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England and Wales Court of Appeal (Criminal Division) Decisions


You are here: BAILII >> Databases >> England and Wales Court of Appeal (Criminal Division) Decisions >> Thomason, R. v [2025] EWCA Crim 484 (26 March 2025)
URL: http://www.bailii.org/ew/cases/EWCA/Crim/2025/484.html
Cite as: [2025] EWCA Crim 484

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Neutral Citation Number: [2025] EWCA Crim 484
CASE NO 202401377/A3

IN THE COURT OF APPEAL
CRIMINAL DIVISION
ON APPEAL FROM THE CROWN COURT AT PRESTON
MR RECORDER JONES KC
CP No: 04ZL2836523

Royal Courts of Justice
Strand
London
WC2A 2LL
26 March 2025

B e f o r e :

LORD JUSTICE WILLIAM DAVIS
MR JUSTICE LAVENDER
MR JUSTICE DEXTER DIAS

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REX
- v -
DALE THOMASON

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Computer Aided Transcript of Epiq Europe Ltd,
Lower Ground Floor, 46 Chancery Lane, London, WC2A 1JE
Tel No: 020 7404 1400; Email: rcj@epiqglobal.co.uk
(Official Shorthand Writers to the Court)

____________________

MR P HILDEN appeared on behalf of the Appellant
MISS R OAKDENE appeared on behalf of the Crown

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HTML VERSION OF JUDGMENT A P P R O V E D
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Crown Copyright ©

    MR JUSTICE LAVENDER:

  1. The appellant appeals with leave granted by the single judge against the sentence of eight years and four months' imprisonment imposed on him on 15 March 2024 by Mr Recorder Jones KC in the Crown Court at Preston for five offences to which he pleaded guilty in the same court on 1 February 2024. Those offences were as follows: count 1, burglary, for which the sentence was two years and four months' imprisonment; count 2, burglary, for which the consecutive sentence was four years' imprisonment; count 3, common assault, for which the concurrent sentence was two months' imprisonment; count 4, threatening with an offensive weapon in a private place, contrary to section 2(1) of the Offensive Weapons Act 2019, for which the consecutive sentence was two years' imprisonment; and count 5, burglary, for which the concurrent sentence was two years and four months' imprisonment.
  2. On 19 August 2023 the appellant entered the home at [redacted] of Hassib Wahid and stole a pair of Louis Vuitton shoes worth around £1,000, a mobile telephone, a watch and a safe containing the victim's wedding ring and various other jewellery. That was count 1.
  3. On 21 August 2023 the appellant entered the home at [redacted] of Miss Miriam Valdez, who was in the house alone. She confronted the appellant and shouted at him to get out, which he ignored. He tried, but failed, to unscrew the television from the wall. He took her purse and used her bank card for purchases totalling £39.15. That was count 2.
  4. Later on 21 August 2023 the appellant banged on the door and rang the doorbell of [redacted], the home of Carla Naylor, whose carer, Leon Lloyd-Hartley, opened the door. The appellant barged him out of the way. That was count 3. The appellant sat down and asked for drugs. Emma Stother was also in the house. She attempted to escort the appellant from the premises, but the appellant produced a kitchen knife and threatened her with it, saying: "I could shiv you right now." As he left, he said that he would return "with some boys and some guns". That was count 4.
  5. Still later on the same day the appellant entered [redacted], the home of Mr and Mrs Slater, and stole two laptops, a bicycle valued at £350, 1,000 euros, jewellery worth around £2,500 and items of sentimental value. That was count 5.
  6. The appellant admitted the burglaries in interview on 22 August 2023 and on the following day in Preston Magistrates' Court he indicated guilty pleas to the burglary charges, but not guilty pleas to the other charges.
  7. However, the appellant refused to attend his pre-trial preparation hearing on 20 September 2023. HHJ Knowles KC said that he would write to the appellant, saying that if he did not indicate guilty pleas within the next two weeks he would lose his credit for plea. In the event, however, what was given to the appellant was a notice in standard form warning him of the potential consequences of not attending his trial.
  8. The appellant's solicitors wrote to the court on 27 September 2023 confirming that the appellant intended to plead guilty to the burglary counts and explaining that he feared that, if he attended Preston Crown Court, he would be transferred to HMP Preston, where he would be in fear of physical retribution.
  9. However, HHJ Knowles KC refused their application for permission for the appellant to appear at the next hearing by video, noting that it was based on mere assertion.
  10. On 23 November 2023 the appellant's solicitors indicated by way of a comment on the Digital Case System that it was the appellant's intention to plead guilty to each count on the indictment when he next appeared before the court. However, the appellant refused to attend the pre-trial review on 14 December 2023. He attended by video for the hearing on 1 February 2024, which was when he entered his guilty pleas. This was only 13 days before the date fixed for trial, for which all witnesses were warned.
  11. The appellant was 29 when he was sentenced and is now 30. He had been convicted of 68 offences committed between 2006 (when he was 12) and 2021, most, but by no means all, of which were committed when he was a youth. He had been convicted of 16 offences of burglary, including 14 offences of domestic burglary, with a total of 19 other offences taken into consideration, and two offences of attempted burglary. He had been sentenced to 876 days' imprisonment for one offence of burglary committed in 2020, with associated offences. He had also been convicted of robbery committed in 2016 and assault occasioning actual bodily harm committed in 2020.
  12. There was no pre-sentence report. We agree that none was necessary.
  13. There were victim personal statements from Mrs Slater and Miriam Valdez. Mrs Slater said that she and her husband were anxious about leaving the house or even sitting alone in certain parts of the house and that they feared for the safety of their foster children. Miss Valdez spoke of how scared she was when she encountered the appellant and her fear of what he might do to her.
  14. The Crown submitted that the burglary offences each fell within category 1A in the offence-specific sentencing guideline, with a starting point of three years' imprisonment and a range from two to six years. It was not disputed that section 314 of the Sentencing Act 2020 applied to all three of the burglary offences and that the recorder was obliged to impose a custodial sentence for a term of at least three years, subject to the appropriate reduction for the appellant's guilty pleas.
  15. The Crown further submitted that the common assault fell within category 3B in the offence-specific sentencing guideline, with a starting point of a financial penalty.
  16. There was no sentencing guideline for count 4, but the Crown invited the recorder to have regard to the sentencing guideline for the offence of threatening with an article with a blade or a point in a public place. The Crown submitted that the appellant's offence would fall within category 1A in that guideline, with a starting point of two years' imprisonment and a range from one year and six months to three years. The recorder noted that there was no dispute as to the categorisation of the offences.
  17. In his sentencing remarks the recorder recognised the totality principle. As to the structure of his sentence, he said that consecutive sentences were appropriate given that there were four separate incidents with separate victims. The recorder said that the appellant's previous convictions were aggravating factors, including his previous offences of violence. The recorder noted the mitigating factors advanced on the appellant's behalf, namely that he had taken steps to free himself of drugs while in prison and that he intended to conduct himself in a decent and law-abiding manner upon his release. Although the recorder did not expressly mention this factor, it appears that the appellant's mental health issues were also advanced as a mitigating factor.
  18. The recorder noted the rival submissions on the subject of the appropriate reduction in sentence to be made for the appellant's guilty pleas, having regard to the procedural history of this case. He decided to apply a reduction of 20 per cent for each count. On count 1 the recorder said that he would impose a sentence of three years less 20 per cent. He said that 20 per cent of three years was about 7.2 months, which he rounded up to eight months, making a sentence of two years and four months. He did the same on count 5.
