England and Wales Court of Appeal (Criminal Division) Decisions

IN THE COURT OF APPEAL
CRIMINAL DIVISION

		Royal Courts of Justice Strand London, WC2A 2LL
		3 June 2015

1. MR JUSTICE WILLIAM DAVIS: Mark Laverick is now aged 41 and prior to this case was a man of good character. On 12th November 2014 in the Crown Court at Newcastle he pleaded guilty to a single offence of attempting to cause grievous bodily harm with intent. He was sentenced on 19th December to an extended sentence: the custodial term was 10 years, the extended licence five years. He was also made subject to an indefinite restraining order in relation to his victim and his victim's children. He appeals against that sentence by leave of the single judge.
2. His victim was his wife, Beverley Laverick. They had been married for 22 years. They had three children. It was apparently a volatile marriage. In due course the marriage broke down, as a result of which Mrs Laverick left the appellant and moved in with her mother. The appellant had, prior to the events which brought him before the Crown Court, in the past threatened to set fire to the home of his wife's mother with his wife inside. These threats had some weight to them. One of his older sons had seen the appellant with a petrol canister in his house a couple of months before the offence and again a month after that. The son very sensibly had taken steps to try and hide the petrol.
3. Two days before the offence, the appellant had sent a message on Facebook to a relative of his wife saying, among other things, this:

"I'm just waiting for the right time, don't give a fuck anymore ... I've got a can of petrol and a two foot long machete ... it's going to be hell or a cell for me and mate I really don't care anymore."

4. It was on 30th June that the offence occurred. Mrs Laverick had taken her child to school and was walking home. The appellant ran up behind her. He accused her of being with someone else, which she denied. He carried on with the accusation and then said: "It ends today." He produced a bottle, unscrewed the cap and threw the contents over Mrs Laverick. It went into her face and burned her eyes. She tried to run away but had difficulty because she could not see where she was going. The appellant chased her, continuing to throw liquid over her. What he was throwing over her in fact was petrol. He said nothing as he did this.
5. Mrs Laverick ran towards a nearby house, screaming for help. As she did so, the appellant struck matches and threw them in her direction. After the event eight spent matches were found at the scene. Fortunately for Mrs Laverick it was a windy day so the matches did not ignite. She throughout was begging the appellant to stop. She ran into a nearby garden and tried to get into the house, but no one was in and the door was locked. The appellant pushed her against a fence. He took out a cigarette lighter and flicked the lighter a number of times close to her clothing, by now doused with petrol. Mrs Laverick was absolutely terrified and thought she was going to die.
6. Fortunately she was able to push the appellant away. She ran to another property where the occupant was able to allow her into the home and the appellant ran off. The police were called. The appellant was arrested outside his home. He had a lighter in his possession and the petrol canister of which his son had spoken was found at his home.
7. In interview he basically told lies. He said he had simply gone to speak to Mrs Laverick about non-payment of bills. He said he was intending to pour petrol over her to scare her with no intention of harming her. His lighting of matches and his sparking of the lighter had been purely to scare her. By his plea that account plainly was something from which he resiled.
8. In his sentencing remarks, Judge Milford QC rehearsed what it was that the appellant had done and concluded by saying this:

"Had the petrol ignited, she would have become a human torch, she would have suffered injuries which would have been painful in the extreme and disfiguring, almost certainly for the rest of her life. One can think of few crueller crimes short of murder than setting someone alight."

