England and Wales Court of Appeal (Criminal Division) Decisions

IN THE COURT OF APPEAL
CRIMINAL DIVISION

		Royal Courts of Justice Strand London, WC2A 2LL
		10th March 2016

1. MR JUSTICE OPENSHAW: On 19th October last in the Crown Court at Reading, following his plea of guilty entered only on the day of the trial, the appellant was sentenced by Mr Recorder Rhodes QC for an offence of stalking involving serious alarm and distress contrary to section 4A(1)(a)(b)(ii) of the Protection from Harassment Act 1997 to two years' imprisonment, a sentence on which he has incidentally just been released. He now appeals against sentence with the leave of the single judge.
2. The facts are as follows. The appellant and the complainant, SH, were in a lengthy relationship. It ended in November 2013. The appellant reacted badly. He sent her numerous text messages. In February 2014 alone he sent her almost 600 text messages. In March and April the tyres on the complainant's car were deflated and her car damaged. On 7th May she reported that she was being followed by the appellant. On 8th May the appellant turned up at her place of work and her car was scratched. On 24th May her car was damaged again. On 12th June the appellant accepted a caution for two offences of criminal damage to her car. In July the appellant continued to send letters and texts. On 15th August the complainant reported to the police that the appellant had used her photograph on his Facebook profile. On 23rd August the appellant was issued with a formal written harassment warning. On 30th August the appellant confronted the complainant's sister and also sent a message saying that he knew that he was not meant to contact her.
3. As a result of this the complainant sensibly installed closed circuit television at her home. On 14th September footage showed him lurking at the back of her house. On 29th September further footage showed him looking over the back of her garden fence in the early hours of the morning. He was seen again doing exactly the same on the 4th, and indeed on the 5th, October.
4. The appellant was arrested on 6th October, but he answered no questions and made no admissions in interview. He was released on bail with conditions that he did not enter the road where the complainant lived and a further condition that he should not contact her.
5. On 7th January, now 2015, the complainant reported that she was being followed by him whilst she was in her car. On 11th January he followed her in a hire car. On 12th January the appellant was arrested again and yet again denied following the complainant. He was released on bail subject to the same conditions. On 30th January the appellant drove past the complainant twice as she drove to her new partner's address. On 1st February the appellant walked past her as she reversed her car into the driveway, and that was at a quarter past four in the morning, in the dead of night. Later that day a neighbour told the complainant that she had seen a man lying on the ground behind her car as she came out of her house, as a result of which the appellant was arrested again, and released this time subject to an electronic tag, after which he did not re-offend.
6. All this has had a devastating effect upon the complainant. She feels unsafe even in her own house and was, quite understandably, fearful of going out alone.
7. The appellant is aged 56. He has no previous convictions. He told the writer of the pre-sentence report that he could not even recall the relationship that he had had with the complainant, which he, entirely unconvincingly, attributed to amnesia following the separation. He suggested it was part of his psychological coping mechanism. So to her he was quite unable to explain his obsessive behaviour. The writer of the pre-sentence report formed the view that the appellant simply did not engage meaningfully in the interviews. He was accordingly assessed as posing a high risk of serious harm to the victim.
8. There were two psychiatric reports: from Dr Isik-Canpolat, one dated 16th September last year, another which is undated. The defendant had sought treatment for depression following a serious suicide attempt. The diagnosis was of a mixed personality trait, including emotional instability. The reports make very disturbing reading:

i. "Since the break up Mr Redman has been unable to stop thinking about his ex-partner and the circumstances of their separation. These thoughts and feelings have become so intense that he had only found resolution from them by seeking out his ex-partner ...

ii. Mr Redman is now very angry with his ex-partner and cannot understand how or why she has felt intimidated by him or why she has called the police so readily."

9. In his sentencing remarks the judge rehearsed this long history of persistent disobedience of conditions of bail. He thought that, in view of his attitude, any community order would be breached and, allowing discount for the late guilty plea, the sentence he passed was one of two years' imprisonment.
10. It is now said on the appellant's behalf that the sentence was manifestly excessive having regard to the plea of guilty, to the appellant's previous good character and to his mental health difficulties. It is also said that following this catalogue of concentrated offending following his latest arrest, there has been no recurrence of his obsessive stalking.
11. In her helpful skeleton argument, counsel, whilst recognising that there are no sentencing guidelines for cases of stalking, suggests that the case of Liddle and Hayes [2000] 1 Cr App R (S) 131 might provide some guidance to the principles which we should apply. That case does indeed make clear that the offender's mental health can be a relevant consideration, and even a mitigating factor, if the offender was willing to undergo treatment or have necessary help from the Probation Service. As we have observed, that hardly applies here. Furthermore, we cannot ignore that if his mental condition did reduce his culpability, it also certainly increased the risk to which the complainant is exposed, and indeed also reflects on the increased harm which she has suffered. The upshot is that for this series of acts of harassment, many in breach of his conditions of bail, we are quite unable to say that the sentence as passed was in any way excessive, and accordingly the appeal is dismissed.