  19. The recorder considered count 2 to be aggravated by the presence of Miss Valdez and by the appellant ignoring Miss Valdez's pleas for him to leave. The recorder's sentence of four years' imprisonment for this offence represented a 20 per cent reduction from five years. The recorder imposed a short concurrent sentence of imprisonment on count 3 because he could not impose a different type of sentence. The recorder said that count 4 was aggravated by the threats made by the appellant as he was leaving the scene and that the sentence after trial would have been two years and six months, which he reduced to two years by reason of the appellant's guilty plea.
  20. The grounds of appeal are that the recorder gave insufficient credit for the appellant's guilty pleas and that he gave insufficient credit for the appellant's mitigation, for the circumstances of the offences and for the principle of totality.
  21. We note that the sentences imposed were equivalent to a total sentence of 10 years and six months' imprisonment before the reductions for the appellant's guilty pleas, i.e. three years on count 1, five years on count 2 and two years and six months on count 4. The principal issue on this appeal is whether that total was manifestly excessive, having regard to the totality principle. The recorder gave effect to the totality principle by making the sentences on counts 3 and 5 concurrent. The question is whether that was sufficient to ensure that, in the words of the guideline on totality, the total sentence reflected all of the offending behaviour with reference to overall harm and culpability, together with the aggravating and mitigating factors relating to the offences and those personal to the offender, and was just and proportionate.
  22. We consider that in order to answer that question it is appropriate to consider the individual offences, especially the burglaries. The Crown submitted that each of the burglaries fell within category 1A in the sentencing guideline, but in fact none of the high culpability factors in that guideline (i.e. targeting of vulnerable victim, a significant degree of planning or organisation, or knife or other weapon carried) were present. There was a category 1 harm factor in each case i.e. persons on premises or theft of/damage to property causing a substantial degree of loss to the victim, so each offence fell into category 1B, with a starting point of two years' imprisonment and a range from one to four years.
  23. It is to be noted that the recorder treated Miss Valdez's presence in her home as an aggravating factor, but it was in fact the only category 1 harm factor in her case and the recorder had to avoid double-counting.
  24. The mitigating factors were of no consequence. There was no medical evidence in respect of the appellant's mental health issues and, his stated intention to address his drug taking and to mend his ways had to be seen against the background of his lifetime of crime.
  25. The appellant's previous convictions were a very significant aggravating factor in respect of each of the offences, although it is relevant to note that the majority of the appellant's offences of burglary were committed when he was a child and that the longest sentence which he had served had been 876 days. In addition, the recorder had to guard against double-counting if he increased each sentence by reason of this aggravating factor.
  26. The statutory minimum sentences of three years' imprisonment on count 1 already included an uplift of one year from the starting point under the guideline of two years by reason of the appellant's previous convictions for burglary. We do not suggest that that reflects the entire aggravating effect of the appellant's previous convictions, but it is a factor to be taken into account.
  27. We do not consider that count 2 merited a sentence of five years' imprisonment before the reduction for the appellant's guilty plea. As we have said, the starting point for that offence was two years' imprisonment and this includes taking account of Miss Valdez's presence in her home as a harm factor. Had the recorder been sentencing the appellant for this offence alone, then a sentence at the top of the range (i.e. four years) would not have been manifestly excessive, given the appellant's previous convictions. But the principle of totality requires some reduction from that figure because the sentence for this offence was consecutive to a statutory minimum sentence which already took account to some extent of the appellant's previous convictions.
  28. We consider that no objection can be taken either to the length of the sentence on count 4 or to the fact that it was consecutive. This offence was different in kind from the burglaries and it represented an escalation in the appellant's offending. We also consider that it was right to make the sentence on count 5 concurrent in the interests of totality.
  29. Accordingly, we consider that the total sentence before the reduction for the guilty pleas was manifestly excessive and should have been nine years, i.e. three years on count 1, three years and six months on count 2 and two years and six months on count 4.
  30. We turn now to the appropriate reductions in these sentences for the appellant's guilty pleas. We can see no objection to the reduction of 20 per cent or one-fifth in the sentence on count 4, since the appellant did not indicate his intention to plead guilty to that count until after the plea and trial preparation hearing.
  31. In relation to count 1 and count 5 the recorder fell into error by rounding up the reduction which he made for the appellant's guilty plea. Section 73(3) of the Sentencing Act 2020 provides that "the mandatory sentence requirement does not prevent the court, after taking into account any matter referred to in subsection (2), from imposing any sentence which is not less than 80 per cent of the sentence which would otherwise be required by that requirement."
  32. Expressed in months, 80 per cent of three years is 28.8 months. That is why sentencers imposing the statutory minimum sentence with the maximum permitted reduction for a guilty plea often express the sentence as 876 days. By imposing a sentence of 28 months (or two years and four months), the recorder imposed a sentence which was shorter by about 22 days than was permitted by section 314. We propose to substitute a sentence of two years and 146 days.
  33. In relation to count 2, the recorder applied a reduction of 20 per cent, but the appellant had indicated a guilty plea in the Magistrates' Court and therefore the appropriate reduction was one-third, subject to the limit imposed by sections 73(3) and 314. The circumstances of this case do not fall within any of the exceptions to that general rule set out in section F of the guideline on Reduction in sentence for a guilty plea. However, if we were to reduce the sentence of three years and six months which we consider appropriate for count 2 by one-third, that would take the sentence below the minimum permitted by section 73(3) and section 314. Accordingly, we propose to substitute a sentence of two years and 146 days.
  34. For these reasons we quash the sentence imposed on counts 1, 2 and 5 and substitute instead a sentence of two years and 146 days' imprisonment (reduced from three years) on count 1, a consecutive sentence of two years and 146 days' imprisonment (reduced from three years and six months) on count 2 and a concurrent sentence of two years and 146 days' imprisonment (reduced from three years) on count 5. The concurrent sentence on count 3 and the consecutive sentence on count 4 remain unchanged. The total sentence is now six years and 292 days.

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