9. The judge went on to consider the Sentencing Council Definitive Guideline in relation to offences of causing really serious harm with intent. He concluded that had the attempt in this case succeeded, there would undoubtedly have been greater harm (by virtue of the very serious injury that would have been caused) and there was higher culpability. This offence was accompanied by significant premeditation, it was carried out with the use of a weapon or its equivalent and it involved the targeting of a vulnerable victim. By that route the judge concluded that this was prime facie a category 1 offence with a sentencing range of nine to 16 years. But he then went on to express the view that had the full offence been committed the seriousness of it would have taken it outside and above the normal category range. He went on to consider whether there was evidence of dangerousness, applying the statutory test. Was there a significant risk of serious harm to members of the public from further specified offences by the appellant? He found that there was such a risk. He relied in part on the nature of the offence itself and also on assessments reached by both a probation officer and a consultant psychiatrist. The probation officer's assessment was that Mr Laverick (the appellant) presented a high risk of serious harm to his wife and also to any future partner. The psychiatrist, a doctor Tacchi concluded his report with these words:

"Mr Laverick ... as a result of his personality disorder and inability to cope without another person in his life, given similar circumstances, that is the break-up of a relationship with someone on whom he was dependent, he could react in a similar way."

10. The judge's conclusion was, taking into account the seriousness of the offence, that the appropriate starting point for a determinate sentence after trial would have been 15 years. There was full credit to be given for the plea and therefore the custodial term was 10 years. Having determined that Mr Laverick was dangerous, he concluded that a life sentence was not necessary; rather an extended licence period would be sufficient to protect the public. He set that licence period at five years.
11. The appeal is put on two bases. First, it is argued that the judge's starting point for the determinate term was too high. The judge was wrong, it is said, to identify this case as within category 1, still less above that category. It was not a case, so it is said, involving greater harm. Second, it is argued that there was an insufficient basis for a finding of dangerousness. In any event, even if there was a basis for finding that this appellant was dangerous in relation to his estranged wife and other future potential partners, that was an insufficient group to represent members of the public. In the grounds of appeal which are expressed in trenchant terms, it is said that this experienced judge "got it hopelessly wrong". We wholly disagree.
12. In relation to the first issue, as to the appropriate starting point, the criticism of the judge in identifying that this was a notional category 1 case is wholly misconceived. Of course there was no serious harm. This was an attempt to cause really serious harm, an attempt which by pure chance, and to use the judge's word, "miraculously" failed. The judge's conclusion assumed the completed offence, which was an entirely reasonable approach given the circumstances. His approach was to identify what sentence he would have imposed had the offence been completed and then discount that sentence level because the attempt had not succeeded. That was an entirely rational and sensible approach to take. The only issue is whether the judge's view that this was a case so serious that on a completed offence it would have gone beyond the appropriate category range was justified. We are satisfied that it was and that even after discounting for the fact that this appellant failed in his aims the starting point of 15 years was entirely justified. Insofar as any statutory support for this approach is needed, it is to be found in Section 143(1) of the Criminal Justice Act 2003 whereby the count, in considering the seriousness of any offence, must consider "any harm which the offence… was intended to cause"
13. As to dangerousness, there was in our judgment ample material on which the judge could conclude that the appellant presented a risk both to Mrs Laverick and perhaps to Mrs Laverick or perhaps, more pertinently, to potential future partners. It is with respect misconceived to argue that that group of people is insufficient to constitute members of the public. We are satisfied that the views expressed by Judge J (as he then was) in Hashi (1995) 16 Cr.App.R (S) 121 remain valid and are applicable to the dangerousness provisions. Hashi was a case in which the learned judge identified that even a single person could for the purposes of the Mental Health Act 1983 constitute a relevant group requiring protection. In this case there was a larger group. There is no ground for limiting the protection of sentences under the dangerousness provisions to cases where the public in general are at risk. There were here members of the public at serious risk from the appellant and they will continue to be so. We are further satisfied that the criticism made of the material relied on by the judge in reaching his finding is similarly misconceived.
14. In all those circumstances, we are wholly satisfied that the sentence imposed by this experienced judge was justified, both in terms of the length of the custodial term and the finding of dangerousness leading to an extended licence. Consequently this appeal is dismissed.
15. LORD JUSTICE McCOMBE: Thank you Mr Knox. As we indicated at the start of the hearing, we do consider it is appropriate in view of the failure of the technology this morning that you should take the earliest opportunity to see Mr Laverick in prison at Frankland.