ON APPEAL FROM THE CROWN COURT AT NEWCASTLE-UPON-TYNE
LAVENDER J
T20197125
Strand, London, WC2A 2LL |
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B e f o r e :
MR JUSTICE SPENCER
and
SIR DAVID FOSKETT
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REFERENCE BY THE ATTORNEY GENERAL UNDER S.36 CRIMINAL JUSTICE ACT 1988 THE ATTORNEY GENERAL |
Appellant |
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- and - |
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ALLY GORDON |
Respondent |
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Mr Andrew Fisher QC for the Respondent
Hearing date: Wednesday 12th February 2020
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Crown Copyright ©
THIRLWALL LJ:
FACTS
Sentencing Exercise
i) whether Gordon was aware that Barrass had a knife; andii) whether he was aware that Barrass had used the knife.
They submitted that the judge should find on the evidence that the answer to both questions was yes. In the absence of any direct evidence to that effect the prosecution submitted that an inference could be drawn from the fact that the respondent had gone up the alley after Barrass had done so. He must have been there when Barrass was using the knife in that part of the incident. The fact that the respondent kicked and stamped on Barrass at the later stage was evidence of his involvement earlier.
Sentence
The application
"which has come to be seen as a significant aggravating feature...is the public impact of violence on the streets, whether in city centres or residential areas…Each of these cases involves such public violence. Specific attention should be paid to the problem of gratuitous violence in city centres and the streets…..the manslaughter cases with which we are concerned involved gratuitous, unprovoked violence in the streets of the kind which seriously discourages law-abiding citizens from walking their streets, particularly at night, and gives the city and town centres over to the kind of drunken yobbery with which we have become familiar, and a worried perception among decent citizens that it is not safe to walk the streets at night".
"In considering the seriousness of any offence, the court must consider the offender's culpability in committing the offence and any harm which the offence caused, was intended to cause or might foreseeably have caused."
a) the sentences imposed by courts in England and Wales for offences; and
b) the need to promote consistency in sentencing.
"... the court may only increase sentences which it concludes were unduly lenient. It cannot, we are confident, have been the intention of Parliament to subject defendants to the risk of having their sentences increased -- with all the anxiety that that naturally gives rise to -- merely because in the opinion of this court the sentence was less than this Court would have imposed."