 2021 should have been a warning to her. The judge rejected the defence's suggestion that she had not intended to kill, given the ferocity of the attack.
  21. This gave the judge a starting point of 15 years, with a range of ten to 25 years' custody. The judge identified the following aggravating features: the use of a weapon; the sustained nature of the attack; the attack took place in the deceased's home; neighbours were disturbed; and the applicant was under court supervision at the time.
  22. By way of mitigation, the judge referred to: the lack of premeditation; the applicant's youth; her difficult and troubled upbringing; and her remorse. He noted her progress in custody and supportive letters from her family.
  23. He concluded that the applicant was dangerous, but that the offending was not so serious that a life sentence was required. He identified a custodial term of 13½ years after trial. After credit of one third discount for the applicant's guilty plea, the resulting custodial term was one of nine years. He then went on to consider that it was necessary for him to impose an extended licence period of five years for the purpose of public protection.
  24. The Grounds of Application

  25. Mr Dein and Miss Rowan acknowledge at the outset the meticulous approach of the judge. However, in summary, their submission is that the truly horrific nature of the background to this offending was not adequately reflected in the judge's ultimate sentence. Justice, it is suggested, was not done. There were acts of abuse of the applicant throughout her life by the mother. There is reference to the 22 page statement of support from the applicant's sister concerning a series of horrific events. It is said that the reality of the cause for the applicant's offending was what had been done to her during her lifetime by the mother. It was lifelong abuse which had resulted in the applicant losing control on the day.
  26. The central suggestion is that insufficient weight was given to the applicant's personal mitigation and the background to her offending. It is said that the high degree of provocation from the deceased was not properly reflected and that there should have been reference, at least by way of calibration, to the Sentencing Council Guideline for Manslaughter by reason of Loss of Control. It is suggested further that the judge was wrong to determine by way of aggravation that this was a sustained attack.
  27. As for the level of retained responsibility identified, it is submitted that the judge placed the level of retained responsibility in the wrong category; it should have been placed in the lower category. The applicant was unaware of her CPTSD condition; nor was there any evidence of the applicant ever refusing any offer of treatment. Further, the applicant's previous conviction from 2021 should not have been treated as relevant to the question of residual culpability.
  28. In addition, it is suggested that the period of the extended licence was too long, largely for the same reasons.
  29. By way of summary and conclusion, Mr Dein and Miss Rowan submit that this is a case which required the court to stand back from the detail and to ask itself whether, in the light of the truly appalling background circumstances, there should have been a departure from a strict analysis of the Sentencing Council Guidelines, reaching at the end of the day a sentence of custody in the first instance "materially less" than nine years.
  30. Analysis

  31. There is rightly no suggestion that the judge made any error of principle. He faithfully applied the relevant legislative framework and followed the relevant Sentencing Council Guidelines. As indicated, the proposed grounds of appeal against sentence concentrate on the length of the custodial term and the period of the extended licence.
  32. The single judge considered these grounds and concluded that there is no arguable merit within them. We have come to the same conclusion.
  33. The agreed psychiatric evidence of substantial impairment of the ability to exercise self-control addressed the question of whether the partial defence of manslaughter within section 2(1) of the Homicide Act 1957 was available. It did not address the level of retained responsibility, which remained a matter for the judge to assess.
  34. As for the suggestion that the judge was wrong to conclude that the level of retained responsibility was in the medium category, as set out above, it is submitted that the applicant's CPTSD substantially impaired the applicant's ability to exercise self-control. It is argued that the fact that there was disagreement as to whether or not the ability to form a rational judgment was also substantially impaired was important and should have caused the judge to find the level of retained responsibility to be low.
  35. However, the very fact that this was a plea to the lesser offence of manslaughter by reason of diminished responsibility already acknowledges and allows for a substantial impairment of ability to exercise self-control. It follows that the level of retained responsibility assessment required by the Sentencing Council Guideline fell to be assessed in this context. The judge identified a number of factors relevant to his assessment that the level of retained responsibility was medium and which, in our judgment, afforded a wholly reasonable basis for that conclusion. He took on board that the applicant's condition of CPTSD was undiagnosed, such that she was not in a position to understand how her condition might cause her to act so violently. But he was also entitled to point to the consumption of a considerable amount of alcohol, which exacerbated her condition. As he commented, on her own account, alcohol heightened her fight or flight responses; she was obviously angry with the deceased in the lead up to the killing; and she made an obviously poor choice to go alone to the deceased's flat. Further, she had some self-awareness of acting violently, as she had done in 2021 when assaulting a police officer by punching and biting the officer.
  36. We are not persuaded that there was any arguable error in the judge's evaluative assessment of retained responsibility.
  37. Further, we see no arguable merit in the further submission that the judge should have taken into account the Sentencing Council Guideline for manslaughter by reason of loss of control, by way of calibration or otherwise. The applicant had pleaded guilty on the basis of diminished responsibility, and the judge correctly used the appropriate guideline. The custodial term of 13½ years, before credit for guilty plea, was plainly towards the lower end of the relevant sentencing range.
  38. The applicant seeks to argue two related points:
  39. (1) That the sustained nature of the attack with 57 knife wounds was irrelevant; it was a product of her substantial impairment in self-control and so should not have been treated as an aggravating factor of seriousness; and

    (2) That it should not be evidence of an intention to kill.

  40. There is no arguable merit in either of these points. The extent of the injuries or harm caused was obviously relevant to the assessment of the seriousness of the offence. Whilst the applicant's CPTSD was relevant in mitigation, the conclusion was not binary; it was neither relevant nor irrelevant. Rather, the judge was required to assess all of the circumstances to reach a reasoned conclusion. He properly weighed up relevant aggravating and mitigating factors. There is no doubt in our minds, having re-read the sentencing remarks, that he had the full history and the background of the applicant well in mind. We find, therefore, no merit in the ground which challenge the length of the custodial term.
  41. Likewise, we are unpersuaded of any arguable merit in the submission that the extended licence period of five years was excessive. The judge was required to assess, at the date of sentencing, for how long the applicant would remain dangerous and how long any extended licence would be necessary. The evidence was that, if the applicant addressed her underlying issues, the risk that she posed would be mitigated. But it was not known at the time – nor is it known now – whether the applicant will be successful in reducing the high level of risk which it is accepted she posed at the time of sentencing.
  42. In short, the extended licence of five years was a period properly open to the judge and not arguably wrong.
  43. Conclusion

  44. In conclusion, we are not persuaded that the applicant's proposed grounds of appeal have arguable merit such that we should grant leave to appeal.
  45. Accordingly, we refuse this renewed application. We would express again our gratitude to both counsel for appearing pro bono and saying everything that possibly could be said on behalf of the applicant.

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